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1 
Introduction 
The topic of the dissertation is the evaluation of public programs. I am submitting 
three papers on related topics concerning methodologies and practices.  The “what 
if” phrase refers to the state of affairs provided that the program under evaluation 
was not carried out. Thus, the “what if” signals a belief that the counterfactual, that 
is, the most likely situation to prevail without the program, should be the benchmark 
against which achievements are measured.  This is the perspective employed in the 
first and second paper presented.  Both papers present analyses of programs carried 
out by Innovation Norway for the Norwegian Government.  
 
The first paper demonstrates the applicability of observational methods for the 
assessment of the program level contributions of two Financial Schemes and two 
Governmental intervention programs from the predecessors of Innovation Norway in 
the early nineties. The four initiatives under scrutiny are different in terms of inten-
tions and organization.  The Regional Venture Capital Loans program aims at com-
pensating presumed regional funding disadvantages. The Investment Grant program 
is, as implied by the name, aimed at stimulating physical investments in buildings, 
machinery and equipment. The FRAM program aims at enhancing leadership skills 
while the Network program tries to encourage cooperation between companies. The 
raison d’être for all four initiatives is a presumed market failure and the public bene-
fits from compensating an assumed funding gap when positive externalities are ex-
pected.  Impact is assessed by means of counterfactual analyses that establish the 
differences between the factual situation and the counterfactual situation; the situa-
tion most likely to prevail provided that the business programs were not imple-
mented. A covariate matching procedure is applied for the construction of the coun-
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terfactual. A combination of covariate matching and difference-in-differences analy-
sis is employed for the purpose of finding the best possible estimates for the effects 
of the programs under scrutiny.  The basis for the estimates is two different but re-
lated analyses. The first are two-period difference-in-differences and the second is a 
panel data analysis, both based on matched data.  
 
The second paper concerns the survival value of a leadership-training program, the 
FRAM program which also is analyzed in the first paper.  The perspective, however, 
is different.   Whereas the important issue in the first paper is the effects of the 
programs in money terms, the focus in the second paper is to what extent the training 
program has contributed to the companies’ abilities to survive in competitive envi-
ronments, i.e., whether it can be substantiated that the program has helped to keep 
the firms in business and avoid going bust.   
 
The third paper concerns contemporary trends within the evaluation community and 
revisits the debate concerning qualitative or quantitative methods.  Current develop-
ments signal a considerable split between the two camps which in many ways re-
flects the history of evaluations as a field of research.  The remainder of this intro-
duction gives a brief introduction to the development of evaluation as a field of re-
search. 
 
II. The origins and many meanings of evaluations 
The three papers all concern evaluations, a highly varied field of activities usually 
viewed as interdisciplinary research.  In the 1950s and 1960s evaluation was mainly 
something that concerned primary schools.  The few people engaged in evaluation 
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research were schoolteachers.  With increased attention to the problems of evalu-
ating the effects of new reform programs for schools and new pedagogical tech-
niques for making education more effective, the psychologist, trained in the experi-
mental tradition entered the scene and introduced more scientific methods, and thus 
the seeds for a new academic field.  Clearly, the concept of policy-research 
(Coleman, 1972) is closely related to the evaluation of public programs, but the 
ambitions throughout the 1980s that evaluations should be a more generic field and 
not limited to public policy problems left this relation more vague. In the U.S., the 
Government and Performance Act (GPRA) of 19931 provided legal obligation for 
evaluation of public projects above a specified cost.  To my knowledge there are no 
equivalent legal devices in European countries although the U.S. initiative undoubt-
edly inspired evaluation activities and boosted what today has become big business, 
in particular within the European Union.   Professional organizations, noteworthy the 
American Evaluation Association (AEA) and the European Evaluation Society 
(EES) are well established with refereed journals and yearly conferences.  Public 
agencies like the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in the U.S. and the Euro-
pean Commission’s various auditing offices and the professional organizations issue 
a substantial number of reports with guidelines and procedures for carrying out 
evaluation, although it is not obvious what coherent knowledge can be extracted 
from these numerous publications.  The academic sphere of evaluation, assembled in 
various camps conditional on educational training and paradigmatic devotion, are 
more coherent but less in agreement with each other even on basic issues like what 
evaluations are supposed to be.   Michael Scriven, philosopher of science and former 
president of the American Evaluation Association, tell us that “Evaluation is the 
process of determining the merit, worth, and value of things” (Scriven, 1991:1).  
                                                        
1 Also known as the Roth bill after Senator William Roth 
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From a political science point of view the Swedish scholar Evert Vedung claims that 
evaluation is “the careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth, and value of 
administration, output, and outcome of government interventions, which is intended 
to play a role in the future, practical action situations” (Vedung, 2000:3), thus 
restricting the reach of the concept to the consequences of government interventions.  
The Northwestern University econometrician Charles F. Manski (1996) maintains 
that: “program evaluations are efforts to learn from experience in order to improve 
social decisions” and the economist Robert L. Darcy (1981) declares that evaluation 
is “the systematic collection and analysis of information to determine the worth of 
purposive organized activity”.  Darcy also includes a footnote, which explains that: 
“there are different views concerning the nature and purpose of evaluations”.    
 
The tendency to desist from authoritative definition of the term evaluation has most 
likely been to the advantage for the field. An unambiguous, delimiting definition that 
marked what evaluation should be and what it should not be, would presuppose an 
authority that could warrant such a declaration. Fortunately, despite considerable 
disagreements over many issues, dogmatism of this kind is alien to the mainstream 
evaluation literature.  The ambiguity of the term evaluation serves to lubricate the 
market for evaluations.  The term evaluation has attracted so many meanings that it 
is appropriate to call it a “semantic magnet” (Lundquist, 1976) “that has come to sig-
nify almost any effort at systematic thinking in the public sector” (Vedung, 2000). 
Or, as stated by Carol Weiss, (1972) “evaluation is an elastic word that stretches to 
cover judgments of many kinds”. Moreover, evaluations come in many forms. We 
have formative evaluations, typically conducted during the development or improve-
ment of a program, summative evaluations, usually conducted after the completion 
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of a program, and process evaluation that focuses on the variables between input and 
output or upon the process components of a full evaluation, just to mention a few.  
The ambiguity of the term evaluation and its many subcategories contributes to the 
dictum that “anything goes” is the hallmark of evaluation practices.    
 
It is the hope that the three papers on evaluations submitted here can contribute to 
bring down the “anything goes” impression which many think of as proper charac-
terization of the field.  
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Measuring the Long-Term Effects of Active Industrial Policies  
Counterfactual Accounts of the Causal Effects of Governmental Actions 
 
 
Olav A. Kvitastein1 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
December 2009 
 
ABSTRACT 
The essence of evaluations of governmental interventions is the appraisal of what is 
achieved by the actions, compared to the situation most likely to prevail in the ab-
sence of these initiatives.  The purpose of this study is to suggest methods that make 
such comparison of the factual and counterfactual situations possible and to demon-
strate that such analyses can be carried out at low cost by making use of information 
from available administrative records.  
 
The paper demonstrates the applicability of observational methods for the assess-
ment of the program level contributions of two Financial Schemes and two Govern-
mental intervention programs from the predecessors of Innovation Norway2  in the 
early nineties, The Regional Development Fund, and from 1993, The Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund.  
The four initiatives under scrutiny are different in terms of intentions and organiza-
tion.  The Regional Venture Capital Loans program aims at compensating presumed 
regional funding disadvantages. The Investment Grant program is, as implied by the 
name, aimed at stimulating physical investments in buildings, machinery and 
equipment. The FRAM program aims at enhancing leadership skills while the Net-
work program tries to encourage cooperation between companies. The raison d’être 
                                                        
1 Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Strategy and Management, 
Breiviksveien 40, NO-5045 Bergen, Norway, olav.kvitastein@nhh.no 
2 As of January 1st 2004 Innovation Norway took over the tasks of the Norwegian Tourist Board, The Norwegian 
Trade Council (NTC), The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) and The Government 
Consultative Office for Inventors (SVO). Innovation Norway is state owned and the objective is to promote 
private and- socio-economic profitable business development throughout the country, and to release the 
commercial opportunities of the districts and regions by encouraging innovation, internationalization and image-
building.  Innovation Norway has offices in all the Norwegian counties and in more than 30 countries world 
wide. The head office is located in Oslo. 
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for all four initiatives is a presumed market failure and the public benefits from 
compensating an assumed funding gap when positive externalities are expected.  
 
Impact is assessed by means of counterfactual analyses that establish the differences 
between the factual situation and the counterfactual situation, the situation most 
likely to prevail provided that the business programs were not implemented. A co-
variate matching procedure is applied for the construction of the counterfactual. The 
contemporary matching literature is a cacophony of conflicting decisions concerning 
algorithms to use and procedures to employ.  Recent research has revealed a need for 
modifications of established routines. The paper is based upon the view that match-
ing routines are nonparametric pre-processing methods that facilitate further analy-
sis. A combination of covariate matching and difference-in-differences analysis is 
employed for the purpose of finding the best possible estimates for the effects of the 
programs under scrutiny.  The basis for the estimates is two different but related 
analyses. The first ones are two-period difference-in-differences and the second is a 
panel data analysis, both based on matched data.  
 
The analyses suggest that all four initiatives produce positive contributions and pro-
duce lasting impacts that are observable for a considerable period following partici-
pation.  
 
 
Keywords 
Program evaluation, difference-in-differences, observational studies, matching 
models, panel data analyses 
 
JEL Classification Codes 
H43, C31, C33  
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1. Introduction 
Causal inference in empirical science is based on counterfactuals.  The “what if” 
statement about counterfactual outcomes is at the heart of evaluations which in turn  
examine what is potentially achieved by a given project or program.  The obvious 
yardstick for comparisons is the situation most likely to prevail in the absence of the 
initiative.  The central statistical model for the analyses of counterfactuals is the 
“Potential Outcome Model” (POM) which describes a setting in which one or more 
units, e.g. human beings, are potentially exposed to a particular treatment, e.g. taking 
an aspirin, and some response corresponding to this treatment e.g. getting rid of 
headache or not.  The causal effect of interest is the outcome of this treatment rela-
tive to some other treatment, usually not taking an aspirin.  Thus the source of the 
medical sounding jargon treatment, control, outcome jargon of the POM model is 
apparent.   
 
The units under scrutiny in this study are private limited firms and the treatments are 
a number of financial schemes and programs executed by Innovation Norway.  The 
outcome of interest is added value, defined as the sum of labor costs and net operat-
ing profit, in the companies that received the treatment.   For the single unit, the in-
dividual firm, only one realization of the treatment can be observed e.g. receiving a 
treatment and observing an outcome in terms of added value.  Clearly, this factual 
information is not enough to establish causation.  To learn about the effect of the 
treatment it is necessary to answer the counterfactual: “What would have been the 
outcome for the firm provided it had not received the treatment?”  The difference 
between the factual and the counterfactual then measures the causal effect of 
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treatment. The obvious problem is that in reality each unit can only be observed in 
one of the two states, as receiving treatment and as not receiving treatment.  The 
conceptual point is that each unit has two potential outcomes associated with itself 
where one can actually be observed and the other is the counterfactual outcome.  
This state of affairs reveals a clear distinction between singular and general causal 
claims: If the CEO or other prominent representatives of a recipient company are 
asked about the effects of treatments the answer could be yes, or no, for a number of 
reasons.  Since there would be no reliable counterfactual at the single unit level, 
judgments are unsubstantiated and possibly speculative.  Adding the answers would 
most likely be meaningless.  Thus, general causal claims have to be based upon the 
subclass of causal theories usually called probabilistic causation.  The Potential Out-
come Model (Neyman, 1923 [1990]) facilitates the statistical analysis of the case 
where two potential outcomes are associated with a single unit.  Hence, general 
causal claims based on probabilistic causation is possible, the problem is that no 
single unit can be observed in two states, as both recipient and non-recipient of 
treatment. The firm that receives treatment has to be compared to another firm that 
does not receive treatment.   This problem is a central theme of this study. 
 
The main source of information for the study is publicly available administrative 
records.  Recent developments in analyses based on such openly available data, col-
lected for a variety of purposes, labels this observational studies (Rosenbaum, 1995).  
Observational methods are primarily developed within labor economics and medical 
testing. The success of observational studies in these settings and the availability of 
administrative records that constitute inexpensive information about the outcomes of 
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policies inspired this attempt to investigate the method’s potential for policy evalua-
tion applications.   
 
Evaluation of public policies has long traditions within economics and political sci-
ence.  The dominant perspective on public policies is undoubtedly welfare econom-
ics, a diverse body of theoretical perspectives that dates back to the 19th century. Its 
contemporary version constitutes insight that is mandatory to take into account.   
Thus, reflections over the outcomes of this particular study of the causal impacts of 
two financial schemes and two intervention programs have welfare economics as a 
central frame of reference. 
 
The purpose of the study is experimental in the sense that we want to test out the 
applicability of observational methods and to reflect over the potential pitfalls and 
fruitfulness of this approach.  The available data has shortcomings and represents 
challenges that call for compromises between the ideal and the possible.   If, how-
ever, we cannot ascertain the proximate impact of governmental actions, theoretical 
reflection may prove futile.  Thus, the ambition of this study is to contribute by add-
ing a piece of evidence concerning the impact of governmental actions. 
 
Despite some departures from the conventional practices, this study is well within 
what we can call the econometric evaluation tradition (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 
1997; LaLonde, 1986).  Thus, the ambition is to establish the causal effects of spe-
cific actions.  
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The phrase industrial policy does not indicate that we are solely concerned with ac-
tions directed at manufacturing industries.  The term is employed due to traditions 
and pertains to all value generating business activities.  Few phrases elicit such 
strong reactions from economists as industrial policy (Pack & Saggi, 2006). We de-
fine industrial policy as any kind of selective government intervention aimed at al-
tering or encouraging business activities in a direction beneficial to society. Con-
ventional wisdom from mainstream economics predicts that the initiatives most 
likely would make little difference; equilibrium effects would prevail, interventions 
may have unwarranted or even adverse effects (Pack, 2000) and neutral, not selec-
tive policies should be preferable (Orvedal, 2005).  The discussions in this paper 
acknowledge both that the lessons learned from economics applies and that indus-
trial policy in this broader sense can make a difference with respect to support and 
encourage economic activities.  The central question of this paper is whether the 
industrial policies work according to intentions.  This should predominantly be an 
empirical question.  In the spirit of Tinbergen (1975) we can distinguish between 
“aprioristic policies ” based on theories rather than empirical research and “empiri-
cal policies” based on experience with alternatives. We hope that this report can be a 
small increment to the latter category.    
1.1 The Purpose and Structure of the Report 
The evaluation methods employed are conventional in the sense that they are thor-
oughly discussed by influential econometricians.   Econometricians are not always 
fond of real data because it tends to invite compromises that make models and 
solutions less elegant.  In this report we have to accept that we are dealing with data 
that does not conform to what econometric models would ideally require.  In 
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particular, program impact is easier to handle when intervention takes place at one 
point in time and the subpopulation of concern for the program is straightforwardly 
identified.  If in addition, assignment to program participation was random, 
estimates of impact could be obtained by trustworthy procedures.  In our case, none 
of these prerequisites are present.   Program participation takes place over several 
years and both self-selection, i.e. you may participate if you qualify, and selection by 
authorities, i.e. you cannot participate since you do not qualify, are present.   
Moreover, participants may leave and re-enter programs several times.   
 
At the sacrifice of elegance we have to respect the peculiarities of the data and ac-
cept that estimates are less than perfect.  The estimates we present are mainly simple 
arithmetic means and differences between means.  A number of compromises have 
to be made in order to provide the best guesses when accurate estimates are infeasi-
ble.  The spirit of the analyses is to explain how compromises are made and how 
solutions are constructed.  
 
The report is divided into fifteen sections. The first is the introduction.  Sections 2 to 
5 discuss the problem under examination, the data at our disposal for the purpose 
and the measurements used.  Section 6 discusses methods and describes the 
matching strategies and the outcomes of the matching procedures.  Sections 7 and 8 
and 9 present the preprocessing that is carried out and the quality of the matched pair 
datasets that is the results of the preprocessing.  Sections 9 to 11 describe the analy-
ses of the matched pairs and section 12 provides scenarios for possible interpreta-
tions of the findings.  Section 13 gives a statistical assessment of the findings and 
evaluates their worth as evidence.  Section 14 includes the replies to invited com-
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mentators and a general discussion of central choices and decisions. Section 15 con-
cludes the report.   
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2. The Cases under Scrutiny  
The two financial schemes Investment Grants and Regional Venture Capital Loans 
are directed towards the stimulation of various business activities and are governed 
by Innovation Norway. Investment Grants can be applied for by all firms located in 
designated regional development areas. Predominantly, grants are provided for in-
vestments in machinery and plant equipment, and in some cases buildings.  Besides 
eligibility based on location, innovative projects that are believed to succeed and 
ventures that stimulate entrepreneurship are prioritized.  Regional Venture Capital 
Loans constitute a kind of top-up finance primarily intended for SMEs and may 
cover up to 50% of investment costs. Interests are usually somewhat above standard 
credit market interest but risk is reduced by means of a contracted right to a 50% 
discount on reimbursement in the case of failure. Normally, Regional Venture 
Capital Loans are disbursed after investment.  Regional Venture Capital Loans are 
directed towards both new and established firms and are not dependent on the 
location of applicants.  Since a considerable percent of the recipients is involved in 
both programs, the two instruments are treated both as jointly coexistent and as 
separate instruments. Thus, the analyses of these programs are split into three sub-
categories:  (1) Regional Venture Capital Loans only; (2) Investment Grant only; 
and (3) the union of the set of members in the Regional Venture Capital Loans group 
and the Investment Grant group combined. 
 
 
The first program under scrutiny, The FRAM program, was developed in 1992-1993 
by The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) as a follow-up 
program of a technology transfer program (BUNT). The FRAM program is now 
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administered by Innovation Norway. The FRAM programs are tailored towards 
various activities such as culture (FRAM-Culture), the establishment of new busi-
nesses (FRAM-entrepreneur) and the development of leadership skills in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (FRAM-Strategy and Innovation). The last one, the 
FRAM aimed at developing leadership skills and strategic competence for SMEs is 
the one under scrutiny here.  The program’s ambition is to contribute to lasting 
transfer of competence, improved competitive power and profitability.  Thus, 
evaluations require a longitudinal design that facilitates analysis of to what extent 
any lasting effect can be traced.   
 
The program was offered to the SMEs as an individually tailored development pro-
gram, and companies are invited to participate, provided that they are not be engaged 
in competition with other participants. Found eligible for participation, companies 
are “screened” by criteria concerning the company’s ability to benefit from the pro-
gram. The program is organized as separate projects for groups of similar firms, usu-
ally groups of 8 to 12 persons, who are leaders of their respective companies.  The 
program is run by experienced process consultants, and concentrates on strategic 
development processes, much in line with the standard textbook theory of normative 
strategic management.   
 
The second program we study, The Network Program, was established in 1991 by 
the Norwegian Foundation for Industry (Industrifondet) and continued by the 
Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) and Innovation 
Norway.  The basic idea behind the program is that cooperation between firms in the 
long run has beneficial effects in terms of profitability.  This idea is anchored in 
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theories collected from economic geography, e.g. theories of agglomeration 
(Krugman, 1991) transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) and theories about 
innovation and economic development.  The networks are organized in smaller 
groups of five to ten firms that focus on themes and activities of mutual interest.  All 
group members (firms) get together a least 3 to 5 times a year and all firms carry out 
a least one project during the network period to ensure that the intentions behind the 
program are attended to.  Otherwise however, it is left to the individual firm to get 
the most out of the program. The expected effects of the program rely heavily on the 
belief that cooperation between firms tends to develop clustering effects (Reve, 
1994).  The Network program was phased out in 1998 pursuant to a negative 
evaluation by the consultancy company Econ.  Thus, the present study makes it 
possible to judge the correctness of that decision.  
2.1 Theoretical Justifications: Why should the initiatives work? 
Public venture capital initiatives i.e. programs that make equity-like investments in 
firms, in particular in young or technologically advanced firms, have been around 
for at least four decades and is prevalent worldwide in the more advanced capitalist 
nations.  Program designs may differ, but usually hinge upon two shared assump-
tion: 1) that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms, and 2) that 
the government either can identify investment which will ultimately yield high social 
and/or private returns or can encourage financial intermediaries to do so (Lerner, 
2002).  The Norwegian Regional Venture Capital Loans initiative clearly shares 
these assumptions but have the regional requirement as an additional dimension.  
The inclusion of the regional aspect reflects both politically decided priorities and 
the belief that the degree of market failure coincides with a regional dimension in the 
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sense that capital supply problems are more severe in the less populated rural areas 
in Norway.  None of these underlying assumptions are thoroughly investigated; it is 
simply assumed that such is the case.   
 
A considerable number of firms are eligible for application for Regional Venture 
Capital Loans; a fraction of the firms get their loan approval after a comprehensive 
screening procedure.   Each individual project receives careful evaluation according 
to criteria similar to those of the private venture capitalists whereas other decisive 
factors such as the likelihood of positive spillovers are unique for public funding.   
 
Investment Grants follow a similar screening procedure where the probability of 
allotment depends heavily upon the prospect of the projects in question and, as for 
Regional Venture Capital Loans, the possibilities of positive externalities.  Thus In-
vestments Grants are carefully evaluated as investments with an expectation of a 
positive payoff to society, which, by definition is also the investor of public funds.  
 
Both Investment Grants and Regional Venture Capital Loans are, as the market fail-
ure assumption implies, contingent upon the availability of private investments and 
loans.   So why can it be the case that public funding works where private venture 
capital organizations and investors do not find efforts worthwhile? Can it be because 
private venture capital funds are in short supply in Norway?  One suggested propo-
sition is the so-called Certification Hypothesis:  Public venture capital awards can 
certify that firms are of high quality and thus reduce the information problem for 
private venture capital organizations.  It can be argued against this hypothesis that 
asymmetric information should from the outset be a problem for the bureaucrats 
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responsible for selecting firms for grants and loans, and thus that moral hazard and 
opportunistic behavior would render the quality of the chosen firms less trustworthy.  
On the other hand, it can be argued that the comprehensive screening process carried 
out by Innovation Norway is considerably more thorough and costly than private 
venture capitalists and investors would ever care to undertake.  Thus, part of the job 
that the private financier otherwise would have to do is now carried out by the gov-
ernment for free.  Empirical research seems to support the certification hypothesis 
(Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Hubbard, 1998; Klette, Moen, & Griliches, 2000) 
but do not provide unambiguous answers to what extent governmental efforts can 
succeed in reducing market failures.  
 
The FRAM program is justified by the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between the quality of management and business performance.  If this link holds 
true, public money spent encouraging and educating leadership would increase eco-
nomic performance and thus provide a positive contribution to the society. Even 
though the FRAM program is aimed at SMEs where the distance between leadership 
and the value creating parts of the organizations may be assumed to be short, empiri-
cal studies point toward that the leadership – performance link is notoriously hard to 
establish (March & Sutton, 1997).  Moreover, the FRAM program can be accused of 
falling prey to myths about the significance of leadership (March, 2005) and thus has 
created a program that does little more than reinforce these myths.  
 
The Network program is based upon the idea that economic growth can be nourished 
by network creation is closely linked to the notion of industrial clusters (Britton, 
2003; Kacirkova, 2009; Kvitastein, 1995; Romanelli & Khessina, 2005; Takeda, 
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Kajlkawa, Sakata, & Matsushima, 2008) and endogenous growth theories (Romer, 
1986; 1991; 1994).  Although it is well established that industrial clusters under 
positive circumstances may induce growth, the underlying mechanisms at work are 
not easily revealed (Johansson, Stough, & Karlsson, 2005; Roterud, 2005). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses about the outcomes of schemes and programs 
Clearly, we have no hope of uncovering the underlying mechanisms that will ulti-
mately decide the success or failure of the financial schemes and intervention pro-
grams.  The designs of our analyses do no provide any evidence for the lower level 
mechanisms but invite speculations concerning the causes of outcomes.  We have to 
accept the effects at the molar level (Cook & Campbell, 1979) at which we operate 
as caused by the financial schemes of program we analyze i.e. as molar causation; 
an overall causal relationship between a treatment package and its effects, in which 
both may consist of several parts (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). That is, our 
sole ambition is to evaluate the surface outcomes in terms of added value i.e. the 
reward to labor and capital in the firms involved.   
 
Conventional wisdom from mainstream economics predicts that the initiatives would 
most likely make little difference while the official justifications assert that these 
actions should be beneficial to society.  Neither the conventional wisdom concerning 
governmental intervention nor the theory-based good reasons for why the actions 
should work, provide much guidance with respect to the formulation of hypotheses 
concerning outcomes.    We can, however, make some guesses based on the impli-
cations of the justifications for the different initiatives.   Loans imply a higher com-
mitment for the firms since they involve a contractual relationship regarding repay-
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ment.  Grants can be distinguished from loans by the higher degree of involvement 
by the bureaucrats of Innovation Norway. This higher concern is most likely due to 
an increased awareness towards the potential moral hazard involved and the embar-
rassment that follows from failure.  Thus, compared to the FRAM program and the 
Network program we can expect that the screening process is substantially more 
thorough for Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants.  Furthermore, 
we expect the selection process to be even more robust for grants than for loans.  
Lastly, we believe that the basis for the FRAM program is the weakest one of the 
four initiatives.   
 
Following these lines of reasoning we can establish a kind of ordering of our ex-
pectations.  Thus, assuming that the average effects at the program level are above 
zero for all four initiatives, and since it is a central goal to compare the four initia-
tives, we propose that we expect the following order to prevail: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The combined Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grant 
allotments will produce the highest yield in terms of added value. 
Hypothesis 2: Investment Grant will produce the second highest yield in terms of 
added value. 
Hypothesis 3: Regional Venture Capital Loans will produce the third highest yield in 
terms of added value. 
Hypothesis 4: The FRAM program will produce the lowest yield in terms of added 
value. 
Hypothesis 5: The Network program will produce the second lowest yield in terms of 
added value. 
 
This ranking implies that we have very low expectations with respect to the FRAM 
program and the Network program.  In fact, the convincing arguments about the 
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weak link between leadership and performance put forward by James G. March 
(2005) make us believe that we should expect very little or nothing from the FRAM 
program in terms of demonstrable effects on added value.  The low expectations 
regarding the Network program have a less elaborate explanation; we have consider-
able trust in the theories of agglomeration and the growth-inducing effects of indus-
trial cluster, but recent empirical analyses of the Network program (Econ, 1998) 
indicate that the program has no observable economic effects.  
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3. The problem addressed 
The primary objective of this paper is to put forward statistically defensible judg-
ments3 about the outcomes of two financial schemes and two motivational programs 
aimed at correcting market failure and encouraging industrial activity in Norway. 
Outcomes are defined in terms that closely resemble the concept of additionality. 
That is, we intend to make judgments that are instructive with respect to the most 
likely effects of these schemes and programs, i.e. the outcomes for the firms that 
participated in these programs compared to the most likely outcomes for the same 
firms provided they had not participated in the programs.   Strictly, the term 
additionality requires that the activities presumably set off by the programs would 
not have been undertaken without the existence of the programs.  We can, however, 
never know the exact answer to questions concerning what a given firm would have 
done in the absence of the actions in question.  Investigating the most likely 
outcomes means a reasonable relaxation of the strictest interpretation of additionality 
and confidence in observable indicators of likely effects.  Changes in value added, 
defined as the sum of operating result and labor costs is an indicator of yearly 
variations in economic outcomes that is observable provided we have access to 
accounting records.  Thus, the proportion value added, defined in this manner, that 
can be attributed to impacts caused by the programs is our central measure of 
outcome, and hence, of the additionality of programs.   Terms like cause and effect 
are challenging and usually linked with experimental thinking. Thus, terms like 
treatment (intervention) and control (non-intervention) will be used throughout the 
paper although no therapeutic or other health metaphor is implied.  
                                                        
3 The informational basis of a judgment identifies the information on which the judgment is directly dependent 
and-no less important asserts that the truth or falsehood of any other type of information cannot directly 
influence the correctness of the judgment Sen, A. 1990. Justice - Means versus Freedoms. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 19(2): 111-121. 
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3.1 The Use of Observational data vs. Experimentations 
The classical randomized experiment is the archetypical design for causal analysis.  
Valid causal inferences can be achieved via the classical experiment roughly due to 
three critical features: (1) Random selection of units to be observed from a given 
population, (2) random assignment of treatment to each observed unit, and (3) rela-
tively large sample size. These three features combined generally render causal con-
clusions feasible. While features (1) and (2) facilitate conclusions about statistical 
inference, (3) guaranties the absence of omitted variable bias.  The experimental 
design guides the data-generating process which decides the statistical properties of 
the data.  The classical randomized experiment is an ideal type and most social sci-
ence research usually fails to meet at least one of the three features.  Failure to con-
form to this ideal type may, however, produce substantially biased conclusions.  We 
define observational data as data based upon data-generating processes or collec-
tion mechanisms that does not meet all three features of a classical randomized ex-
periment  (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007). 
 
The consequences of this definition are far-reaching and some researchers may find 
it prohibitively strict. It is, however, important to realize the consequences of 
ignoring the rules of inference and the strenuous requirements for causal claims. In 
evaluation research causal claims may be imperative for summative evaluations. To 
refrain from causal claims may not be a good solution, particularly not when 
followed up by a rhetoric that points toward causality with some reservations  
(Scriven, 1993).  When it is obvious that causal claims are in demand, the 
justification for such claims should not be ignored.  
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The empirical basis for this paper is administrative records.  Thus, the data generat-
ing process deviates substantially from the classical experiment.  We are dealing 
with observational data that have been generated by processes that do not justify any 
parametrically based inference but represent reliable and comprehensive sampling 
frames for many purposes.  As such, administrative records represent an underuti-
lized source of information (Roed & Raaum, 2003) about social and economic 
consequences of governmental actions and outcomes. 
3.2 Research questions 
The obvious question of most summative evaluations is; does the program work?  
Here the question could be rephrased to ask if the companies which received benefits 
from the government, either in the form of Regional Venture Capital Loans, Invest-
ments Grants, and participation in the FRAM program or the Network program do 
better than those who did not.  And, provided that the companies that received bene-
fits from the government do better than those which didn’t; to what extent can it be 
substantiated that this improvement is caused by the program in question?  These are 
the obvious research questions.  The purpose of this paper is simply to investigate 
whether the average outcome in groups of companies that received governmental 
benefits in the form of participation in one of the above mentioned programs is 
significantly higher than in comparable companies that did not receive such bene-
fits. Although this may seem like an overtly simple task, in essence a simple com-
parison of two means, the procedures that justify emulations of the properties of the 
classical experiment are somewhat involved.  The procedures are, however a prereq-
uisite for a proper answer to the fundamental question of summative evaluations; did 
the program work according to intentions? 
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The dominant problem in this kind of studies is the so-called selection problem.  The 
firms that apply for support from Innovation Norway may be different from those 
that do not apply for support.  In addition, internal procedures, i.e. various rules and 
criteria for eligibility may produce other selection processes among those that have 
chosen to apply.  To be able to make comparisons between the firms that receive 
benefits and those that do not, the selection problem has to be dealt with.  Thus, a 
central goal of this report is to compare recipients and non-recipients in ways that 
make it possible to extract the most likely difference between these two groups in 
term of outcomes, i.e. differences in added value generated.    
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4. The Evaluation Problem 
 
The key to estimating the impact of a program is constructing the counterfactual 
outcomes, representing what would have happened in its absence (Heckman & 
Smith, 1999).   Thus, the logic of empirical analysis follows the potential outcome 
approach to causality introduced by Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974).  Although the 
notation and general framework are mainly the same, the present-day label for this 
approach is the counterfactual approach to causality (Heckman, 1999; Heckman & 
Smith, 1995, 1998b; Lewis, 1973, 1986; Pearl, 2000b; Pearl, 2000c; Winship & 
Morgan, 1999). In our context this means that on the basis of administrative records 
we measure outcomes of interventions as the difference between the actual out-
comes that we can observe and the counterfactual outcomes that most likely would 
have been the case provided that no intervention had been carried out.   The problem 
is that the counterfactual, by definition, is something that does not exist.  Thus, it has 
to be constructed in the most plausible manner.   A crucial feature necessary for 
feasible detection of the effects of an intervention is that we are able to distinguish 
between the group of people, companies or other distinct targets of the action that 
are exposed to treatment (the program) and those that are not exposed to treatment.  
No administrative record has information for more than one state so no unit can be 
observed in both states; as both receiving the treatment and not receiving it.  If this 
was possible, the effect could be calculated by comparing the two states for the same 
unit.  A major problem is that the effect of treatment has to be calculated by com-
paring a unit that received the treatment with another unit that did not receive the 
treatment.   
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The potential outcome framework and the counterfactual approach to causality 
shares the common denomination causal analysis.  This line of research is, however, 
distinct from path analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) (Bollen, 1989; 
Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989; Long & Bollen, 1993; Wold & Jöreskog, 1982) despite 
the fact that both areas are labeled causal analysis (Winship et al., 1999).  Moreover, 
the terminology is distinct between the two strands of research. While SEM-model-
ing has no explicit reference to the terminology of experiments, the counterfactual 
causality framework permanently follows these terms.  For the remainder of this 
paper we follow the conventional notation of the potential outcome framework 
(Rubin, 1974) that has its roots in the works of  Neyman, 1923 [English translation 
(1923 [1990])] Quandt (1972) and Roy (1951).  Thus, we use jargon like “treatment” 
for the groups of firms subject to intervention and “control” for firms that we use for 
constructing comparison groups.  This terminology is consistently used in the lit-
erature and also throughout this paper. 
 
Formally, say a unit can be in either a treated state, denoted state “1” or an untreated 
state, denoted state “0” and say outcomes Y1 and Y0 are associated with each state. 
The gain from treatment could then be calculated as the difference Y1 - Y0 .  Because 
we cannot determine impact of treatment for the individual unit, we have to rely on 
the distribution of impact across units, call it F(Δ) or on certain features of this 
distribution.  The expected gain to a randomly selected unit in the population, de-
noted E(Δ)=E(Y1 - Y0 ) refers to the expected value or population average. Given that 
the entire population was included, as could be the case for e.g. a tax reform, this pa-
rameter provides information necessary to carry out benefit-cost analysis when com-
bined with information about average cost (Heckman & Smith, 1998c).   For a pro-
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gram that targets certain groups, it is more informative to focus on what happens to 
those who actually participated in program. Denoting participation d=1 and non-
participation d=0 we can write the distribution of gains for participants as F(Δ|d=1) 
and the impact for participants as E(Δ|d=1)=E(Y1 - Y0|d=1 ).   The problem is that 
we do not know E(Y0|d=1),; it has to be estimated, and this is not straightforward.  
We cannot use the mean outcome among non-participants as a proxy for what would 
have happened to participants had they not participated.  This is seen by subtracting 
the mean outcome among non-participants from the mean outcome of participants, 
E(Y1|d=1) - E(Y0|d=0), yields  
)}0|()1|({)}1|()1|({ 0001 =−=+=−= dYEdYEdYEdYE  
The first term in the curly brackets gives the mean impact of participation, and the 
second term represents the selection bias caused by the fact that non-participants 
may differ from participants in the non-participating state. That selection bias may 
be different from zero is easily seen in, say, a program that involves a small business 
firm where economic difficulty is the criterion for being eligible for participation.  In 
such a case, non-participants could be expected to have outcomes higher than 
participants, and hence, a negative selection bias could produce incorrect estimates.   
 
Randomization solves this problem, provided that randomization does not alter the 
pool of participants or their behavior and that close substitutes for the treatment are 
not available.   Given that randomization is used both for the treatment (participant) 
group and the control group (non-participants) and that the control group is denied 
access to the treatment group upon completion of the selection procedure, the out-
comes of both groups in the zero state before treatment would be equal.  That is, 
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E(Y0|d=1) = E(Y0|d=0) and the right hand side term in the curly brackets in the 
equation above would cancel out, implying no selection bias. 
 
It is well known that randomization in general is hard to implement in practical set-
tings due to ethical reasons such as fairness or social justice.  In the case of financial 
schemes and programs for encouraging or inciting business activities, random as-
signment of benefits is probably politically unacceptable and likely to stir up reac-
tions. Moreover, as pointed out by Heckman (1992), randomization does not remove 
selection bias. It balances the bias between the treatment group and the control group 
(Heckman et al., 1995). Selection bias may arise from sources that are hard to level 
out by means of randomization.  It can be generated by missing data on the common 
factors affecting participation and outcome, or it may occur when random assign-
ment causes the kind of units participating in the program to differ from units par-
ticipating in the program as it normally operates (Heckman et al., 1995).  This phe-
nomenon is usually labeled randomization bias.  Another cause of randomization 
bias is changes in participant behavior that operate via reactions towards participa-
tion and is measurable prior to treatment.   Furthermore, substitution bias may occur 
when members of the control group gain access to close substitutes of the treatment 
under consideration.  In e.g. training programs for small business firms, this phe-
nomenon is likely to happen when someone in the control group recognizes that they 
are denied a service and react by seeking similar services offered elsewhere. 
 
Even though it is nearly impossible to rule out all sources of bias, randomized ex-
periment is traditionally regarded as the queen of quantitative evaluations.  It is said 
that the late Donald T. Campbell expressed some regret over his celebrated book on 
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quasi- experimentation (Cook et al., 1979) because it may have mislead some 
researchers carry out a quasi-experiment when randomized experiment was a 
feasible and better solution.  Experiments are, however, no universal remedy. 
Longitudinal studies cannot be based upon experiments (Weiss, 1982) and bias may 
be present even in an experimental setting (Heckman et al., 1995).   
 
The selection problem has for a long time (Heckman, 1977; Heckman, 1979) been 
known as one of the major obstacles for evaluation studies.  The hopes for unbiased 
estimates of impacts necessitate that this problem is attended to.   
4.1 The Counterfactual account of causality 
Recent work within so-called “observational studies” (Rosenbaum, 1995) that ex-
plores the “potential outcome” or “counterfactual” model of causality has produced 
valuable insights to the understanding to the understanding of  governmental inter-
ventions.  The philosophical underpinnings of these lines of reasoning is the ground-
breaking work of David Lewis (1973) which provides the logic of counterfactual 
reasoning.  Counterfactual thinking is common and probably unavoidable in ordi-
nary languages.  The “what if” question is prevalent in reflections over what could 
have been the case.  “If I were you” opens empathetic reflections based upon a 
counterfactual in the same manner as the question “what would have happened if the 
government had not bailed out those banks”?   The alternatives that trigger thinking 
are the non-existing counterfactuals.  Noteworthy, statistical thinking does not offer 
an easy access to the empirical world in a way that effortlessly reveals the counter-
factual in question.  Statistical modeling does, however, offer a variety of approxi-
mations and compromises that facilitate a calculus of interventions (Pearl, 2000a) 
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that makes it possible to make judgments concerning the most likely counterfactual.  
Thus, differences between the observed factual and the most likely counterfactual 
may provide an estimate of the most likely effects of the intervention under scrutiny.  
Noteworthy, this way of thinking does in fact reverse conventional thinking about 
the relationship between cause and effect; instead of looking for the causes of ob-
served effects we search for the effects of known or assumed causes (Holland, 1986).   
Noteworthy, there is considerable debate over the meaning of causation and the logic 
of counterfactuals (Choi, 2007) in general philosophy (Schaffer, 2007) and the 
philosophy of science e.g. (Kvart, 1994; Lee, 1986; Schweder, 1999; Shalkowski, 
1992; Yablo, 1992) and in psychology and brain sciences e.g. (Arokiasamy, Robert-
son, & Guice, 1993; Chang & Herrmann, 2007; Mandel, 2007; Pollard, 1983).  
These debates may be of considerable interest for evaluations, in particular for the 
interpretation of results and the translation of results into policy implication.  In this 
paper we focus on the retrospective measurement of effects at the molar level (Cook 
et al., 1979) where effects can be observed i.e. we accept causality at the level ob-
served even though the causal mechanisms involved remains unknown.  More ex-
plicitly, using data based on administrative records, we can identify three levels of 
causal inference; 1) unit-level causal inference, 2) subpopulation causal inference 
and 3) population-level causal inference (Holland & Rubin, 1988).  
4.2 Parameters of interest for evaluations 
Unit-level causal inferences can be defined as the difference Yt(u) – Yc(u) and as-
sumes homogeneity for every pair of matched treatment-control units. Clearly, infer-
ences at the individual level may provide the basis for a variety of meaningful pa-
rameters of interest at the subpopulation level.  Heckman & al. (2001) discuss four 
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parameters of interest , LATE, MTE, ATE and ATT, where LATE means Local Av-
erage Treatment Effect, MTE denotes Marginal Treatment Effect, ATE stand for 
Average Treatment Effect and ATT is Average Treatment Effect on the Treated.  A 
fifth parameter ATC, Average Treatment Effects on the Controls could be added to 
the list.  LATE (Imbens & Angrist, 1994) is defined as a change in the treatment 
effect for the treated that is induced by a change in the instrument (e.g. the intensity 
of the treatment) whereas MTE (Bjørklund & Moffitt, 1987) investigates treatment 
effects at specific levels of the instrument.  Both LATE and MTE assume that 
changes in the instrument may affect the treatment decision (the selection into the 
program) and that changes in the instrument are independent of the outcome 
variable.  ATC is of interest only if the goal is to investigate possible violation of 
central assumptions, such as the absence of equilibrium effects.  ATE and ATT are 
by far the most common in applied research.  ATE is simply the mean causal effects 
for the units whose characteristics are represented by X, (our vector of control 
variables, see section 6.3, page 61) averaged over all units, whereas ATT is the mean 
causal effects averaged over those units that actually received treatment. In most 
applications, the estimation of treatment effect for each observation is not a central 
goal.  This paper focuses on the average effects of treatment on the treated (ATT) 
and is thus solely concerned with effects at the subpopulation and population level. 
 
4.3 Administrative Records and the Timing of Evaluations 
Clearly, the question of effects is at the core of the concerns of policy makers.  
When large amounts of taxpayers money are spent for a purpose that is legitimate 
because it is beneficial to society the demand upon governmental accountability may 
require that outlays are justified i.e. that the actions taken produced the desired re-
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sults.  The asynchrony of events complicates matters in the sense that while effects 
are observable only after an (unknown) amount of time-elapse, the policy process is 
future oriented and interventions may be set off by a perceived urgent need for ac-
tion.  A common pseudo-solution to this problem is premature request for evalua-
tions where the demand for legitimating the actions undertaken dominates and the 
researcher is asked to look for something that is yet to occur.  With increasing ac-
ceptance of evaluations as an integral part of the policy process this phenomenon has 
become an inseparable part of the evaluation problem that has the potential of cor-
rupting the evaluation process.   As indicated in Figure 1, the manifestation of 
effects may not necessarily crop up when it is most convenient for the researcher or 
the authorities that want to have an evaluation done.  In the worst case the research is 
undertaken right before effects are observable (exhibit b and c) or at a point in time 
where effects by coincidence are below average for a certain time span (exhibit e) or 
when effects are no longer observable (after time P4 in exhibit d).  The configuration 
in exhibit a is mostly wishful thinking and highly unlikely to happen.  
 
The various configurations of effects in Figure 1 cast doubts over the usefulness of 
cross-sectional evaluation procedures.  Excluding the time aspect may lead to erro-
neous conclusions.  Thus, we advocate the use of repeated cross-sectional data or 
better, panel data whenever accessible.  In this paper we rely on administrative re-
cords that are openly accessible to everyone, a source of information that is said to 
be underutilized (Roed et al., 2003).   Administrative records offer the opportunity to 
construct panel data where the individual company can be tracked over time.  
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Figure 1 Temporal shapes of how a change in variable x, at time tx, effects a 
change in variable y4 
                                                        
4 Adopted and modified from Blossfeld and Rohwer Blossfeld, H. P., & Rohwer, G. 1997. Causal 
inference, time and observation plans in the social sciences. Quality & Quantity, 31(4): 361-384. 
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5. The Cases and Data 
The data are derived from accounting records collected by Dun & Bradstreet, Inno-
vation Norway’s internal data-warehouse BUSTER and administrative records made 
available by Innovation Norway.  The administrative records provide information 
concerning projects and programs; the accounting date supplies necessary financial 
information and data on location, time of establishment, number of employees and 
time for bankruptcies and liquidation.  In addition, Innovation Norway made avail-
able a dataset that facilitates the exclusion of companies involved in other projects or 
programs administrated by Innovation Norway or other governmental agencies. 
5.1 The Administrative Records 
The data for the Investment Grant and Regional Venture Capital Loan programs are 
collected from administrative records on 5831 individual decisions on allotment of 
capital involving 67 individuals, and 3298 companies, predominantly privately 
owned limited companies over the period 1990 to 1994.  Thus for this dataset we can 
identify the amount of money assigned to the individual firms. We were able to 
identify acceptable accounting records from Dun & Bradstreet for approximately 
66% of the limited companies.  Records for institutions and companies with special 
allotments such as SIVA, and Norwegian Pipelines ltd together with allocations to 
municipalities and counties were deleted from the data.  Table 1 shows that we were 
able to identify the pre-program data for all records and that we have a large pool of 
potential controls for all five treatment periods. 
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Table 1 Participants & potential controls for the Investment Grant and Regional 
Venture Capital Loans programs 
 
 
Control
t-1 t t-1 t t-1
1989 1990 425 425 20007
1990 1991 337 337 26653
1991 1992 237 237 29775
1992 1993 184 184 15733
1993 1994 252 252 41317
N =  1435 1435 133485
TreatmentYear
 
 
The FRAM program data set consists of 425 firms that have participated in the pro-
gram over the period 1992 to 1997.   To be able to carry out the matching procedure 
we need information about the company in question for the year prior to the first 
time it entered the program.  As we can see from Table 2, there is a slight difference 
between the column t and column t-1 indicating that for a few firms, data for the 
year prior to entering the FRAM program could not be identified.  The loss of data is 
not substantial.  The FRAM program aimed at developing general leadership skills 
and strategic competence for SMEs.  We should, however, bear in mind that the 
dataset we have, includes only a minor portion of all companies that have partici-
pated in the many variants of the FRAM program.  Thus, the conclusion from this 
study concerns outcomes from the group of included companies only.  
 
 Table 2 Participants & controls for the FRAM program  
  
Control
t-1 t t-1 t t-1
1991 1992 18 19 16783
1992 1993 19 21 17306
1993 1994 105 110 17595
1994 1995 118 131 18287
1995 1996 126 142 18069
1996 1997 39 46 17748
N =  425 469 105788
TreatmentYear
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Table 2 shows that we have a considerable pool of potential control companies for 
the six years’ treatment period we look at.  For the years 1992, 1993 and 1997, how-
ever, the treatment groups are small and may not be well suited for stand-alone 
analyses. 
 
The data for the Network program is not as complete as the other data sets.  We have 
an exact identification of the records before and after the program but unable to es-
tablish the year of participation.   Thus, we do not know whether a company par-
ticipated in the Network program over the entire period 1992 to 1996 or if it was 
involved in the Network program for a shorter time only, at the minimum one year.  
This is a serious problem in the sense that we run the risk of comparing a company 
that did not participate in a particular year with another company that did participate 
in that year, the only difference being that the first company either has participated 
previously or will be participating later on in the period between 1992 and 1996.  
Provided that the Network program generates a positive, additive payoff, this lack of 
exact mapping of the year of treatment should be expected to produce an upward 
bias in the estimates.   Thus overestimating the differences between the treatment 
group and the control group is a more likely outcome than underestimating the 
difference.  
 
Table 3 Participants & controls for the Network Program 
Control
t-1 t t-4 t t-1
1991 1992 1575 44895
1995 1996 1636
N = Total 1575 44895
TreatmentYear
 
 
  
43
The risk of a too optimistic estimate is however, based on the premise that the Net-
work program gives a positive payoff.  If, on the other hand, companies that were in 
the treatment group at one or other time between 1992 and 1996 performed better 
when not participating in the program within the same period, we have committed 
the error of incorrectly attributing effects to the program when this is not the case. 
Table 3 shows more participants by the end of the period than in the beginning, but 
we have no clear notion of the turnover within the period, i.e. the number of partici-
pants entering or leaving the program between 1992 and 1996.  Low turnover within 
the period would make our estimates more reliable and high turnover would do the 
opposite.  We believe this should give a slight reservation only with respect the 
trustworthiness of our results.  Better knowledge of the turnover between 1992 and 
1996 would make it easier to judge probable impacts.  
 
5.1.1 The Regional Dimension: Participation and Allocation of Funds 
The data available for the two financial schemes are fairly complete.  As indicated in 
Table 4, approximately 4.3 billion NOK is employed by the Government for 
Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants over the period 1990 to 
1994.  Although the total sums allocated to Regional Ventura Capital Loans and In-
vestment Grants are comparable in magnitude, the two financial schemes involve 
different governmental costs.  Whereas Investment Grants are directed towards pref-
erably innovative or other interesting investments this are, as the name implies, 
grants, and as such motivated by their presumed payback to society in term of 
increased economic activity.  Regional Ventura Capital Loans are loans with slightly 
higher interests than conventional loans.  The loans are meant for projects that may 
carry risks which exclude conventional loans and thus, entail a calculated risk of 
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loss.    In the past, losses have been about 30%, based on data from the 1970s and 
the 1980s.  
 
A closer look at the regional allocation of funds reveals that Northern Norway has 
been prioritized with respect to allocation of funds, in particular in the earlier part of 
the period under scrutiny.  Moving down the first column in Table 4 from Oslo to 
Svalbard implies going from the urban areas to the more rural areas of Northern 
Norway.  Inspection of the sums allocated county by county tells us that there is an 
increasing tendency as we move towards the less densely populated areas with a 
marked peak in Nordland.  This tendency is apparent both for Regional Venture 
Capital Loans and for Investment Grants.  A striking feature of Table 4 is the central 
areas of Norway, in particular Oslo, and Østfold has close to zero allocations while 
other urban areas such as Western Norway (Hordaland, Sogn og-Fjordane and Møre 
og Romsdal) receive substantial allocations.  Clearly, Western Norway contains both 
major cities and large rural areas which may partly account for this difference.  
Thus, there is a distinct regional profile in both Regional Ventura Capital Loans and 
Investment Grants with respect to the allocation of funds.   
 
We are, however, not able to identify acceptable administrative records for all 3298 
companies, mainly due to incomplete records and because we wanted to restrict our 
analyses to limited business companies5.  Thus, as should be expected, we have to 
accept analyses based on less than the entire set of available administrative records 
for the financial schemes. 
 
 
                                                        
5 Not that this is a limitation due to missing information in the administrative records from Dun & Bradstreet, it 
is not primarily imposed by shortcomings in the databases received from Innovation Norway. 
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  Table 4 Funds Employed for the Period 1990 to 1994, by County 
Fylke/Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Østfold 5,1 0,0 2,3 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0
Oslo 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,4 0,0 0,0 0,0
Hedmark 37,1 18,7 42,1 10,1 33,9 10,2 12,1 11,8 7,6 48,0
Oppland 25,4 39,2 30,3 14,5 6,5 16,4 10,4 12,5 16,2 28,0
Buskerud 9,6 4,1 11,5 1,6 5,5 3,3 1,1 3,6 1,0 12,9
Telemark 18,0 2,0 13,5 6,2 2,6 17,2 11,4 9,8 19,1 31,5
Aust-Agder 7,6 17,8 18,1 6,5 1,1 2,7 1,4 3,6 8,5 2,2
Vest-Agder 10,5 18,4 11,6 3,6 0,4 2,6 5,5 4,5 9,8 1,3
Rogaland 21,5 16,4 13,8 2,5 2,2 3,8 2,8 4,8 2,7 1,5
Hordaland 26,6 25,2 19,2 15,4 6,8 10,0 10,1 14,9 12,8 17,8
Sogn og-Fjordane 49,8 50,9 61,7 19,8 47,7 42,1 27,4 71,1 21,5 35,9
Møre og Romsdal 78,5 47,8 69,4 24,5 32,2 25,9 47,2 27,6 69,4 49,7
Sør-Trøndelag 25,5 25,6 25,9 48,0 6,2 21,2 18,0 17,4 14,9 18,7
Nord-Trøndelag 35,5 15,4 46,4 16,7 8,0 24,8 24,1 24,0 19,0 25,0
Nordland 101,3 102,0 90,4 35,5 29,7 265,4 113,7 95,7 111,7 128,2
Troms 32,6 20,2 16,0 6,5 5,9 49,4 48,1 44,9 72,5 56,9
Finnmark 68,5 35,3 75,3 16,7 2,9 63,8 60,0 71,1 46,6 47,8
Svalbard 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 1,0 8,7 0,5
Sum 553,3 439,1 547,6 229,8 191,6 558,9 396,7 418,5 442,0 505,9
Total = 4 283,4 Total Lending Funds = 1 961,4 mill. Total Investment Funds =2 322,0 mill.
Expected losses on loans is 30%
Regional Venture Capital Loans Investment Grants
 
 
As shown in Table 5, the overall coverage in terms of what proportion of allocated 
resources we are able to analyze is 31.6%6.  Clearly, the proportions we are able to 
analyze vary somewhat across regions.  If we ignore Oslo (which can safely be done 
since almost no allocations exist) the minimum coverage is 18.5% for Investment 
Grants to Northern Norway and the maximum coverage is 46.4% for both kinds of 
allotments (both Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants) to Agder and Ro-
galand.   
 
Clearly, since conclusion concerning the two financial schemes is supposed to be 
valid for the two schemes as nationwide initiatives it is of importance that the data 
coverage embraces all regions.   Table 5 indicates a coverage that justifies nation-
wide conclusions. 
                                                        
6 These figures are based on reasoning that is explained in more detail later.  
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Table 5 Coverage of Allocations, Total & Proportion of Funds Analyzed 
 
Regional Regional Regional
Venture Invest- Venture Invest- Venture Invest-
Capital ment Both Capital ment Both Capital ment Both
Region Loans Grants Kinds Loans Grants Kinds Loans Grants Kinds
Oslo and Akershus 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Hedmark and Oppland 96.7 77.6 256.8 26.3 24.1 74.8 27.2 % 31.1 % 29.1 %
South Eastern Norway 52.3 88.8 58.6 15.0 28.5 21.8 28.6 % 32.1 % 37.3 %
Agder and Rogaland 96.4 36.2 74.5 27.1 8.0 34.5 28.1 % 22.2 % 46.4 %
Western Norway 247.7 314.2 497.2 70.2 99.9 184.6 28.4 % 31.8 % 37.1 %
Trøndelag 115.3 106.6 238.4 24.0 31.3 98.3 20.8 % 29.4 % 41.2 %
Northern Norway 239.0 896.8 790.1 105.8 165.5 314.7 44.3 % 18.5 % 39.8 %
Total 847.4 1522.5 1915.6 268.4 357.3 728.8 31.7 % 23.5 % 38.0 %
Sum total = 4 285.5 Sum analyzed = 1 354.5 Percent analyzed =31.6%
available - Mill. Nok for analyses - Mill. Nok for analyses - Percent
Total Information Information used Percentage used
 
 
It is, however, reasonable to question whether adequate within-region coverage is 
sufficient if certain regions account for disproportional amounts of the allocations 
analyzed.  Table 6 displays a simple comparison of the percentage regional distribu-
tion of allocated funds based upon the total sums in Table 5 (column 1 to 3) and the 
corresponding percentages for the analyzed sample (column 4 to 6 in Table 5).  The 
difference in percentages (column 7 to 9 in Table 6) indicates mostly insignificant 
discrepancies, except for Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants in 
Northern Norway where the former is relatively underrepresented and the latter 
overrepresented.   Noteworthy, balanced coverage with respect to the distribution 
allocated funds is easily altered when a few or only one large allotment is left out. 
Furthermore, the filtering out of deviant cases is an inevitable consequence of proce-
dures that are used to preprocess the data for analyses.  That is, since all analyses are 
based on comparisons of matched pairs of firms, companies with exceptional fea-
tures e.g. very large turnover, tend to be left out.  
 
  
47
Table 6 Coverage of Allocations, Deviations from Percentage Distributions 
 
Regional Regional Regional
Venture Invest- Venture Invest- Venture Invest-
Capital ment Both Capital ment Both Capital ment Both
Region Loans Grants Kinds Loans Grants Kinds Loans Grants Kinds
Oslo and Akershus 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Hedmark and Oppland 11.4 5.1 13.4 9.8 6.7 10.3 1.6 -1.6 3.1
South Eastern Norway 6.2 5.8 3.1 5.6 8.0 3.0 0.6 -2.1 0.1
Agder and Rogaland 11.4 2.4 3.9 10.1 2.3 4.7 1.3 0.1 -0.8
Western Norway 29.2 20.6 26.0 26.2 27.9 25.3 3.1 -7.3 0.6
Trøndelag 13.6 7.0 12.4 8.9 8.8 13.5 4.7 -1.8 -1.0
Northern Norway 28.2 58.9 41.2 39.4 46.3 43.2 -11.2 12.6 -1.9
Sum percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -0.1 % -0.1 % 0.0 %
Total Information Information used Difference between 
available - Percent for analyses -Percent total and used
 
 
Noticeably, although we find coverage with respect to the funds allocated to be satis-
factory, i.e. the regional distribution laid out by Innovation Norway is not altered by 
the fact that we analyze less than the total number firms that actually have received 
grants or attractive loans, this imposes a limitation.  The limitation that has to be 
kept in mind is that the reduction from population to sample is not due to a random 
sampling procedure.  Thus, it is still necessary to corroborate that the firms selected 
out do not deviate substantially from those analyzed.  Table 5 and Table 6 suggest 
that the differences between the analyzed sample and the population are in-
significant.   The remaining part of the data, the companies left unanalyzed, may still 
be different from the selected sample.  These issues will be addressed in chapter 14. 
 
The regional distribution of participation (firms, cases subject to treatment) does, of 
course, not entirely overlap the regional distribution of allocations of grants and 
loans.  Also, the regional distribution of money is relevant for the Regional Venture 
Capital Loans and Investment Grants only.   For the FRAM program and the Net-
work program the distribution of funds is not an issue since the regional dimension  
was never an integral part of the intended policies behind these programs.  Com-
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parisons of the financial schemes and programs reveal these differences. While the 
financial schemes show distinct regional profiles, the FRAM program and the Net-
work program appear to have participants haphazardly scattered over the country.  
 
Table 7 Distribution of Participation – All financial schemes and programs 
Regional Investment Grants & Total The FRAM The Network
Venture Grants Venture Grants & Program Program
Region Capital Loans Loans
Loans Combined
Oslo and Akershus 2,1 3,4 0,8 2,2 8,9 17,0
Hedmark and Oppland 11,8 6,9 7,8 8,4 11,3 7,9
South Eastern Norway 5,9 6,9 3,5 5,5 22,8 17,9
Agder and Rogaland 10,0 4,8 4,3 5,9 15,2 14,7
Western Norway 42,6 21,2 29,1 28,9 20,0 19,4
Trøndelag 9,7 12,5 11,9 11,6 8,9 12,3
Northern Norway 17,9 44,3 42,6 37,5 12,9 10,8
Sum percent 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Total N 340 609 486 1435 425 1575  
 
The differences in regional profiles clearly reflect the intention of the initiatives.  
Regional Venture Capital Loans, as the name implies, have an explicitly given 
obligation to serve those regions where access to capital is expected to be limited.  
The Investment Grants follow much of the same pattern mostly since the two 
instruments often are employed jointly.  The FRAM program (the part we analyze) 
aims at small and medium sized business while the Network program is intended to 
stimulate and foster industrial clusters.  Thus, the regional dimension is not an 
integral part of the intentions behind these programs.  The regional distributions 
simply reflect and confirm the intended policies of the initiatives. 
 
5.1.2 Changes over time in the use of the Financial Schemes 
Regional Ventura Capital Loans and Investment Grants are often combined.  As 
shown in Table 8, the joint use of the two instruments amounts to close to 50% of all 
  
49
allocations in 1990 while the combination of the two is down to 33.8 percent in 
1994.  Table 8 also reveals a trend away from Regional Ventura Capital Loans and 
towards more use of Investment Grants over the period.  
 
Table 8  Venture Capital Loans & Invest. Grants - Percent of Allocations 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Regional Venture Capital Loans 21.70 20.30 28.90 14.20 8.90
Invesment Grants 29.60 24.00 25.70 51.20 57.30
Jointly Both Kinds of Allotments 48.70 55.80 45.40 34.60 33.80
Total percent 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  
 
The change from the use of Regional Ventura Capital Loans to the use of Investment 
Grants is even more evident when we look at percent approvals.  As shown in Table 
9, while the two instruments and the combination of the two all shared approxi-
mately a third of all corroborated decisions in 1990, Investment Grants alone stood 
for almost eighty percent of all approvals in 1994. 
 
Table 9 Venture Capital Loans & Invest. Grants - Percent of Approvals 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
Regional Venture Capital Loans 34.54 26.86 27.74 12.67 7.01 969
Invesment Grants 30.44 36.12 39.54 62.53 78.44 2030
Jointly Both Kinds of Allotments 35.02 37.02 32.73 24.80 14.55 1254
Total percent 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Total N 1025 886 822 750 770 4253
Note: N  includes all firms involved over the five year period  
 
 
 
5.1.3 Initial Exclusion of potential confounders 
The varying numbers of potential controls in the three datasets (Table 1 to Table 3) 
reflect both the exclusion of records with missing data and the routine of excluding 
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records that fall outside the convex hull i.e. the polygon bounded by the extreme 
points of our matching variables (King & Zeng, 2007).  The chull routine of the R 
package was pragmatically used for the purpose of reducing the number of cases.  
Because the matching algorithm applied (nnmatch) (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, & Im-
bens, 2001) is slow, this was a necessary data-preparing step7.   More important, we 
had to exclude companies that had participated in other programs or received other 
governmental subsidies or allotments.  Thus, although we do not have the complete 
number of participants for all three programs under investigation, we do have a sub-
stantial part of the participants in each scheme and program and we have succeeded 
in excluding companies involved in other projects and programs.  Thus, to the extent 
it is possible; records that are potential confounders are excluded, both from the lists 
of participants in the schemes/programs we investigate and from being included in 
the control groups.   However, as indicated by the (X) in Figure 2, participants in one 
of the schemes/programs that also participate in another of these programs were not 
excluded.  These are few.  Inclusion of cases that participate in more than one pro-
gram does not affect estimation results and facilitates the examination of potentially 
additive effects of participating in several programs.  The size of the circles in Figure 
2 does not reflect the number of firms.  While the number of treatment cases vary 
from 425 to 1575, the number of potential control cases remaining after removing 
possible confounders is more than sufficient for our purposes.  After exclusion of 
cases due to missing data, being outside the convex hull and other reasons, we still 
have large amounts of data, as shown in Table 1 to Table 3.   Data for participants in 
other programs than those under investigation here were supplied by Innovation 
Norway.  We believe these data provide the best available dataset for the exclusion 
                                                        
7 You never run a matching routine only once.  Generally, it may take a considerable number of runs 
and in this case a single run could last more than three hours due to slow convergence. 
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of confounders.  However, it is clear that this list can be incomplete. Thus the exis-
tence of potential confounders in the control groups cannot be entirely ruled out. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Data preparation – elimination of confounding controls 
 
5.2 Measurements 
5.2.1 The dependent variable 
Our central measure is added value, defined as the sum of labor costs and net oper-
ating result. This is our dependent variable in most models.  The measure can be 
thought of as the sum of the reward to labor and capital respectively.  The two vari-
ables that constitute the construct are obtained from the financial records from Dun 
& Bradstreet.  There are many definitions of measures intended to characterize the 
value creation processes of firms (Kay, 1993; Kay, 1995).  The most common ge-
neric term is value added which measures the increase in the value of goods as a 
result of the production process.  We deliberately try to avoid this definition by 
switching the words and use the term added value.  Added value, defined as the sum 
of labor costs and net operating result does not make much sense as a stand-alone 
term.  It takes its meaning as a comparative term; when the outcome of a govern-
mental program is to be measured as the difference between the entities included in 
Regional Risk/Venture 
Capital & 
Investment Grants 
The FRAM Program 
The Network Program 
Other programs x 
Potential Controls 
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the program and comparable entities that are not included in the program.   Using the 
sum of labor costs and operating result has its advantages and disadvantages.  
Changes in the ratio of labor costs to operating result over time may indicate equilib-
rium effects, which in our models, by definition, is assumed away by the SUTVA8 
(stable-unit-treatment-value-assumption).  From an orthodox economics point of 
view equilibrium effects is at the heart of the arguments against governmental inter-
ventions.  In this report the existence of such effects is an empirical question.   From 
the society’s point of view increase in labor costs due to the hiring of more workers 
is beneficial.  Thus, a change in the ration of labor cost to operating result is not a 
problem.   The aggregated differences in added value that can be identified as caused 
by the program in question are interpreted as the additionality that can be credited 
the program. 
5.2.2 The matching variables 
Whereas the dependent variable within the causal counterfactual framework can be 
any measure of interest, this is not the case for the matching variables.  All matching 
variables have to be pre-treatment variables, which are collected before treatment as-
signment. Post-treatment variables should not be used to predict the treatment as-
signment. The inclusion of such variables may result in biased estimates.  Matching 
variables can be related to both the treatment and the outcome.  The outcome vari-
able can not be included among the matching variables. Moreover, according to Bry-
son & al. (2002) variables known to be related to the treatment assignment but not to 
the outcome should not be included.  In the propensity score setting  such variables 
may reduce the balancing properties of the covariates (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005).  
Whether this is also the case in the covariate setting is generally not known.  Note-
                                                        
8 SUTVA implies that the treatment on one particular case should not affect any other case in the analysis.  
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worthy, there is no complete consensus on these issues. Dependent upon whether 
matching is looked on as an estimation technique or mainly a preprocessing tool, 
opinions may differ. The ultimate goal of the matching procedures is to arrive at a 
situation where participation, given a set of conditioning variables X, is independent 
of potential outcomes (see CIA, Conditional Independence Assumption, section 6.3 
page 61) and thus facilitates the ceteris paribus i.e. assuming that full unit 
homogeneity is achieved we can estimated the treatment effect as iii YY 01 −=Δ  for 
unit i .  Furthermore, given that the outcome equations iii XfY 11 )( ε+=  and 
iii XfY 00 )( ε+=  where f  is one or other kind of function of X, can be matched in a 
way that gives [ ] 0|)( 01 =− XE ii εε  where i.e. ε1i and ε0i are i.i.d. with zero 
conditional means, then  the average program effect is )( iATE E Δ=Δ  and the 
program effect for any subgroup S [ ]Sie iS ∈Δ=Δ |  of a sufficient sized can be 
estimated as the difference in outcomes between participants and non-participants.   
We do not assume that we can ever achieve 001 =− ii εε   for any participant so 
interpretations at the unit level may be meaningless9.  
 
We use two continuous and three discrete variables for matching purposes. In addi-
tion we use the variable year for exact matches.  The first variable concerns the size 
of the firm; we want to balance firms of comparable sizes.  As a proxy for company 
size we use the total income of firms. Clearly, this variable is related to outcome; 
generally, both allocations and returns are larger in the bigger firms. The variable is 
constructed from accounting records from Dun & Bradstreet. Due to the skewness of 
the empirical distribution of this variable we use the logarithm of total income for 
                                                        
9 Full homogeneity is of course not fully warranted since this is matching on observables only.  
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the actual calculations.  Since production technology may decide the ratio of total 
income to the size of the workforce, we include labor costs as a percentage of total 
income as our second matching variable.  This variable is more of a semi-continuous 
variable since it has eleven categories where 0 means that labor costs amount to 
between 0 and 10% of total income, 1 means from 10 to 20% and 11 means that the 
company uses between 90 and 100% of total income for labor costs.    The third 
matching variable is a coarse indicator for industry that can take three values; one 
for trade, transportation & other industries, one for services & real estate and one 
for manufacturing, mining & construction.  The coarse division of this variable is 
due to the fact the more detailed NACE-codes are not very informative with respect 
to the nature of the activity of the firm and also that firms may be involved in several 
different business areas and are thus just as well described by a gross description of 
their general activity.   The fourth matching variable concerns the relative newness 
of the company, i.e., approximate time since the firm was established.  The variable 
can take three values; 1 if the company is less than two years old, 2 if it is from three 
to five years since establishment, 3 if it is from six to nine years old and 4 if the 
company was established more than ten years ago.  Our fifth matching variable is a 
location variable that can take seven values; 1) Oslo and Akershus, 2) Hedmark and 
Oppland, 3) South Eastern Norway, 4) Agder and Rogaland, 5) Western Norway, 6) 
Trøndelag and 7) Northern Norway.    
 
Industry, newness and location are all related to the decision about treatment as-
signment.  Although Innovation Norway has no distinctive policy with respect to 
industry for the financial schemes and intervention programs under scrutiny, indus-
try matters. Also, regional priorities are imperative political goals for Innovation 
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Norway’s activities. Thus, as well as for location there is a deliberate policy for 
newness:  New establishments have a certain priority since stimulating the creation 
of new activity is an explicit goal for Innovation Norway.  Moreover, new firms en-
tail the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and thus are more inclined to fail-
ure which may imply a rather high probability of losing matched pairs over time 
while matching firms from the same locations may be a prerequisite for proper use 
of pairwise  matches (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998a).  The simultaneous 
match on size, technology, industry, newness and location may ensure comparisons 
of firms that are commensurable with respect to expected outcomes on our 
dependent variable added value.     
 
The sixth variable employed in the matching process is year.  This variable is used 
solely for the purpose of ensuring that schemes and programs that go on over several 
years have correct matches.  With algorithms other than the nnmatch (Abadie et al., 
2001), this is far from a trivial problem.   
 
Thus, as a summing up; when we assert that two companies are comparable we 
contend that they are close to equal along the dimensions; company size, labor costs 
relative to company size, industry classification, newness and location.  
 
5.2.3 The difference-in-differences estimator 
The dependent variable added value shows considerable volatility from year to year. 
The difference-in-differences estimator (Ashenfelter & Card, 1985) reduces this 
problem.  The combination of matching techniques and difference-in-differences 
analysis constitutes our central strategy for bias reduction. Manual correction of out-
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liers in the dependent variable is carried out by removing the upper and lower 1% of 
the empirical distribution, dependent on the extent of extreme values.  All estimators 
introduced are differences in means between various categories.  The difference-in-
differences estimator reduces volatility by using the difference in means before and 
after treatment in the treatment group and comparing this magnitude with the corre-
sponding magnitude in the control group i.e. DiD = (YAT – YBT) - (YAC – YBC) where Y 
is outcome, T denotes treatment, C denotes control and B and A denotes before and 
after respectively.  As shown in Figure 3 the difference-in-differences is a simple be-
fore-after comparison of ∆T and ∆C which implies that we measure changes in the 
two groups in a way that allows them to evolve independently over time. 
 
 
Figure 3 Causal Effect in the Difference-in-differences model 
Clearly, the DiD estimator by itself does not signify that differences in changes be-
tween the two groups can be attributed to the treatment in question.   The DiD esti-
mator assumes that that the two groups follow approximately the same path over 
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time which indicates that a ceteris paribus clause can be defended.   A quick glance 
at Figure 4 indicates a common increasing trend in both the treatment group and the 
control group for all three sets of intervention data used for matching. 
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Figure 4 Trends in the development of Added Value over time – all cases 
 
There is an inherent ambiguity in the common trends assumption since the key iden-
tifying assumption is that the trends should be the same in both states (control and 
treatment) in the absence of treatment.  As pointed out earlier, the reason for apply-
ing a matched sample strategy is the fact the no single unit can be observed in two 
states, as treated and as controls. Thus, after match we have to regard the degree of 
common trend by roughly counting in what looks like the effect of treatment.   The 
graph for Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grant indicates a peak 
around the millennium followed by a sharp drop in the treatment group.  The Net-
work Program graph shows an atypical toothed pattern in the treatment group right 
after the year 2000.  All three graphs show the treatment group above the control 
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group over most of the period thus indicating that a selection effect is present.   Un-
der the common trends assumption the DiD estimator in combination with matching 
potentially remove or substantially reduce the effect of selection into treatment.   
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6. Methods 
6.1 A brief overview of the section 
In this section we introduce perspectives on matching methods.  The way we look at 
matching methods has bearings upon how it is applied.  We maintain that matching 
is best applied as a preprocessing method i.e. a set of procedures that prepare the 
data for further analyses.  Matching is not a single method; it comes in a multitude of 
variants with options that sum to a cacophony of possible choices.  We therefore 
take the most widely applied approach, propensity score matching (PSM) 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1997), as the point of departure. The frequent 
application of PSM has crystallized a step-by-step standard that provides a helpful 
tool for matching procedures.  We argue that, due to specific features of the data at 
hand, PSM is not the optimal choice and that covariate matching (CVM) (Abadie & 
Imbens, 2002) is a better choice.  Also, since we have a large pool of potential con-
trols, one-to-one matching is preferable because it makes the datasets easier to 
handle and further analyses less complicated.  
6.2 Matching as nonparametric preprocessing  
We think of matching as a nonparametric preprocessing method (Ho et al., 2007) 
rather than as an estimation method.  The preprocessing prepares the data for further 
analysis in the sense that it facilitates the construction of a dataset that resembles 
some features of the classical experiment.  Viewed as a preprocessing method, 
matching offers a way of adjusting for as much of the information in the control 
variables as possible without making any parametric assumptions.   In the 
preprocessed data, the treatment variable is closer to being independent of the 
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background covariates, hence, subsequent parametric adjustments are less important.  
Moreover, the researcher is free to go on with the analyses using his/her favorite 
parametric methods.  Even with a task as simple as comparing two averages, that is 
exactly what we do in this paper: we make distributional assumptions in order justify 
the use of sampling statistics to qualify our comparisons.  Also, to be able to 
incorporate the time dimension, we make further distributional assumptions.  
 
Another important aspect of the preprocessing view of matching methods is that it 
makes analyses less model dependent.  Most applied social science quantitative re-
search does not reach their ideal causal model in just one run, as assumed by statisti-
cal theory.  The sequence: – collect data – decide model – run program – evaluate 
model – write up findings, never happens.  In practical research, numerous, may be 
hundreds of runs are carried out with different control variables and models in order 
to find the model that the researcher finds acceptable, most likely in accordance with 
his/her theory.   Hence, estimates depend heavily on their corresponding modeling 
assumption.  A minor adjustment of the model may yield a very different estimate.  
Most causal models in the social sciences are therefore model dependent, at least to 
some degree (Ho et al., 2007).  The statistical properties of the model do, however, 
depend on the assumption that we know the single correct model.  Thus, any effort 
that can reduce model dependency is advantageous.   
 
The preprocessing view of matching also implies that the notion of causality is un-
tied from the statistical model applied.  We consider causal effect as a theoretical 
quantity, defined independently of any empirical method that has been used to esti-
mate it from the data.   
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 There is little contradiction between this view of matching procedures and the point 
of view that matching is an estimation technique and that the estimate that is the out-
come of the matching procedure is the ultimate goal.  Most likely, the impression 
that the latter view exists and is held by many researchers is a product of the consid-
erable theoretical effort aimed at refining the matching techniques.   Since such work 
implies investigating the properties of estimators it may appear as it is the estimates 
that is under investigation and hence, this is an estimator technique and as such a 
causal model.    In practice, the nature of the data available may have a bearing upon 
the question of causality.  In this paper we want, after preprocessing, to exploit the 
data at hand to the extent necessary for the problem we are investigating.   
6.3 The General Framework of Propensity Scores 
The parameter of interest for this evaluation is the effect of treatment on the treated, 
in the literature usually labeled ATT.  In recent years (PSM) propensity score meth-
ods (Rosenbaum et al., 1983; Rubin, 1973a) have dominated the econometric 
evaluation literature and we will use PSM as an exemplar for the step-by-step proce-
dures that are more or less generic to all matching procedures.  Propensity score is 
defined as the conditional probability of being exposed to treatment.   The probabil-
ity of participation in the treatment group is modeled by careful selection of match-
ing covariates and can in principle be estimated by many different methods; the by 
far most usual is the logistic regression of the form: 
 
(1) }|{)|1Pr{)( XDEXDXp ==≡ where }1,0{=D  is the indicator for participa-
tion, (1 for treatment, 0 for control), X is a vector of relevant covariates, i.e., covari-
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ates believed to influence the probability of participation but not the outcome. Thus, 
the probability that a unit is exposed to the treatment in question is the propensity 
score.  As demonstrated by (Rosenbaum et al., 1983), provided that exposure to 
treatment is randomly distributed within the categories defined by the multidimen-
sional X, then exposure to treatment is randomly distributed over the one-dimen-
sional p(X), the propensity score. 
 
With the individual unit denoted i, ATT can be estimated as: 
(2) τ ≡E{Y1i – Y0i| Di = 1} 
        = E{E{Y1i – Y0i| Di = 1, p(Xi)}} 
        =E{E{Y1i|Di = 1, p(Xi)} – E(Y0i|Di = 0, p(Xi)}|Di = 1} 
 
The expectation applies to the distribution of propensity scores for the treatment 
group (p(Xi)|Di = 1), usually referred to as the region of common support where Y0 
and Y1 are possible outcomes for the effect-variable for treatment and control re-
spectively.  
 
Figure 5 Propensity scores and the region of common support 
 
These results require that:  
(3) D  ┴  X |p(X)  i.e., that assignment to treatment is independent of X, conditional 
on p(X) and that  
(4) Y1,Y0 ┴  D | X  i.e., the outcomes on the effect-variables are independent of the 
assignment to treatment or control, and that: 
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(5) Y1,Y0 ┴  D | p(X) i.e., that the outcome on the effect-variables are independent of 
the assignment to treatment or control, given equal propensity scores.  
 
Provided that the conditions (1) to (5) are satisfied, observations with approximately 
equal propensity scores will have similar distributions of observables (X) independ-
ent of assignment to treatment or control.   The requirements (3) to (5), often called 
CIA, the conditional independence assumptions are central and ensure the inde-
pendence of control variables and treatment assignment and of control variables and 
the outcome variable under investigation.  Condition (2), the region of common sup-
port restricts the range of the propensity scores in the control group to the range of 
the score within the treatment group.  This is a source of bias since cases that are 
outside the region of common support have to be deleted.  Moreover, treatment cases 
and control cases may not be evenly distributed over the common range interval, 
causing an excess number of cases over some parts of the interval and a shortage 
over other ranges, which in sum may cause bad matches over the region of common 
support.  A variety of techniques and matching algorithms are, however, developed 
to minimize or control the effects of such problems.  If a substantial proportion of 
the treatment cases are outside the region of common support it is of course 
important to verify whether these deleted cases are different from the included ones. 
 
An important additional condition, the stable unit-treatment assumptions (SUTVA) is 
considerably harder to control for.  This condition demands that the effect of treat-
ment on a unit i should be independent of the effects of treatment on any other units.  
This assumption implies no equilibrium effects. 
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6.4 Matching strategies and data features 
The data at our disposal does not conform to what is ideal for the most commonly 
used techniques for the analysis of observational data.  First and foremost, we do not 
have programs that take place at one point in time and thus makes it easy to identify 
the exact before and-after intervention periods.  On the contrary, interventions occur 
at several points in time in the sense that a company may be subject to benefits at 
several points in time and in some (rare) cases, may enter the same program repeat-
edly.  For some years the treatment groups are too small to be well suited for analy-
ses. The number of treatment cases for the FRAM program is only 18 and 19 for the 
years 1991 and 1992 respectively (Table 2). In the case of the Network program we 
have no exact information concerning when participants first became engaged in the 
program.   We have data that tells us exactly what firms participated in the program 
between 1992 and 1996 but we cannot identify participants who left or re-entered the 
program within this period.    Moreover, in a few instances firms enter programs in 
the year following the year of founding and thus, for these firms we have no infor-
mation about the year prior to intervention; the central piece of information for the 
matching procedures.    
 
In the case of the Investment Grant and Venture Capital Loans programs the two 
programs are interwoven in the sense that about a third of the firms in our data par-
ticipate in both programs.  In the matching procedures we therefore consider Re-
gional Venture Capital Loans, Investment Grants and the combinations of the two as 
three subsets within the matches of one dataset.  Thus we have two financial 
schemes and two programs, but three datasets to analyze.  Also, participants may 
enter programs at various times over a six-year period and may enter one of the 
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programs prior to entering both programs and also participate and receive benefits 
over more than one year.  No participants enter one of the programs after a period of 
being involved in both programs, but some participants may re-enter one of the pro-
grams after a year or more of absence from the program.  Thus, the before program 
year, which carries the central information for the matching procedure, the informa-
tion about the pre-program status for our matching variables and our outcome vari-
ables is a moving window that ensures that the pre-program year for the treatment 
cases matches the  pre-program year for the control cases.  For all three datasets we 
can identify firms that left the market due to bankruptcy or other reasons for closure.  
In the treatment group, less than ten percent of the cases in all three datasets are lost 
over the observation period 1989 to 2006. Since we have a large pool of potential 
controls, control cases that are lost before 2006 are deleted from all three datasets, 
 
The complexity of the three datasets and their peculiarities calls for matching strate-
gies that attend to both their irregularities and what they have in common. We want 
to have the best possible estimate of the effects of interventions for all three pro-
grams and we also want to evaluate effects on an equal footing that makes com-
parisons possible.  This implies compromises that may sacrifice exactness for com-
parability.   The use of matching as a nonparametric preprocessing method that in-
vites further analysis (Ho et al., 2007) has some consequences for how matching is 
carried out, noticeably a preference for one-to-one exact matching.   
 
One-to-one exact matching is a feasible option for all three datasets because we have 
a large pool of potential controls.  Thus, analyses that go beyond the simple differ-
ence between the means in the treatment and control group, notably analyses that 
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attend to the advantages of having longitudinal data, are facilitated.  The question of 
comparability, i.e. to what extent we can compare the outcomes of the schemes and 
programs in question is a different one: We can argue that outcomes are comparable 
because a) all entities under scrutiny are from the same population b) the majority of 
firms are on the average within the same range in terms of size, although firms in the 
FRAM- program may be a bit below average compared to the other two inter-
ventions (most of them are small and medium-sized enterprises, SME) c) we use the 
same covariates for matching for all three programs.   
 
We follow the principle that the features of the data decide our choice of procedures 
as long as this line of proceeding does not compromise the applicability of methods.    
 
These overarching considerations place heavy demands on the implementation of 
operative procedures for matching.    Clearly, when the goal of the procedures is to 
identify a non-treated firm that is as similar as possible to the treated firm, the solu-
tion is to search in the direction of the “twin” firm.  Of course, identical “twin” firms 
cannot be found.  Moreover, administrative data provides a limited number of firm 
traits and we have decided that five traits, firm size, the logarithm of total turnover, 
technology understood as the ration of employees to turnover, a coarse categoriza-
tion of industrial sector based upon NACE codes, degree of newness, understood as 
the time elapsed since establishment, and geographical localization (region) provide 
a sufficient and feasible characterization of the firm.  Thus, the achievable goal of 
the matching procedure is, for each firm exposed to intervention; to find the non-
exposed firm that most closely resembles the exposed firm, along the five above 
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mentioned dimensions taken together.  This requires a matching procedure able to 
account for all the peculiarities of our three datasets.  
 
The structure of the data for Investment Grants and Regional Venture Capital Loans 
and the FRAM program has in common that interventions take place at various 
points in time over a limited time span.  As illustrated in Figure 6, this implies that 
we can identify the before and after periods.  It does, however, imply a couple of less 
obvious problems:   
 
 
N= ...1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ….2006
1 p i
2 p i
. p i
. p i
n p i
  { - - -  intervention period  - - - }
p  = prior to intervention, i = intervention
{------- Before -------} {----- After-----}
 
 
 
Figure 6  The timing of interventions 
 
Provided that a match for case ni in the first occurring intervention is identified, that 
case has to be reserved for all succeeding time periods in order to preserve the possi-
bility for one-to-one exact match for the consecutive time periods.  Furthermore, any 
case that has found its match has to be protected from being confused with cases 
from both preceding and succeeding periods. This situation is different from the 
multiple treatment case (Lechner, 2001) where a multinomial logit model can be 
applied.  Clearly, within the intervention period we have no clear distinction between 
before and after intervention without an explicit inclusion of the time variable.  This 
feature is important to our choice of matching procedure. 
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6.5 Matching methods – guidelines and procedures  
The choice of matching algorithm is something that is usually discussed within a 
propensity score framework (section 6.3, page 61). The great divide in the matching 
literature is, however, between propensity score matching (PSM) and covariate 
matching (CVM) or matching on X in Heckman’s (1998a) terminology. Until re-
cently, only a few applied papers based upon covariate matching have been avail-
able.  Thus, guidelines and procedures for covariate matching are rare.  On the other 
hand, guiding principles and methods for propensity score matching (Caliendo et al., 
2005) are now so well developed that they  provide good instructions and checklists 
for  covariate matching as well.  Thus, we follow the assumptions in section 6.3 and 
use propensity score matching (PSM) as the standard for comparisons of alternative 
procedures.  
6.5.1 Matching in one dimension – the propensity score  
With PSM as reference, the algorithm decision is a question about how to best match 
two vectors of probabilities ranging from zero to one.  Alternatively, we can use a 
number derived from this probability (e.g. p’=ln((p/(1-p))) in order to improve the 
working of the matching algorithm employed.  The baseline technique for PSM 
matching is the nearest neighbor method algorithm, which is available in many vari-
ants.  Since PSM operates by reducing the dimensionality problem from many di-
mensions to one dimension, the problem is usually that there are more cases close to 
one in the treatment group than in the control group. Correspondingly, there are 
(usually) more cases close to zero in the control group. Since the endpoints zero and 
one are not included in the range of probabilities, cases near the extremes should be 
deleted (Abadie et al., 2002). Clearly, the matching of propensity scores close to 
zero may not contribute much to the balancing properties of the covariates since the 
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substantial meaning of this is to compare two units that both have a low probability 
of being included in the treatment group.  
 
As implied in section 6.3, the widespread use of propensity score matching (PSM) 
has via practice crystallized an almost standardized six-step procedure which starts 
with the choice between  PSM and CVM (covariate matching) and ends with 
sensitivity analysis. Since PSM almost invariably is the preferred method, CVM is 
mentioned only as a part of the initial choice in Caliendo’s (2005) excellent outline 
of the PSM procedure.  Figure 7 also implicitly indicates that cross-sectional data is 
assumed.  This most basic implementation assumes an identifiable binary treatment 
i.e., a treatment regime where it is clear-cut to decide who received treatment and 
who did not. It also assumes that treatment takes place at one point in time.  Step 2, 
the estimation of propensity scores can be carried out in many ways. The most 
commonly applied is the binary logit model.  Step 3 involves the choice of matching 
algorithm; an issue that depends heavily on sample issues such as the extent of 
common support region (Figure 8, page 71).  Thus, step 4 may have consequences 
for step 3 in the sense that the amount of overlap between the propensity score for 
the treatment group and control group, the common support, may determine what 
matching strategy is best suited.  Thus, with a control group that is large relative to 
the treatment group, one-to-one matching may be the preferred action while a rela-
tively undersized control group may call for a one-to-many match and even match-
ing with replacements of the comparison units.  One-to-one matching permits unit 
weights in further analyses while one-to-many assumes one or other kind of 
weighting regime to account for the relative influence of the various comparison 
units, usually in the form of weights based on the distance to match, adjusted to sum 
  
70 
to unity. One-to-many matching may reduce bias, but weights may be cumbersome 
to handle in further analysis. Replacement of comparison units will also reduce bias 
and is recommended when the control group is small. There is, however, a trade-off 
between bias and precision: Compared to matching without replacement, replace-
ment will generally lower the bias and  increase the variance (Abadie et al., 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7  The stepwise procedures for practical propensity score matching10  
 
The worst case for matching is the situation where a substantial number of treatment 
cases are outside the region of common support (to left in Figure 8).   For this situa-
tion there is no proper cure.  Another problem is different distributions of propensity 
scores in the treatment and control groups within the region of common support. One 
remedy for this is the so called caliper-matching which substitutes the notion of the 
closest match for an idea of an approximately evenly distributed distance between 
treatment and control cases over the region of common support.  This is usually 
achieved by use a “caliper” radius around a point instead of using the nearest 
neighbor principle thus accepting a fixed difference in propensity score. 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 The figure is modified from Caliendo, M., & Kopeinig, S. 2005. Some Practical Guidance for the 
Implementation of Propensity Score Matching. Bonn: Forschunginstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. pp 2. 
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Figure 8 The Region of Common Support and Loss of Cases (Hypothetical) 
 
 
Caliper matching is implemented in some matching programs and can be a reason-
able compromise when data deviate from what is ideal, in particular when the num-
ber of propensity scores is scarce in the mid-range of the region of common support 
whereas cases cluster in the upper and lower part of the region.  There are few, if 
any, rules or research based knowledge concerning the width of the caliper. Even 
though it is frequently applied, few scholars manage to come up with a credible 
justification for their choice of bandwidth.    
 
A different strategy is to break the treatment sample up into intervals and estimate 
treatment effect separately in each region.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (2006) have 
demonstrated that even a few groups reduces bias substantially.  A more sophisti-
cated strategy is to use some type of distribution to account for the distance between 
propensity scores.  Kernel estimators, e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd  (1997) put 
one or other distribution (e.g. normal) around each treatment unit and weight closer 
control units more heavily than farther control units.   Ongoing research (Sekhon & 
Diamond, 2005) implies that the list of matching methods will be extended.   
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6.5.2 Matching in many dimensions – Covariate Matching 
We have decided to make use of covariate matching (CVM) as the basis for the con-
struction of control groups. So why not use the well established procedures of pro-
pensity score matching?  Our reasons for the decision to use CVM are based both on 
practical and theoretical grounds. We will first discuss the practical reasons. 
 
An algorithm that has an opening for exact matches for at least one variable, the time 
indicator, is convenient.  Without such an option, matching becomes very laborious 
and the likelihood of errors may increase.  To demonstrate the problem we can re-
turn to Table 1, page 41, where we have altogether 1435 pre-treatment cases for the 
treatment variables and 425 cases that are registered in 1989 (t-1) which means that 
the decision concerning allotment was done in 1990.  Regardless of the chosen 
matching method, these 425 cases have five pre-treatment covariates that have to be 
matched to the corresponding control group pre-treatment covariates also registered 
in 1989, not to covariates belonging to any other year.  Thus, we can split the dataset 
into five datasets, one for each year, and estimate propensity scores separately for 
each set and then execute the matching procedure.  Because almost all cases will 
exist over all five periods we then have to exclude all matched control cases from the 
remaining data before we estimate propensity scores and match the data for the next 
period (year-dataset).  A problem with such a procedure is that it will produce differ-
ent results dependent upon which year we take as our starting point for the proce-
dure, and we would not know the optimal sequence of years until all ordered per-
mutations (5!/(5-5)! = 120) are attempted.   
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Another problem is that, for some years, the treatment groups are small.  As shown 
in Table 2, page 41, in the FRAM dataset we have only 18 and 19 treatment cases 
for the years 1992 and 1993 respectively.   This may cause a problem with empty 
cells in those comparisons cases that would otherwise give the best matches.  For the 
Network program (Table 3) the problem is that we do not know the exact years when 
treatment took place (what years companies participated in the projects).  Thus, 
common features of the datasets calls for procedure that makes it possible to have 
exact match for at least one variable, namely years, while simultaneously matching 
the other variables according to one or other measure of minimum distance between 
treatment and control cases conditional upon the chosen covariates.  Because 
matching is predominantly looked upon as a cross-sectional method,  such options 
are not included in the most commonly used programs for propensity score matching 
such as Leuven and Sianesi’s (2003) excellent Stata programs psmatch2, and 
pscore (Becker & Ichino, 2002), Sekhon’s (2005) versatile R+ program GenMatch, 
and the R+ programs MatchIt  (Ho et al., 2007) and CEM (Stefano M. Iacus, Gary 
King, & Porro, 2008). To our knowledge the only known program that has this op-
tion is the Stata11 ado-program nnmatch (Abadie et al., 2001) for covariate match-
ing.  The feature of the data is a weighty reason, but convenience is not the only rea-
son for using the program nnmatch.  We have categorical covariates such as region, 
newness and industry that are not well suited for logistic regression unless they are 
recoded as dummy variables.  
 
On the theoretical side, as we discuss later, some properties of covariate matching 
may be preferable to the comparable properties of propensity score matching e.g. 
efficiency (Frölich, 2007a).  Clearly, covariate matching is more cumbersome to ap-
                                                        
11 StatCorp ©1984-2009 
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ply and the six steps that guide discussions of propensity score matching (Figure 7, 
page 70) cannot be fully followed. 
 
6.5.3 Covariate matching vs. Propensity Score Matching 
With many covariates, especially continuous ones, matching on covariates runs into 
the curse of dimensionality, the problem that propensity score matching so elegantly 
circumvents (Rosenbaum et al., 1983).  Also, while matching on propensity score 
uses the absolute difference between the score in the treatment group and the control 
group as the basis for matching observations, covariate matching relies of other met-
rics for the judgments concerning differences between observations in the treatment 
and control groups.  This implies that a clear-cut notion of the region of common 
support is lacking for covariate matching.  Clearly, this is an instance where we can-
not entirely follow Caliendo’s (2005) excellent six-step procedure. While propensity 
matching (usually) relies upon a fine-grained number between 0 and 1 (excluding 
the endpoints) covariate matching relies upon a metric that is the outcome of matri-
ces of the form (XD=1 – XD=0)W(XD=1 – XD=0)T  where W is a weight matrix and X is 
matrices of covariates.  The program nnmatch offers several alternatives for W; the 
Euclidean metric, the Mahalanobis metric and two variants of what we can call the 
“Abadie-Imbens weight matrix”.  The Euclidean weight matrix is the identity matrix 
while the Mahalalobnis weight matrix is the inverse of the variance-covariance ma-
trix of X. The Abadie-Imbens weight matrix is a diagonal matrix with the inverses of 
the variances of X as its elements.  The result from the program nnmatch can be 
either ATE, the average treatment effect, the ATC the average treatment effect on 
the control group, or ATT, the average treatment effect on the treated.  The program 
has several useful options that will not be discussed here.  We consider only the 
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ATT and the bias correction option for the ATT that is based on the regression ad-
justment suggested by Rubin (1973b).  The nnmatch algorithms minimize biases by 
allowing for more than one control case to match to each treatment cases.  The pro-
gram works in this manner regardless of whether the option for one-to one match is 
selected or not.  The bias adjustment usually adds more matching cases to achieve 
the optimum result12.   Despite many differences, the basic template of the propen-
sity score procedure should be kept in mind in the discussion of results. 
 
                                                        
12  Abadie et al. (2002) show that, besides retrial, this is the only way to reach a less biased estimate.  
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7. Preprocessing 
7.1 A brief overview of the section 
This section outlines the strategies applied for the preprocessing.  The central goal of 
the preprocessing is to establish for later use the initial datasets and their respective 
control groups. We introduce additional assumptions required for the use of the dif-
ference-in-indifferences estimator and the basic approaches to the construction of 
new datasets. The pragmatic strategies introduced reflect both the limitations im-
posed by the complexity of the data at hand and our preference for taking advantage 
of the longitudinal structure of the data.  The section presents the construction of 
match pairs and preliminary results for the intervention periods.  These preliminary 
results should be considered as nothing more than an integral part of the prepos-
sessing stage. They constitute the point of departure for necessary adjustment and 
corrections for the construction of datasets made up of one-to-one matched pairs of 
treatment cases and control cases.    
 
7.2 The Construction of Pairwise Control 
In line with the perspective that we use matching as a nonparametric preprocessing 
method we will present various analyses we believe can account for the effects of 
the interventions in question.  All suggested analyses are based upon the difference-
in-differences (DiD) estimator and are solely concerned with estimates of the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated (ATT).    
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The first step in our estimation strategy is to construct the control groups.  For each 
treatment case we seek to identify the closest possible non-treatment case in order to 
construct three datasets; one for Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment 
Grants and the combination of the two, hereafter called the schemes dataset, one for 
the FRAM program and one for the Network program.  Each dataset is made up of 
the most similar pairs of treatment and control cases, i.e. similar with respect to the 
five matching variables measured in the year prior to treatment.  Thus, we construct 
three datasets made up of such pairs for all years within the intervention periods.  
Note that we construct only one schemes dataset and consider the three variants of 
the financial schemes as subgroups within this dataset. 
 
The upper part of Figure 9, the pre-intervention and the intervention period, shows 
the general structure of the schemes dataset.  The corresponding datasets for the 
FRAM program and the Network program have a similar structure but different in-
tervention periods.  Note that the post-intervention period is merged to the datasets 
after cleaning and corrections of the datasets for the pre-intervention and the inter-
vention period.  This is easily done since every treatment case has a unique identifier 
(1…i) which after one-to one matching has found its pair which also has its unique 
(1…n) identifier.   Perfect match means that any XTi,j,year equals XCn,m,year. The unique 
ij-combinations facilitate the construction of a new unique identification number to 
represent matched pairs.  The one-to-one match structure of the data matrix provides 
flexibility that permits rearrangements that facilitates many kinds of longitudinal 
analyses.  
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Yt1,1,1989..Xt1,2,1989..Xt1,j,1989..Yc1,1,1989.. Xc1,2,1989..Xc1,m,1989..
:
Yti,1,1989..Xti,2,1989..Xti,j,1989..Ycn,1,1989.. Xcn,2,1989..Xcn,m,1989..
:
Yt1,1,1990..Xt1,2,1990..Xt1,j,1990..Yc1,1,1990.. Xc1,2,1990..Xc1,m,1990..
:
Yti,1,1990..Xti,2,1990..Xti,j,1990..Ycn,1,1990.. Xcn,2,1990..Xcn,m,1990..
:  
Yt1,1,1994..Xt1,2,1994..Xt1,j,1994..Yc1,1,1994.. Xc1,2,1994..Xc1,m,1994..
:
Yti,1,1994..Xti,2,1994..Xti,j,1994..Ycn,1,1994.. Xcn,2,1994..Xcn,m,1994..
:
Yt1,1,2006..Zt1,2,2006..Zt1,j,2006..Yc1,1,2006.. Zc1,2,2006..Zc1,m,2006..
:
Yti,1,2006..Zti,2,2006..Zti,j,2006..Ycn,1,2006.. Zcn,2,2006..Zcn,m,2006..
 
Post-Intervention period
Intervention period
Pre-Intervention period
 
 
Figure 9  General Structure of the matched files 
 
Since matches are based upon the values of the Xs in the year prior to intervention 
(see Figure 6, page 67) it important that we do not lose cases over the analyses pe-
riod.   Missing cases may generate unbalanced panels that may affect estimates. 
7.3 Difference-in-differences for Matched Data 
In this section we present the initial results from the matching procedure based 
nnmatch.  The purpose of this section is to explain the rationale for the adjustments 
of the initial matches and to introduce the initial average over the intervention pe-
riod estimators for the treatment groups.  The estimators are based upon the 
casewise after-before difference (Yi,after – Yi, before) constructed for all cases before 
running nnmatch.  After program execution this difference becomes the difference-
in-differences.  Note that the algorithms of the ado-program are constructed so that 
the program can perform matching without entering any outcome variable.  The ad-
vantages of running the program with the outcome variable included is that we ob-
tain the standard errors suggested by Abadie & al. (2002) which is otherwise not 
easily calculated. Also, we can report their bias-adjusted estimates.  This section is 
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also a prelude to two estimates we ultimately intend to report, the two-period esti-
mates and the panel estimates.   
 
The two-period estimates we intend to report are the difference-in-differences based 
upon matched data for the consecutive years after the first year after treatment.  The 
panel structure of the data i.e. that we can follow the individual firm over time, fa-
cilitates these analyses.  Thus the estimates we report are the traditional difference-
in-differences from year to year based on the pairwise matched data.  We are aware 
that these analyses are vulnerable to bias due to influence by unmeasured factors.  
These issues will be addressed by means of sensitivity analyses. The purpose of 
these analyses is primarily to get an idea of the shape of the non-linear development 
over time of the presumed effects (see Figure 1). The two period estimates will also 
be used in order to get an idea of how the magnitude of the cumulative effects 
evolves over the time-span observed after treatment. 
 
The panel data estimates are more robust to hidden bias than the two-period esti-
mated and make better use of the information in the data but give us an only overall 
estimate of the presumed effect over the time period subject to analysis. These 
analyses are based upon solutions suggested by Imbens and Woolridge (2007) con-
cerning difference-in-differences estimation for  panel data.   
7.3.1 Additional Assumptions for DiD estimation for Matched Pairs 
Traditionally, the natural experiment was the setting for difference-in-differences 
estimation.  Challenging assumptions such as that the same process should generate 
the observed outcomes of the target variables in both the treatment group and the 
control group and, that the generated outcomes follow approximately the same pat-
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tern over time in both groups, was central (Ashenfelter, 1978) to the analyses of the 
natural experiment.  Problems like  selection bias (Heckman, 1976, 1979), well 
known to be of importance in natural experiments was, however, less emphasized.  
In general, difference-in-differences estimation is a technique developed for settings 
that do not involve matching and where the before – after- differences in the 
treatment and control groups are estimated independently.  More recently, (Dorsett, 
2005; Eichler & Lechner, 2002) the combination of DiD estimation and matching 
techniques  has become more common, often with an explicit reference to, among 
other things, the sample selection problem.  Usually, the assumptions for difference-
in-differences estimation in analyses that do not involve matching (Ashenfelter, 
1978; 2005) are invoked for matching based analysis as well.   
 
Noteworthy, matching involves a range of assumptions concerning the independence 
between treatment assignments and the variables used for matching, and the inde-
pendence between treatment assignments and the outcomes on the effect-variable. 
The assumptions needed to use difference-in-differences after matching is that (6) 
XDYY otot ⊥− '  and 1)1(0 <=< XDprob , where t’ means the period before treat-
ment and t means the period after treatment.  Note that this concerns only the poten-
tial non-treatment outcome and that this in fact is a weaker assumption than those 
listed as assumptions (4) and (5) in section  6.3.  Since we construct our panel by 
following the same units over time we must assume that the before-after differences 
in the outcome variable in the control group are independent of the treatment assign-
ment, conditional upon our observed covariates used for the matching procedure 
and, that no control cases are systematically excluded in ways that affect this before-
after difference. Clearly, a breach of this assumption is possible; it could for instance 
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occur as a result of a systematic dropping of cases over the time span after interven-
tion.  If so, this would imply a violation of the standard assumption of MCA13 (Little 
& Rubin, 1987; 1989) which is a prerequisite for deleting missing cases.  Through-
out the analyses of the matched pair datasets, MCA is assumed and if any case is 
missing in the control group, the corresponding (pair) case is also dropped in the 
treatment group.  Thus, although the panel data analyzes are based upon unbalanced 
panels14, equal number of treatment and control cases is maintained over time for all 
pairs over the entire time span used.  Other violations of assumption (6) would most 
likely also imply infringement of the SUTVA15 assumption which says that the 
potential outcome on one unit should be unaffected by the assignment of treatment 
to any other unit (Cox, 1958). SUTVA  goes beyond the concept of independence 
but is, according to Rubin (1991) not needed for defining causal effects.  
7.4 Initial estimates and the adjustments of matched pairs 
The average effect of treatment on the treated, ATT, is measured as the mean value 
of the difference between treatments and controls the year before the intervention 
periods contrasted with the corresponding difference the first year after the end of 
the intervention periods:  
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Where t is the number of observations in the treatment group and c is the number of 
observations in the control group.   Clearly, ATT, as expressed above, can be calcu-
lated without any matching procedure.  The result would most likely contain a large 
                                                        
13 MCA = Missing Completely at Random 
14 Panel datasets with unequal number of cases over the time-span under examination e.g. due to missing data are 
called unbalanced panels 
15 SUTVA = Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
  
82 
amount of unobserved heterogeneity since we would not know a lot about the obser-
vations (firms) we compare.  After matching, however (t = c) and every (i = n) 
along a set of specified criteria, in our case, five carefully chosen observable charac-
teristics, our five matching covariates.  Dependent on the goodness of match, we 
now have difference-in-differences for any selected subgroup and any such group 
would have an equal number of treatment cases and control cases.  Moreover, we 
obtain averages controlling for our five matching covariates. 
 
Clearly if we estimate three ATTs, one for the financial schemes, one for the FRAM  
program and one for the Network program, these three simple measures of differ-
ence-in-differences for the groups that received treatments also add in the effects of 
being in the treatment group in any year prior to the last year before the end of the 
intervention period.  For the Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grant dataset such 
effects will be present for the period 1991 to 1994, for the FRAM  program, such 
effects will apply to the period 1993 to 1996 and for the Network program the period 
1994 to 1996 will be affected. For a case that receive treatment only in the last year 
before the end of an intervention period that lasts, say 5 years, this implies that this 
case is viewed as receiving treatment in four consecutive years despite the fact that it 
did not.  The direction of bias in such cases is most likely downwards, towards un-
derestimating the true effect of intervention.  If, on the other hand, a case receives 
treatment in the first year of the intervention period and is included as a treatment 
case in the remaining four years, the direction of bias is less clear.  If effects of in-
tervention are instantaneous and then fade off, extending the length of the interven-
tion period may produce downward biased estimates. Effects that are additive over 
the years may work in the opposite direction.   In any case, any extension of the in-
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tervention period beyond a single point in time is, from a statistical point of view, 
problematic. From a more pragmatic point of view we do not expect the various 
lengths of the intervention periods to be a problem in this setting since the estimator 
obtained is not our most central measure of effects; it should rather be regarded as an 
estimator that is motivated by the matching procedure, i.e., an estimator that facili-
tates simultaneous calculation of the best matches for control cases over the entire 
intervention periods.  As such, the estimator should be interpreted as the average 
over the intervention periods difference-in-differences effects.  
 
The estimates presented in this section are the direct (which only means that esti-
mates are not bias adjusted) outcomes of the program nnmatch (Abadie et al., 2001) 
based on the difference in added value before and after the treatment calculated 
separately for the treatment group and the control group before running the program.  
Thus, the estimates are difference-in-differences.  We present the direct and the bias-
adjusted estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT).  All the 
estimates are based upon the uncorrected datasets; which means that all duplicate 
cases produced by the program are kept and there are no corrections for outliers.  
Thus, the peculiarities of the data are handled by the program and no manually ad-
justments are made.  This implies that more cases than the number of existing treat-
ment cases are used for constructing the best possible matching pairs. We estimate 
treatment effects (intervention effects) using the program option for one-to-one16 
matching.  One of the side effects of using this option is that the difference between 
the direct estimates and the bias-adjusted estimates is less than if we allow for more 
than one control case to be used as matches for each treatment case.  It turns out, 
                                                        
16 One-to-one matching should not be confused with exact matching although the concepts 
occasionally are used interchangeably.  Exact matching should be reserved for what it literally 
expresses, a casewise perfect match. 
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however, that the program nnmatch in most cases does not converge17 to the one-to-
one solution.  Thus, one-to-one matching does, in most cases, imply that a minimum 
number of duplicate cases are used in the matching procedure.  
For the dataset for Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grant we present 
the initial results for the entire group only. In later analyses we will split this data set 
into three subgroups, (1) Regional Venture Capital Loans (2) Investment Grand (3) 
the group that received both kinds of allotments.  The initial results presented below 
are for all three categories lumped together.   
    
7.4.1 Preliminary Estimates for the Financial Schemes 
Table 10  shows the estimates for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
over the entire intervention period as estimated by the algorithms introduced by 
Abadie et al. (2001).  The bias corrected estimate suggests that the mean of the 
difference-in-differences between the treatment group and the matched control group 
between 1989 (the year before intervention) and 1995 (the first year after the period 
of interventions) is on the average 2.264 million NOK per company that received 
treatment.  Thus, after choosing between 134920 minus 1435 potential controls, 
1453 cases have been selected as acceptable controls and yield an estimate above 2.2 
mill. NOK, which is our initial estimate of the difference-in-differences (DiD) 
between 1989 and 1995.   Thus, the joint effects of the allocation of funds to limited 
companies in the form of Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grant are, 
over the intervention period, at the average, about 2.2 mill NOK per company. The 
                                                        
17 Convergence is in general a substantial problem for nnmatch.  
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two estimates are both significantly different from zero with relatively narrow confi-
dence intervals ranging from 1.2 mill NOK to about 3.2 mill NOK.  
 
Table 10 Preliminary ATT estimates for the Financial Schemes 
Coef. Std. err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
2223.41 513.941 4.33 0.00 1216.10 3230.71 Direct estimate 
2264.12 515.934 4.39 0.00 1252.91 3275.33 Bias Adjusted 
Total number of matched pairs =     1453  
Total number of treatment cases =     1435  
Total number of potential control cases = 133485  
Total N = 134920  
 
 
Note that both estimates are very similar and that the bias adjustment procedure re-
sults in a slightly higher estimate and a small increase in the standard errors of the 
estimate.  Note also that 1453 matched pairs means that 18 treatment cases are added 
during execution, i.e. there must be duplicate cases in the treatment group. 
 
7.4.2 Preliminary Esimates for the FRAM  program 
Table 11 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  The effect of the 
FRAM program is at the average about 170,000 NOK per company.  The bias ad-
justed estimate is slightly higher than the direct estimate and the standard errors of 
the estimate is somewhat increased.  The confidence interval contains zero, thus in-
dicating that the estimated effects are not significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 11 Preliminary ATT - estimates for the FRAM  Program 
Coef. Std. err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
169.27 164.551 1.03 0.304 -153.24 491.79 Direct estimate 
172.55 164.469 1.05 0.294 -149.80 494.91 Bias Adjusted 
Total number of matched pairs =      530  
Total number of treatment cases =      525  
Total number of potential control cases =105788  
Total N =106213  
 
 
  
86 
Thus, we have positive, insignificant outcomes and five cases are added during exe-
cution; hence, we know that we have duplicate cases in the treatment group.  
 
7.4.3 Preliminary Estimates for the Network program 
The Network program shows very strong effects.  As shown in Table 12 the average 
treatment effect on the treated is close to 5 mill. NOK per company.  The estimates 
are both highly significant with relatively narrow confidence intervals at the 95% 
level.  The table shows that the bias-adjusted estimate exceeds the non-adjusted 
while the change in the standard error is only minor.  The increase in estimates after 
regression adjustment is reassuring since the adjusted estimate is supposed to be the 
more accurate one. Even though we know that these estimates may reflect the addi-
tive effects over the five-year period the dataset covers and thus clearly overstate the 
true effects, the results are surprising, in particular since previous evaluations indi-
cated no effects of this program.  Surprising results does, however, ask for thorough 
further inspections.  Since our analyses are based upon matches on observed covari-
ates we should check for the influence of other unobserved variables.  
 
Table 12 ATT - DiD - direct and bias adjusted estimates – Network Program 
Coef. Std. err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
4776.45 1188.488 4.02 0.00 2447.06 7105.84 Direct estimate 
4813.78 1188.836 4.05 0.00 2483.70 7143.85 Bias Adjusted 
Total number of matched pairs =    1582  
Total number of treatment cases =    1575  
Total number of potential control cases =  44895  
Total N =  46470  
 
 
 
 
We observe that 7 cases are added during execution and thus, we know that dupli-
cate cases in the treatment group are generated during execution of the program. 
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7.4.4 Preliminary Estimates: A Summing Up 
We decided to construct one single dataset for the financial schemes and analyze 
each individual scheme as a subgroup.  Separate matching procedures for the Re-
gional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants were also carried out. Matching 
results were almost identical, regardless of whether we matched the two groups 
separately or together.  With close to 40% of the companies receiving both kinds of 
allocations the best match for all three (the third being the combination, i.e. close to 
40%) groups were found by using one match that included all three groups.  The 
reason for this result is probably that there are small differences between those firms 
that received one kind of allotment, Regional Venture Capital Loans or Investment 
Grants and those who received both.  Analyses of subgroups depends on the sum of 
the quality of the matches for the individual cases within the subgroups only, and 
lumped together the mean of the distance metrics was more even distributed across 
the three groups and about the same size; thus we consider the one dataset strategy 
justified. 
 
For all three datasets, the algorithm added cases in the treatment group.  These sur-
plus cases have to be removed in order to construct one-to-one matches.  It also 
turned out the algorithm produced duplicate cases in the control group, even when 
the option for one-to-one matches was specified.  The duplicate cases are of concern 
since the necessary deletion of cases may be a source of bias. 
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8. Matching quality and bias reduction 
8.1 A brief overview of the section 
The purpose of this section is to establish the quality of the outcomes of the match-
ing procedures.  This is primarily done by comparing the degree of similarity be-
tween the treatment group and the control group, measured in terms of the scores on 
the covariates selected for matching.  The matching algorithms of the nnmatch pro-
gram do not provide a perfect one-to-one match.  The program generates duplicate 
cases, both in the treatment group and the control group, mostly in the control group, 
and these cases should be deleted.  Moreover, we do not want our matched datasets 
to contain extreme outliers.  Both outliers and duplicates have to be removed manu-
ally.  Maximum bias reduction is achieved under perfect one-to-one match and de-
viation from perfect match implies a loss of bias reduction.  Thus, the central goal of 
this section is the evaluation of the quality of the outcomes from the matching pro-
cedures.  Furthermore, matching on observables does not fully exclude the potential 
influence of unobserved variables.  We cannot entirely rule out the latent influence 
from unobserved confounders, but we can make judgements concerning the amount 
of influence they potentially can exert.  Such considerations are the subject matter of 
the latter part of this section where we discuss the sensitivity of our measures. 
8.2 Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grants 
With propensity score matching as the template, it is easy to see that some central 
points of reference are missing.  With covariate matching we have no unambiguous 
region of common support (step 4, Figure 7, page 70) as with propensity score 
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matching.  Each matched pair has one distance metric in common which informs us 
whether the two parts (the treatment case and the control case) that constitutes the 
pair have a good match or a less good match.   Thus, although there is no such clear 
cut criterion as the region of common support we can distinguish between better and 
worse matched pairs.  We have chosen to use the “Abadie - Imbens” (Abadie et al., 
2001) distance metric which assumes a weight matrix which is a diagonal matrix 
with the inverses of the variances of X, our chosen matching covariates, as its ele-
ments.  This metric depends on the properties of X and has no standardized scale that 
provides an unambiguous criterion for what magnitude that should be considered a 
good match.  The distance metric is however, useful in many respects.  We remove 
the duplicate cases with the greatest distance metric and keep the best ones, those 
with the smallest distance metric.  We use outlier analyses to remove extreme pairs.  
 
There are many ways to evaluate the quality of the matching procedures.  A com-
mon, not very recommendable practice is to look at the t-value for the difference 
between TX  and CX  before and after matching and consider the improvement.  
Since the control group may be, as here, very large compared to the treatment group 
a significant improvement may be meaningless because the significance depends on 
the number of cases in the larger group.  A better, but not unreserved recommend-
able procedure is to use the t-statistics after match. Clearly, a low t-value would be 
taken to indicate a good match. The treacherous aspect here is that it may lead to the 
deletion of cases in order to improve match and such a procedure is self-fulfilling in 
the sense that it will invariably give the illusion of a better match since t decreases as 
the number of cases decreases.   Clearly, deleting cases creates a new source of bias. 
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Another common procedure for checking overall matching quality (step 5 in Figure 
7, page 70) is to look at the percent reduction in bias based on the  
 formula bias = 
2
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22
CT
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ss
XX
+
−
  where TX   and 
2
Ts  are the sample mean and vari-
ance for the treatment group and CX  and 
2
Cs  are the comparable statistics for the 
control group (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).  For propensity score matching, this 
measure is usually reported for each control variable.   The percent bias reduction is, 
however, less appropriate for discrete variables.  A more obvious measure is the per-
cent of cases correctly matched as shown in Table 13.   
 
As noted above, another peculiarity we have to take into consideration when using 
nnmatch is that fine-tuning the matches means that more than one control case is 
usually matched to each treatment case.  This is very inconvenient when we intend 
to use the matched datasets for further analysis and try to avoid cumbersome 
weighting procedures.  Thus we delete all duplicate cases even though the loss of 
cases also is a potential source of bias.  As shown in Figure 10, the dataset for Re-
gional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants is reduced from 1453 cases to 
1125 cases due to duplicates and extreme cases.  In particular, cases that are ex-
tremes in terms of the matching metric are removed so the maximum distance metric 
is down to .25 compared to the original matched sample that had cases with dis-
tances above 10.  Note that the original number of cases was 1435 while the matched 
sample has 1453 cases.   Outlier detection is based on Hadi’s Stata program for de-
tecting extremes (Hadi, 1992; 1994). 
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Figure 10 Outlier & duplicate correction for the Venture Capital & Invest-
ment Grants dataset – Matched pairs 
 
 
Table 13 shows that the original match gave a bias reduction of more then 50% for 
the continuous variable and a correct match for well above 90% for all the discrete 
variables.  The table also shows that outlier and duplicate corrections improved 
matches and brought all discrete variables up to a 100% correct classification. 
  
Table 13 Matching statistics for the dataset for Venture Capital & Inv. Grant  
 
Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. C-T t -value Industry Region Newness Labor/
Unmatched Control 133485 8.27 1.360 -0.780 -21.57 ratio
Data Treatment 1435 9.05 1.636
nnmatch Control 1453 9.05 1.629 0.052 6.95 99.8 % 92.9 % 99.2 % 91.3 %
results Treatment 1453 9.00 1.523
Corrected Control 1125 8.82 1.326 0.020 3.94 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
Match Treatment 1125 8.80 1.293
21.6 %
51.9 %
Cont. variable Ln Total Income - improved balance
Percent of cases lost
Percent bias reduction
Discrete variables - percent correct  
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Even though Table 13 shows significant difference between the means for the treat-
ment and the control group, t = 3.94 after corrections, this can safely be ignored as 
consequence of the large number of cases, the difference, 0.02 is substantially insig-
nificant.  A 21.6% loss of cases is a problem, but should not invalidate conclusions 
that are drawn solely on the basis of the subset of cases that are kept for further 
analysis.  
 
 
0
5
10
15
Tr
ea
tm
en
t (
N
=1
43
5)
0 5 10 15
Control (N=133485)
0
5
10
15
Tr
ea
tm
en
t (
N
=1
45
3)
4 6 8 10 12 14
Control (N=1453)
4
6
8
10
12
14
Tr
ea
tm
en
t (
N
=1
12
5)
4 6 8 10 12 14
Control (N=1125)
0
2
4
6
D
en
si
ty
-.5 0 .5 1
Distribution of difference Treatment-Control
 
 
Figure 11 Q-Q plots of Total Income (log scale) and the distribution of the 
difference between treatment and control groups (Venture Capital & In-
vestment Grants) 
 
The practice of using the mean as the standard for assessing bias reduction 
may be deceitful since equal means may have completely different distribu-
tion.  As pointed to by King (2007) a quantile-quantile plot gives a better 
picture of the improvement achieved by matching.  As shown in Figure 11 
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the matching procedure has made the distribution of total income (on loga-
rithmic scale) in the control group (upper left corner) more comparable to 
the distribution in the treatment group after match (upper right corner).  Out-
lier and duplicate correction have further improved the equality of the distri-
bution of income in the treatment in control group (lower left corner).  The 
lower right corner of Figure 11 shows that the distribution of the difference 
between the two groups is approximately normal. 
8.3 The FRAM  Program 
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Figure 12 Outlier and duplicate correction for the FRAM program – 
Matched pairs 
 
Figure 12 shows the number of cases lost due to outliers and duplicates in the control 
and treatment groups.  The major reason for loss of cases is duplicates in the control 
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group due to the matching procedure. More than 90% of these are kept for further 
analysis, but for a few cases the magnitude of the metric matches is relatively high. 
 
Table 14 Matching statistics for the dataset for the FRAM  program  
Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. C-T t -value Industry Region Newness Labor/
Unmatched Control 105788 8.95 1.129 -0.127 -2.31 ratio
Data Treatment 425 9.08 0.850
nnmatch Control 430 9.10 0.821 0.010 1.06 99.8 % 92.8 % 93.7 % 95.3 %
results Treatment 430 9.09 0.848
Corrected Control 391 9.06 0.823 0.001 0.08 99.8 % 94.9 % 94.4 % 97.0 %
Match Treatment 391 9.06 0.847
8.0 %
12.7 %
Discrete variables - percent correct  Cont. variable Ln Total Income - improved balance
Percent of cases lost
Percent bias reduction  
 
 
The matching statistics for the FRAM program indicate a moderate bias reduction 
due to the continuous variable Total Income.  The percent correct classification of 
the discrete variables is well above 90% for all variables.  This is the smallest dataset 
and the relatively low bias reduction and the fact that we have kept cases with a 
relatively large matching metric reflects a compromise between the quality of match 
and the loss of cases.   Both low quality of match and loss of cases may cause bias.  
With small datasets the trade off between these two factors becomes more apparent. 
 
As indicated by the quantile-quantile plots in Figure 13, matching causes a major 
improvement in the comparability of the distribution of Total Income between the 
treatment and the control group (upper left corner).  The improvement due to the 
exclusion of duplicates and outliers is, however, less clear.  Even though the Q-Q 
plot shows close to a straight line, the lower and upper regions of the plot reveal at 
least a few deviant cases.  Given that a small dataset may require a compromise be-
tween matching quality and the loss of cases, this turns out to be the best possible 
adjustment so far.  It does, however, signal that additional corrections may be neces-
sary. 
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Figure 13 Q-Q plots Total Income (log scale) and the distribution of differ-
ence between treatment and control groups (FRAM) 
 
8.4 The Network  Program 
The dataset for the Network program is relatively large with 1575 treatment cases 
that result in 1582 cases after matching.  As can be seen in Figure 14 the dominant 
reason for loss of cases is duplicates in control cases (146) while only a few cases 
are excluded due to large distance metrics (24) or duplicates in treatment cases (7). 
Moreover, the maximum distance to match in terms of the matching metric is con-
siderably reduced after corrections.  The loss of cases after corrections is 10.8% 
only, leaving 1405 cases for further analysis.  As shown in Table 15, the bias reduc-
tion due to the income variable is close to 90% and the percentage simultaneously 
correctly classified discrete variables is close to 100%.  
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Figure 14 Outlier and duplicate correction for the Network program – 
Matched pairs 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 Matching statistics for the dataset for the Network program 
 
Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. C-T t -value Industry Region Newness Labor/
Unmatched Control 44895 8.06 1.546 -1.411 -35.48 ratio
Data Treatment 1575 9.47 1.686
nnmatch Control 1582 9.46 1.687 0.050 8.49 99.9 % 97.3 % 100.0 % 95.1 %
results Treatment 1582 9.41 1.620
Corrected Control 1405 9.26 1.585 -0.030 -6.32 99.9 % 97.9 % 100.0 % 95.7 %
Match Treatment 1405 9.29 1.618
10.8 %
87.2 %
Cont. variable Ln Total Income - improved balance
Percent bias reduction
Percent of cases lost
Discrete variables - percent correct  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows that the similarity of the distribution of Total Income between the 
treatment group and the control group is substantially improved after matching and 
that the removal of duplicate cases and outliers further improves the comparability 
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of these distributions over treatment and control cases.  Also, the distribution of dif-
ferences in Total Income between the two groups appears to follow a symmetrical 
distribution indicating balance improvements.  
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Figure 15 Q-Q plots Total Income (log scale) and the distribution of differ-
ence between treatment and control groups – The Network program 
 
 
8.5 Matching quality – a summing up 
With pairs of matches (one-to-one matching) we have created three datasets for fur-
ther analysis.  The corrections for outliers and duplicates cause a slight loss of cases 
but improve the overall quality of matches.  Thus, although covariate tends to be 
cumbersome compared to propensity score matching it may be well suited as a pre-
processing tool, in this case particularly since it facilitates exact matching on a dis-
crete variable, a property so far only found in nnmatch.     
  
98 
8.6 Sensitivity analysis for matched pairs 
Matching on observables implies that 1) the choice of control variables can always 
be questioned and 2) we have to recognize that we have limited knowledge about the 
influence of unobserved variables.  Sensitivity analysis may provide some informa-
tion concerning the potential influence of unobservables. Rosenbaum bounds 
(Rosenbaum, 1995) provides one way of  assessing sensitivity.  His arguments go 
briefly like this:  Without randomization, statistical inference is generally not valid 
and we cannot permute data to form p-values. With correctly matched data, how-
ever, there should be no differences between the treatment group and the control 
group, data points should be exchangeable and inference based on permutations 
should be valid and the p-values should be valid, provided there are no unobserved 
confounders.  Rosenbaum’s method for sensitivity analysis relies on the sensitivity 
parameter Г (gamma), the odds of receiving treatment.  In a randomized experiment 
Г = 1 since randomization ensures that the odds of receiving treatment is equal for 
all units. If, in an observational study, two units that are identical on matched 
covariates have a Г that equals, say, 2 this would mean that one of the units might be 
twice as likely as the other to receive treatment because they differ in terms of an 
unobserved covariate (Rosenbaum, 1995).  If we denote the probability of receiving 
treatment for case j as pj, then this probability after match should solely be a function 
of our vector of covariates X and hence, if two units with the same values of X have 
different p, there is hidden bias.  Formally, we have hidden bias if xj = xk and pj ≠ pk 
for some units j and k.   The odds of receiving treatment for a unit j is pj/(1 – pj), thus 
the odds ratio of receiving treatment for any two units j and k with the same values 
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of x is ))1/(/)1/(( jjjj pppp −− . If we assume that this odds ratio is bounded 
between 1/ Г and Г, i.e. Γ≤−
−≤Γ )1/(
)1/(1
kk
jj
pp
pp
 then this would imply that if  
Г equals one, the odds ratios of receiving treatment would be equal for j and k and 
there would be no hidden bias.  If Г is greater the 1, say 3, then the odds of receiving 
treatment for units with the same value of x would differ by a factor of 3.  If we 
think of the deviation from Г equals one (the randomized experiment) as caused by a 
binary unmeasured covariate u we can write a logistic regression model that links 
the covariates to the odds of treatment as log(pj/(1 – pj) = μ(x) + γuj . where μ is a un-
known function and γ is an unobserved parameter and ui is constrained on 
10 ≤≤ju .  Provided that unit j and k have the same values on x i.e. xj = xk, this can 
be  rewritten as exp{
)1/(
)1/( =−
−
kk
jj
pp
pp
γ(uj – uk)} which implies that two units with the 
same values of x differ in their odds of treatment by a factor of γ and the difference 
in the unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum, 1995).  Hence, we can think of Г in terms 
of the size of the coefficient for the unobserved covariate u and this line of reasoning 
can give us an idea of the approximate size of the influence of a hypothetical unob-
served variable. The process of sensitivity analysis then goes as follows:  We choose 
values of Г, say, from 1 to 3 and use the information in our dependent variable, 
which is based on matched pairs, to assess the results of randomization tests based 
on the Wilcoxon sign rank test and the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate for the sign 
rank test for increments in Г . The program rbounds (Gangl, 2004) is used for esti-
mating the Rosenbaum bounds.  
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Table 16 Rosenbaum bounds - Venture Capital Loans & Investm. Grant – 
matched pairs 
Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min
1,00 0,0000 644,0 644,0 505,5 791,8
1,05 0,0000 585,1 703,5 451,0 856,0
1,10 0,0000 532,4 761,5 401,0 918,5
1,15 0,0000 482,0 819,0 353,5 980,5
1,20 0,0000 435,5 875,0 308,5 1041,0
1,25 0,0000 392,0 930,0 265,5 1100,0
1,30 0,0000 350,5 984,5 225,0 1159,1
1,35 0,0000 310,5 1037,5 186,0 1217,5
1,40 0,0000 273,0 1090,0 148,5 1274,5
1,45 0,0001 237,0 1141,5 113,0 1331,5
1,50 0,0007 202,0 1193,0 78,0 1387,5
1,55 0,0039 169,0 1243,3 45,0 1442,8
1,60 0,0156 137,0 1292,5 12,5 1498,3
1,65 0,0477 106,0 1343,0 -19,5 1552,5
1,70 0,1158 75,5 1391,0 -50,5 1608,5
1,75 0,2300 47,0 1439,5 -80,5 1662,5
1,80 0,3843 18,5 1487,5 -109,0 1716,1
1,85 0,5549 -9,0 1535,0 -138,0 1771,1
1,90 0,7119 -36,5 1582,8 -166,5 1824,5
1,95 0,8337 -62,5 1630,5 -194,0 1878,5
2,00 0,9144 -88,5 1676,5 -221,0 1932,0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
 
 
Table 16 shows the Rosenbaum bounds for the treatment effects for the unadjusted 
estimates in Table 10.  The first column is the values for gamma which we have cho-
sen to vary between 1 and 2.  The table shows the p level, maximum and minimum 
of the Hodges-Lehmann point estimates and the upper and lower confidence interval 
for the estimates based on the estimated significance level.  The first line indicates 
an approximate medium value of 644 mill. NOK when gamma equals one, the base-
line, i.e. as in a randomized experiment.  We can see that when gamma equals 1.65 
the p-level approaches the usual 0.05 threshold and the estimated treatment effect 
may be as high as 106 or as low as 1343.  At the lower bound, this is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Hence, the odds of being in the treatment group are 1.65 
times higher because of different values on an unobserved covariate u, and, despite 
being matched on the same observed covariates, our inference changes.  There are 
few guidelines for judging whether the odds ratio 1.6 is high or low. Compared to 
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other social science studies it is relatively high (Rosenbaum, 1995) and indicates that 
the influence of an unobserved variable has to be substantial to affect estimates. 
 
Table 17 Rosenbaum bounds – The FRAM program – matched pairs 
Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min
1,00 0,0072 221,5 221,5 43,0 396,0
1,05 0,0223 179,5 261,5 5,0 433,5
1,10 0,0556 142,0 299,0 -33,0 471,0
1,15 0,1159 106,5 334,0 -68,5 508,0
1,20 0,2071 71,0 367,0 -104,0 543,5
1,25 0,3253 40,0 399,0 -140,0 579,5
1,30 0,4587 9,5 428,5 -171,5 615,0
1,35 0,5918 -20,5 458,5 -205,0 650,0
1,40 0,7109 -49,0 488,5 -237,0 681,0
1,45 0,8075 -77,0 516,0 -267,5 712,5
1,50 0,8792 -105,0 544,5 -299,0 743,0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
 
 
 
 
Table 17 show the Rosenbaum bounds for the estimates for the FRAM program 
(Table 11) where we found positive but statistically insignificant effects.  The table 
shows that the p-values of the Hodges-Lehman point estimates exceed the usual 0.05 
threshold when we change the odds ratio of receiving treatment from 1.0 to 1.1 and 
that the estimated treatment effect may be as high as -33 or as low as 471. At the 
lower bound this is not significant different from zero.   
 
Table 18 Rosenbaum bonds – The Network program – matched pairs 
 
Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min
1,00 0,0000 903,7 903,7 567,3 1260,5
1,05 0,0000 756,1 1053,6 429,5 1421,1
1,10 0,0001 621,0 1200,5 300,0 1580,0
1,15 0,0010 494,3 1344,5 178,0 1736,0
1,20 0,0090 376,0 1487,3 64,0 1890,0
1,25 0,0474 263,5 1626,0 -45,0 2040,4
1,30 0,1579 157,5 1764,5 -150,9 2189,5
1,35 0,3590 57,0 1900,0 -251,5 2338,0
1,40 0,6016 -39,9 2032,8 -350,6 2484,5
1,45 0,8035 -133,5 2164,0 -446,3 2630,0
1,50 0,9238 -223,0 2295,6 -541,5 2773,0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
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Table 18 shows that a 25% change in the odds ration of receiving treatment would 
render the estimates of treatment effects from the Network program vulnerable to 
hidden bias.  
 
Our second kind of estimators; the difference-in-differences based upon matched 
data for consecutive years after the first year after treatment, would, by the line of 
reasoning outlined above, require sensitivity analysis for a minimum of 48 datasets 
for matched pairs, provided that we treat Regional Venture Capital Loans and In-
vestment Grant as one dataset.   The tables for these analyses would require a con-
siderable number of pages.  We therefore present only the minimum gammas neces-
sary for a likely effect of unobserved variables on our initially matched pairs over 
the observation period.  Tables for Rosenbaum Bounds are provided in appendix A. 
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Figure 16 Gamma values at p ≤ .05 for Matched Pairs  
 
Figure 16 indicates the matched pair datasets for Regional Venture Capital Loans 
and Investment Grant (all three categories) are relatively robust in the sense that for 
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the period up to the year 2002, with an exception for 1997, the influence of an unob-
served variable has to be considerable to affect estimates.  Also, the Network pro-
gram seems fairly robust up to the year 2001, although less healthy than the matched 
pairs for Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grant.  The matched pair 
dataset for the FRAM program appears to be highly vulnerable to unobserved het-
erogeneity and the estimates could thus easily be altered by variables not included in 
the matching procedure.   Estimates for the years after 2002 are clearly less trust-
worthy for all three datasets.  
 
8.6.1 Sensitivity analysis – a summing up 
The effects for Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grant are fairly insensitive to 
hidden bias. The estimates for the Network program and for the FRAM program in 
particular, are highly vulnerable to hidden bias.  Thus, for the latter two programs 
unobserved heterogeneity may be a problem.  The sensitivity analysis for these two 
programs implies that the conditional independence assumption (CIA, see assump-
tion 4, section 6.3, page 61) may be violated.  The sensitivity analysis reveals that 
the insignificant effects of the FRAM program appears to be the most exposed to the 
influence of hidden bias, while there is little evidence that the stronger the effects the 
less vulnerable the estimates are to hidden bias. The Rosenbaum bounds is a kind of 
“worst-case” scenario (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004) which simply shows how large the 
influence of a confounding variable must be to undermine conclusions from the 
matching analyses.  Or, to quote Arild Aakvik (2001) : “A sensitivity analysis shows 
how biases might alter inferences. However, it does not indicate whether biases are 
present or what magnitudes are plausible.”   
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Clearly, the sensitivity analysis18 hints that we should look for additional evidence 
that could corroborate our initial estimates.  We do so by using more of the informa-
tion available, namely the possibility of constructing panel data. 
                                                        
18 Overview of the sensitivity analysis is provided in Appendix A.  
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9. Analysis – two-period estimation 
The before-after difference-in-differences two-period estimator is the traditional 
measure for two-period panel data. We extend this estimator to cover all observation 
periods where we have a sufficient number of observations.  Let A be the control 
group and B the treatment group. The basic tool for the two-period estimators is 
dummy-regression with an equation of the general form:    
y = β0 + β1*dB + δ0*d2 + δ1d2*dB+u, where y is the outcome of interest, here 
added value. The dummy dB captures differences between the treatment group and 
the control group that may exist prior to the intervention by the government, d2 
catches what could cause changes in y even in the absence of an intervention. The 
coefficient of interest is δ1, the interaction between d2 and dB that captures the dif-
ference-in-differences. Thus, all variables included in the regression equation are 
simple zero-one dummies coded 1 for treatment and zero for control, d2 is a dummy 
coded 0 for the period before intervention and 1 for period after intervention.  
 
 Table 19 Regression setup for difference-in-differences 
Difference-in-differences Before After Difference (After-Before) 
Treatment β0 + δ0 β0 + β1 + δ0 + δ1 β1 + δ1 
Control β0 β0 + β1 β1 
Difference (Treatment-Control) δ0 δ0+ δ1 δ1 
 
 
The two-period estimator has its particular advantages and disadvantages.  First and 
foremost it is vulnerable to effects of unobserved variables.  Clearly, the further we 
move away from the time of intervention, the more likely it is that outcomes in terms 
of added value are influenced by other factors than the intervention19.  The main 
                                                        
19  The sensitivity analyses indicate that this is in particular the case for the FRAM program and the Network 
program. 
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advantage of the two-period estimator in this setting is that it provides an opportu-
nity to study how effects evolve over time. 
 
As hinted at in Figure 1, page 39, the patterns of effects over time are not obvious.  
The progress over time may evolve in a variety of shapes and knowledge of the ap-
proximate nature of these patterns may be of crucial importance.  In the case of pat-
tern a) and b) in Figure 1, evaluations that take place at time p2 or p3 may provide a 
positive (b) or a negative (a) answer to the question of effects of intervention de-
pendent upon the point in time when the evaluation is carried out.  It is not the case 
that effects invariably occur when it is convenient to carry out an evaluation.  More-
over, from a governmental point of view, c is the preferable pattern.  Thus, although 
we are aware of the weakness of the two-period estimators, they are presented here 
to provide an understanding of how of the effects of interventions evolve over time. 
 
The two-period estimates follow the setup shown in Table 19 where the interaction 
term (δ1) gives the estimates of the DiD which is simply the differences between the 
difference of the means of added value in the matched treatment group and control 
group respectively before and after treatment, and thus, simply an estimate of a sin-
gle mean value  )()( ,,,, BeforeControlBeforeTreatmentAfterControlAfterTreatment YYYYDiD −−−= . It 
is well known that the traditional dummy-regression setup gives unbiased estimates 
of the means but inflated standard errors.  Bootstrapping the means does not solve 
this problem (Abadie, 2002).  In the tables that follow we therefore estimate the 
means and the standard errors by the rank-based methods as described in Gardner 
and  Altman's (1989) book "Statistics with Confidence", pp. 74-79.  A normal ap-
proximation with a continuity correction of 0.5 is used, rather than tables of exact 
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values.  The accuracy should be adequate when both groups have at least 5 observa-
tions20.   The tables show estimates and confidence intervals for each year. 
 
Table 20  Regional Venture Capital Loans, ATT-DiD - 1000 NOK 
  
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err.
1989 302 151 0.00 240.361 -473.01 473.01 Before
1990 338 187 134.27 242.180 -342.11 610.65
1991 338 187 -75.96 226.004 -520.52 368.60
1992 321 170 139.83 266.082 -383.67 663.32 Intervention
1993 311 160 576.53  293.880 -1.73 1154.79
1994 309 158 959.87 * 344.172 282.64 1637.11
1995 306 155 479.96  358.942 -226.36 1186.29
1996 306 155 487.11  447.413 -393.31 1367.52
1997 295 144 599.34  569.283 -521.06 1719.74
1998 285 134 910.98  589.863 -250.10 2072.05
1999 279 128 2037.20 * 520.143 1013.26 3061.13
2000 275 124 1835.83 * 582.345 689.37 2982.29 After
2001 266 115 1359.01 * 648.526 82.07 2635.95
2002 253 102 1356.54 * 637.585 100.85 2612.24
2003 250 99 614.49 575.237 -518.48 1747.47
2004 242 91 1284.53 * 641.128 21.58 2547.49
2005 235 84 2001.74 * 598.097 823.38 3180.11
2006 228 77 2183.59 * 725.685 753.62 3613.57
938.05
1262.53
Average 1989-2006 =
Average 1995-2006 =
∗        p≤ .05
% Conf. Interval  ]
 
   
 
 
Table 21  Investment Grants, ATT – DiD – 1000 NOK 
 
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err.
1989 424 212 0.00 303.253 -596.08 596.08 Before
1990 512 300 183.46 257.301 -322.04 688.96
1991 549 337 112.18 254.361 -387.46 611.82
1992 556 344 341.63 274.301 -197.17 880.43 Intervention
1993 576 364 733.69 * 305.894 132.88 1334.50
1994 574 362 1023.92 * 315.773 403.70 1644.14
1995 560 348 874.00 * 341.334 203.54 1544.45
1996 564 352 936.95 * 433.616 85.25 1788.66
1997 546 334 1081.25  575.458 -49.14 2211.65
1998 523 311 1555.02 * 578.113 419.30 2690.74
1999 507 295 1811.97 * 734.455 369.00 3254.93
2000 487 275 2299.33 * 806.736 714.21 3884.46 After
2001 465 253 1579.54 * 788.704 29.66 3129.43
2002 440 228 1015.54  795.883 -548.68 2579.77
2003 420 208 1571.32 * 792.444 13.65 3128.99
2004 407 195 1901.06 * 865.542 199.55 3602.58
2005 394 182 1397.73 789.539 -154.53 2950.00
2006 376 164 1340.86  919.702 -467.58 3149.29
1097.75
1447.05Average 1995-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ]
Average 1989-2006 = ∗        p≤ .05
 
  
                                                        
20 Note the difference between pairs of observations and total observations. The two would differ since means for 
the years prior to treatment are subtracted from every mean for years after treatment and standard deviations are 
calculated by the method suggested by Gardner and Altman (1989).  
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Table 22  Capital Loans & Investment Grants – Combined – 1000 NOK 
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err.
1989 598 299 0.00 248.489 -488.02 488.02 Before
1990 673 374 438.27 * 220.915 4.50 872.04
1991 690 391 596.30 * 227.598 149.43 1043.17
1992 681 382 1049.85 * 247.518 563.86 1535.85 Intervention
1993 676 377 1277.25 * 274.103 739.05 1815.45
1994 671 372 1814.07 * 309.561 1206.24 2421.90
1995 666 367 2309.14 * 357.225 1607.71 3010.56
1996 667 368 2013.32 * 424.515 1179.76 2846.87
1997 641 342 2175.29 * 489.538 1213.99 3136.58
1998 620 321 2760.49 * 569.185 1642.72 3878.26
1999 593 294 2621.42 * 582.131 1478.12 3764.72
2000 579 280 2942.37 * 693.571 1580.14 4304.60 After
2001 551 252 1972.08 * 656.114 683.28 3260.88
2002 537 238 1522.45 * 646.891 251.70 2793.21
2003 520 221 1279.49 * 641.793 18.66 2540.33
2004 509 210 1420.75 * 685.671 73.64 2767.86
2005 493 194 2113.10 * 661.747 812.90 3413.31
2006 465 166 2444.49 * 766.326 938.58 3950.40
1708.34
2131.20
Average 1989-2006 =
Average 1995-2006 =
∗       p≤ .05
% Conf. Interval  ]
 
 
Gardner and Altman’s (1989) method21 calculates the confidence intervals based on 
all available data independent of whether data is missing for a pair or not.  The esti-
mated means are exactly the same as for the dummy regression model but the confi-
dence intervals are narrower.  Since we know that we have inflated standard errors, 
Gardner and Altman’s method compensates this and gives fewer missing cases.  For 
analyses at the program level this may method be an appropriate strategy22.  Even 
though we compare balanced pairs of treatment and controls, the central issue here is 
yearly comparisons and thus, the year by year averages are the preferred basis for the 
two-period difference in differences.  The discrepancy between the two estimation 
methods is shown in table C9 and the figures C1 to C3 in appendix C. Estimates are 
mostly very similar.  The exceptions are Investment Grants and the FRAM program.  
For the latter the divergence is substantial, in particular after the year 2000.   
 
                                                        
21 The enthusiasm for Gardner and Altman’s methods among other statisticians is somewhat reserved.   
22 Limiting the differences to true pairs only gives slightly different estimates and more missing cases.  The 
sensitivity analyses are all based on true pairs (no missing data), which by definition is required.  
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Table 23 Two-period estimates for the FRAM- program – 1000 NOK 
 
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err.
1991 323 646 0.00 222.425 -436.77 436.77 Before
1992 349 672 127.77 231.808 -327.39 582.93
1993 365 688 66.88 198.406 -322.67 456.44
1994 374 697 358.46 191.654 -17.83 734.75 Intervention
1995 380 703 434.07 * 196.238 48.78 819.36
1996 379 702 642.50 * 209.257 231.65 1053.35
1997 369 692 675.69 * 254.292 176.40 1174.99
1998 346 669 489.10 291.506 -83.29 1061.49
1999 319 642 924.37 * 329.651 277.04 1571.70
2000 297 620 871.71 * 376.273 132.78 1610.63
2001 269 592 529.73 559.126 -568.39 1627.85
2002 250 573 605.69 444.499 -267.36 1478.74     After      
2003 233 556 518.75 489.980 -443.70 1481.19
2004 220 543 836.97 534.318 -212.62 1886.56
2005 206 529 568.49 598.684 -607.61 1744.59
2006 188 511 443.39 657.031 -847.44 1734.21
505.85  
643.13  
∗        p≤ .05
Average 1997-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ]
Average 1991-2006 =
 
 
  
Table 24 Two-period estimates for the Network Program – 1000 NOK 
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err.
1992 1364 2728 0.00 558.121 -1094.38 1094.38 Before
1993 1360 2724 458.18 582.239 -683.50 1599.86
1994 1330 2694 830.25 621.703 -388.82 2049.31 Intervention
1995 1288 2652 1214.54 656.764 -73.28 2502.36
1996 1245 2609 1847.26 * 698.991 476.63 3217.90
1997 1160 2524 1930.82 * 694.840 568.30 3293.33
1998 1082 2446 2232.43 * 744.199 773.10 3691.75
1999 1000 2364 4008.54 * 906.567 2230.79 5786.29
2000 958 2322 3636.47 * 971.249 1731.87 5541.08
2001 899 2263 5611.40 * 989.927 3670.14 7552.66 After
2002 829 2193 4513.24 * 1031.067 2491.27 6535.22
2003 772 2136 3397.61 * 1009.099 1418.69 5376.53
2004 727 2091 3722.14 * 1043.948 1674.85 5769.42
2005 670 2034 4058.36 * 1093.130 1914.59 6202.14
2006 614 1978 4199.36 * 1150.487 1943.07 6455.66
2777.37
3731.04
∗        p≤ .05Average 1992-2006 =
Average 1997-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ]
 
 
 
At a glance the estimates suggest that our hypotheses concerning the ordering of 
expected magnitudes of the effects of the various financial schemes and programs 
are supported: It appears as if the combination of Regional Venture Capital Loans 
and Investment Grants gives the best return.   Investments Grants singly appear to 
produce a somewhat better yield than Regional Venture Capital Loans singly, but the 
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difference is not considerable.  The FRAM program produces as expected the lowest 
result.  The surprise is the Network program which appears to give a substantial re-
turn.   The result is no less surprising as previous evaluations of the Network pro-
gram (Econ, 1998) have come to different conclusions.  
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10. Analysis – panel data estimation 
With true panel data we can follow the same units over time.  True panel data allows 
us to address the issue of unobserved fixed effects and hidden bias. Consider the 
equation: itititititit vdBdddBy ++++= *22 1010 δδββ , where i denotes the unit, 
and t denotes time.  As before23, the dummy dB captures differences between the 
treatment group and the control group that may exist prior to the intervention by the 
government, d2 catches what could cause changes in y even in the absence of an 
intervention. The coefficient of interest is δ1 , the interaction between d2 and dB that 
captures the difference-in-differences. The outcome variable yit is added value (AV). 
In the panel data setup the only difference from the two-period setup is that d2it de-
notes the after treatment period in the sense; all observed years after the treatment.  
Since the d2it may differ for the single record because firms start receiving treatment 
at different times, we use two versions of d2it; one that considers d2it to be the period 
from the first year after the treatment period and a variable dt+2it that also includes 
the treatment period. This allows us to separate out the effects that may occur within 
the treatment period e.g. immediate effects of treatment.  If we consider the error 
term of the equation above as vit = ai + uit  i.e. as a composite of the usual error term 
uit and a time constant component ai , a fixed effects, it is easier to grasp the virtues 
of the panel model.  If this unobserved fixed effect, ai is correlated with the 
independent variables, the ordinary least squares (OLS) suffers from omitted vari-
able bias.  If, on the other hand, ai is uncorrelated with the independent variables, 
OLS gives unbiased estimates. However, if the error terms are correlated, the stan-
                                                        
23 Note the similarity between the general equation for the panel data estimation of difference-in-
difference and the corresponding equation for the two-period case (see section 9 page 105). 
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dard errors can be seriously wrong (Wooldridge, 2002). The random effect estimator 
is a generalized least squares (GLS) method for obtaining more correct standard er-
rors.  We estimate24 both the random effect model (RE) using GLS and the fixed 
effect model (FE) and compare the estimates of the two models by means of a 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) which compares the fixed effects model and the ran-
dom effects model under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorre-
lated with the other regressors in the model. The Hausman test tests the differences 
between the estimated covariance matrix in FE model and the RE model under the 
assumption that the difference follows a χ2 distribution. A p-value for the chi-square 
larger than .05 implies that the random effects model is the most efficient model 
while a significant p-value indicates that the fixed effects model should be preferred. 
Deciding what model to choose based on the Hausman tests only is, according to 
Badi H. Baltagi “… not as easy a choice as it might seem” (Baltagi, 2008).  Thus our 
preference for the fixed effects model relies on convenience: The fixed effect model 
removes the omitted variable bias resulting from the exclusion of unobserved 
variables that vary over the individual firms but are constant over time.  We also rely 
on traditions (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter et al., 1985) since fixed effects can be 
interpreted as treatment effects and  thus are the models we want to exploit.  An 
overview over the contrasts between the fixed effects and the random effects models 
and the corresponding Hausman tests is provided in Appendix B.  
 
The panel estimators follow a dummy regression setup similar to those presented in 
section 9, page 105.  The explicit inclusion of the time dimension in combination 
with matched pairs of data as the control group allows us to explore the before-after 
intervention effect based on the best possible comparison data.  As noted earlier, a 
                                                        
24 The Stata program xtreg is used for most panel data estimations. 
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requirement for difference-in-differences is that the control group is independent of 
the treatment assignment, that is XDYY otot ⊥− '  and that no comparison unit is be-
forehand excluded, conditional upon the matching vector, i.e. 
 1)1(0 <=< XDprob , where t’ means the period before treatment and t means the 
period after treatment.  Moreover, the pattern of development over time for the de-
pendent variable yit in the control group should follow a path that does not deviate 
systematically from that of the treatment group (Imbens et al., 2007). As indicated 
by Figure 4, page 57 this last assumption appears to be satisfied, at least for the first 
part of the observation period.   
 
Although the Hausman χ2 is are insignificant for almost all FE-RE comparisons in 
Appendix B and all models have very similar estimates for treatment effects we ex-
pect that both temporal and spatial correlation may still be a problem.  We therefore 
report both the fixed effect standard errors and the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) corrected 
standard errors which gives more conservative estimates of the confidence intervals. 
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Table 25 Fixed Effects Panel Data Estimates for Average Treatment Effects  
 
Coef Std. Err. t P>|t|
733.97 232.111 3.2 0.0020 278.93 1189.01
1125.64 299.488 3.8 0.0000 538.52 1712.77
733.97 338.343 2.2 0.0310 68.91 1399.02
1125.64 190.197 5.9 0.0000 751.79 1499.50
Coef Std. Err. t P>|t|
1615.50 589.719 2.7 0.0060 459.55 2771.46
888.49 298.614 3.0 0.0030 303.14 1473.83
1615.50 812.750 2.0 0.0470 20.28 3210.72
888.49 128.879 6.9 0.0000 635.49 1141.48
Coef Std. Err. t P>|t|
1815.00 280.090 6.5 0.0000 1265.97 2364.02
2409.68 382.680 6.3 0.0000 1659.56 3159.80
1815.00 581.034 3.1 0.0020 674.69 2955.31
2409.68 431.344 5.6 0.0000 1563.15 3256.22
Coef Std. Err. t P>|t|
358.71 128.631 2.8 0.0050 106.57 610.85
516.79 169.948 3.0 0.0020 183.66 849.92
358.71 94.923 3.8 0.0000 172.36 545.05
516.79 131.010 3.9 0.0000 259.61 773.98
Coef Std. Err. t P>|t|
3254.64 250.065 13.0 0.0000 2764.50 3744.77
2707.81 274.821 9.9 0.0000 2169.15 3246.47
3254.64 526.340 6.2 0.0000 2222.57 4286.70
2707.81 654.988 4.1 0.0000 1423.48 3992.13
Treatmen Period
1995 - 2006
 Both Investment Grants & Venture Capital Loans
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]
 The Network Program
 Regional Venture Capital Loans
 Investment Grants
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]
With Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
With Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
Treatmen Period
Treatmen Period
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
With Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
Treatmen Period
1997 - 2006
 The FRAM Program
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]
1993 - 2006
1997 - 2006
1992 - 2006
Treatmen Period
1997 - 2006
1992 - 2006
With Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
With Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
1997 - 2006
1993 - 2006
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11. Analysis – comparing estimates 
11.1 Comparing the various results of the estimations 
We have obtained various estimates for all three datasets using different estimation 
methods.  To what extent are these estimates similar or different?  Table 26 gives an 
overview of the results.  We are aware that the different estimation techniques 
should not be expected to produce very similar results.  Moreover, for the two-period 
estimates we have nothing that really corresponds to the panel data estimates and 
have to compare the panel estimates with averages over the observation periods.  
 
Table 26 shows that the estimates are different, but not all that different.  Their 
differences in magnitudes are mainly within a reasonable range.  Moreover, the par-
ticularity of the intervention may explain some of these differences.  For the Re-
gional Venture Capital Loans there is a considerable gap between the panel esti-
mates for post-treatment period and the average over the two-period estimates for 
the same period. (0.733 mill NOK versus 1.262 mill NOK on the average per firm).  
Some of this deviance may be explained with the differences within in the treatment 
period (the entire treatment period minus the first year is included in the panel data 
analyses) and the increasing number of missing cases towards the end of the estima-
tion period.  Moreover, loans should also be expected to have less of an immediate 
effect upon added value since the payback of loans may affect net operating result. 
This is also in correspondence with the visual inspection of Table 20 (page 107) and 
Figure 17 (page 117).  Also, the negative estimates within the intervention period 
may contribute to these contradicting predictions. Comparison of the various esti-
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mates and the attempt to explain differences can not go much beyond mere specula-
tions.  The most conspicuous differences between the results from the panel esti-
mates and the two-period averages can, however, most likely be explained as differ-
ences due to the fact that outcomes within the treatment period have substantial 
influence.  The difference between the estimates that include the treatment period 
and the estimates that consider the post-treatment period only should give a rough 
estimate of the contribution to ATT that occurs within the treatment period. 
 
 
 
Table 26 Comparisons of estimates from various methods – 1000 NOK 
Panel Data Means over Medians over 
Estimates Two-Period Estimates Two-Periode Estimates
733.97 1 262.53 1 320.54
1 125.64 938.05 762.74
Panel Data Means over Medians over 
Estimates Two-Period Estimates Two-Periode Estimates
1 615.50 1 447.05 1 476.38
888.49 1 097.75 1 052.59
Panel Data Means over Medians over 
Estimates Two-Period Estimates Two-Periode Estimates
1 815.00 2 131.20 2 144.19
2 409.68 1 708.34 1 893.08
Panel Data Means over Medians over 
Estimates Two-Period Estimates Two-Periode Estimates
358.71 643.13 568.49
516.79 505.85 524.24
Panel Data Means over Medians over 
Estimates Two-Period Estimates Two-Periode Estimates
3 254.64 3 731.04 3 865.34
2 707.81 2 777.37 3 397.61
1997 - 2006
1993 - 2006
1992 - 2006  
 The Network Program
Treatmen Period
Treatmen Period
1998 - 2006
 The FRAM Program
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
1995 - 2006
1991 - 2006
Investment Grants & Venture Capital L
Treatmen Period
1991 - 2006
 Investment Grants
Treatmen Period
 Regional Venture Capital Loans
Treatmen Period
1995 - 2006
 
 
 
Clearly, the various estimates do to a substantial extent corroborate each other.  De-
spite the fact that they are based on very different methods and that the dependent 
variable, added value is a volatile measure, the estimates are within reasonable 
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ranges for all datasets.  Moreover, the development over time that is revealed by the 
two-period estimates makes sense.  Figure 17 to Figure 19 show the means (the solid 
lines) and confidence intervals (the short-dotted lines) for the panel estimates and the 
two-period estimates. 
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Figure 17 Two-period & Panel data estimates for the Financial Schemes 
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Figure 18 Two-period & Panel data estimates for the FRAM program 
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Figure 19 Two-period & Panel data estimates for the Network program 
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The two-period estimates reveal the patterns of evolvement over time (Figure 17 to 
Figure 19) while the panel estimates are simply point estimates of means with confi-
dence intervals (the dotted lines), which, for the purpose of illustration are drawn as 
parallel lines over the entire observation period i.e. we use the panel estimates for 
the entire observation periods (the shadowed lines in Table 26 and the red lines in 
the figures).  Note that whenever the lower bound for the confidence intervals goes 
beyond zero, the estimates are not significantly different from zero at the 95% level.   
 
Figure 17 shows that the two-period and panel estimates compares quite well for the 
financial schemes.  The panel estimates appears to be a reasonable compromise.     A 
pattern of a post-treatment increase and-then a decrease in outcomes is evident for 
all financial schemes.  The exception is Regional Venture Capital Loans (upper left) 
where the two-period estimates appear to have a delayed growth right after the end 
of the treatment period.  Towards the end of the observation period some estimates 
are not significantly different from zero while others increase, giving the highest 
estimates in the last year of the observation period.  The estimates for Regional 
Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants are insignificant towards the end of 
the observation period.  This upward tendency after the year 2003 should be down-
played since the matched pair datasets are increasingly vulnerable to the influence of 
unobserved variables as we move forward over the observation period.  As indicated 
by the sensitivity analysis (e.g. Figure 16) the estimates for the last couple of years 
appear to be less robust25. For the Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment 
Grant combined all estimates are significantly different from zero.   The overall pat-
tern for the financial schemes is an upturn from the end of the treatment period in 
                                                        
25 Note that many authors consider the Rosenbaum bounds test to be too strong and therefore 
potentially misleading  Becker, S. O., & Caliendo, M. 2007. Sensitivity analysis for average treatment 
effects. Stata Journal, 7(1): 71-83.. 
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1994 until a peak is reached in 2000.  From 2000 to 2002 the two-period estimates 
go down and all three schemes have their lowest estimates in 2003.   
 
The FRAM program shows a more confusing pattern with only a few significant 
estimates.  All estimates are positive, but three of the five significant estimates are 
within the treatment period.   As shown in Figure 18 only estimates within the treat-
ment period or in a few years right after the intervention period are significantly dif-
ferent from zero (above the green dotted line at zero). 
 
The Network program shows an almost steady rise-and fade-off pattern and has 
relatively large, significant magnitudes of the estimates over the entire period after 
intervention.  The typical low estimate in 2003 is with the subsequent increase in the 
years to follow is evident in Figure 19.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21 these patterns of evolvements of ATT over the 
observation period, the rise on the way to 2000 and fall towards 2003, is corrobo-
rated by other figures such as the Index of Production and the Business Tendency 
Survey in manufacturing, from Statistics Norway.  Thus, the overall pattern also 
mirrors general economic tendencies over the period.  The similarity of these figures 
indicates that although the contributions from Innovation Norway have undoubtedly 
contributed positively to those firms that received funds, firms are nevertheless af-
fected by a variety of other factors. 
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Figure 20 Evolvement of ATT over time for all programs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Business tendencies 1999 to 2008 – Statistics Norway 
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12. Interpretation of the findings – A scenario approach 
12.1 Introduction to the Scenario Approach to Interpretations  
This section is different from the other sections in the sense that interpretations go 
beyond analysis.  With go beyond we mean that interpretations are anchored in a 
rhetorical context that is different from the analysis perspective.  While statistical 
analyses are based on theories of probability and statistical inference, interpretations 
of results involve a conceptualization of reality i.e. ideas about the situation results 
are read into.  It is well known within the evaluation field that results tend to be con-
strued according to the preferences of the readers and that is hard for the researcher 
to counter such interpretation with reference to e.g. distributional assumptions.  
Thus, distorted interpretations of results are likely to occur and they may either over-
state or understate the meaning of the results.  In the case of causal effects of inter-
vention it is not unlikely that the devotees of market liberalism would have an un-
derstanding of the results that deviate from that of, say, the more Keynesian inclined 
economist.   
 
To avoid the impression that the interpretations outlined here are authoritatively the 
only possible understandings we use the term scenario.  A scenario can be defined as 
a possible set of future events or as an imagined or projected sequence of events 
where any of several detailed plans of possibilities are sketched out.  We use the 
term scenario despite the fact that we are mainly looking at the past. If we substitute 
the term “future events” for the term “likely events” in the definition of scenario, it 
is easier to see why scenario is also a proper term for descriptions conditional upon 
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the conjecture that our analyses are correct and a number of assumption that must be 
made to justify the ceteris paribus clause. Thus, in the following we present various 
scenarios based upon our ATT-estimates.  These scenarios assume that our estimates 
are correct and also rely on untestable assumptions such as no equilibrium effects.  
Moreover, we assume a constant discount rate over the periods under scrutiny and 
consider the returns in terms of added value due to positive ATTs as “cash flows” to 
the society.   This “cash flow” concept adds to the versatility of the scenarios by 
facilitating lines of reasoning known from financial economics.  It also makes it 
easier to make comparisons across the different financial schemes and interventions.  
 
The first part of this section outlines some general principles and discusses the avail-
able information on costs associated with the various schemes and programs.   The 
fact that we do not have ATT-estimates for all firms registered in our data as users of 
the financial schemes, led to the decision to carry out separate comparisons of costs 
and returns both for the proportion analyzed and for all firms known to have re-
ceived funds.  Thus, for the financial schemes we make two comparisons; one for all 
firms registered in the database from Innovation Norway i.e. analyses where we 
compare costs and gains as if the average estimated gains (the ATT) are valid for all 
firms involved; and one for the proportion of costs associated with those firms actu-
ally in the analyzed sample. These dual comparisons are carried out for the financial 
schemes only.    
 
The meaning of loss on loans is discussed in subsection 12.3.1.  Since stipulated 
losses entail considerable ambiguity we sketch two possible interpretations that are 
used for the scenarios.  Subsection 12.3.2 compares the gains from grants and loans 
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and subsection 12.3.3 uses the “cash flow” perspective in order to calculate internal 
rates of return.  Since the uncertainty concerning cost side is considerable for the 
FRAM program and the Network program, scenarios for these programs are more 
briefly sketched in subsections 12.4.1 and 12.5.1 respectively.  Finally a comparison 
of the scenarios for the schemes and programs is introduced in subsection 12.6.  
12.2 Average Treatment Effects and the Scenario Approach 
Interpretations of the findings should be straightforward in the sense that all we have 
is estimates of the average added value for the firms subject to intervention, com-
pared to what should be expected provided that no intervention had taken place. Ex-
pected values above zero are interpreted as a positive contribution to the causal ef-
fect of interventions, likewise, below zero constitutes negative effects. Our analyses 
do not, however, justify conclusions at the firm level, only group level figures are 
warranted, and here, only program level estimates are reported.  The sensitivity 
analysis of pairs (8.6, page 98) provides an idea of the likelihood that our estimates 
of the average treatment effects (ATT) are affected by other variables not included in 
the analyses.  Analogous reasoning at the firm level is not feasible. We have to ac-
cept that we have little control over unknown factors and events that may affect out-
comes for the individual firm.  We can clearly evaluate outcomes at various aggre-
gate levels such as industry levels or regional levels, which may also be of interest.  
The interpretations presented here do, however, solely concern the program level i.e. 
the intervention program or financial scheme as a whole. 
 
Any meaningful interpretation of results should relate outcomes to program costs.   
The presumed benefits from the financial schemes and programs have to be com-
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pared to the costs of the initiatives.  What we are doing here is, however, not 
conventional cost-benefit analyses26.  The ambitions are simply to visualize and 
demonstrate the meaning of our estimated average differences between the treated 
and the non-treated firms and speculate over interpretations under various scenarios.  
When time and interest rate have to be considered, interpretations may not always 
be clear-cut.  Moreover, the cost side also requires some disputable decisions con-
cerning what to compare.   
 
We do not have accurate measures for all the costs associated with the programs and 
financial schemes we study.   For the Regional Venture Capital Loans and the In-
vestment Grant we have fairly precise figures; we have the exact allotment decisions 
for each individual firm.  The main problem is that Regional Venture Capital Loans 
are loans, and as such, advances that carry substantial risks. We have no exact meas-
ures of actual losses, but for the year 1993, 1992 and 1993 a loss account covering 
30% of the lending was appropriated.  For the FRAM program we have cost esti-
mates from previous evaluation reports (Nesheim, 1997) and for the Network pro-
gram we have figures from previous evaluations (Econ, 1998). 
 
Interpretations are demonstrated in the form of scenarios.  That is, we try to exem-
plify what the estimated average effects of treatment on the treated (ATT) would 
mean assuming various possible circumstances.  Most of these scenarios require ad-
ditional assumptions which are explicitly stated but not always testable.  
                                                        
26 We do, however, believe counterfactual reasoning is an implicit albeit mostly ignored assumption in CBA. 
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12.3 The Financial Schemes 
According to available administrative records a total of 4.285 million NOK was allo-
cated for the Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grant programs over 
the period 1990 to 1994.  The firms we were able to identify for our analyses of 
these programs account for 1014 mill NOK or approximately 24% of total 
allotments.  These figures are based upon the analyses of 5831 registered decisions 
concerning funding assignments to 3298 firms.  Our analysis includes 1117 firms for 
the post treatment period i.e. approximately a third of the firms involved, and since 
several decisions concerned the same company, 37.7% of the individual decisions 
about allotments.    Compared to the distribution of total funding across regions, the 
24% proportion we use for analysis covers the various regions quite well. 
 
 
Figure 22 Distribution of Funding across Regions – All Financial Schemes 
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Only around 10% of the cases are lost due to bankruptcies or other causes of missing 
data across the observation periods.   We are able to identify most of the funding-
carrying treatment cases and their corresponding matched pair.  
 
Clearly, the two financial schemes are different; Regional Venture Capital Loans are 
loans that require repayments while Investment Grants are grants.  Results of the 
analyses should be interpreted accordingly.  For grants returns to society i.e. out-
comes in terms of added values above what should be expected in the absence of 
grants, can be meaningfully compared to the amount of resources allocated for 
grants, such comparisons may no be so straightforward for loans. A further compli-
cation arises from the fact that a substantial proportion of the firms have received a 
mixture of grants and loans.  
 
The Regional Venture Capital Loans carries a calculated risk of losses, which, evi-
dently is the raison d’être for the initiative.  Based on historical data, Innovation 
Norway estimates these losses to approximately 30%27.  Thus, the governmental 
costs associated with the loans and the mixture of loans and grants could be consid-
erably different from what is reported in Table 27 below.   Moreover, comparisons 
of returns and costs are limited by the fact that we analyze only about a forth (24%) 
of the total allocation of funds and only about 34% of the firms (1117 of the 3298 
involved over the five year intervention period).  The size distribution of the ana-
lyzed sample that represents these 24% of total costs deviates from the size distribu-
tion of the population28 in the sense that bigger firms are not included.  The conse-
quence of this dissimilarity is that the mean allotments in the analyzed sample differ 
                                                        
27 There is no documentation concerning the procedures that produced this 30% estimate. 
28 We simply use the term population for the entire set of firms the received allocations from Innovation Norway. 
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from the mean allotments in the population and thus, direct comparisons of esti-
mated means (ATT) and mean allotments do not seem like a good idea.  Hence, 
comparisons have to be carried out by assuming that the estimates of average effects 
of treatments on the treated (ATT) can be aggregated to conform to the total sums of 
investments (or expenditures/costs) so that this measure can be used to assess the 
presumed developments of sums of returns in terms of added value under the various 
scenarios.   
 
Table 27 Statistics for the allotments to all firms – Mill. NOK 
Year Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean St.dev Sum
1990 0,6815 354 1,507 241,25 1,0567 312 8,534 329,70 0,8691 359 1,503 312,01 0,6385 1,042 229,24
1991 0,7112 238 1,389 169,26 0,6267 320 1,188 200,53 0,8228 328 1,146 269,87 0,5980 0,999 196,14
1992 1,2278 228 3,930 279,94 0,7648 325 1,607 248,55 0,9949 269 2,118 267,63 0,6392 1,034 171,95
1993 0,9993 95 2,517 94,93 0,7341 469 2,021 344,28 0,7253 186 0,881 134,91 0,5256 0,627 97,76
1994 1,1483 54 2,793 62,01 0,6613 604 1,139 399,42 1,1574 112 3,447 129,63 0,9506 3,043 106,46
Mean: 0,9536 0,7687 0,9139 0,6704
Sum: 847,4 1522,5 1114,0 801,6
N = 969 2030 1254
Total N (number of firms=4253
Total sum = 4285,5 Mill. NOK
Investment Grants Part
Both Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment 
Venture Capital Loans Investment Grants Capital Loans Part
 
 
 
Table 27 and Table 28 show the differences that cause difficulties to the direct use of 
means for comparisons.   Inspection of the columns for means demonstrate consider-
able difference between the figures for total governmental expenditure (Table 27) 
and the figures for the proportion of spending actually included in the analysis.  
Moreover, as seen by comparing Table 27 and Table 28 (t-statistics are shown in 
table C1 in appendix C) the means for the proportion analyzed are invariably smaller 
than for the total.  Even though only one of the differences between the means of 
total governmental expenditures and the means in the analyzed group is statistically 
significantly different from zero, (table C1 in appendix C) the consequences of small 
differences between the means in the analyzed group and the total may carry sub-
stantial impact upon comparisons of effect estimates and the actual expenditures. 
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Table 28 Statistics for the allotments to the firms included in the analysis 
 
Year Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean St.dev Sum
1990 0,5517 119 0,921 65,65 0,3153 69 0,320 21,75 0,8184 121 1,605 99,03 0,5076 0,606 212,69
1991 0,3365 82 0,583 27,59 0,3576 72 0,331 25,75 0,7391 111 0,693 82,04 0,5490 0,681 61,42
1992 0,5414 45 0,710 24,36 0,4897 63 0,726 30,85 0,7383 71 1,442 52,42 0,5145 1,020 60,94
1993 0,9460 17 2,045 16,08 0,3977 86 0,359 34,20 0,6292 34 0,581 21,39 0,3844 0,392 36,53
1994 0,3770 13 0,350 4,90 0,5626 178 1,046 100,14 0,6389 36 0,643 23,00 0,6534 0,791 13,07
Mean: 0,5505 0,4246 0,7128 0,5218
Sum: 138,6 212,7 277,9 384,6
N =  276 468 373
Investment Grants Part
Both Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment 
Venture Capital Loans Investment Grants Capital Loans Part
Total N (number of firms=1117
Total sum = 1013,8 Mill. NOK  
 
The reason for these differences is rooted both in the matching procedures and cor-
rection measures carried out after matching.   The combined effect of these proce-
dures is that extreme cases, mostly the bigger allotments, are left out, and thus, the 
distributions of the expenditures included in the analyses differ from the distribution 
of total expenditures.   Gini-indices are considerably lower for the cases included in 
the analyses than for the total expenditures in all three categories, Regional Venture 
Capital Loans, Investment Grants and the two combined. 
 
Thus, the lesson to be learned from the difference between the distributions of the 
analyzed and the total allocation is that the total sums provide a better basis for com-
parisons than the means of money allocations per firm. We use a two-step procedure 
for all comparisons; first we compare the sums of expenditures covered by the sam-
ple of firms used in the analyses, then we proceed under the assumption that the es-
timated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are valid for all cases, not 
only for the cases included in the analysis.  Clearly, such a procedure encompasses 
an untestable assumption which is convenient since it permits the hypothetical what 
if that facilitates the comparisons of treatment effects and total expenditures.   
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Estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) (Table 20 to Table 22, 
page 107 - 108) are point estimates valid only for the year within which they are 
estimated.   Thus, year-by-year comparisons have to be based upon the future value 
of earlier allocated resources.  Assignment of money takes place over five years 
range with a different number of firms entering every year in the treatment period.  
Thus, future values tipvfv )1( +=  where i is the discount rate and t is time, have to 
be calculated separately for each year and added together as shown in e.g. table C4 
and C5 in appendix C. The ATT’s are made comparable to the total sums by multi-
plying the estimated averages by the number of cases involved.  This simply implies 
a linear transformation that brings the figures on an equal footing and facilitates the 
interpretation of means as proxies for sums, qualified by standard errors or confi-
dence intervals.   Clearly, these procedures can not provide exact answers, only ap-
proximations that give a fairly good idea about the magnitudes involved.  
 
All calculations are carried out based on a discount rate at 7% over the entire period 
in time analyzed29.  The revenue effect due to tax financing is assumed to be 21% for 
all governmental expenditures.  
 
12.3.1 Projected Costs: The meaning of a 30% loss on loans 
It is not all that clear what a 30% loss on loans could mean and how it should be in-
terpreted in money terms.  Loans assume expected future income. Thus, one inter-
pretation of a 30% loss on loans is that 30% of the expected income is lost over a 
five-year period.  Another equally reasonable understanding is that 30% of expected 
                                                        
29 The interest on loans shows considerable variation over the period in question.  On average the general interest 
on loans was just above 8%. Thus, a flat discount rate is a source of errors.  Figure xx in appendix D provides an 
overview over the development of the interest rate.  
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income is lost over a ten-year period.  An expected return rate of 7% would in the 
first case (five years) mean that the interest is reduced by 30%/5 = 6% and thus that 
the return rate is reduced from 7% to 1%.  In the other case (ten years) the return rate 
is reduced by 30%/10 = 3% and thus the return rate is 4%.  These interpretations 
yield conservative estimates of losses in the sense that we assume that losses remain 
constant over the entire observation period.  The cumulative sum of the present 
value of losses over the entire observation period will of course exceed 30% when 
the calculation period gets above five and ten years respectively.  Thus the cost 
estimates for loans are conservative in the sense that they do not understate potential 
losses. 
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Figure 23 Assumed Losses on Venture Capital Loans, Population  
 
 
Figure 23 gives a stylized picture of presumed losses over five and ten years based 
on 1% and 4% interest and the lines A – B and A – C indicate the respective losses. 
The calculations behind the graphs are shown in table C5 Appendix C.  Corre-
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sponding interpretations are employed for the analyzed sample of Regional Capital 
Loans and the loan part of the combinations of Investment Grants and Regional 
Capital Loans.  Calculations are found in Appendix C. 
 
12.3.2 Scenario comparisons of returns from grants and loans 
The estimated average effects of treatment on the treated (ATT) are calculated year-
by-year as two-period estimates and for the entire period as panel estimates.  As such 
the two-period estimates are considered as future values and the panel estimates as 
average future values30.  Thus, the strategy employed for comparisons is to bring 
costs and returns on an equal footing and compare the presumed results over time.  
The costs of loans, as shown in Figure 23, are constructed in future value terms, and 
thus on a scale compatible to the treatment effects on the treated (ATT).  The cost of 
grants is provided in Table 27 and Table 28 as yearly expenditures. To be able to 
compare the three financial schemes we proceed by emulating a kind of financial 
analysis, i.e. by finding the most reasonable way compare the present value of gov-
ernmental expenditures to the present value of future cash flows.  By accepting the 
average effects of treatment on the treated (ATT) as a measure of returns to the firms 
caused by the financial schemes we can construct an aggregate quantity that can be 
used as an expression for the “cash flows” to society in terms of added value.  These 
“cash flows” are constructed by simply multiplying the number of firms involved 
with the figures of average treatment effects (ATT).   
                                                        
30 Since difference-in-difference estimation is predominantly a cross-sectional technique, discount rate based 
adjustments before estimation is usually not discussed in the literature.  It is clear that DiD diminishes but never 
entirely removes the effects of the nonconformity of the numbers involved in the calculations.  The likely effects 
of using future values for the calculations would be an upward bias while no adjustment would most likely 
induce a downward bias. 
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Clearly, such comparisons are scenarios in the sense that they go beyond what is 
actually estimated and involve untestable and dubious assumptions such as the con-
jecture that every company involved has equal returns from the financial schemes.  
Scenarios are, by definition, hypothetical descriptions that solely serve the purpose 
of giving a meaningful interpretation of our findings.  Moreover, the “financial 
analyses” presented here are an integral part of the scenarios and should not be 
otherwise understood.  Clearly, the “cash flows” introduced are not cash flows in the 
traditional sense; they cannot by reinvested and they do not appear anywhere in the 
accounts of the individual firm.  The “cash flows” are simply the aggregated differ-
ences in sums of added value between participants and non-participants where the 
added value is defined as the sums of the contributions to labor and capital.    
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Figure 24 Present value comparisons for financial schemes -Analyzed samples 
 
Figure 24 shows the present values of expenditures (the horizontal dotted lines) and 
the cumulative present values of the presumed “cash flows” (the solid lines) for the 
entire period under investigation for Regional Venture Capital Loans, Investment 
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Grants and the two combined.   The three scenarios of Figure 24 indicate a payoff to 
society well above governmental investments for all three financial schemes.  The 
corresponding scenario for all firms involved in the financial schemes is shown in 
Figure 25.  Note that although Figure 24 and Figure 25 are similar in all respects 
except for the number of cases used in the multiplication31 of the ATT, the two fig-
ures show some notable differences.  
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Figure 25 Present value comparisons for financial schemes – Entire Sample 
 
These discrepancies reflect both differences in the proportion of cases that are in-
cluded in the analyses of the three financial schemes (28.5%, 23% and 29.7% re-
spectively) and the differences in the proportion of expenditures used in the calcula-
tions (16.4%, 14% and 25% respectively).  Both for the cases included in the analy-
sis (Figure 24, analyzed sample) and for all cases involved (Figure 25, the entire 
sample) the three scenarios depict overtly optimistic outcomes.  The two-period es-
                                                        
31 Note the number of cases used for multiplications over the intervention period 1990 to 1994 is less than the N 
given in the figures, which is the cumulative N over the intervention periods. 
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timates and the panel estimates produce reasonably similar results and give a fairly 
good idea about the magnitudes involved.    
 
Although we have quite accurate measures of costs since these figures are calculated 
directly from the allotment decisions for each individual firm, we have to keep in 
mind that the scenarios reflect the limitations given by the estimates which they are 
based upon.  As shown in Figure 17 page 117 the estimations of the average treat-
ment effects have rather wide confidence intervals.  In particular, the 95% confi-
dence intervals for the two-period estimates (the black dotted lines) that are below 
zero indicate less trustworthy estimates.  Since our scenarios are based upon the 
ATTs (the black solid lines) this has to be kept in mind when judging the reach of 
the scenarios.  On the other hand, it is known that matching procedures tends to pro-
duce large and rather inaccurate confidence intervals32 that cannot easily be re-esti-
mated by bootstrap techniques (Abadie, 2002; Abadie & Imbens, 2006).  Further-
more, our scenario calculations based upon two-period estimates do not deviate sub-
stantially from those based upon the panel estimates (the red solid lines) where the 
lower limit of the 95% confidence interval (the red dotted lines) never goes below 
zero.  The close resemblance of the panel estimate based scenarios to the two-period 
based scenarios is reassuring in the sense that it signals that two entirely different 
estimation procedures produce comparable scenarios.   
 
                                                        
32 Clearly, we could include the confidence intervals when constructing the scenarios and thus make the 
inexactness of the calculations more explicit.  The reasons for not including the confidence intervals are twofold; 
first and foremost, they are inaccurate, secondly, the confidence intervals for the cumulative figures would add to 
the inaccuracies since each cumulative step would involve recalculations of the variances involved i.e. the 
variance in year n plus the variance in year n+1 plus two times the covariance between the measures for year n 
and n+1 for which we have no estimate.  Also, the confidence intervals from such a procedure would become 
both inaccurate and forbiddingly wide.  
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12.3.3 Scenario based comparisons of internal rates of return 
In line with the interpretative view of the average treatment effects on the treated 
(ATT) as mean future “cash flows” and governmental expenditures as “investments” 
we can calculate comparable accounts of the internal rate of return (IRR).  The IRR 
is defined as the discount rate that generates a zero net present value33.  In finance, 
IRRs are frequently used for comparing different projects in order to be able to 
choose the most profitable ones.   Here, the sole purpose is to compare the projects. 
 
Table 29 Internal Rate of Return for Regional Venture Capital Loans  
5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years
Analysis
    Number of Cash Flows 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
    Period Unit Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly
    Undiscounted Sum 11 568.86 13 616.23 12 510.87 14 558.24 3 802.57 4 163.86 4 141.37 4 502.66
    Discount Rate 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Net Present Value (NPV) 2 887.47 4 934.84 4 761.61 6 808.98 1 329.36 1 690.65 1 924.99 2 286.28
    Future Value (FV) 9 120.98 15 588.24 15 041.04 21 508.30 4 199.19 5 340.44 6 080.70 7 221.95 Average:
    Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 12.06 % 19.03 % 17.94 % 30.72 % 17.77 % 25.76 % 29.56 % 48.49 % 25.17 %
    Pay-back Period 11.43 9.05 7.01 4.19 9.32 6.56 4.25 2.65
    Present Worth Cost (PWC) 4 725.94 2 678.57 4 686.66 2 639.29 843.92 482.63 830.58 469.29
    Present Worth Revenue (PWR) 7 613.40 7 613.40 9 448.27 9 448.27 2 173.27 2 173.27 2 755.57 2 755.57
    Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.61 2.84 2.02 3.58 2.58 4.5 3.32 5.87
    Present Value Ratio 0.61 1.84 1.02 2.58 1.58 3.5 2.32 4.87
Reinvestment
    Reinvestment Rate of Return 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Modified NPV 2 887.47 4 934.84 4 761.61 6 808.98 1 329.36 1 690.65 1 924.99 2 286.28
    Modified FV 9 120.98 15 588.24 15 041.04 21 508.30 4 199.19 5 340.44 6 080.70 7 221.95 Average:
    Modified IRR (MIRR) 10.21 % 14.07 % 11.51 % 15.34 % 13.43 % 17.44 % 14.82 % 18.74 % 14.45 %
All Expenditures (N= 969) Analyzed Expenditures (N= 276)
Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates
 
 
Table 29 gives an overview of the total sums of presumed “cash flows” and costs 
over the 17-year period, the net present values (NPV) and the future values (FV) 
involved for the various scenarios.  The benefit-cost ratio reported is simply the ratio 
of present worth revenue to present worth cost (PWR/PWC) and does not signify 
anything else, i.e. it does not reflect a cost benefit analysis in the traditional sense.  
In the same manner the present value ratio is simply NPV/PWC.  The expected pay-
back period reflects the internal rate of return (IRR) and varies from approximately 
12 years for the two-period estimates when all cases for which we have acceptable 
                                                        
33 Mathematically, IRRs are the roots of an NPV function and in some cases there are multiple roots.  
  
137 
administrative records are accounted for and a 30% loss over a five-year period is 
assumed, to as little as about 3 years for the panel estimates when only the analyzed 
cases are considered and we assume that the 30% loss is distributed over a 10-year 
period.   With two different estimation methods, two different ways of understanding 
the expected losses on loans, and two different samples, the variation across the 
various scenarios is within a reasonable range. The most misleading feature of IRR 
calculations is the assumption that all cash flows will be reinvested at the calculated 
IRR.  This is usually not a very realistic assumption and it is particularly unrealistic 
as applied here where no reinvestment is possible.  The modified internal rate of 
return (MIRR) calculated at 7% reinvestment rate of return may be considered a 
better candidate as an expression for the interest gain to society due to governmental 
investment in regional venture capital loans.  Thus, regardless of how we understand 
a 30% loss (whether over 5 or 10 years) or the way we construct the scenario (using 
all data or the analyzed part only) the dividend exceeds the most likely alternative 
cost, the foregone interest of 7% (the discount rate used).   
 
Since all scenarios are constructed in a similar manner we can compare any measure 
provided in the tables showing the financial calculations.   The preferred measure for 
comparisons is, however, the modified internal rate of return (MIRR).  A brief 
glance at the eight scenarios in Table 29 shows that the MIRR varies substantially 
less across scenarios than does the IRR.  The mean of IRR across scenarios is 
25.17% with a standard deviation as high as 11.4 while the corresponding number 
for MIRR is 14.45 and 2.8 respectively.  
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The scenarios for Investment Grants are simpler in the sense that we compare four 
situations only; two samples and two estimators.  Table 30 shows an average modi-
fied rate of return of 24.57% and a moderate variation across the four scenarios. 
 
Table 30 Internal Rate of Return for Investment Grants 
Two-Period Panel Two-Period Panel
Analysis Estimate Estimates Estimate Estimates
    Number of Cash Flows 17 17 17 17
    Period Unit Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly
    Undiscounted Sum 37 232.82 24 806.12 8 702.49 5 816.83
    Discount Rate 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Net Present Value (NPV) 17 251.74 12 313.05 4 103.90 2 948.23
    Future Value (FV) 54 495.06 38 894.65 12 963.48 9 312.92 Average:
    Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 44.52 % 51.01 % 57.04 % 70.84 % 55.85 %
    Pay-back Period 4.28 3.16 3.81 2.32
    Present Worth Cost (PWC) 1 597.14 1 597.14 214.26 214.24
    Present Worth Revenue (PWR) 18 848.88 13 910.19 4 318.16 3 162.47
    Benefit-Cost Ratio 11.8 8.71 20.15 14.76
    Present Value Ratio 10.8 7.71 19.15 13.76
Reinvestment
    Reinvestment Rate of Return 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Modified NPV 17 251.74 12 313.05 4 103.90 2 948.23
    Modified FV 54 495.06 38 894.65 12 963.48 9 312.92 Average:
    Modified IRR (MIRR) 23.72 % 21.53 % 27.68 % 25.36 % 24.57 %
All data (N=2030) Analyzed data (N=468)
 
 
The combination of Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants involves 
eight scenarios since the loans part is investigated with two different interpretations 
of the 30% loss i.e. whether it is spread over 5 or 10 years.  As shown in Table 31 
below the variation across scenarios for the MIRR is reasonable with an average of 
16.18% 
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Table 31 Internal rate of return for both Loans and Grants combined 
5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years
Analysis
    Number of Cash Flows 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
    Period Unit Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly
    Undiscounted Sum 30 387.78 33 057.82 39 872.04 42 542.07 9 106.14 9 807.83 12 027.69 12 729.38
    Discount Rate 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Net Present Value (NPV) 12 494.82 15 164.86 18 514.30 21 184.34 3 778.64 4 480.33 5 657.48 6 359.17
    Future Value (FV) 39 468.83 47 902.99 58 483.26 66 917.43 11 936.01 14 152.52 17 870.94 20 087.44 Average:
    Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 21.38 % 30.25 % 30.29 % 44.61 % 21.83 % 29.61 % 31.70 % 44.74 % 31.80 %
    Pay-back Period 6.63 5.13 4.35 3.09 6.5 5.19 4.11 2.99
    Present Worth Cost (PWC) 6 986.60 4 316.56 6 986.60 4 316.56 2 049.66 1 347.97 2 049.66 1 347.97
    Present Worth Revenue (PWR) 19 481.42 19 481.42 25 500.90 25 500.90 5 828.30 5 828.30 7 707.14 7 707.14
    Benefit-Cost Ratio 2.79 4.51 3.65 5.91 2.84 4.32 3.76 5.72
    Present Value Ratio 1.79 3.51 2.65 4.91 1.84 3.32 2.76 4.72
Reinvestment
    Reinvestment Rate of Return 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 % 7.00 %
    Modified NPV 12 494.82 15 164.86 18 514.30 21 184.34 3 778.64 4 480.33 5 657.48 6 359.17
    Modified FV 39 468.83 47 902.99 58 483.26 66 917.42 11 936.01 14 152.52 17 870.94 20 087.44 Average:
    Modified IRR (MIRR) 13.65 % 16.92 % 15.47 % 18.78 % 13.78 % 16.62 % 15.67 % 18.56 % 16.18 %
All Expenditures (N= 1254) Analyzed Expenditures (N= 373)
Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates
 
 
 
12.4 The FRAM program 
The FRAM program consists of several modules that have been evaluated on several 
occasions in the past.  We analyze a smaller part of the program only and our cost 
estimates are taken from the 1997 evaluation carried out by Nesheim (1997).  The 
FRAM program is a training program aimed at individual competence building for 
the management of SMEs and no records of governmental expenditures per partici-
pating firm are available.  Thus, the costs on the supply side are approximated as the 
Innovation Norway’s expenditures associated with this particular segment of the 
FRAM program.  These expenses are estimated by Nesheim (1997) to be approxi-
mately NOK 94,000 per participating firm. 
 
Participation is inexpensive, but not free.  The program fee is NOK 19,000 per firm.  
In addition the costs of own efforts and travelling and lodging expenses associated 
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with participation are incorporated on the demand side.  Since the program is mainly 
organized as meetings at various conference hotels, expenses may vary.  A rough 
estimate of these additional expenses given in Nesheim (1997) is NOK 82,860 be-
fore the tax-deductible sum is subtracted.    
 
12.4.1 Scenarios for the FRAM program 
A scenario for the FRAM program tries to answer the question “what would the gain 
to society be, provided that our estimates of the effect of treatment (ATT) on treated 
are sound foundations for calculating the “cash flows” from the program?” and 
provided that the costs of the program are of an approximately correct magnitude. 
Figure 26 shows the cumulative present values of aggregate gain, that is, the simple 
multiplication of 425 times the two-period estimates (Table 23) and the panel esti-
mates (Table 25) assuming that 425 firms participated in the program, where the 
firm’s specific expenses multiplied by number of firms participating per year are 
subtracted from the “cash flows” in their respective years.  
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Figure 26 Scenarios of Aggregate Cumulative Present Values – FRAM 
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Figure 26 indicates that the FRAM program, provided that the scenario assumptions 
are correct, may produce aggregate outcomes of substantial proportions compared to 
the inputs in money terms. 
 
 
Viewed financially, Table 32 indicates a return on investments in the neighborhood 
of roughly 31% (the modified IRR), which, provided that the scenario assumptions 
reflect something near the expected, hints that the FRAM program could be an ini-
tiative that is easy to defend as a policy for business development. 
 
 
Table 32 Internal rate of return for the FRAM program - Scenarios 
Two-Period Panel
Estimates Estimates
Analysis (N=425) (N=425)
    Number of Cash Flows 15 15
    Period Unit Yearly Yearly
    Undiscounted Sum 3 145 154,50 2 999 921,25
    Discount Rate 7,00 % 7,00 %
    Net Present Value (NPV) 1 679 395,08 1 749 245,45
    Future Value (FV) 4 633 504,00 4 826 223,00
    Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 74,74 % 221,37 %
    Pay-back Period 2,75 0,48
    Present Worth Cost (PWC) 89 253,31 83 322,00
    Present Worth Revenue (PWR) 1 768 648,39 1 832 567,45
    Benefit-Cost Ratio 19,82 21,99
    Present Value Ratio 18,82 20,99
Reinvestment
    Reinvestment Rate of Return 7,00 % 7,00 %
    Modified NPV 1 679 395,08 1 749 245,45
    Modified FV 4 633 503,98 4 826 223,36
    Modified IRR (MIRR) 34,12 % 31,48 %  
 
12.5 The Network program 
The costs of the Network program is discussed in Econ’s evaluation of the program 
(1998).  Admittedly, as stated by the report (Econ, 1998), these figures are not espe-
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cially precise. They are, however, the only immediately available source of informa-
tion on these matters.  
 
Table 33  Costs Associated with the Network Program 
Objective * 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Pre-Study 7 500 11 205 7 605 3 869 3 008 773 1 332 35 292
Planning Measures 1 546 6 042 4 937 5 486 4 972 3 292 2 362 28 637
Operating Costs Year 1 4 237 12 523 18 180 16 499 16 071 24 478 13 832 105 820
Operating Costs Year 2 953 2 179 5 467 2 680 8 686 10 134 30 099
Operating Costs Year 3 300 685 990 2 028 4 003
Additional Costs 1) 1 655 5 518 1 517 4 787 13 477
Additional Costs 2) 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 570 4 570
Additional Costs 3) 1 052 1 750 2 180 1 370 1 415 1 925 1 660 11 352
Tourism 3 000 10 000 4 000 17 000
Additional Costs 4) 500 500 500 500 2 000
Additional Costs 5) 420 420 840
Total 14 335 32 473 35 381 35 846 38 849 53 581 42 625 253 090
1) Company specific 2) Competence  Development (UNIKE) 3) Counselling
4) Companies without Limits 5) Consultant JFR  * Adapted f rom Econ (1998)  
 
The approximate costs of the Network program facilitates a scenario for the Network 
program that gives us an idea about the magnitudes involved, provided that our two-
period estimates (Table 24) and panel estimates (Table 25) offer a justifiable basis 
for calculations of the presumed “cash flows” from the program. 
 
12.5.1 Scenarios for the Network program 
Figure 27 shows the cumulative present values of the estimated effects of treatment 
on treated (ATT) found in table 24 and table 25 multiplied by 1575, the number of 
firms involved in the ATT estimations. That is, we try to provide an answer to the 
question “what would be the hypothetical gain to society, provided that the estimates 
of costs and expected “cash flows” are in the neighborhood of what can be expected 
to be correct?” provided that exactly 1575 firms participated in the Network pro-
gram.   
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 Figure 27 Scenarios of Aggregate Cumulative Present Values – The Net-
work Program 
 
The calculations are based on a cost estimate of 48234 mill. NOK (Econ, 1998).   
Figure 27 shows that, viewed on the basis of the premises of the scenario listed 
above, the Network program could provide substantial gains to society in term of 
value creation above what could have been expected, provided that the program not 
was carried out.  
 
As shown in Table 34, the above calculations would give an internal rate of return of 
about 46% over the 14 years considered.  Since costs are not very accurately given, 
this relatively high (modified) internal rate of return should be interpreted with care.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 The estimate does in fact concern more firms than the 1575 used in the calculations and we are informed by 
Econ’s report that the estimates are adjusted for revenue effects due to tax financing. It is not a very accurate 
estimate and it is used here solely for demonstration purposes. 
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Table 34 Internal rate of return for the Network program - Scenarios 
Two-Period Panel 
Estimates Estimates
Analysis (N=1575) (N=1575)
    Number of Cash Flows 14 14
    Period Unit Yearly Yearly
    Undiscounted Sum 65 133,44 59 225,21
    Discount Rate 7,00 % 7,00 %
    Net Present Value (NPV) 35 675,43 36 815,68
    Future Value (FV) 91 990,31 94 930,48
    Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 210,19 % 0,00 %
    Pay-back Period 0,71 0,12
    Present Worth Cost (PWC) 482 482
    Present Worth Revenue (PWR) 36 157,43 37 297,68
    Benefit-Cost Ratio 75,02 77,38
    Present Value Ratio 74,02 76,38
Reinvestment
    Reinvestment Rate of Return 7,00 % 7,00 %
    Modified NPV 35 675,43 36 815,68
    Modified FV 91 990,31 94 930,48
    Modified IRR (MIRR) 45,65 % 45,98 %  
 
 
12.6 Comparing the Scenarios – A summing up 
The “financial scenario” analysis sets up a link between inputs and outputs; a rela-
tionship between costs and impacts. This relationship is established in terms of gov-
ernmental expenditures looked upon as investments where dividend is assessed by 
means of its internal rate of return.  The investment part is explicit in the sense that 
expenditures can be traced in public administrative records.  The return part is more 
ambiguous since this is payback to the society at large; there is no money that floats 
back to the investor in the ordinary sense.  Thus, the implicit assumption that what is 
good for business is good for society applies.  Moreover, we do not distinguish be-
tween the companies that managed to benefit from the various financial schemes and 
intervention programs and those that did not.  Conclusions apply to the overall pic-
ture only.  That is, we operate at the program level i.e. at the program or scheme as 
such.   
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 A central purpose of the scenario analyses was the comparisons of the various fi-
nancial schemes and intervention programs.   Table 35 shows the average modified 
internal rate of return (MIRR) across the different scenarios for all programs and 
financial schemes investigated.    The averages for the financial schemes show a 
reasonable pattern: Investment Grants has the highest average return, the pure Re-
gional Venture Capital Loan the lowest and the combination of the two is situated in 
between.   Based on the calculations above this is reasonable because our two inter-
pretations of the meaning of a 30% loss (distributed over 5 years/10 years) generate 
a heavy cost component.   
 
 
Table 35 Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) – All Interventions 
 
Regional Averages
Venture
Capital 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years
Loans 13.43 % 17.44 % 14.82 % 18.74 % 10.21 % 14.07 % 11.51 % 15.34 % 14.45 %
Investment
Grants Two-Period Panel Two-Period Panel
Estimate Estimates Estimate Estimates
27.68 % 25.36 % 23.72 % 21.53 % 24.57 %
Regional Venture
Capital Loans &
Investment Grants 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years
Combined 13.78 % 16.62 % 15.67 % 18.56 % 13.65 % 16.92 % 15.47 % 18.78 % 16.18 %
The FRAM
Program Two-Period Panel
Estimate Estimates
34.12 % 31.48 % 32.80 %
The Network
Program Two-Period Panel
Estimate Estimates
45.65 % 45.98 % 45.82 %
Analyzed Data  (N= 373)
Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates
Analyzed data (N=425)
Analyzed data (N=1575)
Two-Period Est. Panel Estimates
Analyzed data (N=468) All data (N=2030)
Data for All Expenditures (N= 1254)
Data for All Expenditures (N= 969)Analyzed Data (N= 276)
Two-Period Est. Panel EstimatesTwo-Period Est. Panel Estimates
 
 
From a substantial point of view viz. based upon the nature of these initiatives these 
differences make sense: Both loans and grants are based upon thorough judgments 
of applicants.  Although venture capital loans imply a calculated risk, they are loans 
and a payback is expected.  Grants are based upon a different set of considerations 
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which place a heavier burden upon the applicant in terms of required plans and 
validation of arguments for the prospects of the investment in question.  Thus, we 
should expect higher thresholds for consent for grants than for loans.  Most likely, 
the differences in the average rate of returns reflect the decision processes behind 
allotments.  
 
The FRAM- program and the Network program both show very high rates of return. 
Since the costs that enter the calculations are not very reliable, these rates of return 
should be interpreted with care.  
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13. The Balance of Evidence 
The use of two different estimation methods, both based upon matched pairs, does 
not produce unambiguous evidence about the causal effects of financial schemes and 
intervention programs.  It is, however, clear that the sum of the bits and pieces as a 
whole points in the direction of strong causal effects.   The purpose of this section is 
to give a brief assessment of the putative weights of evidence from the various parts 
of support for the causal claims that are presented in the analyses section.  Weight of 
evidence (WOE) is predominantly practiced within fields like risk assessment and 
medical testing but is highly relevant for other disciplines as well, especially when a 
single question is to be answered based on several pieces of evidence.  In evaluation 
research it should be clear that it is advantageous that the author responsible for car-
rying out the research should also be answerable for the assignments of weight to the 
various part of evidence presented.  It should not be left for the principal to decide 
what parts of evidence to emphasize.  
 
The term WOE can be defined as “any process used to aggregate information from 
different lines of evidence to render a conclusion regarding the assessment of causes 
or/and magnitude of effects”.  On the road to the overall conclusion a myriad of cru-
cial decisions that affect results are made.  Thus, a retrospective assessment and an 
attempt to weight the importance of the various blocks of evidence provides guide-
lines about how to read and interpret the findings. 
 
We apply essentially two tools for the assessments of WOE: Analyses of statistical 
power and sensitivity analyses as discussed in section 8.6.  The analysis of statistical 
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power across the two-period estimates gives us an approval rate, defined as the per-
centage of tests within each category (financial schemes or programs) that have ac-
ceptable statistical power.  The principles for and use of the matching methods are 
thoroughly explained in the analysis section.  It is the outcomes of these principles, 
choices and methods which are the subjects of scrutiny here.  The assessments of 
effects sizes and power analyses are explained in the first part of this section.  We 
also revisit the sensitivity analyses since these analyses do not directly affect the 
outcomes reported in the analyses section.  The joint reflections over effect sizes, 
post-hoc statistical power and sensitivity constitute the WOE.  
13.1  Power analyses and Effect Sizes as elements of WOE 
All basic results in the analysis section outcomes are simple estimates of means, de-
fined as the outcomes of two kinds of difference-in-differences estimation; two-pe-
riod estimates of average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) and the corre-
sponding estimates based upon panel data.  In reporting the analyses we have down-
played the use of significance tests35 and preferred the use of confidence intervals.  
The logic behind the tables that report one point estimate and its corresponding 
maximum significance level and confidence interval is, however, a test against the 
null-hypothesis that the difference between the treatment group and the control 
group is, in fact, zero.  Thus, with one or to stars behind the estimates, or a confi-
dence interval that does not contain zero, we conclude that our alternative hypothesis 
that the difference between the treatment group and the control group is different 
from zero.  This is the standard test of the difference between two means.  Moreover, 
the standard rhetoric of this procedure usually has a statement that says that the dif-
                                                        
35 We have mainly reported the traditional “stars” that signal the results from the statistical tests give 
probabilities that at least are less than a specified maximum value, usually * = p ≤ .05 or ** = p ≤ .01. 
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ference is significantly different from zero.  This is deceptive in the sense that it con-
ceals the simple logic of the test of the difference between two means and that the 
meaning of the term significant has strong connotations in ordinary language use and 
a more specific and less weighty meaning in statistics. The observed value 
CT XXATT −=   is only one of an infinite number of sample-mean differences that 
constitutes a population. Thus, the null hypothesis that we state from the outset in 
order to compare the two sample means is in fact a statement about the mean of the 
population of sample-mean differences.  Moreover, we assume that the transformed 
score ( ) 2,1/ XXCT SXXt −=  follows the bell-shaped t-distribution and the H0, the 
null-hypothesis is rejected if the observed value of the transformed score is found at 
the extreme ends of the t-distribution, the top or bottom 5% or 1%. Thus, it is more 
likely to have a score that comes from a population with a non-zero sample mean 
than it is to have a score that comes from a population with a zero mean.  The likeli-
hood of the latter outcome is, by the definition of the test only 5% or 1%.   Clearly, 
the logic of testing against the null-hypothesis reflects that the researcher believes 
that the H0 is false and intends to reject it.  In the case of the presumed causal effects 
of the financial schemes and intervention programs we study, it is an almost obvious 
implicit assumption that our point of departure is that we believe that a causal effect 
is present and observable in the administrative records which constitute our data.  It 
is important to avoid rejecting a true null-hypothesis (called Type I error) and we 
have controlled this by setting the probability of committing this error at or below 
.01 or .05. i.e. the so-called significance level α.   However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the null hypothesis is true and thus, we also have to consider the 
probability of not rejecting H0 (the so-called Type II error).  If this probability 
(called β) is substantial we have made it too easy for ourselves and in fact 
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constructed a test that gives little chance of concluding that the financial schemes or 
intervention programs have an effect when they in fact have an effect.   Thus, if we 
want the rejection of the null-hypothesis to serve as evidence for our research 
hypotheses we have to have a small β or, equivalently to have its complement (1- β), 
the power of the test sufficiently large.  The statistical power of a significance test is 
the long-term probability of rejecting H0 given the effect size, the α-level and the 
sample size (Cohen, 1992).  Magnitudes close to .5 is the equivalent of tossing a 
coin36.  The preferable level of precision suggested by Cohen (1992) is .80 (β=.20) 
for α = .05.  This is simply a convention proposed for general use.   We have 
calculated the observed power by means to the Stata-program sampsi (Mander, 
2006).  As used here the calculations imply that magnitudes much below .80, 
provided a sufficiently large effect size, should indicate that the number of 
administrative records available for estimations are insufficient and the estimate in 
question should count less in the WOE since it does not qualify as evidence. 
 
The second element of WOE, the effect size, is of importance for a different reason. 
Clearly, confidence intervals as reported (e.g. in Table 20 to Table 24) offer more 
information than p-values; it is easy to see that an interval that does contain zero 
implies that the estimate is significantly different from zero. It is, however, not that 
obvious how we should compare two estimates of equal magnitude with very differ-
ent confidence intervals; two equal magnitudes with equal confidence intervals but 
with a very different number of cases involved in the estimations or various varia-
tions in the combinations of these elements: number of cases involved, width of con-
fidence intervals and magnitude of estimates.   There are many ways of making es-
timates comparable across different analyses; the most common one is the effect size 
                                                        
36 According to Cohen (1992) power close .5 to detect medium effect sizes is not unusual in published research. 
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which basically involves comparing the various estimates in comparable standard 
deviation units.  The effect size use here is Cohen’s d which is calculated as 
CT
CCTT
CT
nn
SnSn
XXd
+
−+−
−=
22 )1()1(
 and provides for us a metric that makes the various 
estimates of ATT comparable across tests.  The interpretation of Cohen’s d is, ac-
cording to Cohen, as follows (Cohen, 1988):  less than .15 is a negligible effect, .15 
to .40 is a small effect, .40 to .75 is a medium effect and above .75 is a large effect.   
Cohen’s d is coarse measure of effects which provides an accepted standard for 
comparisons across studies. 
13.1.1 The Relationship between Power and Effect Size 
Some researchers may claim that post-hoc power analysis is meaningless and akin to 
meta-analysis of your own research.   Clearly, if a finding is insignificant according 
to a standard statistical test it also has insufficient power.  Statistical power and ef-
fect size are for the planning of a study and have no meaning after having completed 
the study.  Such contentions imply a simplified view of the research process and 
assume that you are able to specify the desirable effect size and power in advance 
and, hence, your sole concern is the size of your random sample.  
 
In this particular study sample size varies substantially across tests and even within 
the individual test one part of a difference that constitutes the difference-in-differ-
ences may vary.  Furthermore, sample sizes are fixed by available administrative 
records over the observation period.   It is clear that you need a large sample to be 
able to detect a small difference between the treatment group and the control group 
and vice versa that a large difference can be detected in a relatively small sample.  
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Moreover, with sample size and significance level fixed, the power of a test in-
creases with the magnitude of the effect size.   
Thus, as shown in Figure 28 the smaller the effects size (the magnitude in standard 
deviation units, e.g. Cohen’s d) given a fixed level of preferred power (e.g., 0.80 as 
recommended by Cohen (1988) the higher the number of cases necessary for detect-
ing the effect.  In observational studies it is not always possible to increase the num-
ber of cases.  Hence, post-hoc observed power should be reported in order to demon-
strate to what extent a causal effect cannot be detected simply because the number of 
available administrative records is insufficient to achieve statistical power (1-β) that 
gives a reasonable37 trade-off between type I error (the probability of rejecting a true 
null hypothesis) and type II error (probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis).   
 
Figure 28 Statistical Power and Effect Size – One-sided test 
 
 
The stylized symmetric distribution above shows that maximizing power (1-β) de-
pends on the α-level and the choice between one-sided or two-sided test.  As shown 
in Figure 29 below, the use of two-sided tests complicates matters and makes it 
harder to achieve acceptable power of a test.  In general a two-sided test decreases 
                                                        
37 This is not to say that sample size should be increased to make it possible to detect an insubstantial magnitude.  
What is and what is not a substantial magnitude depends on what you are looking for and is not an issue for 
statistics.  
  
153 
power, given fixed effect size and sample size.  Therefore, for any given hypothesis 
test, ceteris paribus, there is more possible Type II error and less statistical power in 
the test. All tests conducted here are one-sided tests and the α-level is the conven-
tional α = .05.  
 
Figure 29 Statistical Power and Effect Size – Two-sided test 
 
 
With post-hoc observed power we can evaluate the success or failure of our tests and 
also set some yardsticks with respect to the necessary requirements for future re-
search.  We can give a rough calculation of the minimum detectable effect size for a 
given powerκ , a given significance level α and sample size if we know the propor-
tion assigned to treatment and the standard deviation estimates or we can rearrange 
the equation below to reflect over the number of cases that would be needed in order 
to estimate the effect sizes that we actually have. 
NPP
ttMDE
2
)1( *)1(
1*)( δακ −+= −  
Clearly, the role of power and effect sizes in observational studies has to be different 
from the role as a tool for planning a study.  We think that, after all, since we apply 
parametric statistics the power of tests should be reported as integral part of study. 
As used here, it is also well-suited as a tool for evaluating the evidence produced. 
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13.2 The Comparison of Power and Effect Sizes 
Figure 30 shows the observed pos-hoc power and effect size for Regional Venture 
Capital Loans and Investment Grants.  The relevant range of the observation period 
is the post-treatment period, i.e. the years after 1994.  It is easy to see from the fig-
ures that small effect sizes give low power. Clearly, pos-hoc power analysis is hind-
sight. With a fixed number of cases, however, it provides important information 
about the worth of the evidence obtained.  The estimates for Regional Venture Capi-
tal Loans have small to medium effects over the post-treatment period.  The power 
of the tests is acceptable for 3 of the 13 years of the post-treatment period, yielding 
an approval rate of approximately 23%.  Figure 30 also shows a considerable varia-
tion in both effect sizes and the power of the tests over the observation period.  
Compared to the fluctuations shown in Figure 17, page 117 that exhibits the estima-
tions in money terms, the transformation into effect sizes reflects both the width of 
the confidence intervals as estimated by the methods suggested by Gardner & 
Altman (1989) and the fact that the effect sizes are calculated from the two different 
means that are uses for estimating ATT.  These two different means may, due to 
attrition within years, have different sample sizes.  The figures for Investment 
Grants show only small effects, but 5 of the 13 tests over the post-treatment period 
have acceptable power thus giving an approval rate of 38%.   
 
Effect sizes and power for both Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment 
Grants combined is shown in Figure 31.  The left side of the figure shows medium-
sized effects in the first years after the end of the treatment period and that the ef-
fects level off to a small effect for the remaining of the post-treatment period.  The 
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statistical power of the tests is satisfactory for most of the post-treatment period until 
2002 where a sharp decline in power occurs.   
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Figure 30 Effect Size and Power for Financial Schemes – part 1 
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Figure 31 Effect Size and Power for Financial Schemes – part 2 
 
 
 
The effect sizes for the FRAM program (Figure 32) are small or negligible over the 
post-treatment period and essentially of considerable magnitude only in the period 
right after the treatment period38.   Only 2 of 10 tests have acceptable statistical 
power, giving us an approximate approval rate of 20%. 
 
In comparison, the Network (Figure 33) program have small effects and acceptable 
over the entire post-treatment period, thus yielding an approval rate of 100%.  
Looking back to Table 24 page 109 it is fairly clear that a part of this outcome can 
be attributed to the sample size available for the Network program and the surpris-
ingly large magnitude of the estimates.  
 
 
                                                        
38 Note the post-treatment period for the FRAM program starts in 1998 whereas the corresponding years for the 
financial schemes and the Network program is 1995 and 197 respectively.  Note also that we do not take into 
consideration power and effect sizes within the treatment period. 
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Figure 32 Effect Size and Power for the FRAM program 
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Figure 33 Effect Size and Power for the Network Program 
  
158 
 
Throughout the study we have compared the two-period estimates against the esti-
mates from the panel data analysis.  The goal of the panel data analysis is the same 
as for the two-period analysis; we want to estimate the average difference-in differ-
ences between the treatment groups and the control groups (ATT).  Since the panel 
data estimates use more of the available information than the two-period estimates 
and are considered to be less vulnerable to variation caused by outside factors, we 
consider these estimates as generally more reliable.  However, in terms of explained 
variance in the panel regression models, these models are known to have low statis-
tical power39.  The only parts of the models considered here, however, are the esti-
mates of ATT.  These estimates are evaluated as ordinary estimated means and 
power and effect sizes are compared against the null hypotheses that the difference 
between the treatment group and the control group is zero.  We have demonstrated in 
the analysis section that the means estimated by panel data methods are within a 
reasonable range of the two-period estimates.  Estimation methods are, however, 
very different.  Thus, comparing the panel data effect sizes to the two-period effect-
sizes reveals that the effect sizes from the panel estimates are very small, or what 
Cohen (1988) terms negligible.  Due to the large number of cases when the entire 
samples are used for estimations, the statistical power of the tests is satisfactory for 
all categories.  The problem can be demonstrated by using the panel estimate for the 
effects of receiving Regional Venture Capital Loans for which we estimated to be 
1.125 mill NOK with a confidence interval ranging from the lower limit of .538 mill 
NOK to 1.712 mill NOK at a p ≤  .05.  As shown in Figure 34, to be able to detect an 
ATT of this magnitude (i.e. compared against H0 =0) takes a considerable sample 
size.  At a sample size of 1000 statistical power for a mean of this magnitude would 
                                                        
39 Details from the panel data estimations are reported in appendix B. 
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be around .5, the equivalent of tossing a coin.  As seen from the figure a sample size 
around 3500 would be the minimum required to get a power near or above .80.  
Since all effect sizes for the panel estimates are in the neighborhood of the effect 
size for Regional Venture Capital Loans we do not find it necessary to show the 
graphs, which would look almost the same.  
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Figure 34 Power and necessary sample sizes (Reg. Vent. Capital Loans) 
 
The actual effect sizes and post-hoc power for the panel estimates are shown in 
Table 36.   As can be seen from the table; despite the small effect sizes all tests have 
acceptable statistical power due to the large sample sizes.  
 
Table 36 Effect size and Statistical Power for the Panel data estimates 
 Effect Size Post-hoc Power N of obs. 
Regional Venture Capital Loans 0.051 0.98 5442 
Investment Grants 0.028 0.91 11911 
Both Loans & Grants 0.057 0.99 12413 
The FRAM program 0.030 0.92 10963 
The Network Program 0.050 1.00 38057 
 
Thus, we accept the panel estimates as reliable estimates of ATT  
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13.3 WOE – Principles and summing up 
The principles for WOE used here are straightforward: we compare to what extent 
we have succeeded in detecting the effects that show up in the data, given the fixed 
sample sizes that we have collected from the available administrative records.  All 
effects we consider are ATTs, effects of treatment on the treatment, and all effects 
are based upon matching on observables.  Thus, we also have to take into 
consideration to what extent it is likely that influential unobserved variables have 
sizeable influence.  The sum of the evaluation of these two pieces of information 
decides the weight we will assign to the various estimates.  Clearly, the weights of 
evidence (WOE) do not provide any clear-cut answers.   As an assessment of the 
procedures we have carried out, it does, however, give us a way to range the three 
categories of financial schemes and the two intervention programs according to the 
degree of trustworthiness.  That is, for those categories where we have relatively 
high confidence in the estimates we believe that causal effects and the approximate 
size of the effects in money terms, are substantiated.  Where we cannot trust the 
estimates we have to conclude that results are inconclusive.  
 
 
Table 37 Elements of WOE – Statistical Power and Sensitivities 
 Percentage of  estimates Г- values at 
 above the Power  of .80 p –critical ≤ 0.05 
 in the Post-treatment period for initially matched pairs 
Regional Venture Capital Loans 23% 1.25 
Investment Grants 38% 1.60 
Capital Loans & Grants Combined 62% 1.65 
The FRAM Program 20% 1.10 
The Network Program 100% 1.20 
 
 
As shown in Table 37, for the two-period estimates the lowest ranking category has 
the FRAM program.  The combination of columns 1 and 2 tells us that only 20% of 
the tests have sufficient power and that the effect of a hidden variable does not have 
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to be large to render our conclusions from the comparisons of matched pairs un-
steady.  The fact that matched pairs might exceed p-critical at the conventional .05 
level for the Hodges-Lehman point estimates when the assigned odds of receiving 
treatment (Г) is changed from 1 to 1.10 indicates that if matched pairs differ with as 
little as 10% in unobservable characteristic (see Table 17 page 101) the confidence 
interval for the difference between the two means that constitute the ATT may in-
clude zero. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the CIA assumption is vio-
lated; it simply implies that if unobserved heterogeneity exists it has the potential of 
affecting our estimates.  Thus, the estimates for the FRAM program are vulnerable 
and easily affected by unobserved factors.  The result that p-critical is exceeded at Г 
set to 1.10 is, however, no proof of the actual existence of influential hidden bias.   
 
For the Network program the situation is less clear.  We have the odd combination 
of relatively low gammas and a 100% approval rate on the statistical tests.  Matched 
pairs ought not to differ by more than 20% due to unobservable characteristics if the 
estimated ATTs should be taken as robust to the influence of hidden factors.  Hence 
the magnitude of a relevant unobserved variable does not have to be large in order to 
affect estimates.  It is also worth noting that one of the reasons for the large sample 
size is that we have incomplete information regarding the timing of events; we do 
not know what year firms participated in the Network program, we simply know that 
firms joined the program in one year or more between 1992 and 1997. This lack of 
information gives us the larger sample size which in turn accounts for the high 
statistical power.  The sum of these shortcomings, the relatively high vulnerability to 
unobserved heterogeneity and imprecise information concerning the timing of 
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treatment has to be emphasized as factors that make the estimates for the Network 
program less trustworthy.  
 
The analysis of the financial schemes demonstrates evidence that seems more reli-
able.  First and foremost, we have better data.   While we analyze only a small frac-
tion of the firms that have participated in the FRAM program and have incomplete 
timing of participation for the Network program, we have exact timing of participa-
tion and fairly complete records for the number of participants for the financial 
schemes.  Furthermore, we have information about the size of allotments which 
makes it possible to remove obvious outliers such as loans or investment grants that 
stand out because they are extremely large compared to the common participants.    
 
The weakest part of the analyses is for the Regional Venture Capital Loans where 
only 23% of the tests have a post-hoc power near or above .80.  Moreover, the sen-
sitivity analyses indicates that the estimates for ATT may be unstable if an influen-
tial hidden factor that may cause matched pairs to differ with more than 25% is pre-
sent.    
 
The Investment Grants have a relatively low approval rate, 38% of the tests have 
post-hoc power above the recommended .80, whereas matched pairs might differ up 
to 65% in unobservable characteristics and still have significance values below .05 
for the ATT estimates.   
 
The combination of Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grant has a high 
approval rate; 62% of the tests have a statistical power of .80 or above.  Moreover, 
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the assigned gamma value at p-critical is as high as 1.65.  Thus, we consider the two-
period estimates for this category to be highly trustworthy in comparisons with the 
other four categories.   
  
Table 38 sums up the rankings of the estimation results for the financial schemes and 
intervention programs based on the above reflection over to what extent we have 
succeeded with respect to simultaneously having both acceptable power of the tests 
and estimates based upon matched pairs that are robust towards the effects of poten-
tial unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Table 38  WOE – Rankings of the Financial Schemes and Programs 
 WOE 
 Ranks of 
 Trustworthiness 
Regional Venture Capital Loans 3 
Investment Grants 4 
Capital Loans & Grants Combined 5 
The FRAM Program 1 
The Network Program 2 
1 is the lowest score, 5 the highest  
 
The WOE ranks the FRAM program at the bottom and the combination of Capital 
Loans and Investment Grants at the top40. The implications of these ranking is not 
that we consider the top ranking estimates as near perfect and the bottom ranking 
estimates as worthless.  All estimates assume the unconfoundedness assumption 
(CIA) holds and the sensitivity analyses give us an indicator for to what extent this is 
true. If the data suggest that if it would take the presence of unobserved covariate 
that changes the odds of participation by a considerable factor, say 10, in order to 
increase to influence the p-value we could conclude that our results are robust.  For 
e.g. the FRAM program this factor is as low as 1.10 and we have to conclude that 
                                                        
40 Note that the results from the panel data analyses do not enter the rankings in Table 38 
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the two-period estimates are not very robust since all estimates, including the panel 
data estimates rely on the quality of the initially matched pairs.  We have gammas 
ranging from 1.10 to 1.65.  It is clear that 1.10 is a relatively small value, but it is 
less clear to what extent 1.65 is considerable.  It is rare, however, that values above 
1.6 are found in social science studies (Becker et al., 2007).  Note also that 
Rosenbaum bounds are worst-case scenarios.  Thus, a small value of Г as the 1.10 
for FRAM, does not mean that unobserved is present and that there is no effect of 
treatment on the outcome variable, it simply means that we have to interpreted re-
sults with care since they are not very robust to overlooked confounders.  
 
Thus, drawing conclusions from the analyses should be done with the rankings in 
Table 38 in mind.  This means that all estimates should be considered as numbers 
that indicate the approximate magnitudes of the causal effects of treatment on the 
treated, but some estimates are more robust than others.  For say, the FRAM pro-
gram, we can conclude that we have some estimates of causal effects of magnitudes 
that, conditional on an agreement that we have chosen relevant observables for the 
matching procedure, most likely would be within this range, provided that no con-
siderable confounder is present.  By the same token, we can conclude that it is likely 
that we have found positive measurable causal effects of the Network program.  For 
these particular estimates we have some doubts concerning the magnitudes; both 
because we believe that the inexact timing of treatment have caused to many records 
to be included and thus that we believe that in this case, the power of the tests is in 
fact inflated and the estimates are relatively vulnerable to unobserved heterogeneity.  
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For the financial schemes, and, in particular for the combination of both Regional 
Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants we believe we have substantiated 
causal effects of treatment and that the estimated magnitudes are the best estimates, 
provided that we have chosen relevant observables for the matching procedures. 
 
In terms of the hypotheses put forward on page 18 we have found support for the 
suggested rankings of yields from the five initiatives.  The WOE analysis has, how-
ever, demonstrated that hypothesis testing against the null is seductive in the sense 
that it implies that a hypothesis that is supported by mere coincidence is accepted as 
evidence.  Moreover, we have also demonstrated that for analyses based on matched 
pairs, it is of importance to evaluate the likelihood that the estimates are affected by 
unmeasured factors.  
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14. Discussion 
14.1 Reply to invited commentators 
We have received a number of comments Dr. Arvid Raknerud and Dr. Morten  Hen-
ningsen (2009)  (hereafter R&H), Statistics Norway.  The first section of the discus-
sion attempts to provide an answer to their questions and suggestions. 
14.1.1 Propensity score procedures and covariate matching 
Their first remark concerns the use of covariate matching (CVM) viz. we have fol-
lowed a step-by-step procedure based on propensity score matching (PSM) while the 
actual estimations are covariate matching41, or matching on X using Heckman’s 
(1998a) terminology.  Thus, the question is whether covariate matching and propen-
sity score matching are equivalent with respect to assumptions and implications. In 
particular, what are the consequences of the fact that there is no region of common 
support within CVM? 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that matching on the propensity score  
)|1()( XDprobXp ==  implies that )(| XpXD ⊥  i.e., that assignment to treatment 
is independent of X, conditional on p(X) and that )(|, 01 XDYY ⊥  i.e., the outcomes 
on the effect-variables are independent of the assignment to treatment given the co-
variate vector X and that )(|, 01 XpDYY ⊥  the outcome on the effect variables are 
independent of the assignment to treatment, given equal propensity scores.   Propen-
sity score matching has become popular and is widely used since it reduces the 
                                                        
41 Part of the incitement to switch from propensity matching to covariate matching came from the good advice 
from Dr. Raknerud who generously commented a PCM-based report in 2007.  
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matching problem from many dimensions to one and thus eliminates the curse of 
dimensionality.  Intuitively CVM is more reliable than PSM since PSM implies a 
reduction of the matching problem, nearly a shortcut.  A closer inspection reveals 
that major differences are situated in the matching logic itself and that these differ-
ences have consequences.  The matching logic will be discussed first. 
 
Provided that the unconfoundedness assumption )(|, 01 XpDYY ⊥  and the common 
support assumption 1)(|1(0 <=< XpDprob  are satisfied, selection bias is only due 
to the observables X.  In Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) terminology, treatment 
assignment is strongly ignorable given these assumptions. This is the CIA, the “con-
ditional independence assumption”. The proof of that this assumption, when satis-
fied for X is also fulfilled for p(X) is the so-called balancing property that: 
Prob(X|D=1, p(X) =p) = prob(X|D=0, p(X) =p) = prob(X|p). 
The crucial point here is the common support assumption, which is distinct within 
the PSM framework. As shown in Figure 5 page 62, it is straightforward to decide 
whether a propensity score is inside or outside the range of the probability of being 
assigned to the treatment group.  A corresponding region or any other condition that 
logically restricts the acceptable distance between the treated sample and the com-
parison sample, || X1 – X0 ||, is not available for CVM.  The distance is expressed as a 
metric that is the outcome of matrices of the form (XD=1 – XD=0)W(XD=1 – XD=0)T  
where W is a weight matrix and X is the matrices of the covariates42. This metric 
depends on the chosen weight matrix but is scale-invariant and facilitates the in-
spections of outliers.  The region of common support in PSM represents a minimum 
criterion.  Within the region, further checking of the balancing properties of X and 
                                                        
42 The program nnmatch has several options for weight matrices; the Mahalalobnis weight matrix is the inverse 
of the covariance matrix of X whereas the one we have used, the Abadie-Imbens weight matrix is a diagonal 
matrix with the inverse of the variances as its elements. 
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the re-evaluation of the chosen matching algorithm is usually necessary.  The 
balancing properties of the CVM have to be evaluated in the same manner.  For 
PSM better balancing properties should mean better match between the propensity 
score of the treatment sample and the comparison sample, for CVM improved 
balancing properties should decrease the magnitude of the distance metric and all 
covariates should balance over the treatment and comparisons samples.  Analyses of 
the balancing properties are outlined in section 8 page 88.  
 
Noticeably, perfect match on X is better than perfect match on p(X) since with a 
lengthy X more than one single unit in both the treatment sample and the comparison 
sample may have exactly the same propensity score while the scores on the individ-
ual variables in X may differ within the same unit.  Thus, in terms of the potential for 
exactness CVM is superior to PSM.  Collapsing the data into one variable is not free 
of costs.  Clearly, PSM is more convenient than CVM and what is shown by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is in fact that matching on the empirical propensity 
score (which may differ from the true propensity score) may work (almost) just as 
well as matching on each single variable.  The widespread use of PSM is not an 
argument in favor of the method. In fact the more technical part of the literature 
tends to point out CVM as preferable for a number of reasons, especially because 
recent research on PSM has found deficiencies in term of its capacity to fully ac-
count for the information43 in X.  Also, the prevalent reliance upon statistical tests 
such as the t-test for the assessment of the balancing properties (King & Zeng, 2006; 
King et al., 2007) may be flawed.  When the number of cases in the treatment sam-
                                                        
43 First and foremost, PSM introduces model dependency since the propensity score is modeled by means of one 
or other regression type model, usually a logistic regression model. Also, the variable that is closely related to the 
treatment-control dichotomy accounts for a higher proportion of the propensity score than the other variables in 
the model thus creating the false impression that two units are equal along many dimensions when in fact, the 
success of the balancing tests may be purely accidental.  
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ple is gradually reduced during the matching procedure in order to improve the bal-
ancing properties it is easy to forget that the process that reduces the number of cases 
is not a random process and that the number of cases in the comparison sample does 
not constitute a population from which cases are randomly drawn. Balancing tests 
based upon the means may also ignore differences in the shapes of the distributions 
for the treatment sample and the comparison sample.  In this paper we have pre-
dominantly used qq-plots to evaluate the full empirical distributions of the continu-
ous variable and percentage hit (i.e. identical scores) for the discrete variable to 
avoid biased conclusions concerning the balancing properties.   The decision to use 
CVM was partly practical; nnmatch has some advantageous properties that make it 
suitable; in particular the option for exact match44 which made it possible to analyze 
programs that go over more than one year.  The alternative would be to analyze each 
year separately and manually check for overlaps in the year that follow. With respect 
to differences in terms of statistical properties it is recently shown analytically that 
the semi-parametric variance bounds for matching on X is lower than for propensity 
score matching (Frölich, 2007b).  Thus we consider CVM to be a good solution in 
this particular setting. 
 
14.1.2 Inclusion of pre-treatment level of Y in X 
Raknerud and Henningsen (2009) suggest that the lagged pre-treatment level of the 
endogenous variable Y should be included in X the vector of covariates.  The reason 
for their suggestion can be found in Figure 4 page 57 which shows the common 
trend in the development of added value over time.  Their interpretation of the figure 
                                                        
44 The exact match is not part of the matching algorithm.  It is simply an option for the simultaneous operation on 
several subsets of the files involved. 
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is that 0),( 1, >−tii YDCov  and 0),( 1, >Δ −tit YYCov  i.e. that treatment assignment is not 
independent of the pre-treatment level of the dependent variable and that growth rate 
in Y over the period figure depends on the level of Yt-1 so that the larger companies 
have a higher growth rate. The alleged consequence is an overestimation of effects.  
 
Firstly, Figure 4 is included to demonstrate the common trend assumption, which 
has to be satisfied for the use of difference-in-differences analyses. The figure shows 
data matched on the values of the five variables chosen for the X-vector in the year 
prior to treatment.  The figure shows that the difference between the mean values of 
Y, added value is zero in the first year prior to treatment for the Financial Schemes 
and the FRAM program, but deviates from zero for the Network program data.  
Thus, the figure indicates that the matching procedure has produced an equal starting 
point for the dependent variable even when the level of the dependent variable is not 
included. This is not to the same extent the case for the Network program.   
 
Second, our main argument for not including the dependent variable among the 
matching covariates is that it would violate the conditional independence assump-
tion, XDYY |, 01 ⊥ .  We will not, however, completely reject the suggestion of 
including the level of Y in the covariate vector e.g. by means of coarse blocking on 
levels of Y.  This is an issue that is discussed in the literature e.g. (Black & Smith, 
2004).  Recent research (Glynn & Quinn, 2008) also implies that there is a need for 
rethinking the principles and underlying causal mechanisms when choosing the con-
ditioning covariates.   In this study the decisions concerning X are clearly limited by 
what is obtainable from the sets of administrative records at hand.   We are open for 
further discussions on the proper selection of appropriate conditioning variables.  
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The problem suggested by R&H that may arise for the reason that 
0),( 1, >Δ −tit YYCov  i.e. because there is a positive level dependent growth rate is of 
less concern for our two-period estimates since the ATT is not measured as the di-
rect difference between the added value in the treatment sample and the comparison 
sample. ATT is throughout this study always measured as the difference-in-differ-
ences, which implies that the difference in levels between the two groups cancels 
out.  This property of the DiD estimator also reduces the problems implied for the 
Network program because of the difference in Y in the pre-treatment year.   The 
problem that may occur in the panel analyses because 0),( 1, >Δ −tit YYCov  is compre-
hensively discussed by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan  (2004).   Their main con-
cern is that the nominal growth phenomenon invariably produces positive results 
when difference-in-differences is employed for natural experiments.  We believe that 
the matching procedures employed in this study to a substantial extent reduce this 
problem45.  
 
14.1.3 Unobserved changes in the dependent variable over time 
The dependent variable Added Value is defined as the sum of labor costs and net 
operating result.   The proper question from Raknerud and Henningsen (2009) con-
cerns the stability of this variable in terms of  the labor cost to operating result ratio 
over the period we study.  As they point out, changes in labor costs and/or return on 
                                                        
45 None of the 92 DiD-paper reviewed by Marianne Bertrand and her co-authors was based upon matching 
procedures.  However, their criticism may still apply.  
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capital may affect the dependent variable and cause a spurious effect to be credited 
the governmental initiatives46.    
 
The central question to be answered in this paper concerns the value creation that is 
caused by the initiatives we study, two financial schemes and two intervention 
schemes.  Although the notion of value creation has a central role in the public de-
bate about industrial policies, it is not a well-defined concept.  We constructed a 
proxy for value creation, a composite of the contribution to labor and capital, labeled 
it Added Value and defined it as the sum of labor costs and net operating result.  The 
concept is less than perfect but corresponds closely with the popular conception of 
value creation.   
 
In order to avoid that changes in the dependent variable are misinterpreted as causal 
effects we included a variable which we labeled technology.   Technology is defined 
as labor cost as a percentage of total income.  We called this variable semi-continu-
ous since we collapse it into 11 categories where 0 means that labor costs is between 
0 and 10% and 11 means that labor costs is between 90 to 100% of total income.  
The percentage correct match for this variable varies from 97% to 100% (Table 13 
to Table 15 page 91 to page 96).  Clearly, the close match on this variable reduces 
the problem, but does not eliminate it. If a significant change in the ratio of labor 
costs to net operating result should occur over the period we study, it would most 
likely show up the further we move away from the initial match i.e. the more we 
                                                        
46 Since nothing is said about the direction of this spurious effect, we believe they assumed this effect to be 
positive and thus being a contribution to overestimation. 
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move towards 2006.   The direction of a presumed impact is not, however, very 
clear47.  It is however; straightforward to check if such a change has occurred. 
 
As pointed out by R&H, it is very clear that a close match in the pre-treatment pe-
riod cannot be expected to be a good match over the entire observation period.   That 
is one of the main reasons for demonstrating both the two-period estimates and the 
panel estimates. Note, however, that three of the matching variables, industry, region 
and newness should be expected to be fairly, if not completely stable, over the ob-
servation period.  Thus, along these dimensions we should expect a close match. 
 
R&H also suggest using alternative measures for value creation, e.g. a dependent 
variable where labor costs are dropped.  In fact, the pre-processing perspective and 
the procedures employed facilitate the replacement of any dependent variable as 
long as the new variable relates to the conditioning variables in a way that satisfied 
the conditional independence assumptions (CIA).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
47 Moreover, a major change in the ratio of labor costs to net operating result sufficiently large to influence the 
difference between averages at the national level would be sensational and probably publicly known in advance. 
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14.2 Appropriateness of the choosen estimation strategies 
The evaluation of impact of the two financial schemes and the two intervention pro-
grams are carried out by means of a matching strategy aimed at the construction of a 
control group that facilitated pairwise comparisons of similar firms, where one of the 
two firms received treatment and the other did not receive treatment.  We called this 
first phase a nonparametric preprocessing method, thus indicating that we look at 
this first step, not as an integral part of the analyses, but as a procedure that left sev-
eral options for analyses open.   The two estimation strategies, two-period differ-
ence-in-differences estimation and panel data analysis are two distinct different sta-
tistical methods.  The two estimation methods have two things in common; they both 
use the difference-in-differences estimator and they both use the same data.  Fur-
thermore, we use the same five covariates for matching for the two financial 
schemes and the two programs namely company size, labor costs relative to com-
pany size, industry classification, newness and location.   
 
It is clear that the chosen estimation strategies and the preprocessing view intro-
duced cause our analyses to deviate from the more common procedures based on 
propensity score matching where both matching and estimation are seen as one 
coherent estimation method.  Traditionally, propensity score matching is predomi-
nantly a cross-sectional method.  The model that is used for creating the propensity 
scores is usually central to discussions.  It is known the results from various 
algorithms such as nearest neighbors matching, radius matching, kernel matching 
and local linear regression matching may yield slightly different results  (Imbens, 
2000); (Rosenbaum et al., 1985).  Consequently, lengthy discussions concerning the 
selection of matching algorithms are frequent.  Moreover, one-to-many matching, 
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i.e. using more than one control case per treatment case is known to reduce bias 
(Abadie et al., 2001), which is a useful property in situations with a limited pool of 
potential control cases.  Also, with few control cases available matching with 
replacements is frequently in use so that any control case can be used for more than 
one treatment case. However, whereas one-to-many matching with replacement is 
easily implemented in a cross-sectional setting, it is for obvious reasons very 
awkward to use with longitudinal data where we want to be able to trace the same 
unit over time.  
 
Thus, we have chosen one-to-one48 matching without replacement for our construc-
tion of control groups. It is known that replacement of cases in general will lower the 
bias and increase the variance (Abadie et al., 2002).  The decision to use one-to-one 
matching is based on the fact that we have a large pool of potential control cases to 
choose from.   
 
The decisions concerning preprocessing of the data, the choice of two different esti-
mation methods and the selection of the same five variables to be used as the basis 
for matching for both financial schemes and programs together with the use of co-
variate matching (instead of propensity score matching) are choices that make this 
paper different from many other applications of matching procedures.  We believe 
that these choices make the results more robust.  Compared to the well-structured 
discussions following Caliendo’s (2005) proposal for propensity score matching 
(Figure 7, page 70), however, the discussion should be slightly different:  Firstly, the 
choice of covariate matching (CVM) renders the discussions of models for 
                                                        
48 Not to be confused with exact matching although. Because nnmatch produce only a single distance metric 
one-to-one matching appears to be exact matching even though such a thing does not exist as long as at least one 
continuous variable is included among the matching variables.  
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propensity score estimation and the choice of matching algorithm obsolete. Second, 
there is little need for discussing regression adjustment since such bias reducing 
procedures may not make much difference in one-to-one (near exact) matching.  
There is, however, a need for discussing the common support assumption even 
though this cannot be carried out in the same manner as for propensity score 
matching since separate casewise estimates of the probabilities of being in the 
treatment group (the propensity score) does nor exits.  The only comparable numeral 
for CVM is the metric that measures the distance between two vectors of covariates, 
which by definition implies that a single number only exists for each matched pair.  
Thus, the term “outside the region of common support” has no meaning.  The degree 
of closeness, which is also discussed within the PSM literature (Wilde & Hollister, 
2007) does, however make good sense.  Lastly, judgments concerning matching 
quality and the potential influence of unmeasured variables (potential confounders) 
should be equally relevant for both CVM and PSM.  
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15. Concuding remarks  
The report states that it is fully possible to evaluate the long-term impact of govern-
mental initiatives and that evaluations can be carried out based upon available ad-
ministrative records.  The lines of reasoning put forward are based upon state of the 
art algorithms and procedures.   Provided that the administrative records used are 
free of errors and that estimation procedures are carried out in manners that preclude 
considerable mistakes, we believe that the causal effects of the financial schemes 
and intervention programs are substantiated and that the estimated sums in money 
terms are within reasonable range of their true magnitudes.  The routines used are in 
line with the bulk of the literature produced by the most prominent scholars within 
this field.  Thus, despite a number of necessary compromises due to the inherent 
limitation of available information, we believe the results stated in this report reflect 
the actual causal effects of the governmental initiatives analyzed.   The applicability 
of the methods suggests that a range of programs and other initiatives can safely be 
evaluated by utilizing the information stored in administrative records.  
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1. Introduction 
Leadership training is big business.   Considerable amounts of money are spent worldwide 
by organizations in both public and private sectors for leadership development.  Thousands 
of journal and magazine articles are written and numerous books on leadership theory can be 
found on the bookshelves at airports. Some of these books appear regularly on the best-seller 
lists and are acceptable items for the business executive’s attaché case. Others are self-help 
books that are better left unexposed to customers and business associates.  
 
Leadership theory is a central part of the core curriculum at most business school where the 
ambition is to cultivate the future leader.  Leadership theory is however, not an integrated 
body of knowledge.  It is more a set of separate theories that have evolved into a number of 
sub-disciplines aimed at various aspects of the leadership challenges such as how to relate to 
subordinates, e.g. human relations management theories, or how to act in a competitive 
world, e.g. strategic management theories.  Strict definitions of the exact scope of leadership 
are futile.  Most leadership training programs generally reflect that the consultants are free to 
preach a variety of gospels.  
 
The money and time invested in leadership training programs, the knowledge amassing in 
written texts, and the efforts by scholars reflect the perception that leaders play an essential 
role in the operations of organizations and that leadership skills are more abstract and diffi-
cult to learn than the skills required for the rank and file members of the organization.   
Moreover, in order to justify the time and money spent there has to be an underlying premise 
or belief that the improved leadership skills enhance organizational performance.  The prime 
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goal of this paper is to examine whether these premises and beliefs can be substantiated for 
one particular category of leadership programs; those that explicitly target the small and me-
dium-sized enterprises. 
1.1 SME - targeting leadership programs 
The European Commission defines medium-sized enterprises as firms which employ fewer 
than 250 people and whose annual turnover does not exceed EUR 50 million or whose 
annual balance-sheet total does not exceed EUR 43 million. Small enterprises are companies 
below these boundaries.  A second part of the definition concerns the ownership structure.  
An autonomous SME is not owned by more than 25% by another enterprise or public body 
and does not itself hold more the 25% in another enterprise.  The Norwegian enterprise 
population is different from the corresponding population of firms in central Europe in the 
sense that Norway has fewer large firms and a relatively higher proportion of small firms.  
Thus, leaving the ownership definition equal, Norwegian SMEs are generally smaller than 
what is implied by the European Commission’s definition. 
 
Nearly all industrialized countries utilize taxpayers’ money to offer consultancy support for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. SMEs are targeted by several EU programs, by public 
agencies, such as ALMI in Sweden, Innovation Norway in Norway, and indirectly, through 
subsidized private-sector consultancies, such as Law 44 in Italy and the regional Funds in 
France.  In Sweden, advisory services to small firms was estimated to absorb seven to eight 
percent of net industrial costs more than ten years ago (Lundstrøm, Boter, Kjellberg, & 
Ohman, 1998) . In the UK, the corresponding costs are estimated to be around £650 million 
per year (Gavron, Cowling, & Westall, 1998).   Although we do not have exact figures for 
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Norway, we believe that Norwegian public capital input to advisory services is at least of a 
comparable magnitude. 
The basic rationale for the creation of SME programs and interventions aimed at stimulating 
the performance of SMEs in general, is, for most of the literature, the market failure 
paradigm (Bator, 1958), i.e. the notion that there are some “production factors” that the 
market “fails” to offer the SMEs.  That is, it is commonly assumed that SMEs have problems 
with both formulating and acquiring new knowledge and skills necessary for efficient 
operation.  It is also assumed that SMEs are of vital importance to a country’s economic 
growth and employment (Commission, 1995).  Taken together, the importance of SMEs in 
the national economy and their presumed problems with attaining the competence necessary 
for growth and performance constitutes the reasons for programs like the FRAM program.   
 
Theories that provide guidelines for the substantial content of programs like FRAM are usu-
ally theories concerning issues of strategic management and the firm’s potential benefits 
from improved skills and competence in the workforce (Grønhaug & Nordhaug, 1992).  We 
can label this kind of theories “internal” because they concern specific suggestions about 
how performance can be enhanced by means of the implementation of goal-setting processes 
and procedures.  Theories that seek to explain why such “internal” measures may work, 
seem, however, to be of an “external” kind.  Most prominent among them are agglomeration 
theories or the industrial cluster hypotheses (Porter, 1990) derived from newer theories of 
endogenous economic growth (Romer, 1986).  The “internal” theories prescribe what should 
be done in the firm, while the “external” theories explain why the prescribed actions would 
produce desirable outcomes, provided favorable external circumstances.   
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Provided that some loss with respect to detail is acceptable, it is our ambition to demonstrate 
that program impact can be demonstrated.  The loss we have to accept concerns the 
processes that mediate the effects. That is, we have to accept conclusions at the level decided 
by our units of analysis.  In our case the lowest level is the individual firm. We cannot draw 
conclusions about the micromediation of the putative causes and effects. E.g. outcomes may 
depend upon specific person-to-person interactions within the firm that “caused” the 
implementation of say, an assumed successful strategy.  Hence, when we attribute impact to 
programs, we establish a molar causal relation that is fallible and hence, probabilistic, (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979) because it is contingent on many other conditions and causal relations at 
lower levels where we have no empirical information.  We can e.g. only speculate about to 
what extent specific theories of leadership and strategic management that might have been 
applied in the programs receive any support by our findings.   
1.2 The structure of the paper 
Section two introduces the problem that is studied.  Section three presents the case that is 
examined and gives a brief description of the data.  Section four outlines the preprocessing 
methods that lead to the construction of the dataset of matched pairs of firms which are as 
equal as feasible along a set of chosen dimensions such as size, technology, financial 
standing, industry and localization.  Two different matching strategies are applied and 
compared.  Section five introduces the hazard rate framework and decides whether we can 
defend to assume time as continuously measured or whether we should apply discrete time 
modeling methods.  Section six presents the analyses and sums up the findings.  Section 
seven discusses the implications of the findings. 
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2. The problem adressed 
Clearly, knowledge that has the power to release or instigate enhanced performance (I) in the 
organization must exist and be in the possession of those in charge of the leadership training 
program.  The individual consultant(s) (II) who run the program should have the teaching 
skills necessary for getting the message across (III) to the leaders.  The leaders should have 
the managerial discretion essential for generating actions based on their newly acquired wis-
dom (IV) and the improved organizational performance (V) should be measurable in order to 
demonstrate that participation in the program was useful.  
 
       (I)                        (II)                          (III)                        (IV)                       (V) 
Leadership  mediated  and acquired  put insights  and improve 
knowledge  by  by leaders  into  organizational 
is  consultants  who  action  performance 
  
Figure 1 The presumed leadership program knowledge transmittance chain  
 
The stylized chain of presumed knowledge transmittance reveals a number of problems.  If 
we take no notice of the predicament that the knowledge base may be unsatisfactory and 
assume it so powerful that, provided seamless dissemination and implementation of the mes-
sage, improved performance would of necessity occur, some problems may still remain.  If 
everyone involved in the in the knowledge transmission chain were clever enough to send on 
eighty percent of the original wisdom, only about forty percent of the message would remain 
intact for the implementation phase.  Moreover, managerial discretion rarely amounts to 
dictatorship; unruly markets and other external factors may dominate outcomes and thus 
making it hard to decide whether changes in organizational performance are due to good 
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management or simply a matter of luck or coincidence.  Thus, even though the two basic 
premises that justify leadership training are valid, namely that; (i) the participants in the 
program are leaders who play an essential role in the operations of their organizations and, 
(ii) improved leadership skills enhance organizational performance, the potential impact of 
any leadership program can be evaluated only in retrospect.   Exactly how much time that 
should elapse before results can be expected to show is not easy to decide on in advance.  In 
this particular study we have an observation window of 8 to 14 years, that is, we have 
observations from a leadership program from 1992 to 1997 and the study ends in 2005.  
Establishing the existence of a link between leadership training programs and organizational 
performance empirically is still not straightforward:  Leadership skills are abilities at the 
individual level while organizational performance has to be measured at one or other ag-
gregate level i.e. at division or subdivision level or for the smaller firms, for the entire com-
pany.  Thus, this study concerns only one aspect of the results of the leadership training 
program; the firm’s ability to stay in business.  This perspective assumes that bankruptcy is 
an undesirable outcome; an outcome to be avoided.  The declared goal of the FRAM 
program is to stimulate growth and new hiring of employees. Hence, it might be just to 
declare bankruptcy as a failure.   We expect the FRAM program to inspire enthusiasm and 
disseminate insights that translate into action assumed by the knowledge transmittance chain 
in Figure 1.  Thus, our working hypothesis is that the probability of bankruptcy is decreased 
among firms that have participated in the FRAM program, compared to other firms.   
 
Patterns of the bankruptcies may shed considerable light on the functioning of the FRAM 
program and may be useful for making adjustments to the program. 
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3. The Case and the Data  
3.1 The FRAM program 
The FRAM program aims at developing leadership skills and strategic competence for 
SMEs.  The program’s ambition is to contribute to lasting transfer of competence, improved 
competitive power and profitability.  FRAM was developed in 1992-1993 by The Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) as a follow-up program of a technology 
transfer program (BUNT). The program was offered to the SMEs as an individually tailored 
development program, and companies are invited to participate, provided that thy meet the 
following criteria: 
• they should not be engaged in competition with other participants  
• they should have supplier or customer relationships to other participants 
 
Found eligible for participation, companies are “screened” by undisclosed criteria that have 
to with judgments concerning expectations about the company’s ability to benefit from the 
program.  The program is organized as separate projects for groups of similar firms, e.g. 
firms within the tourism industry, construction, and so on, usually groups of 8 to 12 persons, 
who in most cases are the CEO of their respective companies.  The program is run by expe-
rienced process consultants, and concentrates on strategic development processes, very much 
in line with the standard textbook theory of normative strategic management.   
3.2 The FRAM data sets 
The FRAM program data set consists of 469 firms that have participated in the program over 
the period 1992 to 1997.  For the 469 firms, survey data was collected as part of an evalua-
tion study carried out by the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Admini-
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stration in 1997 (Nesheim, Kvitastein, Lines, Grønhaug, & Espedal, 1997).  The survey data 
was supplied with information from administrative records from Dun & Bradstreet and data 
on bankruptcies from the Brønnøysund Register Centre, the official registry for company 
information in Norway.  Since our primary concern in this paper is the hypothesized 
differences in bankruptcy rates between FRAM program participants and other, comparable 
firms, the public registries should be considered to be our prime source of information. To be 
able to carry out the matching procedure we need information about the companies in 
question for the year prior to the first time it entered the program.  As we can see from Table 
1 there is a slight difference between the column for the original FRAM participants and the 
column showing the number of FRAM participants actually used as treatment cases 
indicating that for a few firm data could not be identified in the registry of administrative 
records.  The loss of 59 cases is not substantial.  Noteworthy, the dataset we have, includes 
only a minor portion of all companies that have participated in the many variants of the 
FRAM program.  Thus, the conclusion from this study concerns outcomes from the group of 
included companies only.  
Table 1 FRAM-participants, treatment cases and potential controls 
Year Origninal Treatment Cases Potential Total
of inter- FRAM cases lost control number 
vention participants used cases of cases
1992 19 18 1 25622 25640
1993 21 14 7 5699 5713
1994 110 104 6 31631 31735
1995 131 112 19 32237 32349
1996 142 124 18 38154 38278
1997 46 38 8 41439 41477
N = 469 410 59 174782 175192  
 
Table 1 shows that we have a considerable pool of potential control companies for the six 
years treatment period we look at.  For the years 1992, 1993 and 1997, however, the 
treatment groups are small and may not be well suited for stand-alone analyses.   
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Looking back, a decade later, in 2005, Table 2 shows that 304 of the 410 firms we were able 
to identify are still active.  54 firms are registered as bankrupt and 52 firms have left the 
market for other reasons.  We have information that shows that 24 of these latter 52 firms 
have either merged with other firms or are in the process of negotiating acquisitions.  In 
total, about 13% of the firms involved in the FRAM program have as far as 2005 
experienced bankruptcy and an approximately equal percentage are no longer registered as 
active for other reasons, i.e. close to a third of the participating firms have disappeared after 
2005. 
Table 2  The FRAM - participants in 2005  
Year of Firms in the Firms Firms leaving until 2005 Percent
Intervention FRAM-survey Identified Bankruptcies Other reasons Total 
1992 19 18 2 11.1 % 2 11.1 % 22.2 %
1993 21 14 0 0.0 % 4 28.6 % 28.6 %
1994 110 104 15 14.4 % 10 9.6 % 24.0 %
1995 131 112 10 8.9 % 23 20.5 % 29.5 %
1996 142 124 20 16.1 % 9 7.3 % 23.4 %
1997 46 38 7 18.4 % 4 10.5 % 28.9 %
N = 469 410 54 52  
     
  
3.3 Measures  
Apart from the hazard rate, our dependent variable that will be explained later, we measure 
an independent variable concern ownership as a dummy variable code 1 if a company is 
owned by more than 25% by another company and zero otherwise.  We measure short-time 
debt as the by means of short-time liabilities as a percentage of total assets based upon 
accounting records, and, due to the liability of newness hypothesis, (Stinchcombe, 1965) we 
define a variable frail coded 1 if a company is established after 1991 and coded zero 
otherwise.  Of these three variables, only short-time debt has to be used as a time-dependent 
variable, i.e., a variable that may take a different value every time it is observed.  Variables 
used for preprocessing purposes will be reported in the sections on preprocessing methods. 
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4. Preprocessing methods 
4.1 Selection bias, non-randomness and the causal counterfactual 
Participants for the FRAM program are not picked at random.  Applicants have to qualify for 
the programs and from the firm’s side the decision to hand in the application depends 
heavily upon the extent to which the busy SME leaders believe the program is of any worth 
in their daily work.  The obstacles, motivations and other more or less rational consideration 
that led to the decision to participate or not to participate are all part of a process that con-
stitutes a process of non-random selection into the program.  Hence, we are left with a par-
ticular problem that may be the source of considerable bias, the so-called selection problem.  
If, say, only SMEs with a solid profit margin and sufficient supply of stable long-term con-
tracts ready at hand found participation justifiable, life expectancy would, from the outset on 
be higher among participating firms than among any randomly picked sample of comparable 
SMEs.  Or, vice versa, if the FRAM program was designed to target firms on the edge of 
bankruptcy, we should not be surprised to find that participating firms had a lower life ex-
pectancy than comparable non-participating firms.  When trying to estimate the impact of the 
FRAM program upon survival expectancy, the selection mechanism into to the program 
clearly is of importance. Hence, we have to find means of limiting selection effects as a po-
tential threat to the validity of conclusions. 
 
The key to estimating the impact of a program is to consider what would have happened in 
the absence of the program and compare this counterfactual situation to the factual situation.    
The problem is that the counterfactual, by definition, is something that does not exist.  Thus, 
it has to be constructed in a way that most closely represents what alternatively would have 
happened. The impact caused by the program is then represented as one or other kind of 
distance between the factual and the counterfactual situation.  This way of thinking about 
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causality and impact of intervention has become commonplace in the econometric evaluation 
literature and is looked upon as development that has evolved over time as an amalgamation 
between the logical foundation outlined in David Lewis’s (1973) work from the early seven-
ties, the seminal work in statistics by Donald Rubin and Paul Rosenbaum (1985a; 1983; 
1984; 1985b) in the eighties and the contribution by econometricians (1989; 1998; 1992; 
1989; 1997; 1991; 1998) and many other scholars throughout the eighties and the nineties2.  
A comprehensive summing up of the causal counterfactual way of reasoning is summed up 
in Judea Pearl’s Lakatos prize winning book “Causality” in 2000 (Pearl, 2000).  
 
A crucial feature necessary for feasible detection of the effects of a program is that we are 
able to distinguish between the group of firms that are exposed to treatment (to use the 
experiment jargon) and those which are not exposed to treatment, that is, between 
participants and non-participants. This is not a problem in the FRAM case.  It is however 
important that we are able to check whether participating firms are engaged in other 
programs.  To be able attribute effects as caused by the program in question, involvements in 
other programs could contaminate findings.  
 
Note also that no unit (firm) can be observed in the two states we intend to use for our com-
parisons, as both receiving the treatment and not.  If this was possible, the effect could be 
calculated by comparing the two states for the same unit.  A major problem is that the effect 
of treatment has to be calculated by comparing a unit that received the treatment with an-
other unit that did not receive the treatment.  
                                                 
2 The list of authors could easily be extended.  The burgeoning literature in the field that we loosely can label “econometric 
evaluation methods” makes it difficult to pay justice to all significant contributions.  
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Formally, say a unit can be in either a treated state, denoted state “1” or an untreated state, 
denoted state “0” and say outcomes Y1 and Y0 are associated with each state. The gain from 
treatment could then be calculated as the difference Δ = Y1 - Y0 .  Because we cannot deter-
mine impact of treatment for the individual, we have to rely on the distribution of impact 
across units, call it F(Δ) or on certain features of this distribution.  The expected gain to a 
randomly selected unit in the population, denoted E(Δ)=E(Y1 - Y0 ) refers to the expected 
value or population average. Given that the entire population was included, this parameter 
provides information necessary to carry out benefit-cost analysis when combined with in-
formation about average cost. This situation is, however, rare in program evaluations.  The 
FRAM program targets certain firms, and we have to focus on what happens to those who 
actually did participate. Denoting participation d=1 and non-participation d=0 we can write 
the distribution of gains for participants as F(Δ|d=1) and the impact for participants as 
E(Δ|d=1)=E(Y1 - Y0|d=1 ).   The problem is that we do not know E(Y0|d=1), it has to be 
estimated, and this is not straightforward.  We cannot directly use the mean outcome among 
non-participants as a proxy for what would have happened to participants, given that they 
had not participated.  This is easily seen by subtracting the mean outcome among non-par-
ticipants from the mean outcome of participants, E(Y1|d=1) - E(Y0|d=0), yields  
(1) {E(Y1|d=1)-E(Y0|d=1)}+{E(Y0|d=1)-E(Y0|d=0)} 
 
The expression for the counterfactual, E(Y0|d=1), that is, the outcome for the participants, 
provided that they had not participated, appears twice in the equation.  The first term in the 
curly brackets gives the mean impact of participation, and the second term represents the 
selection bias caused by the fact that non-participants differ from participants in the non-
participating state. This selection bias may be different from zero if, as mentioned above, the 
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SMEs’ selection into the program is regulated by, say, the perceived good economic 
prospect of the firms. In such a case non-participants could be expected to have outcomes 
higher than participants, and hence, a negative selection bias could yield incorrect estimates.   
 
Randomization solves this problem, provided that randomization does not alter the pool of 
participants or their behavior, and that close substitutes for the treatment are not available.   
Given that randomization is used both for the treatment (participant) group and the control 
group (non-participants) and that the control group is denied access to the treatment group, 
the outcomes of both groups in the zero state would be equal.  That is, E(Y0|d=1) = 
E(Y0|d=0) and the right hand side term in the curly brackets in the equation above would 
cancel out, implying no selection bias.  Clearly, as is usually the case in retrospective 
evaluations of public intervention programs, randomization is not an option in this case of 
the FRAM program.   
 
Following the recommendations of Rosenbaum and Rubin (Rosenbaum et al., 1983) we 
suggest matching procedures based on propensity scores as a way to emulate en experi-
mental setting.  Matching, in this context, means that for each individual firm participating in 
the FRAM program we seek for a “comparable” non-participating firm that “matches” the 
participating firm.  Propensity scores are probabilities, i.e. scores that tell us how likely it is 
that a particular firm could be found in the participant group.  Denoting the participant group 
d=1 and the non-participating group d=0, the probability of membership in the participating 
group can be expressed as e(X)=prob(d=1|X), where X for each individual SME represents a 
vector of variables, i.e. a range of attributes of the firm that may discriminate between 
participating and non-participating firms.  Hence, if e(X) =prob(d=1|X), i.e. if the estimated, 
predicted probability of membership in the participant group, conditional upon a number of 
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firm characteristics, X, is approximately equal for two different firms, and one of them is 
known to be in the participating group and the other is known not to be in the participant 
group, they are considered as matches.  
 
This procedure has remarkable advantages compared to former matching techniques.  The 
traditional matching techniques assume matching on each individual variable.  Thus, even 
with a few, discrete variables, the number of possible combinations quickly becomes large 
and requires a very large pool of potential candidates for match. By means of propensity 
scores, that can easily be estimated using an ordinary logistic regression model, it is possible 
to match on one single variable only, namely the propensity score.  Simulation studies also 
show that propensity scores, when compared to older matching techniques like the 
Mahalanobis metric matching, often removed more than twice as much bias (Gu & 
Rosenbaum, 1993).  
 
 The justification for the propensity score procedure is straightforward: In the simplest ran-
domised experiment one may just toss a fair coin and, say, assign head to the treatment 
group and tail to the control group and in this way ensure that e(X) =prob(d=1|X)= ½  for 
each unit involved.  With propensity score, this would clearly not be the case.  Some units 
may have probabilities less than ½ and other may have probabilities close to 1.  The point is 
that as long as two units have approximately the same probabilities of membership in the 
treatment group, they can be compared. 
 
It is clearly of importance that the outcomes for the treatment and comparison group, condi-
tional on X are independent of the (0/1) grouping itself.  This is the so-called conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). If we assume the propensity score procedure produces this 
result, that is: 
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(2)       )(|),( 01 XpdYY ⊥  and thus  XdYY |),( 01 ⊥  where ⊥ means “independent of”, 
 
Then, in the terminology of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) treatment assignment is strongly 
ignorable given the observed covariate vector.  This implies that, conditional on X, outcomes 
in the non-participant group (comparison group) have approximately the same distribution as 
outcomes in the participant group, provided that the participant had not participated.  
Returning to equation (1), this implies that the equation reduces to: 
 
(3) E(Y0|X,d=1) = E(Y0|X,d=0) = E(Y0|X) 
 
 
That is, the missing counterfactual can be estimated from the outcome among non-partici-
pants. This is an important property of the propensity score matching procedure.  It facili-
tates approximate emulation of an experiment because it balances observed covariates, i.e. 
the X.  Clearly, the propensity score procedure does not take into account unobserved rele-
vant covariates.  In this respect the propensity score procedure is inferior compared to a pro-
cedure that allowed for random assignment of treatment.  This is a limitation that may im-
pose problems.  Hence, even though bias in estimates may be considerably reduced, we still 
have to be aware of possible sources of bias that may inflict on the validity of conclusions. 
4.2 Transition data analysis and the propensity score model 
Propensity score matching is predominantly a cross-sectional technique. We intend to ana-
lyze longitudinal data.  Our hypothesis is that participating in the FRAM program makes a 
difference for the participants, i.e. that bankruptcy is an event that is less likely to occur for 
the firms that participated than for those comparable firms that did not participate.  Akin to 
what is common in the medical literature, (e.g., (Foster, 2003; McIntosh & Rubin, 1999; 
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Rubin, 1993; Stone et al., 1995) we construct a control group based upon matched pairs and 
inspect the differences in survival rates between treated and non-treated units; the only 
difference is that we compare firms, not people.  This difference may be considerable in the 
sense that the dissimilarity among firms is thought of as more prevalent than the variation 
that is usually present among the patients that are the units in, say, the analyses of the effects 
of a particular drug.  Clearly, this presumption can be questioned.  Most likely, both firms 
and people show considerable variation along arrays of relevant traits that may affect the 
validity of conclusions.   Firms and people change over time and thus, any two chosen units 
that are fairly equal at the beginning of the observation period may be very different by the 
end of the period. This is a problem that is easily overlooked.  Moreover, since survival 
analysis implies that the data-generating processes evolve over time, the problem of the 
potential influence of hidden or unmeasured variables parallels central problems in the 
Neyman-Rubin model (Holland, 1986).  Also, other near untestable problems such as the 
stable unit-treatment assumption (SUTVA) which demands that the effect of treatment on 
unit i should be independent of the effects of treatments on any other unit will also apply to 
transition rate models.   
    
4.3 The practical implementation of propensity score matching 
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) the implementation of propensity score 
matching can be thought of as a five-step procedure: 
(1) Propensity score estimation 
(2) The choice of matching algorithm 
(3) Checking of overlap/common support
(4) The evaluation of matching quality 
(5) Sensitivity analysis 
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The first step involves the choice of conditioning variables for the matching procedure.  This 
clearly involves decisions with wide-ranging consequences.  
4.3.1 Propensity score matching and the choice of conditioning variables 
Propensity score is estimated by means of a logistic regression model, which is by far the 
most commonly applied.  The covariates used for estimating the propensity scores are shown 
in Table 3 below.  The chosen covariates reflect that we want the treatment group and the 
control group to balance with respect to size, (measured as the logarithm of total turnover) 
the financial situation (where the equity ratio is used as a proxy for the relative wealth of the 
company) two measures for capital/labor intensiveness (where factor costs as a percentage of 
total turnover are used as proxies).  In addition, we use a number of dummy variables to 
account for localization and business sectors broadly defined in order to increase the 
probability of finding matches that roughly operate within the same markets3 within the 
same regions.   Even though most of the firms involved are SMEs we have a dummy 
variable for those firms that are big enough to be characterized as medium-sized enterprises.  
The last variable, newness is of particular importance since new firms are more vulnerable to 
external forces than older firms according to the liability of newness hypothesis 
(Stinchcombe, 1965).   
 
The decisions concerning the selection of covariates for the estimation of the propensity 
score is of crucial importance in the construction of the counterfactual. Since causal reason-
ing in observational studies usually assumes that treatment and control cases are matched at 
                                                 
3 The term business sector is used simply because we deviate somewhat from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).  
We are well aware that two firms categorized within the same business sector do not necessarily operate under equal com-
petitive conditions.  Even with many more dummy variables added this has to be a coarse approximation to comparable 
competitive conditions.  
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one or other point in time prior to treatment the conditioning variables have to be measur-
able in the pretreatment period. The chosen covariates are decisive in the sense that they give 
the dimensions along which we can consider the treatment group and control group to be 
comparable.  Unfortunately, the literature provides no clear advice with respect to the choice 
of conditioning covariates. The classical econometric advice is that when one is unsure 
whether a measured pre-treatment variable should be included or not it is best to err on the 
side of including potentially irrelevant covariates.  The famous quotation often used to jus-
tify the almost unrestrained inclusion of hopefully relevant matching variables is: 
”The conclusion, then, is that if the specification error consists of including some irrelevant explana-
tory variables in the regression equation, the least squares estimators of the regression coefficients 
are unbiased but not efficient. The estimators of the variances are also unbiased, so that, in the ab-
sence of other complications, the usual tests of significance and confidence intervals for the regres-
sion coefficients are valid” (Kmenta, 1986). 
 
 
The question under which circumstances conditioning covariates effectively reduce selection 
bias in observational studies is investigated in a series of more recent articles by Thomas D. 
Cook, William R. Shadish et al.  (2008; 2009; 2009; Diaz & Handa, 2006; Pohl, Steiner, 
Eisermann, Soellner, & Cook, 2009).  Their findings, mainly based upon social science re-
search in the context of the regression-discontinuity design, are mixed, but indicate that a 
substantial part of bias can be eliminated by means of various ways of conditioning on co-
variates.  Review of the labor economics literature shows, however, that in practical applica-
tion matching models almost always fail to remove all selection bias (Glazerman, Levy, & 
Myers, 2003; Michalopoulos, Bloom, & Hill, 2004).  In theory, the covariates that support 
the strong ignorability assumption are those that are closely related to both the real selection 
process and study outcomes and still leaves outcomes independent of the treatment assign-
ment.   
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Since our primary source of data is administrative records the choice of covariates is con-
strained by what is available in the records.  The chosen covariates displayed in Table 3 
reflect this limitation.   
 
Table 3 Logistic regression – treatment/control with selected covariates  
Covariates Coef. Std. Err z P>z
Total turnover (log scale) 0.63 0.053 11.86 0.000 0.53 0.74
Equity ratio (percent) 0.00 0.002 -2.37 0.018 -0.01 0.00
Labor costs 0.03 0.004 7.53 0.000 0.02 0.04
Other factor costs 0.00 0.003 -0.31 0.753 -0.01 0.01
Localization 
Hedmark and Oppland 1.36 0.224 6.07 0.000 0.92 1.80
South Eastern Norway 1.08 0.195 5.54 0.000 0.70 1.46
Agder and Rogaland 1.11 0.209 5.31 0.000 0.70 1.52
Western Norway 0.85 0.200 4.25 0.000 0.46 1.24
Trøndelag 1.03 0.235 4.36 0.000 0.56 1.49
Northern Norway 1.35 0.215 6.27 0.000 0.93 1.77
Business sectors
Other Industries 0.69 0.224 3.09 0.002 0.25 1.13
Construction -0.30 0.171 -1.74 0.081 -0.63 0.04
Property Management -0.11 0.231 -0.49 0.627 -0.57 0.34
Information Technology 0.28 0.239 1.16 0.247 -0.19 0.74
Expert-knowledge services -1.18 0.297 -3.98 0.000 -1.76 -0.60
Furniture Industry 0.80 0.321 2.49 0.013 0.17 1.43
Food industry -0.08 0.334 -0.23 0.817 -0.73 0.58
Plastics industry 0.98 0.297 3.30 0.001 0.40 1.56
Tourism industry -0.18 0.224 -0.80 0.421 -0.62 0.26
Wood products 0.87 0.211 4.13 0.000 0.46 1.28
Commodity trade -1.39 0.196 -7.08 0.000 -1.77 -1.00
Shipbuilding industry 0.36 0.371 0.96 0.338 -0.37 1.08
Size
Medium-sized enterprises -1.65 0.392 -4.20 0.000 -2.42 -0.88
Firm maturity
Newness 0.01 0.004 2.55 0.011 0.00 0.02
Constant -13.08 0.569 -22.98 0.000 -14.20 -11.97
Number of obs   = 175192 410
LR chi2(25)     = 521.95 174782
Prob > chi2     = 0
Pseudo R2       = 0.0902
[95% Conf. Interval]
 Treatment cases
 Potential control cases
 
The table shows the estimates for the chosen conditioning variables measured in the year 
prior to the participation in the FRAM program.  This is the propensity score producing 
variables used for constructing datasets of matched pairs, i.e. to each and every unit we have 
chosen to proceed by using only one control unit for each treatment unit.  
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4.3.2 Two different Matching Strategies 
Table 1 (page 196) shows that the year of participation (intervention time) spans from 1992 
to 1997, a period that covers six years. The two first years and the last year have relatively 
few participants.  The logistic regression shown in Table 3 above is based on all six years 
jointly used as the treatment category and coded 1 on the binary dependent variable, and the 
controls coded as zeros. All covariates are measured one year prior to intervention.  Thus, 
the binary dependent variable for intervention in year t is moved to year t-1 and the 
estimated predicted (the propensity score) value for intervention in year t is estimated in year 
t-1.  This is the conventional procedure in the cross-sectional usage of propensity scores.  In 
the longitudinal setting the logic of the procedure is that of constructing datasets of matched 
pairs which facilitate following the development of each comparable pair over time.  The 
problem with this procedure is of course that pairs that are relatively equal at t-1 measured 
from the time of intervention may become increasingly unequal over time.  Note also that 
since our intention is to compare the probability of bankruptcies between firms that have 
participated in the FRAM program and comparable non-participants, we find it convenient to 
restrict the number of comparison cases to one for each firm, i.e. use matched pairs4.   
 
The criticism of the year-by-year deterioration of matching quality as we move further away 
from the matching year is relevant for longitudinal studies based upon matching methods. 
We therefore introduce a second matching regime where we use the best matches within 
each year.  A brief look at Figure 1 can explain the difference.   
                                                 
4 This is strictly not necessary.  We could use more than one comparison case and weight each control case according its 
distance from the best match. Many comparison cases and weighting may, however, become very cumbersome in the 
survival analyses.  
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Figure 2  The conventional matching regime 
 
The conventional matching regime for program evaluations usually employs a before-after 
strategy where matching is based upon information gathered prior to the intervention, and 
thus, the counterfactual is searched established and utilized for comparisons after the 
intervention event of interest.   This is also what we have done here in what we can call the 
first regime which is based on the logistic regression model in Table 3.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2 we intend to construct pairs of firms that are as equal as possible, conditional upon 
our chosen covariate vector at each year of intervention 1992 to 1997, as marked with 
ellipsoids embracing each pair.  Thus we will produce a dataset with exactly twice as many 
units as we have treatment cases, provided that we are able to find an exact match for every 
treatment case.  This procedure makes it easy to measure duration time i.e. time from 
intervention to event, either bankruptcy or further activity, which is the input for further 
analysis.  
What we have called the second matching regime is radically different in the sense that we 
now estimate for each year i.e. in the observation period 1992 to 2005 we estimate 14 
models using the same conditioning variables as in Table 3. Thus, instead of constructing 
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pairs that are as equal as possible in the year prior to intervention we construct pairs that are 
as equal as possible within each year that we observe.  This implies that we use 14 different 
estimates of the propensity score instead of just one.  Thus, we eliminate the problem of 
increasing differences within matched pairs over time and create another one, namely that 
we now do not follow the same control unit over time.  The logic of this second matching 
regime is different from the first regime in the sense that whereas in the first regime we 
follow matched pairs of treatment units and control unites over time, we now ask the 
question; what is the duration time in the state as active (or until event) for those (control 
unit) firms that are maximally equal to the firms in the treatment group within each year they 
are observed?  Clearly, this implies that while we follow all treatment cases over the entire 
observation period any control case may be substituted for a different one within each year.  
The advantage of this procedure is each matched pair is more equal in the sense that the 
absolute distance between the propensity score for the control cases and the treatment cases 
are more effectively minimized and thus we should achieve an improved bias reduction.  
Moreover, we also minimize the potential impact of hidden (unmeasured) variables and thus 
reduce the influence of unobserved heterogeneity.  
4.3.3 The choice of matching algorithm  
A number of user supplied matching algorithms available in Stata© and R+ can be applied 
for finding the closest possible match between the propensity score in the treatment group 
and the control group.  The many programs and algorithms offer an extensive collection of 
the many ways two numbers can be matched.   Our two matching regimes do, however, 
make it most convenient to use algorithms that facilitate exact matching (for each year) in 
addition to the matching on the propensity score.  We therefore use a modified version of the 
Stata ado-program nnmatch (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, & Imbens, 2001) where we use the 
option for exact matching for  the variable years and otherwise use Mahalanobis matching on 
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the logit of the propensity score.  The one modification we do is that we do not allow a 
control case that is selected as match in one year to reappear as a match in any subsequent 
year.  This modification is done in a sequence of matches outside the ado-file nnmatch. 
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Figure 3  The effect of a logit transformation on the propensity score 
 
Taking the logit of the propensity score makes no difference when we apply the algorithm 
for Mahalanobis distance5.   Figure 3 is based on the predicted values from the logistic 
regression model for what we call regime 1 matching (Table 3 above).   The figure reveals a 
very common pattern with more values near zero in the control group than in the treatment 
group.  The right hand side of the figure demonstrates how it is easier to see the region of 
common support when we use that logit of the propensity score.  Thus, we can decide the 
boundaries of the region of common support in advance and use both the value of the 
Mahalanobis distance metric and the requirement that we have to be inside the region of 
                                                 
5 The logit transformation makes a difference for other matching algorithms such as caliper matching and other algorithms. 
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common support in our decisions concerning what cases to accept and what cases to 
disregard.   In both matching regime 1 and matching regime 2, of the control cases 408 are 
inside the region of common support. 
4.4 The balancing properties of matching regime 1 
There are many ways to present the achieved balancing properties of the matched samples, 
from the least meaningful but most frequently applied, the t-tests for differences in means6 to 
the quantile-quantile plot, which is excellent for this kind of comparison since it also shows 
the equality of the distribution of the covariate in the treatment and control groups. Because 
of the considerable number of comparisons due to our two matching regimes we apply the 
suggestion by Rosenbaum & Rubin (Haviland, Nagin, & Rosenbaum, 2007; Rosenbaum et 
al., 1985a) for the continuous variables since it gives a compact presentation of the balance 
achieved.  Table 4 reports two absolute standardized measures similar to Cohen’s d (Cohen, 
1988) where, 
x
xpxt
x s
MM
d
|| −= ,  
x
xcxt
xm s
MMd || −=  and 2/)( 22 xcxtx sss +=   where Mxp is 
the mean of all potential control cases (N = 174782), Mxt is the mean of the treatment cases 
(N= 410) and Mxc  is the mean of the matched control cases and sx is the overall standard 
deviation in the calculations of absolute differences.  
For the dummy-variables included we simply report the proportions since with exact 
matching the proportion of any dummy-variable should be close to 50% in both the control 
group and the treatment group7.  As shown in Table 4 above, matching substantially 
improves the balance of the covariates.  Apart from the percent bias reduction, which 
                                                 
6 Simple tests for differences in means are deceptive because the t-statistics depends on the number of cases involved and 
the number of cases before match will normally outnumber the number of cases after match and cause an inevitable de-
crease in the t-values after match. 
7 Effect sizes would balance and both dx and dxm would be 0 at 50%.   
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depends heavily on the relative imbalance before matching, what we want to see is values 
near zero for the dxm – column.  Note that the propensity score is included in the table even 
though it is not a covariate.  It is included to demonstrate the effect of matching in terms of 
dx and dxm. 
Table 4  Covariate Imbalance before and after Matching - Matching Regime 1 
  
Covariate Year dx dxm 
Percent bias 
Reduction 
Estimated propensity score 1991 1.26 0.13 89.7 
" 1992 0.98 0.01 99.0 
" 1993 0.93 0.08 91.4 
" 1994 0.80 0.03 96.3 
" 1995 0.94 0.00 100.0 
" 1996 0.86 0.11 87.2 
Total turnover (log scale) 1991 0.31 0.12 61.3 
" 1992 0.41 0.15 63.4 
" 1993 0.46 0.19 58.7 
" 1994 0.44 0.06 86.4 
" 1995 0.59 0.02 96.6 
" 1996 0.51 0.37 27.5 
Equity ratio (percent) 1991 0.00 0.52 na 
" 1992 0.36 0.35 2.8 
" 1993 0.09 0.03 66.7 
" 1994 0.05 0.10 -100.0 
" 1995 0.00 0.01 na 
" 1996 0.01 0.13 -1200.0 
Labor costs  1991 0.40 0.60 -50.0 
(as percentage of turnover) 1992 0.35 0.30 14.3 
" 1993 0.52 0.04 92.3 
" 1994 0.48 0.00 100.0 
" 1995 0.46 0.03 93.5 
" 1996 0.73 0.03 95.9 
Other factor costs 1991 0.45 0.39 13.3 
(as percentage of turnover) 1992 0.48 0.12 75.0 
" 1993 0.39 0.03 92.3 
" 1994 0.33 0.02 93.9 
" 1995 0.26 0.01 96.2 
" 1996 0.46 0.02 95.7 
Maximum  1.26 0.60  
  
Table 4 also shows that the years with the lowest number of cases (1991, 1992 and 1996 
with respectively 18, 14 and 38 cases) do not achieve the same level of balance as the years 
with a higher number of cases.   The same pattern is also observable in Table 5 where most 
dummy-variables balance around 50% for the years 1993 to 1995. 
The quantile-quantile plot in Figure 4 gives a better visualization of the distribution of the 
propensity scores after matching.  Any two equal distributions will follow the 45% degree 
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line in the figures while the differences between the two distributions will appear outside the 
45% degree line. 
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Figure 4  QQ- plot of the propensity score before and after matching – Regime 1 
 
Table 5 Dummy covariate Imbalance after Matching - Matching Regime 1 
 
Dummy variable One Year prior to Intervention Average 
Covariates 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 over 
Localization (percent) years 
Hedmark and Oppland 0.0 0.0 57.9 57.1 46.4 65.0 54.2 
South Eastern Norway 50.0 57.1 48.9 52.2 48.4 50.0 50.0 
Agder and Rogaland 62.5 60.0 43.8 43.3 47.5 63.6 48.4 
Western Norway 66.7 37.5 63.2 55.8 50.0 50.0 55.4 
Trøndelag 50.0 0.0 45.5 50.0 53.9 25.0 46.1 
Northern Norway 33.3 50.0 40.0 47.2 52.8 18.2 43.9 
Business sectors              
Other Industries 66.7 50.0 53.8 58.3 28.6 100.0 51.0 
Construction 50.0 0.0 50.0 54.8 56.0 37.5 49.5 
Property Management 100.0 50.0 53.3 41.7 42.9 33.3 46.8 
Information Technology 0.0 50.0 28.6 66.7 64.3 80.0 57.9 
Expert-knowledge services 0.0 0.0 50.0 40.0 71.4 100.0 65.0 
Furniture Industry 100.0 0.0 45.5 33.3 20.0 0.0 38.5 
Food industry 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 20.0 33.3 43.5 
Plastics industry  50.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 60.0 100.0 65.0 
Tourism industry  0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 45.8 0.0 38.5 
Wood products  33.3 66.7 66.7 45.5 58.8 33.3 56.4 
Commodity trade 0.0 0.0 57.1 46.4 52.9 50.0 51.1 
Shipbuilding industry  0.0 0.0 0.0 55.7 100.0 0.0 61.5 
Size              
Medium-sized enterprises 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 20.0 45.0 50.0 
Average over dummies 37.5 30.1 44.5 48.7 49.5 46.5  
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4.5 The balancing properties of matching regime 2 
Following the same line of reasoning as for matching regime 1, Table 6 shows the covariate 
imbalance before and after matching when treatment and control cases are matched, not the 
year prior to treatment as in matching regime 1, but in the year they are observed.   Clearly, 
with respect to matching quality, matching regime 2 shows a considerable improvement over 
matching regime 1.   
Table 6 Covariate Imbalance before and after Matching - Matching Regime 2 
 Covariates 
 Estimated Total  Equity Labor costs Other factor costs 
 propensity turnover  ratio (as percentage (as percentage 
 score (log scale) (percent) of turnover) of turnover) 
Year dx dxm dx dxm dx dxm dx dxm dx dxm 
1992 1.21 0.02 0.50 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.39 0.00 0.24 0.01 
1993 1.23 0.02 0.56 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.41 0.08 0.25 0.07 
1994 1.29 0.02 0.63 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.40 0.03 0.23 0.05 
1995 1.37 0.02 0.68 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.41 0.06 0.22 0.08 
1996 1.42 0.01 0.72 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.42 0.10 0.28 0.07 
1997 1.32 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.39 0.00 0.24 0.00 
1998 1.20 0.02 0.51 0.09 0.23 0.03 0.32 0.03 0.21 0.01 
1999 1.18 0.02 0.46 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.29 0.07 0.22 0.03 
2000 1.18 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.26 0.06 0.19 0.06 
2001 1.17 0.01 0.36 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.05 
2002 1.12 0.02 0.33 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.02 
2003 1.13 0.01 0.32 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.07 
2004 1.12 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.00 
2005 1.12 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.21 0.00 
Max 1.42 0.02 0.72 0.09 0.25 0.08 0.42 0.10 0.28 0.08 
  
Table 7 Percent bias reduction due to matching 
Est. Prop. Total Equity Labor Other
Year Score turnover ratio costs costs
1992 98.3 86.0 -100.0 100.0 95.8
1993 98.4 83.9 87.5 80.5 72.0
1994 98.4 93.7 87.5 92.5 78.3
1995 98.5 91.2 61.1 85.4 63.6
1996 99.3 91.7 90.9 76.2 75.0
1997 98.5 98.4 75.0 100.0 100.0
1998 98.3 82.4 87.0 90.6 95.2
1999 98.3 100.0 70.8 75.9 86.4
2000 98.3 100.0 87.0 76.9 68.4
2001 99.1 75.0 68.2 88.9 80.8
2002 98.2 75.8 88.2 100.0 91.7
2003 99.1 84.4 96.0 76.2 69.6
2004 99.1 100.0 95.2 68.8 100.0
2005 98.2 96.4 62.5 92.3 100.0
Average 98.6 89.9 81.3 86.0 84.1
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Figure 5 QQ- plot of the propensity score before and after matching – Regime 2 
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Table 8 Dummy covariate Imbalance after Matching - Matching Regime 2 
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5. Analyses – the choice of models 
The nature of the data confronts us with two basic choices; (1) the choice between 
competing risk modeling or the acceptance of bankruptcies as a single absorbing state, and 
(2) the choice between assuming time is measured discrete or continuous.  Also, in the 
preprocessing of the data we have used two different matching regimes in the construction of 
our matched pair datasets.  Thus we also have to assess the difference between the two 
matching regimes and decide which to use for further analysis. 
5.1 Competing risk or single event 
It is clear from Table 2 (page 197) that about half of the firms left the market for other 
reasons than bankruptcies.  The official Norwegian Company Registry in Brønnøysund 
report 52 of the 410 firms as simply “no longer in the registry”.  The registry does, however, 
have information that 24 of the firms we cannot find in the registry were involved in mergers 
or acquisitions in the year prior to their last registration.  Thus, it is relatively likely that the 
category “no longer in the registry” may imply that they are still active and even that this is a 
positive outcome e.g. that the company is sold at a profit and thus that in some cases exit 
may be a success story.  In other cases “no longer in the registry” may mean that the 
company does not make sufficient money and, thus, phasing out is a rational action although 
not necessarily a success story.  Bankruptcy, on the other hand, is usually not to be regarded 
as a desirable outcome.  Thus, based on these lines of reasoning we find it reasonable to use 
bankruptcy as the single absorbing event of interest in the further analyses. 
5.2 Discrete or continuous time 
The available data from Dun & Bradstreet are yearly registered accounting records including 
information on industry, localization, year of establishment and of number of employees.  
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Thus, we do not have event histories, i.e. we have not have knowledge of the exact dates of 
events.  The exception is the records for bankruptcies from the official Norwegian Company 
Registry in Brønnøysund where we have the exact dates for the declaration of bankruptcies.  
There is usually a gap in time between first warnings, declarations and final closure.  In this 
period of negotiations and frantic efforts to avoid bankruptcy, some deliver complete 
accounting reports as required, most companies do not. This leaves us with two problems.  
First, we do not have complete records for the last years prior to bankruptcies; second, we 
have a kind of hybrid data which have exact dates for the ending time of spells but inexact 
dates for the starts of spells.  The latter problem implies that a model that uses discrete time 
is a more appropriate choice than models that assume that time is measured continuously.  If 
we choose to use a discrete time model, however, we throw away information and run into 
problems with the differences between the exact dates for bankruptcies and the clear-cut 
dates needed for discrete modeling (Allison, 1982).   In the following we will report results 
from single spell episodes for both discrete and continuous time. 
5.3 Matching in the year prior to intervention versus yearly matching 
The results in sections 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that matching regime 2 has better balancing 
properties than matching regime 1.  Matching regime 1 is in line with the standard 
procedures for propensity score matching for cross-sectional data (Caliendo et al., 2005)  
where the propensity scores are estimated on covariates observed one year prior to the 
intervention. Matching regime 2 is, however, very unusual.  Matching regime 2 facilitates 
time varying covariates and creates a different propensity score for each observation year.   
The advantage of this kind of preprocessing is that we are able to create datasets of pairs that 
are maximally equal to each year, conditional on our vector of covariates.  With one-to-one 
matching this means that we may assign a different comparison case to the treatment case in 
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question every year over the observation period.  Thus we construct two comparable single 
spells where we ignore the history of the control units.  Since time varying external forces 
may be the most decisive factors for survival this comparison strategy may be more robust to 
the effects of unobserved variables (unobserved heterogeneity).  
 
Table 9  Number of events for matching regime 1 and 2 
Matching Regime 1 Matching Regime 2 
(Conditioning on covariates in (Conditioning on covariates in 
 
one year prior to intervention) every year over the observation period) 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Censored Cases 356 363 354 349 
Events (bankruptcies) 52 45 54 59 
Total 408 408 408 408 
 
 
As shown in Table 9, the results of the two matching regimes differ with respect to the 
number of events in the treatment and control groups.   The difference between the numbers 
of events in the treatment groups occurs because two cases outside the region of common 
support matches two firms that later on went bankrupt, and thus, two treatment cases are 
discarded.  Otherwise, the most striking difference is the unequal number of cases with 
events in the control groups.  While matching regime 1 results in a lower number of 
bankruptcies in the control groups than matching regime 2, Table 9 does not tell us much 
with respect to the choice between the two matching regimes.  Their differences are not 
surprising.   Since matching regime 1 implies that we follow each firm in the control group 
over its entire life span from the year prior to intervention (the year prior to the treatment 
group’s participation in the FRAM program) until event eventually occurs or we leave the 
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observation window in 2005. We also know that at any point in time, provided that a firm 
has managed to stay in business so far, the chances of surviving until the end of the 
following year is improved.  This is a truism in the sense that this is always the case for any 
episode.  The point to be made here is that matching regime 1 forces this phenomenon to be 
present while we have no knowledge of the prevalence of a corresponding effect in matching 
regime 2 where any comparison case is void of history and thus, the survival probability in 
the next year has a random distribution. 
In the further analyses, based on the presumption of better properties, we base our models on 
the preprocessing resulting from matching regime 2.  However, we present some 
rudimentary demonstrations of the differences between the two matching regimes. 
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6. Analyses – The Hazard-rate Framework 
6.1 The continuous time model 
The fundamental dependent variable within the hazard-rate framework (Petersen, 1993) is 
the hazard, in the continuous case defined as 
tt
tTtTt
tt
tr −
≥<≤
→= '
'
'
)|Pr(lim)(  where T is a 
random variable that represents the duration from the beginning of an episode, t0 (for 
simplicity and in accordance with conventions we assume t0 = 0) until a change in the 
dependent variable i.e., a transition from the origin state (here, the firm is active) to the 
destination state (here, the firm is bankrupt) occurs (Blossfeld, 1995).  Thus, the basic for the 
single episode data we intend to model is of the form ),()( xttr λ=  where x represents our 
covariates in this regression type model and λ represents the functional forms.   Since the 
hazard rate is an abstraction that is not directly observable we also demonstrate outcomes in 
terms of the directly observable survivor function  )Pr()((1)( tTtFtG >=−=  where 
)Pr()( tTtF ≤=  is the probability distribution of T.   The specific shape of the time 
dependence for the hazard rate may take many forms and have specific interpretations such  
as in the parameterization known as the Hernes distribution (Hernes, 1972) where the hazard 
of getting married is a decreasing function of time. Other common forms are an increase 
which levels off, such as the risk of fatal events after childbirths (e.g. a log-logistic model) or 
a rate that does not change over time (the exponential model).  We have no knowledge about 
the shape of the time dependence in the case of the survival of firms. Our basic hypothesis is 
that participation in a leadership-training program should in general reduce the probability of 
failures. Hence, e.g. an increase in the risk of failure immediately after participation should 
not be expected.   However, we use various parameterizations of time dependence in order to 
investigate model misspecification e.g. potential effects of unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. 
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effects of variables not included in our models.  We also use the Cox proportional hazards 
model which leaves the function of time unspecified.   In log- form the Cox model can be 
written in the regression form as xtxt ')(),(log βαλ +=  where β is the familiar effects of the 
independent x-variables and )(tα  is the unspecified function of time.  Note that for all 
analyses here we assume no left censoring, that is, all censored cases are censored to the 
right i.e. is observed at t, but not t+1.  Our observation window runs until 2005 and firms 
still active are considered as right censored.   
6.2 The discrete time model 
The discrete-time model (Allison, 1982) is quite similar to the continuous time models but 
assumes a rearrangement of our matched pair datasets so that  each individual episode 
constitutes one case, thus an individual firm that is active for say five years and then goes 
bankrupt is repeated five times, if it is observed six times it is repeated six times and so on.  
This process of expanding the datasets go on until an event occurs or the case is censored.  
Using the rearranged dataset the discrete model can be estimated with a logistic regression 
model which in its logit form can be written as [ ] xpp t ')1/(log βα +=−  where p is the 
proportion of cases with events, i.e. events are coded as ones and censored cases are coded 
as zeros.  This model is very similar to the Cox-model in the sense that the tα - part does not 
carry essential information, it simply picks up the effects of the dummy variables which is 
coded as ones for each time-specific line of data, zeros otherwise.   
 
When comparing the continuous and the discrete model some discrepancies may arise that 
are due not to the true difference between the two models but the fact that the discrete model 
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cannot be estimated with gaps within the time span over which it is estimated.  In our dataset 
there are no events in the first year after the intervention in the treatment group.  Thus, we 
have to manually change the data to make sure that time starts at 1 and not at 2. The 
consequences of these changes should be minor. 
6.3 Results – graphical displays 
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Figure 6 Survivor and cumulative hazard functions for matching regimes 1 and 2 
 
Assuming that time is measured continuously and using treatment and control as two 
different strata, Figure 6 shows very similar patterns of survival and cumulative hazards over 
time, regardless of the chosen matching regime. Log-ranks test of the differences between 
the survivor functions for the treatment groups and the control groups (Table 10) show no 
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significant differences in the survivor functions between strata for both matching regimes 1 
and 2.   Thus, the first impression is that there are no differences between the firms that 
participated in the FRAM program and comparable firms that did not participate (the control 
group) and we could arrive at the conclusion that leadership training has had no impact upon 
the firm’s chances of avoiding bankruptcies. 
 
Table 10 Log-rank test of the difference between survivor functions 
 Matching Regime 1 Matching Regime 2 
 Events Events Events Events 
 observed expected observed expected
Control 45 48.81 59 56.39
Treatment 52 48.19 54 56.61
Total 97 97.00 113 113.00
 χ2 = 0.60 χ2 = 0.24
 Pr > χ2 = 0.438 Pr > χ2 = 0.623
  
The combined impression from the graphical displays and the log-rank tests implies that 
there is little difference between the two preprocessing regimes.   The balancing properties 
of matching regime 1 are inferior compared to matching regime 2 and we believe that the 
influences of unmeasured variables are less severe in matching regime 2 since we use yearly 
matches.  Thus, in the further analysis we are based upon matching regime 2 only. 
6.4 Results – simple regression models – discrete vs. continuous time 
We can also think about the difference between the treatment group and the control group in 
terms of an independent dummy variable, coded one for the treatment group and zero for the 
control group, and inspect the effects of participation in the FRAM program by means of 
regression models.  The regression approach facilitates comparisons between the continuous 
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time model and the discrete time model.   Table 11 below (with an excessive number of 
decimals) shows the difference between estimates.   
 
Table 11 Comparisons of the estimates from the discrete vs. continuous time model8 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Discrete   -.0917061 .189972 -0.48 0.629 -.464045 .280633 
(Logistic) N = 7691      
Continuous  -.0923134 .188335 -0.49 0.624 -.461443 .276817 
(Cox)  N = 816      
        
Discrete   Odds ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
(Logistic)  .9123732 .1733256 -0.48 0.629 .6287353 1.323967 
Continuous  Haz. ratio      
(Cox)  .9118194 .1717275 -0.49 0.624 .6303732 1.318924 
  
Despite the fact that we manually changed the data to avoid missing events in the first year 
after intervention, the estimates are strikingly similar, almost down to the third decimal.  
However, a dichotomized treatment/control variable as an independent variable only 
confirms what we already knew, the confidence intervals for coefficient estimates include 
zero and hence, it seems evident that participation in the FRAM program is unrelated to the 
likelihood of a future bankruptcy.   Table 11 does, however, indicate that the approximation 
to continuous time may be appropriate.  Thus, we proceed by using the continuous time 
model. 
6.5 Results – overlooked differences and unobserved heterogeneity 
The lack of difference between the treatment group and the control group may hide 
differences that are not easily detectable in the Cox proportional hazard model.  Also, a 
                                                 
8 We have omitted the results for the twelve dummy-variables involved since they are not central to our argument. 
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closer look at exhibit B in Figure 6 shows that the survivor function for the two groups cross 
and thus, the proportional hazard assumption is violated.  Also, a closer inspection of the 
development of the most likely cause of bankruptcy, short-term liabilities, indicates that 
there are differences between the two groups that should affect the hazard rates. 
 
Figure 7  The evolvement of short term liabilities 
 
The figure above shows that short time liabilities are lower in the treatment group than in the 
control group over the observation period but also that liabilities have increased in the 
treatment group in the first part of the intervention period.  Note that these are fairly rough 
measures, simple means based on relatively few cases, in particular in the 1992 and 1993.  It 
may imply that there are differences due to the selection processes that could affect the 
probability of bankruptcy that is not picked up by our preprocessing.  Generally, we believe 
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that the liability of newness (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Singh, Tucker, & House, 
1986; Stinchcombe, 1965) is the single most important factor for explaining bankruptcies. 
This is also the reason why newness was included as a covariate in our matching vector.  The 
result of the preprocessing with respect to this variable is shown in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8 Newness and the frailty of firms  
 
Figure 8 indicates that the “degree of newness” is well balanced between the treatment and 
the control group.  Closer inspection shows that around 33% of the firms in the control group 
and 24% in the treatment group were established in or after 1991.  In line with the liability of 
newness hypothesis and  in the terminology of Vaupel et al. (1979) we label these firms 
frailty cases simply because we believe they are more vulnerable due to inadequate financial 
solidity and also because the leadership in these firms may be more receptive to new ideas 
about how to run the firm.  The latter point, that they are more easily influenced by ideas 
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about leadership may mean that the consequences of their vulnerability differ between 
FRAM participants and non-participants.   
 
 
Figure 9  Short-term liabilities for the frailty cases 
 
The figure above indicates that solidity may be a problem for the newly established firms 
(the frailty cases).  The solidity conditions for new firms are prevalent in both the treatment 
group and the control group, the question is whether participation in the FRAM program 
causes leaders to act differently to leaders who do not participate and to what extent these 
actions affect future outcomes.  
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Since we have very little theoretical grounds for assuming any form of duration dependence 
we ran a Weibull regression model with a Gamma frailty term separately for the treatment 
group and the control group in order to inspect possible differences between the population 
level hazards and the individual level hazards.  The difference between the individual level 
and the population level hazard is, by definition, assumed away by the proportionality 
assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model, hence, we simply chose a very common 
parameterization of the duration dependence to be able to distinguish between the two levels.  
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Figure 10 Weibull regressions with gamma frailty  
 
The population hazard is the hazard averaged over all survivors while the individual hazard 
is the hazard that the individual unit faces.  In the proportional hazard model these two 
magnitudes are the same since all individual units are assumed to be identical.   Unobserved 
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heterogeneity may arise precisely because all units are not identical.  Figure 10 shows that 
while the hazards at the population level for both groups follow a familiar pattern of a slight 
increase which levels off over time, the patterns at the individual level are different between 
the treatment group and the control group.  The scale on the y-axes indicates that the rise-
level of pattern at the population level is in fact relatively flat while differences at the 
individual level are of greater magnitude.  Thus, what is worth noting from Figure 10 is that 
while the hazard falls at population level, the hazard at individual level continues to rise in 
the treatment group but not to the same extent in the control group.  The phenomena may 
indicate a frailty effect caused by a heterogeneity that assures that the population hazards 
decline over time regardless of the shape of the hazard the individual firms face.  The worst 
cases scenario is that this means that the FRAM program stimulates leadership behaviors 
which reinforce risks in the frailty group.   
 
Clearly, the Weibull model with the frailty term is just another parameterization of duration 
dependence; we have not substantiated that a particular negative interaction between what is 
learned in the FRAM program and the hazard rate is present.  We can however, test whether 
frailty effects are present in the statistical sense by means of a likelihood ratio test and then 
try out whether the presence of frailty alters estimates for other variables that may affect the 
hazard rate.  The result from this test is shown in Table 12 below.  Note that the test show 
the results from “shared” frailty defined as a dummy variable for firms established after 
1991, whereas Figure 10 shows “unshared frailty” which was used in the graphical check of 
the possible presence of frailty.  While Figure 10 led us to discover localized frailty by 
means of simply specifying a Weibull model with Gamma frailty included, “shared” frailty 
takes us one step further by allowing us to specify the frailty variable.  Moreover, by 
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specifying the “shared frailty” we assume that similar observations share frailty, even though 
frailty may vary from group to group.   
 
Table 12 Weibull and Cox regression with and shared frailty and frailty as a 
variable9 
  Weibull Weibull with Cox 
 Weibull with shared Frailty included Proportional 
  Frailty as variable  Hazard Model 
Treatment/control -0.987* -0.994* -1.257** -1.321** 
 (0.531) (0.531) (0.546) (0.552) 
Concern ownership 0.390 0.435 0.428 0.455 
 (0.423) (0.424) (0.425) (0.425) 
Short-time debt 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Short-time debt & TC 0.016** 0.018** 0.016** 0.017** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Frail firms   0.198 0.199 
   (0.270) (0.270) 
Frail firms & TC   0.928** 0.926** 
   (0.384) (0.384) 
Constant -12.544*** -12.448*** -12.783***  
 (0.911) (0.936) (0.923)  
Shape parameter ρ 1.922 1.940 1.963  
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.171)  
Frailty parameter θ  0.080   
  (0.098)   
Observations 816 816 816 816 
Log-Likelihood -342.08 -339.62 -333.97 -690.86 
* p < 0.10;  **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed); Standard errors are given in parentheses  
& TC  means interaction with Treatment/control 
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) = 4.91 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.013 
  
Table 12 shows that frailty is present10 but does not have any noteworthy impact upon other 
estimates in the model.   The table also demonstrates that there are only modest differences 
between the estimates from the Cox proportional hazard model and the Weibull model after 
including frailty and the interaction between treatment and frailty as independent variables, 
                                                 
9 Note that these regressions are based upon time-varying covariates such as short time liabilities as a percentage of total 
assets.  The Stata program facilitates the inclusion of time varying covariates both for the discrete and the continuous hazard 
rate models, thus in the regression models we have 8886 records for 816 subjects. For the time-constant variables we have 
the exact same results whether the datasets are expanded or not.  The id-variable in Stata’s st-setup takes care of the adjust-
ments. 
10 Note that the frailty parameter theta is evaluated by a likelihood-ratio test as shown beneath the table, dividing the coeffi-
cient by its standard error has no meaning. 
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even though we are well aware that the proportionality assumption for the Cox model may 
be violated.  Table 12 shows some consequential results; first and foremost we note that the 
sign of treatment/control variable now is negative and it is significantly different from zero.  
These results are in striking contrast to those from the log-rank test in Table 10 and the 
regression results in Table 11 which indicates no significant difference in hazard rate of 
survival rate between the treatment and the control group.   Figure 11 shows that the 
relatively decreased hazard of bankruptcy is lower in the treatment group regardless of the 
estimation model used; both the parametric Weibull model and the semi parametric Cox 
model generate approximately the same patterns for the cumulative hazards. 
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Figure 11 Cumulative Hazard for treatment and control after estimation 
 
The most important findings reported in Table 12 are the interactions between short-term 
liabilities and treatment and between frailty (firms established after 1991) and treatment.  It 
should not be a surprise that larger short-time liabilities significantly increase the likelihood 
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of bankruptcy but it is less reassuring that the interaction between treatment and short-time 
liabilities goes in the same direction, although to a lesser degree. Both estimates of the 
effects of short-time liabilities do, however, have insufficient power i.e., the magnitude of 
the coefficients’ effects sizes are simply too small to be detectable with the sample size we 
have11.  The estimates of the effects of the treatment/control variable and the interaction 
between treatment and frailty has power near one even after assuming considerable multiple 
correlations among the independent variables. The most important finding is, however, that 
the interaction between treatment and frailty which indicates that participation in the FRAM 
program may increase the probability of failure i.e., bankruptcy for the newly established 
firms.  The interaction between participation and increased hazard can also be shown by a 
simple graph of the cumulative hazard within the treatment group and the control group as 
shown in Figure 12.  
Frailty=1
Frailty=0
Treatment Group (N=408)
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
0.
30
0 50 100 150 200
analysis time
Frailty=0
Frailty=1
Control Group (N=408)
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
0.
30
0 50 100 150 200
analysis time
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates
 
Figure 12 Cumulative hazard rates for treatment and control by frailty 
                                                 
11 Power is estimated by means of Stata’s stpower cox – routine. 
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7. Discussion 
7.1 The trustworthiness of our findings  
As we rely solely on administrative records, the presented findings depend heavily on our 
preprocessing procedures.  On the other hand, observational studies like this exhibit a high 
degree of transparency; each individual firm can be identified by a unique number and lists 
of accounting information are publicly available.  Thus, anyone can reproduce our matched 
pair data and check to what extent comparisons make sense. The experimentalists would 
most likely maintain that the chosen methodologies have their shortcomings. However, as 
pointed out by Heckman, even randomization does not remove selection bias; it balances the 
bias between the treatment group and the control group (Heckman & Smith, 1995).  The 
tradition of comparing observational studies to pure experiments (Dehejia, 2005; Dehejia & 
Wahba, 2002; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, & Todd, 1998; Smith & Todd, 2005) tends to 
claim that there is always a better answer.  The tradition of considering the experiment as the 
“gold standard” has, however, its limitations. Apart from the problem that random 
assignment of leadership training programs nay not be the ideal task, selection bias may arise 
from sources that are hard to level out even by means of randomization.  Selection effects 
can be generated by missing data on the common factors affecting participation and 
outcome, or it may occur when random assignment causes the kind of units participating in 
the program to differ from units participating in the program as it normally operates 
(Heckman et al., 1995).  This phenomenon is usually labeled randomization bias and could 
easily occur if SMEs simply receive a message saying that they by lottery have been so 
lucky to be invited to participate in the FRAM program.   Another source of randomization 
bias is changes in participant behavior that operates via reactions towards participation and is 
measurable prior to treatment.   Furthermore, substitution bias may occur when members of 
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the control group gain access to close substitutes of the treatment under consideration.  In 
e.g. training programs for small business firms, this phenomenon is likely to happen when 
someone in the control group recognizes that they are denied a service and react by seeking 
similar services offered elsewhere.  Thus, experimentation is no “magic bullet” and neither is 
matching techniques.  The best we can hope for is that we have succeeded in constructing 
datasets of matched pairs that are as good as possible and thus, that major confounders are 
eliminated. 
 
7.2 The implications of our findings 
The initial direct comparisons of the survivor functions for participants in the FRAM- 
program and non-participants implied no difference, i.e., initially, we found no support for 
our main hypothesis that participation should lower the probability of bankruptcy.  However, 
after controlling for short-time debt, frailty defined as recently established firms and their 
respective interactions with treatment, the picture changes and it now appears as if the 
FRAM-program in fact has a positive impact in the sense that it lowers the probability of 
bankruptcies.  The analyses indicate that this positive result comes at a cost; the participating 
firms that are established after 1991 have a considerably higher probability of failure than 
their non-participating comparison cases.  Evaluated by the Cox model the estimate of 0.926 
for the interaction of treatment and frailty means that participation in the FRAM- program 
would increase the probability of failure with 100*((e0.926)-1) ≈ 152%.  Thus, the overall 
positive outcome of the program results from controlling out the negative effects on the 
newly established firms.  Thus, the most vulnerable firms are affected negatively by the 
program and most probably contrary to intentions.  
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We may speculate over the possible mechanisms underlying this result.  One could be the 
moral hazard argument i.e., participants felt safe in the assumed protection of Innovation 
Norway and, eager to conform to the program’s goal of increased turnover changed their 
behavior to a more debt-generating risky behavior.  Other explanations could imply that lack 
of practice led the inexperienced leaders to literally accept everything that was taught in the 
seminars thereby ignoring necessary attention to their own firm’s financial situation.  Or, it 
could be the case that a level of robustness is necessary if a company is to be exposed to a 
change-inducing leadership program.   
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Abstract 
The article discusses how strong directional pressures and the framing effects of the 
New Public Management mantra may set off institutional processes that mould the 
methodologies of applied evaluations. The emergence of evaluations as an integral 
part of New Public Management (NPM) and the substandard argument, i.e., the no-
tion that applied evaluation research should accept lower methodological standards 
than discipline research, produce an unfortunate dualism. Moreover, the tension be-
tween the protagonists of naturalistic inquiry and the devotees of probabilistic causa-
tion within the evaluation community may be harmful to the public confidence in 
social science based evaluations.  This tension is specific to the social sciences, has 
no parallel in other sciences, and tends to create the impression that most evaluations 
are disputed.   
 
The history of evaluation has produced a number of sub-fields based on different 
parent disciplines.  Strong paradigmatic commitment to own sub-discipline and cor-
responding rejection of competing world-views may lower the overall trust in 
evaluations.  Local legitimacy in evaluations refers to the problem that some meth-
ods are recognized within specific sub-disciplines only.  Since New Public Manage-
ment is predominantly based on a popular notion of economics, this is the story of 
how pluralism meets monism.   
 
The focus of the article is the potential for bias in the evaluations of governmental 
projects or programs that is created by the methodological state of affairs. The pecu-
liarities of the various ‘schools’ of the field of evaluation and the question to what 
extent strong adherence to a particular ‘school’ can be a source of bias is debated.  
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The paper pertains to summative evaluations of public programs and projects where 
the initialization, finalization and intentions are identifiable. A central theme 
throughout the paper is the agenda setting nature of the overt superficial “first” ques-
tion of applied evaluation studies, namely, “did it work?”  This question demands 
claims about effects, regardless of how well the program or project under investiga-
tion lends itself to causal investigations. Ambiguities of results provide opportunities 
for strong stakeholders to set the premises for debates.   
 
While qualitative methodologies may be well suited for evaluations of ongoing pro-
gram/projects where the intent is to improve performance, inquiries that have low 
transparency and rely heavily on subjective impressions and interpretations are less 
suited for summative evaluations. 
 
Thus, the conclusion is that the final, overall conclusion about the merit or worth of 
a program should, whenever possible, imply a minimum of disputable subjective 
interpretations and follow strict rules and procedures that are backward traceable and 
have a high degree of transparency. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. New Public Management, Accountability and Evaluation 
Over the past three decades applied evaluation research has changed from being an 
activity mainly concerned with efforts to improve the primary schools system, 
(Worthen, Sanders, & Fitzpatrick, 1997) to become an integral part of the profes-
sional apparatus of the bundle of managerial reforms referred to as New Public 
Management (NPM) in Europe, Australia and New Zealand, and as the Reinventing 
Government movement in the US (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999; Christensen, Lae-
greid, & Wise, 2002; Hood, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). New Public Manage-
ment introduces a new language of public administration where the emphasis on 
stability, rules and responsiveness to the law, is replaced with a vocabulary that ac-
centuates change, decentralization, responsiveness to consumers, performance, and 
the need to “earn” rather than to “spend” (Maor, 1999).   Public demand for account-
ability is both central to the justification for New Public Management and a prime 
responsibility for the new administrative regime.  Hence, the NPM movement has 
prepared a new place for social science research-based reasoning that has made ap-
plied evaluations one of today’s fastest growing areas of social science.  This revival 
of social science research is, however, not uncontroversial.  While some researchers 
welcome the new financial support and the apparent resurgence of applied social 
science, others are more hesitant to welcome an activity they believe will necessarily 
introduce double methodological standards. That is, lower methodological and pro-
fessional standards are unavoidably enforced in situations where most evaluation 
contracts demand swift answers to complicated questions.   Common reasons for 
accepting methodological sub-standards for applied evaluations is acceptance and 
respect for the fact that policy-making processes follow their own pace and logic.  
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Thus, if social science arguments are to be taken into consideration at all, researchers 
have to comply with the standards the evaluation task at hands allows for.   
 
1.2. Evaluation’s problematic relation to varying parent disciplines 
The conception of social science implied by applied evaluations, that researchers do 
not identify problems, they simply solve predefined tasks, is hard to accept for many 
scholars.  Reactions to decreasing availability of funding for general social research, 
combined with growing opportunities for finance via evaluation contracts, take many 
forms.  The formation of professional organizations like the European Evaluation 
Society and the American Evaluation Association and the birth of professional jour-
nals dedicated to evaluation studies, are all positive adaptive institutional responses.  
The tension between the research communities within the established disciplines and 
the emerging sub-discipline dedicated to evaluation research is, however, the other 
side of the coin.  Even though evaluation research is well accepted as a legitimate re-
search activity, hints of opportunism and insinuations about biases in reported out-
comes, are not entirely absent.  For the legitimacy of evaluation research, it is of im-
portance to reveal the alleged sources of bias.  
 
1.3. The paradoxical revival of the social sciences 
Several prominent scholars (Haveman, 1987; Nathan, 1988; Aaron, Gramlich, Ha-
nushek, Heckman, & Wildawsky, 1990) maintain that the status of the social sci-
ences has been on a downward slide since the seventies. It may seem paradoxical 
that evaluations flourish in times when the social sciences in general have a down-
turn, and it is not all that clear that the new confidence in evaluations and hence, 
social science based public policies, implies a renewed vote of confidence in the 
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social sciences.  As an integral part of the managerial orientation of NPM, the awak-
ening of evaluations is interpretable, but badly in need of clarifications.  What used 
to be called a report is now an evaluation, and thus, carries a promise of something 
more than just a report.  Evaluation is a semantic magnet (Vedung, 2000) with a 
positive power that lends itself easily to a message of confidence. On the other hand, 
the American Evaluation Association is, to my knowledge, among the very few pro-
fessional organizations that openly admits to and publicly discusses that a negative 
reputation is a problem for their profession (Donaldson, 2001). Recently, some 
evaluators have also expressed frustration over the tension between the quest for 
confidence and the feeling that a widespread acceptance of relativism characterizes 
both practical evaluation reports and the professional recommendations from leading 
journals in the field.  With respect to methodology, the impression is that “anything 
goes” (Adelman, 1996).  
1.4. The ivory tower and the pettiness of evaluations 
However, applied evaluations have a built-in propensity to reveal deep-seated prob-
lems in the social sciences.  The practical, interest ridden setting of applied evalua-
tion research, tends to unveil unpleasant questions about ideological underpinnings 
of the theories in use, and ambiguities of the methods employed.  Practical implica-
tions of the theories that guided interventions may disclose unwarranted side effects, 
and the prescribed methods may fail to provide trustworthy information about out-
comes.  Frustration in the research communities seems to disperse in two directions; 
towards overconfidence or retreat.  Overconfidence tends to surface as an expression 
of near unconditional faith in theories in support of the arguments set forth and re-
treat can be described as the backfire of the researcher’s methodological training.  
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When the prescribed remedies fail, the researcher renounces, not only the recom-
mended methods, he/she rejects the entire role as a researcher and takes flight into 
apparently more favorable roles, such as, say, the role as a judge.  The canon of op-
portunism in this respect, is the so-called “fourth generation evaluation” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989) where the idea of evaluation as the search for quality, merit, worth, 
etc., is rejected in favor of the idea that it is negotiation which is the issue (Scriven, 
1993).  That is, negotiation between stakeholders with different interests or world-
views is the essence of program evaluation.  
 
1.5. New directions in evaluation research 
Guba and Lincoln’s (Guba, 1990; 1989) work presents considerable creativity and 
insights.   With the exception of their open prejudice to an undefined group of their 
fellow evaluation researchers who they label “positivists”, for anyone interested in 
research methodology, the Fourth Generation Evaluation (1989) is worth reading.  
They describe the “positivists” in the following way: “Convinced that there exists 
some single, true reality, driven by natural laws, open to discovery and harnessing 
by the methods of science, positivists reject all relativist views, of which construc-
tivism is one, as not only seriously in error but pernicious and repugnant” (Guba et 
al., 1989:16).  Clearly, by negatively attaching a historical philosophical position, or 
more precisely, a set of related philosophical positions, to a generalized third person, 
the “positivist” evaluator, they create a straw man, made up for the sake of the ar-
gument. By doing so, they tell us that constructivists not only reveal and recognize 
the existence of social constructions, they also create them.  Indeed, people con-
stantly create and communicate social constructions and it is of great importance that 
we seek to understand and unveil the underlying processes.  
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The Fourth Generation Evaluation constitutes one of the two extremes of evaluation; 
on the one hand, the assumption-dependent devotees of the cost-benefit methods of 
neo-classical economics, on the other hand, the followers of constructivist inquiry, 
supposedly dependent on fewer unrealistic assumptions concerning human nature 
and behavior.  Both traditions have problems with the empirical contents of their 
analysis and they both run the risk of being victims of dominant stakeholders, simply 
because of predictable methodological flaws. Another reason for taking these two 
traditions as extremes is that they both seem overtly convinced of the supremacy of 
their positions and that they are located on opposite sides of the qualitative- quanti-
tative divide.  
 
1.6. Lower methodological standards for evaluations 
A point of departure for the article is the recommendation put forward in the seminal 
article by James S. Coleman almost forty years ago (Coleman, 1972) where he 
claimed that policy-analyses have to accept lower methodological standards than 
should be accepted in mature discipline research.  He pointed out that most meth-
odological development in the social sciences has been directed toward the develop-
ment of theory and testing, refinement and confirmation of these theories.  Thus, 
there was a need to develop methods tailored for the testing and evaluation of spe-
cific policies.  I argue that the qualitative movement in evaluation research and also 
the progress within the cost-benefit tradition tends to overlook the advances in 
methodologies aimed at the evaluation problem.  Recent development within obser-
vational studies (Rosenbaum, 1995) and the counterfactual account of causality 
(Pearl, 2000) has proven to be of immense importance to evaluation studies. The fact 
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that most of these advances have taken place within fields like econometric, medical 
statistics and pure statistics, i.e., fields outside the adjacent border of evaluation 
studies and cost-benefit analysis signals that the boundaries between disciplines do 
not necessarily serve the progress of science.  
 
1.7. The applicability of qualitative methodology for evaluations 
In line with Reichenbach (1938), I agree that qualitative inquiries are usually better 
suited for theory development and new discoveries than most quantitative methods 
that seem more correctly applied to confirm what is already indicated by other meth-
ods. In some cases, however, for instance a change in infant mortality, discoveries 
rely exclusively on quantitative methods.  I argue, however, that recently developed 
quantitative methodologies are far better suited for many evaluations, in particular in 
situations where the cry for documentation of impacts of public programs or projects 
dominates.  Substituting qualitative methods for quantitative methods as a matter of 
principle does not improve the reputation of applied evaluation. 
 
1.8. The many Schools of Evaluation 
For historical reasons, evaluation research in the US is characterized by a number of 
“schools” that differ with respect to methodology, willingness to accept how prob-
lems are defined by principals and enthusiasm for making evaluative claims. In 
Europe the situation is somewhat different; whereas respect for formal rules and 
relatively stringent methodologies is marked within the various otherwise very dif-
ferent schools or sub-disciplines of evaluation research, it is hard to find a corre-
sponding stringency within the European evaluation community.  With respect to 
methodology we can dimly perceive American discipline and European anarchy.  
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The cleavage along the qualitative – quantitative division is, however, significant 
both in Europe and the US.   The most important consequence of the multitude of 
“schools” for applied evaluations of public programs/projects is confusion.  The dif-
ferent world views that underlie the methodological divisions produce divergent 
answers to similar questions and create impressions of widespread professional dis-
agreement which, for the wider public audience, is difficult to interpret.  
 
1.9. Outline of article – including expressions and definitions used 
The paper contains concepts and expressions that may not be familiar outside the 
evaluation community.  Below we explain them as they are used in the text: 
Summative evaluation, the kind of applied evaluation that is the topic here is usu-
ally defined as evaluations conducted after completion (or stabilization of an ongo-
ing program) of a program/project and for the benefit of some external audience or 
decision-maker e.g., funding agency, governmental ministry or other principal. 
Formative evaluation, often contrasted with summative evaluation, is usually con-
ducted during the development or improvement of a program/project, for the in-
house-staff of the program with the intent to improve (Scriven, 1991). 
Evaluation research simply refers to evaluation done in a serious scientific way.  
Since this paper only concerns summative evaluation of public programs/projects the 
term refers to applied social science research conducted with the intent to investigate 
the results of the initiative in question. 
Naturalistic evaluation or methodology is used about an approach that minimizes 
the use of technical jargon, the need for prior technical knowledge about statistics 
and instead emphasize the use of metaphor, analogy, informal inference, reasons- 
explanations, interpretations, meanings and so on.  
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Throughout the paper I will use the terms method and methodology almost inter-
changeably but method will refer more to applied techniques while methodology 
will refer to the broader scope of the world views and logic that guides the kind of 
inquiry in question.  Thus qualitative inquiry may refer to methodologies in terms 
of a range of methods of investigation that emphasize naturalism while quantitative 
inquiry refers to thinking that recognize numbers and emphasizes statistical model-
ing. 
 
The article is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the contem-
porary context of evaluations and section 3 outlines the research questions that can 
be summed up in three theses:  a) The substandard argument is invalid and possibly 
harmful to the reputation of applied evaluations. b) Confirmation bias may be a 
threat to evaluation studies based on qualitative methodologies. c) Strong commit-
ment to a specific school of evaluation may produce bias in conclusions.  Section 4 
sketches the development of evaluations and gives a crude overview over the quali-
tative – quantitative debate.  Section 5 discusses several sources to bias in evaluation 
research and section 6 sums up the presumed consequences.  Section 7 is concerned 
with the way contractual practices are organized and section 8 completes the discus-
sion. 
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2. The Context of Public Evaluations 
2.1. The Move from Bureaucratic to Managerial Control 
While the twentieth century was governed by the principle of a politically neutral 
civil service offering impartial policy advice to the elected government of the day, 
the last part of the 20th century has witnessed an increasing importance of public 
servants in process of policy formulation and implementation (Plowden, 1994). The 
demise of Weberian bureaucracy and the belief that a stronger, more competent and 
vigilant bureaucracy is the result of modernity, is among the basic premises behind 
many newer governmental reform initiatives (Wallis & Dollery, 1999). Over the last 
three decades, NPM initiatives have produced fundamental and ubiquitous institu-
tional change in the nature of public administration in most western industrial de-
mocracies.  These changes have had a variety of consequences, some of them of 
considerable concern for evaluation practices.  The paradigmatic essence of NPM is 
reducing and deregulating bureaucracy, using market mechanisms and simulated 
markets to conduct government action, devoting responsibility downward and out-
ward in organizations, increasing productivity, energizing agencies, and empowering 
employees to pursue results, improve quality, and satisfy customers (Carrol, 1998). 
The “worldview” of NPM presupposes that “something” fundamental happened in 
the 1980s that changed the field of public administration.  The (assumed) appearance 
of new forms of governance, new relationships between citizens and their govern-
ment and between the public, private, and non-governmental sectors fundamentally 
altered the processes of policy-making.  The nature of this assumed change is ex-
plicitly expressed by former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore, when he claims that 
Americans view themselves as customers of the government rather than as citizens 
(Gore, 1993).  
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The new orientation implies the substitution of self-interests for the more complex 
norms of traditional bureaucracy as the baseline for the design of governance, and 
the substitution of the customer for the citizen as the basic individual unit of democ-
ratic society. These changes have altered the core concept of evaluation, account-
ability, from its many-valued meaning democratic accountability to the single-val-
ued meaning economic accountability, and thus, brought new topicality to look at 
evaluations as an agency problem.   
 
Agency theory assumes opportunism in the relationship between principal and agent. 
I do not believe that traditional bureaucracy was devoid of opportunism. My basic 
point is that, under the realm of NPM there may be, at least at the individual level, a 
better payoff for opportunism, in particular for the top civil servants (Laegreid, 
2000).  A market-based system for evaluation contracts implies agency problems.  
By its reliance on self-interests as the driving forces of governance, NPM acknowl-
edges self-interests as a more legitimate concern for the individual than was the case 
under the traditional bureaucratic regime.  This may be viewed as a concession to 
opportunism and may interfere with the choice of research strategies.  To understand 
some implausible evaluation outcomes it is of importance to come to grip with the 
interplay between evaluation methodologies, the institutional mechanisms of re-
search practices that pertain to the various methodologies, the emerging routines of 
evaluation practices, and the potential rewards or penalties for opportunism.    
 
2.2.  Agency theory – the heart and soul of New Public Management 
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the analysis of principal-agent relation-
ships, in which one person, an agent, acts behalf of another person, a principal, lays 
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at the heart of NPM and can be viewed as the dominant idea behind structural re-
forms.  Hence, when consulting companies and research institutions are competing 
for evaluation contracts, the contest for contracts is in line with the ideological un-
derpinnings of the new managerialism.  It is an implicit, albeit naïve assumption, 
that competitive bidding guarantees the best quality in the evaluation process.  Apart 
from overlooking the differences in normative traditions between consulting compa-
nies and research institutions, this line of thinking confuses the costs of the govern-
mental contract with the costs of the consequences of the evaluation task.  Also, this 
line of reasoning fails to recognize that the very same contractual theory that justifies 
the competitive bidding process can be applied to the evaluator – evaluation man-
agement relationship.  Whenever a contractual relationship can be identified, agency 
theory can be applied.  From a methodological point of view, there are very few rea-
sons to believe that the less costly evaluation contract produces more reliable results 
than the more expensive contract.  It is more likely that minimum funding for the 
evaluation task will induce methodological shortcuts, thus undermining the trust-
worthiness of results.   On the other hand, an abundance of research funding does not 
guarantee the quality of evaluations.  Hence, the assumption that competition is a 
quality optimizer does not apply.  The agency framework applied to the contractual 
relation between evaluator and evaluation management may, however, shed some 
light on the problem.  There is, however, a peculiar feature with this relation, namely 
that it cannot be understood as a principal agency relationship without violating the 
fundamental rationale for undertaking the evaluation task.  The basic rationale for 
evaluations is the independence between the researcher and the evaluation manage-
ment. 
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2.3. Institutional theory – reinforcing human habit-taking2  
Institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995) offers considerable 
insights for understanding evaluation processes.  It is, however, not easy to compre-
hend institutional theory as an unambiguous coherent theory. The concept of an in-
stitution has been used in different ways by numerous authors, and to cover diverse 
phenomena.  In accordance with the purpose here, I use W. Richard Scott’s omnibus 
definition: “Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures 
and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are 
transported by various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they oper-
ate at multiple levels of jurisdiction” (Scott, 1995:33). In Scott’s conceptualization, 
institutions are multifaceted systems, including symbolic systems, cognitive con-
structions and normative rules, and regulative processes carried out through and 
shaping social behavior (Scott, 1995).  The view of institutions as both systems and 
processes facilitates discussions of the interplay between the overarching ideas from 
economic theory that settle what the operating notion of evaluation should be and the 
design of the evaluation process.  It also provides for a way to interpret the cognitive 
mechanisms that make diverse empirical representations converge across researchers 
within homogeneous subgroups when methodological rules or norms are unclear or 
absent.  Noteworthy, even though constructed and maintained by the individual, in-
stitutions assume the guise of an impersonal and objective reality.  Institutional 
mechanisms require little or no conscious mobilization of will or effort (Scott, 1995) 
and hence, makes it possible to discuss the pitfalls of various research strategies 
without invoking accusations of deliberate distortions of assumed empirical repre-
sentations.   
                                                        
2 The term “habit-taking” is used since, according to Charles Sanders Peirce, concepts are habits because they 
relate to or organize feelings, which are themselves connective tissues of thought. (Peirce, Collected Papers, VI, 
137-138) 
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Scott’s brilliant summing up of institutional theory provides a way to systematize the 
many active mechanisms of institutional processes that are suggested in the vast lit-
erature on the subject.  Table 1 gives a sketch of the basis of compliance, the mecha-
nisms at work, the logic of the particular process, the indicator for the process and 
the basis of legitimacy according to what Scott labels the three pillars of institutions.   
 
 Table 1. The three pillars of institutions  
 Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanism Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification, accreditation Prevalence, isomorphism 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported, 
conceptually correct 
  
Scott’s table (1995:35) sweeps thousands of pages of research and his synthesizing 
conceptualization has a strong intuitive appeal.  Although there are no well-defined 
boundaries that allow for precise definitions of the various concepts introduced, it is 
easy to grasp each and every concept as descriptive of a social relationship that is 
possible to imagine when we think about how an evaluation process is unfolding.  
We can reflect about the relations between the evaluation management and the 
evaluator, or we can envision the relations between researchers with different per-
sonalities.  Scott’s conceptualization provides a rich source for speculations and re-
flections about what the relations could be and what they could produce of outcomes 
that are simply due to the nature of the relations alone.  This way of using concepts 
to induce reflections over relations e.g., Cassirer (1910) Bourdieu & Coleman 
(1991a) has a distinct flavor of European sociology, is easily applicable for discuss-
ing hypothetical configurations of relations, and is indicative of Scott’s synthesizing 
capacity.   
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The three pillars cover diverse scholarly approaches, the discussion of institutions 
and different understandings of institutional processes.  The regulative pillar clearly 
resembles the approaches typical of economists and economic historians, the nor-
mative pillar mostly that of sociologists and the cognitive pillar mirrors the ap-
proaches most likely to be found among psychologists and organization theorists.  
Scott’s (1995) typology also contains suggestions about the factors or types of re-
positories or ‘carriers’ that sustain or reproduce institutions.  Cultures as carriers 
transmit schemes that inform and constrain behaviors, social structures carry ex-
pectations connected to networks of social positions and role systems, while routines 
carry habits, standard operating procedures and other repetitive behaviors or trained 
incapacities3. 
 
 Table 2. Institutional pillars and carriers 
  Pillar  
Carrier Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Culture Rules, laws Values, expectations Categories, typifications 
Social structure Governance systems, Regimes, authority Structural isomorphism, 
 power systems systems Identities 
Routines Protocols, standard Conformity, performance Performance programs, 
 routines of duty Scripts 
 
The carriers (Scott, 1995:52) provide yet another way for reasoning about likely 
mechanisms or processes behind outcomes.   When we observe outcomes that are 
most likely biased in one or another direction, it is possible to make constructive 
speculations about what processes would be the most likely candidates for producing 
such a result, without the requirement that we are able to directly observe the process 
                                                        
3 The origin of this term has been credited to Randolph Bourne, Thorstein Veblen, Kenneth Burke and James G. 
March.   
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in question.  Institutional theories provide frameworks for speculations and discus-
sions. 
 
Thus, I take agency theory as indicative of the dominant underlying epistemology of 
New Public Management.  In its most general form, agency theory implies a coher-
ent epistemological understanding that leaves little grounds for choosing among per-
spectives that exclude e.g. general equilibrium theory or welfare theory. Neither 
does it easily embrace other understandings that conflict with mainstream econom-
ics.  These features of NPM and of agency theory facilitate strong framing effects of 
the chosen perspective.   
 
Provided that we do not accept lower methodological standards for evaluation re-
search than for discipline research, we should start looking for sources of bias where 
they are most likely to be found.  That is, in the human imperfection as revealed in 
institutional theories, given the strain of the task of conducting unbiased judgment 
under conflict, which should be expected to prevail in most evaluations.    
 
 260 
3. Three theses concerning sources of bias in evaluations 
3.1. Is the substandard argument an acceptable excuse? 
The substandard argument (Knudsen & Waerness, 2001) arises from a misinterpreta-
tion of James S. Coleman (Coleman, 1972) and maintains that policy research4 is 
different from discipline research and hence, that lower standards should be accepted 
due to lack of time and obligations to the pace of the policy making process5.  This 
point of view is, I believe, on different grounds, widely accepted among evaluation 
researchers. I also think it has had its impact on evaluation practices, even though 
the substandard argument has never been prominent in debates over methodologies.  
The discussions have more often focused on the connection between theories and 
methods.  The concern has often been over inconsistent or weakly established links 
between theory and methods.  This article follows along the same lines, but in addi-
tion maintains that in applied evaluation research the perspective has to be extended 
to include the peculiarities of the evaluation context. The idea that evaluation re-
search is different from other kinds of research is neither revolutionary nor new. I 
argue that the impact of the substandard argument has, however, mainly been in the 
direction of serving as an excuse for opportunism e.g. by asserting that a program or 
project can be evaluated based on other grounds than the kind of reasoning that is 
acceptable as social science standards. Thus, evaluation research can base its legiti-
macy on scientific standards without having to meet the terms.  Hence, the first the-
sis to be dealt with is:  
 
                                                        
4 I am aware of the distinction between policy analysis and evaluation (e.g., Geva-May, I., & Pal, L. A. 1999. 
Good Fences Make Good Neighbours. Evaluation, 5(3): 259-277.). However, even though I agree that a differ-
ence exists, I hold the substandard argument to be valid also for evaluations.  
5 Noteworthy, Coleman in the same article rejects the substandard argument.  
 261 
I. Accepting substandard evaluations leaves the debate over evaluation meth-
odology obsolete and makes it hard to establish the status of evaluations. 
 
By accepting the substandard dictum we may only contribute to worsen the reputa-
tion of evaluation research; a problem that recently justified a special issue of the 
American Journal of Evaluation (Donaldson, 2001).  In the long run, acceptance of 
substandard may also affect the legitimacy of social science in general and hence, be 
erosive to the very foundation of evaluations.  
 
3.2. Does qualitative inquiry make the position of the researcher harder? 
I believe that the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy is in many respects a false di-
chotomy that stimulates an unfortunate debate.  I do, however, think there are some 
features of this debate that may help us to identify sources of what is usually labeled 
confirmation bias (Baron, 1981; Jones & Sugden, 2001; Krems & Zierer, 1994; 
Nickerson, 1998; Pollard, 1983).  The term confirmation bias implies unidirectional 
bias.  That is, the bias goes mainly in favor of dominant stakeholders.  Hence, I con-
tend that the context of evaluations tends to influence the outcomes of evaluations 
and that researches who see qualitative methods as the only valid way, give away 
means for resisting pressure towards concordance.  That is, I do not suggest any dif-
ference between the devotees of qualitative inquiry and other researchers with re-
spect to moral courage. I simply suggest that the qualitative researcher lacks the op-
portunity to appeal to method as independent judgment.  The lack of support from 
method as a “third person” may hold back the researcher’s opportunity for creating a 
distance between him/herself as a professional and the results he/she presents. This 
distance may be essential in situations with conflict between researchers and stake-
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holders, however weak the distinction between the researcher and this “third person” 
might be.  Hence, my second thesis of inquiry is: 
II. Qualitative inquiry may produce confirmation bias in evaluation studies by 
amalgamating the research and the researcher, and hence confusing psy-
chological self-defensive mechanisms and professional argumentation. Thus, 
conflict may be experienced as insult and support for argument as praise, 
constituting a mechanism that increases the probability of agreement be-
tween the researcher and the dominant stakeholders.    
 
By leaving little or no room for methodology, the researcher risks being understood 
as a lawyer who continuously writes and rewrites the law he/she practices.  Needless 
to say, this is a situation where any blame will be directed towards the person, not 
the rules. Thus, by invoking a discussion of this kind, the researcher leads the debate 
towards the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem, in soccer jargon, the fallacy of tak-
ing the man instead of the ball. 
 
3.3. Is the division into “schools” of research a likely source of bias? 
Also, the researcher’s dedication to a specific sub-discipline or “school” of research 
may serve as a source of bias insofar that loyalty to the common understanding lim-
its the range of valid outcomes. Thus, by excluding arguments that do not conform 
to the epistemological and ontological basis of the ‘school’, the researcher may 
cause disciplinary loyalty to become a source of bias in the direction of central be-
liefs held by the “school”.  The bias is hypothesized to be in the direction of “within 
school consensus”, and reinforced when conclusions coincide with the interest of 
dominant stakeholders. Hence, my third thesis of inquiry is: 
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III. Strong commitment to a specific ‘school’ of thought may produce bias in a 
direction that ensures paradigmatic support. 
 
Noteworthy, this proposal reflects my impression that at least some qualitative 
methodologies seem to be more directed towards paradigmatic support than towards 
traditional investigation. That is, some methodologies seem to search more for the-
ory-laden observations than others. I do, however, accept the notion that theory-
laden observations are hardly entirely avoidable regardless of methodologies.   By 
the same token, actively seeking observations that are good candidates for confirma-
tion and excluding observation that could lead to refutation violates the very notion 
of doing research.  
 
3.4. The Scope of the Questions Proposed  
In accordance with Coleman (Coleman, 1972) I believe that the substandard argu-
ment should be rejected in any kind of evaluation studies.  That is, regardless of 
what kind of evaluation is carried out, there is no legitimacy for accepting lower 
standards for evaluation research than for discipline research.  The argument that 
qualitative inquiry may produce confirmation bias in evaluation studies is however, 
only taken to be valid insofar that a question about outcomes, i.e., the effects of a 
project/program or its merit in other respects is invoked.  That is, the argument may 
be applicable to both formative and summative evaluations, but for formative 
evaluations only to the extent the relative merit or worth of the project/program is 
questioned.  For summative evaluations where the demand for evaluative claims is 
explicit, problems concerning bias are indubitably of importance.  For evaluations 
where the intentions behind the evaluation is of a different nature, say, program ad-
justment based on analyses of implementation processes or other more intermediate 
 264 
concerns, problems of bias in conclusions may still apply, but is of a different nature.  
Thus, producing exaggerated expectations is different from exaggerating claims 
about outcomes. By the same token as the distinction between formative evaluations, 
process evaluations, summative evaluations, effect evaluation is fuzzy due to a great 
many different uses of these two concepts.   For the sake of simplicity it is most 
convenient to restrict the scope of our arguments to be valid only for summative 
evaluations.  
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4. Some development paths of evaluations  
4.1. The Substandard argument 
James S. Coleman was prescient when he, 31 years ago, stated that “There is no 
body of methods, no comprehensive methodology, for the study of the impact of 
public policy as an aid to future policy”.  … “The systematic methods they (the so-
cial scientists) have developed are methods for aiding the disciplinary development, 
not for such externally-imposed irritants as the evaluation of public policies.  The 
philosophical bases of the methods are all oriented in this direction – toward the de-
velopment of “theory”, toward the generation and testing of hypotheses to confirm, 
refine and enlarge theory”… “A central implication is that a coherent and self-con-
scious methodology for studying impacts of public policy must be developed, if the 
social sciences are to function as policy sciences” (Coleman, 1972).  Clearly, it is 
unfortunate that his foresight has been turned into an argument for accepting lower 
standards for evaluations than for others fields of social research.  It is also clear that 
the tremendous impact of Coleman’s article is also rightfully justified because of 
other insights offered.  In the aftermath, especially the insights elaborated around the 
four features of policy research he considered most important for describing the dif-
ference between policy research and discipline research, namely time, language, 
conflict and information.   
1. Time.  Policy research has to follow the time-schedule of decisions in the world 
of action in accordance with the pace of politics, and accept to work based on the 
information available at the time when answers are demanded.  
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2. Language. Researchers who are doing policy research have to communicate with 
people who are not familiar with and do not master the concepts and jargon of 
the specialized researchers.  
3. Conflict.  Policy research is characterized by conflicting interests. Results may 
interfere with existing power-relations and resource allocation.  It is difficult to 
avoid the researchers being dragged into or affected by conflicts.  
4. Information.  In the world of action, comprehensive explanations and additional 
information may be of major importance.  The discipline’s research requirements 
for elegance and parsimony do no apply.  In the world of action one has to use 
simple models despite prevailing complexities.  Policy research has to accept 
“the world as it is” in a way very different from what can be expected to be val-
ued in the world of discipline research.  
 
According to Coleman (1972:2), it follows from these differences that: “it is impor-
tant at the very outset to distinguish sharply between a methodology that has as its 
philosophic base  the testing and development of theories, and a methodology that 
has as its philosophic base a guide to action”.  Needless to say, this statement is 
completely in line with the fundamental premises and inspirations for this article.  I 
truly agree with the argument that in many respects, there is a distinct difference 
between applied evaluation research6 and discipline research.  I also recognize the 
importance of a sharp distinction between a methodology for evaluations and a 
methodology for testing and developing theories.  My reasons for not accepting 
Coleman’s reasoning as a basis for the substandard argument is that there has been 
tremendous development in methodology the last thirty years aimed at precisely 
                                                        
6 Noteworthy, Coleman does not insist on a sharp distinction between evaluation research and policy research. 
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these problems.  Clearly, this development has had, as should be expected, a devel-
opment marked by optimism over new methods, criticism, setbacks, and retries.   
 
The first serious, and may be the most well known attempt to solve the methodology 
puzzle was Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) celebrated work on quasi-experimenta-
tion. Their book started a wave of optimism and progress and moved the logic of 
experimentation and causality from the well-developed, isolated experimental setting 
of physics to the open field setting, carrying with it the lessons learned from psy-
chological experimentation.  A decade or so later, more problems are listed and op-
timism is less prominent in the follow up volume by Cook and Campbell (1979).  
The long list of possible threats to the validity of quasi-experiments reveals one ma-
jor problem; how to analyze the impact of a project and program when randomized 
experiments are not a feasible option?  You cannot, on moral grounds, expose people 
to random treatment for school achievements, health problems or other problems 
that seriously affects their fate, even if you were confident that the new knowledge 
gained would be to the benefit of mankind.  In most cases you cannot assign random 
treatment for legal reasons.  Hence, the problem that most public projects and pro-
grams involved non-random treatment, even when participants had to qualify for the 
program, remained.  Of the early serious attempts to solve the problem was the work 
of Charles Judd and David Kenny (1981) and Christopher Achen (1986) who mainly 
sought the solutions within the econometric tradition.  The major breakthrough came 
with the work of the Harvard statisticians Paul Rosenbaum and Donald Rubin (1983) 
but was not well communicated to the social science community before it was criti-
cized, reinterpreted and reiterated by econometricians (Heckman, Smith, & 
Clements, 1997).  Hence, the methodological developments requested by Coleman 
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in the early seventies were established first nearly thirty years later.  Regrettably 
however, the peculiarities of evaluations, so clearly spelled out by Coleman were 
discovered by others and taken as an argument for accepting substandard research.  
Unfortunately, the solution to the methodological problems seems to have appeared 
so late that the evaluation disciplines and sub-disciplines that have surfaced in the 
meantime seem to have developed impenetrable boundaries. 
 
Noteworthy, incorporating the new methodological insights may reduce some of the 
problems caused by the four features of policy research that according to Coleman 
(1972) constitute the major difference between policy research and discipline re-
search, namely time, language, conflict and information.  Time is likely to remain a 
major problem, but language may be less of a problem since the logic of experi-
mentation is easy to communicate.  Conflict may be reduced, both as a consequence 
of the ease of communication and because the new methods may increase perceived 
legitimacy and authority of results.  Hence, there are many reasons to reject the sub-
standard argument, and thus, to invoke a renewal of the debate over methodologies.  
 
The logic of experimentation may, however, be more convincing than it deserves to 
be and the counterfactual accounts of causality are, from a variety of points of view, 
rightfully contested.   I do, however, argue that the new quantitative methodologies 
outperform older methods in their ability to answer rather simple questions in a more 
reliable way.  The new methodologies are, however, not well suited to answer the 
more complex questions that are often the ambitions of qualitative methods.  Hence, 
it can be argued that the new quantitative methodologies in some respects are infe-
rior to qualitative methods.   The point to put forward here is that the evaluation con-
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text may not be the best time and place for the more complex questions. Dominant 
stakeholders will tend to give priority to the more simple questions concerning the 
correspondence between goals and outcomes, regardless of the extent to which re-
searchers find such questions to be of any relevance.  
 
4.2. The qualitative-quantitative methods debate 
More than two decades ago John Van Maanen stated that “the label qualitative 
methods has no precise meaning in any of the social sciences” (Van Maanen, 
1979:520).  The absence of a precise meaning does not, however, disqualify this 
loosely connected bundle of methods, “since qualitative researchers tend to regard 
social phenomena as more particular and ambiguous than replicable and clearly de-
fined” (Van Maanen, 1979).  By the same token, it is not so easy to give an exact 
account of what methods should qualify for the label quantitative methods.  Further, 
there is no reason to assume that researchers who use quantitative methods a priori 
take social phenomena to be less complex and ambiguous than the qualitative re-
searcher.  It is, however, probably not entirely wrong to say that, despite many as-
sertions that qualitative and quantitative methods are not mutually exclusive and in 
usual should strengthen analysis when combined, the tension between the devotees 
of each camp have not leveled off over the years. On the contrary, many new text-
books express attitudes that come close to hostility towards any use of numbers be-
sides necessary paging.  The deadly serious, humorless rhetoric employed hints to a 
hermeneutics of suspicion7, indicative of a linguistic turn8, where, however, the text  
                                                        
7 This term was coined by Paul Ricoeur, P. 1970. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.:27) to describe the three key intellectual figures of the twentieth century, who, in 
their different ways, sought to unmask, demystify, and expose the real from the apparent, namely Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud, the leading figures of the school of suspicion. 
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to be dissected is missing. 
 
The book on Grounded Theory has obtained the status of a classic text (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Many of the newer textbooks also give valuable contributions to the 
understanding of methodologies and the limitation of methods.  Some are extremely 
well organized, e.g. Flick (2002) and others open new perspectives for the organiza-
tion researcher by relating both research strategies and methods to established re-
search traditions (Creswell, 1998). Many of these books could indeed be included on 
more curricula.  The point is that qualitative methods open for insights that add to, 
not substitute other insights. As additions, new perspectives should receive a warm 
reception while as alternatives they can be erosive.   
 
A particular feature of many textbooks on qualitative methods is the overwhelming 
number of methodologies and perspectives introduced.   Creswell (Creswell, 1998) 
encourages students to become familiar with the research tradition of biography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case studies.  Instructions for all 
five traditions, usually taught in different courses to students of philology and sel-
dom offered to social science students, are all covered in a single textbook.  As 
shown in Table 3, the different perspectives introduced cover research traditions that 
require a wide range of training and skills.  Biography is something that is usually 
understood as quite apart from what in general occupies the social scientist.  The 
focus is on the life of an individual, a theme that is even further from the traditional 
tasks of the evaluation researcher.  Phenomenology, a tradition heavily criticized for 
                                                                                                                                                            
8 Attributed to the excellent, humorous phrase by the econometrician Arjo Klamer Klamer, A. 2001. Making 
sense of economice: from falsification to rhetoric and beyond. Journal of Economics Methodology, 8(1): 69-75. 
“It was about then that I made my linguistic turn”.   
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departing from Husserl’s original intentions, is included with a focus on under-
standing.  Grounded theory is introduced as a methodology with a focus on theory 
development, ethnography with a focus on cultural interpretation and case study 
methodology is introduced as a means for in-depth analysis of single or multiple 
cases.   
 
The ambitions of a training project of these dimensions are praiseworthy, even 
though the realism of gaining thorough understanding of all these traditions can be 
questioned.  Indeed, my experience from discussions with scholars from ethnogra-
phy and cultural studies indicates that many of the courses offered in business 
schools tends to imprint the content of courses in ethnography and phenomenology 
with instrumental epistemologies, alien to the original theories.  Case studies9, on the 
other hand, are more familiar to the business student, but mostly applied as a teach-
ing device, to a lesser extent as a research methodology.   
 
A very informative way to organize and understand the different methodologies is 
introduced by Morgan (Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  The different methodologies are 
organized along a continuum from subjective to objective approaches to social sci-
ence, differentiated by their assumed core ontological assumptions and their basic 
epistemological stances.  His rough typology is a helpful device for discussion, al-
                                                        
9 Noteworthy, however, Creswell, J. W. 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among 
Five Traditions. London: Sage. has no reference to Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An assessment and 
review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1): 57-73., the elsewhere most cited article on the theory building 
aspect of case studies.  
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though he has added some spice to the debate, in particular by using the term “con-
crete” quite frequently and using Skinner (1953) as an example of the “positivist”. 
 
 
Table 3. Dimensions of five research traditions in qualitative research 
 
Dimension Biography Phenomenology Grounded 
Theory 
Ethnography Case Study 
Focus Exploring the   
life of an 
individual 
Understanding the 
essence of experi-
ences about a phe-
nomenon 
Developing a 
theory 
grounded in 
data from the 
field 
Describing and 
interpreting a cul-
tural and social 
group 
Developing an 
in-depth 
analysis of a 
single case or 
multiple cases 
Discipline 
origin 
Anthropology 
Literature 
History 
Psychology 
Sociology 
Philosophy, Sociol-
ogy, Psychology 
Sociology Cultural anthro-
pology 
Sociology 
Political sci-
ence, sociol-
ogy, evalua-
tion, urban 
studies, other 
social sciences 
Data collec-
tion 
Primarily 
interviews and 
documents 
Long interviews 
with up to 10 people
Interviews 
with 20-30 
individuals to 
“saturate” 
categories and 
detail a theory 
Primarily observa-
tions and interviews 
with additional 
artifacts during 
extended time in the 
field (e.g., 6 months 
to a year) 
Multiple 
sources- docu-
ments, archi-
val records, 
interviews, 
observations, 
physical arti-
facts 
Data analy-
sis 
Stories 
Epiphanies 
Historical 
content 
Statements 
Meanings 
Meaning themes 
General description 
of the experience 
Open coding 
Axial coding 
Selective 
coding 
Conditional 
matrix 
Description 
Analysis 
Interpretation 
Description 
Themes 
Assertions 
Narrative 
form 
Detailed pic-
ture of an 
individual’s 
life 
Description of the 
“essence” of the 
experience 
Theory or 
theoretical 
model 
Description of the 
cultural behavior of 
a group or an indi-
vidual 
In-depth study 
of a “case” or 
“cases” 
Source: (Creswell, 1998) 
 
 
 
Combing Table 3 and Table 4 opens up large fields of inquiry that should inspire 
imagination and clarify how the same phenomenon could look very different de-
pendent on how we choose to observe it. 
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Table 4.  Basic Assumptions of the subjective – objective debate  
 Subjectivist 
Approaches to 
Social Science 
 
    Objectivist 
Approaches to 
Social Science 
 
Core 
Ontological 
Assumptions 
 
Reality as a  
Projection 
of 
Human 
Imagination 
 
Reality as a 
social 
construction 
 
 
Reality as a  
Realm of 
symbolic 
Discourse 
 
Reality as a 
Contextual 
field of 
Information 
 
Reality as a 
concrete 
process 
 
Reality as a 
concrete struc-
ture 
Assumptions 
About 
Human Nature 
Man as pure 
spirit, 
conscious-
ness, being 
Man as a social 
constructor, the 
symbol creator 
Man as an 
actor, the 
symbol user 
Man as an  
Information 
Processor 
Man as an 
adaptor 
Man as a re-
sponder 
Basic  
Epistemological  
Stance 
To attain 
phenome-
nological 
insight, 
revelation 
To understand 
how 
social reality 
is created 
To under-
stand patterns 
of  
symbolic  
discourse 
To map con-
text 
To study 
systems 
process, 
change 
To construct a 
positivist sci-
ence 
Some Favored 
Metaphors 
Transcen-
dental 
Language game, 
accomplishment 
text 
Theater  
Culture 
Cybernetic Organism Machine 
Research 
Methodology 
Exploration 
of pure 
Subjectivity 
Hermeneutics Symbolic 
analysis 
Contextual 
analysis 
of Gestalten 
Historical 
Analysis 
Lab experi-
ments, 
surveys 
Source: (Morgan et al., 1980) 
 
 
The data analysis part of Table 3 gives a rough impression of how one should go 
about data collection and a less than lucid guidance to data analysis.   Table 4 dem-
onstrates that explicating core ontological assumptions and basic epistemologies 
clarifies both the choice of research strategies and what kind of question will have 
priority in a given study. 
 
Clearly, questions concerning the impact of a given project or program do not have 
high priority in a qualitative methods framework.  On the contrary, questions con-
cerning understanding of the nature of a given project or program are emphasized.  
Also, theory construction is an essential objective of qualitative inquiries.  
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4.3. Evaluation as a Domain of Schools 
Evaluation, with its origin in education, psychology and sociology has over time 
evolved into a variety of “schools”.  These “schools” reflect both their origins, i.e. 
the basic epistemologies of their parent disciplines, such as economics, psychology, 
sociology and so forth, and the diverging ways of thinking in various subgroups 
within disciplines that constitute sub-disciplines occupied with evaluation research.  
The nature of the sub-disciplines varies from sociologists that on principle grounds 
renounce quantitative techniques, theorists of economic organization specializing in 
transaction cost economics to economists who prefers non-empirical, theoretical 
deductions.  Sub-disciplines may be more or less institutionalized and boundaries 
may be more or less pragmatically upheld. Sub-disciplines can be identified and 
categorized based on the methodologies applied, basic epistemological beliefs, and 
how they view the evaluation task.  Without any ambition of a comprehensive list-
ing, only a brief sketch of the most important will be described here.   
 
The distinction between the various schools within the evaluation community intro-
duced here originates from Michael Scriven’s work that sums up a long experience 
from evaluations at the theoretical, the institutional and the practical level (Scriven, 
1993). Scriven emphasizes that his standpoint is the consumer's point of view, that 
is, his approach is a consumer-weighted view, rather than a management-weighted 
approach. 
 
The ‘decision support’ school maintains that program evaluation is a part of the 
decision process of rational program management.  This perspective is in particular 
accentuated in the work of Ralph Tyler (Stufflebaum, Guba, & Tyler, 1971) the 
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founder of educational evaluation.  It is made explicit in the CIPP model (Context, 
Input, Process, Product) and plays a leading role in evaluation, in particular in edu-
cational evaluation.  
1. Context evaluation supports planning decisions.  The clarification of needs fa-
cilitates more comprehensive definitions of goals. 
2. Input evaluation serves as a structuring device for decision making by identify-
ing available resources and relevant strategies for action.  Design of pro-
jects/programs is then based on the plans or strategies with the best prospect for 
goal realization.  
3. Process evaluation supports decisions about implementations.  How good were 
the implementation strategies?  What are the threats to success? What revisions 
should be undertaken?  After answering such questions, procedures can be moni-
tored and adjusted. 
4. Product evaluation aims at the re-circulation of decisions. What is achieved? To 
what extend are the needs fulfilled? When should the mission be regarded as 
completed? 
 
Many contemporary evaluation theorists basically share the ‘decision support’ view 
of evaluation although it is important to recognize that the CIPP model goes far be-
yond the basic idea of decision support into detailed checklists that cover most of 
what is involved in program evaluation (Scriven, 1993).   
 
The ‘relativistic’ approach (Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999) maintains the view 
that evaluation should be done by using the client’s values as a framework, without 
any commitment by the evaluator to those values (Scriven, 1993). This view is 
probably the most common among evaluators, and implies that the idea of the possi-
bility of value-free research is to some extent preserved. That is, there is a basic be-
lief that the researcher possesses relatively neutral methodologies that can be used 
for providing the necessary answers, independently of the nature of the questions 
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asked.     ‘Relativistic’ is Scriven’s term, but implies nothing more than the main line 
in most social science departments, at least within the U.S. As far as I know, this is 
Scriven’s personal opinion, not a verified widespread attitude.  In the case, say, 
where a researcher was asked to evaluate only the beneficial outcomes of a pro-
ject/program, I believe most researchers would reject the invitation, based on the 
nature of the question asked. If not, Scriven’s (1993) term ‘relativistic’ is indeed 
appropriate. 
 
The ‘rich description’ approach, often associated with the North Dakota school, 
(Kemmis & Stake, 1988; Stake, 1975, 1986, 1995; Stake, Easley, & Anastasiou, 
1978) sees evaluation as a kind of ethnographic or journalistic enterprise, where 
evaluators report what they see without trying to make evaluative statements that 
infer on evaluative conclusions.  This view also has wide support from many UK 
theorists and is characterized by a research strategy where the researcher has a de-
tached, outside-looking in and neutrally observing kind of attitude toward the 
evaluation problem. They pretend to report neutrally what they observe, without 
drawing any conclusions. There is a flavor of relativism about the “rich description 
school” and it has much in common with the “relativistic approach” in the sense that 
both schools pretend toward neutrality and objectivity, avoid value issues and shrink 
from or ensure that they do not produce any evaluative claims.  I believe the “rich 
description” approach has considerable merit as a strategy for meta analyses, but is 
otherwise a step away from what is traditionally regarded as program evaluation. 
Such meta-analyses can be of immense value for reflections over policies, but may 
produce ambiguities when confused with substantive evaluations.  
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The ‘social process’ school originates from a distinguished group of Stanford aca-
demics led by Leo Cronbach (1980). It is known for its rejection of the importance 
of evaluation for decision support purposes, for downplaying the need for ac-
countability, and for the substitution of ‘understanding’ for evaluating them in the 
ordinary sense (Scriven, 1993).  The approach emphasizes measurement models, and 
is probably close to ways of thinking that are common in the mainstream of the so-
ciologically oriented members of the American Evaluation Association. The central 
point for Cronbach and his followers was not evaluation in the consequence-oriented 
meaning of the word as it is used in this paper, but rather evaluation as the under-
standing of the project or program in question. To use a simple patient metaphor: 
For the ‘social process’ school it is more important to understand what the symp-
toms express than to reduce the patient’s pain.  The followers of the ‘social process’ 
school do not take value issues for granted and do not avoid discussing such issues. 
Ethical issues are often explicitly debated and they do not seek to avoid evaluative 
claims.  Even though it is more than twenty years since the ‘social process’ school 
was at its height and a lot of methodological development has taken place over the 
years, this school should probably be regarded as one of the directions that have con-
tributed most to quantitative modeling within evaluation studies.  
 
The ‘constructivist’ or ‘fourth generation’ approach has gained a lot of attention 
the last ten years (Guba et al., 1989) and has many followers, in particular in Europe.  
This point of view rejects evaluation as the search for quality, merit, worth, etc., in 
favor of the idea that it is negotiation which is the issue (Scriven, 1993). That is, 
negotiation between stakeholders with different interests is the essence of program 
evaluation. The core of the ‘fourth generation’ approach is constructivism, a radical 
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position in contemporary epistemology and research methodology.  The term ‘con-
structivism’ refers loosely to the idea that reality is not ‘out there’ but is constructed 
by each of us, and is rooted in the hermeneutic school (Bontekoe, 2000).  The pur-
pose of evaluation is to negotiate the conflicting interpretation of reality that is as-
sumed to exist among stakeholders.   The approach is relativistic in the sense that it 
is not a priori possible to define what apprehension of the evaluation question that is 
the most correct or objective one.  Interpretations and understanding of problems and 
results may vary between stakeholders and there are no objective criteria that can aid 
in deciding what the best or the most correct one should be.  Thus, negotiations are 
the most appropriate strategy for evaluations.  – This is a radical view of the essence 
of evaluation that implies a complete re-conceptualization of the very task of evalua-
tions and changes the very role of the evaluator from that of a researcher to the role 
of a judge.  The approach does, however, build upon well recognized and established 
theoretical positions such as grounded theory (Glaser et al., 1967), interpretation 
theory e.g. (Eco, 1992) and hermeneutics, e.g. (Bernstein, 1983).  I believe the ap-
proach is of great value for meta-evaluations, but to lesser extent suited for outcome 
oriented applied evaluations.   
 
Cost-benefit analysis, or benefit-cost analysis; the more recent positive wording of 
the discipline, is the preferred method of evaluation for many governmental agen-
cies. Cost-benefit analysis can be characterized both as a ‘school’ of evaluation and 
as an aspect of evaluation since the cost-effectiveness of the project/program in 
question is its major concern.  Due to traditions, general trust in the discipline of 
economics, and the fact that the educational background of many bureaucrats is eco-
nomics, many tender documents specifically require cost-benefit analysis to be inte-
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gral part of the evaluation.  That is, whatever kind of evaluation the researcher wants 
to carry out, whatever ‘school’ the evaluator subscribes to and whatever methodol-
ogy supports the conclusions, the final report has to include an assessment of bene-
fits and costs in the form of a cost-benefit analysis.  Clearly, this requirement should 
be expected to have some impact upon the choice of evaluation methods.  There are, 
however, surprisingly many evaluation reports that manage to carry through a cost-
benefit analysis even though they do not include convincing attempts at assessing 
the impacts of the project/program in question.  
 
In its general form, cost-benefit analysis has an appealing logical structure that re-
sembles sound accounting principles.  The benefits refer to the changes in the allo-
cation of resources brought about by a project or program by comparing the situation 
before and after the installation of the project/program.  Given some norm of calcu-
lating social welfare, the two situations can be compared.  The common measure of 
the returns from a project/program is the net present value (NPV) of the project.  
Given that costs, benefits, and the social rate of discount are all accurately measured, 
NVP has a straightforward interpretation.  When NVP is positive, the pro-
ject/program under consideration provides a desirable yield to society, and hence, 
the evaluator can conclude that the decision to undertake the project/program indeed 
was a correct one.  
 
The political use of cost-benefit analysis during the deregulation era in the early 
eighties during the Carter and Reagan administrations is an outstanding example of 
the use of evaluations to restrain regulatory agencies.  Mandatory use of cost-benefit 
analyses “unless specifically prohibited by law” was used in order to dissolve even 
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health related regulations provided that NVP was below unity.  The exemplar politi-
cal use of cost-benefit analysis is the case of the cotton dust standard (Tolchin, 
1987).  Recent research has revealed that cost-benefit analysis is in such a troubled 
state that its usefulness in evaluations could be questioned (Frank, 2000; Korn-
hauser, 2000; Posner, 2000; Richardson, 2000; Sen, 2000).  “The Statement of Prin-
ciples on cost-benefit analysis” from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) states 
that “Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major regulatory decisions, but 
agency heads should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost test. Instead, they should 
be required to consider available benefit-cost analysis and to justify the reasons for 
their decisions in the event that the expected cost of a regulation far exceeds the ex-
pected benefits”10.  
 
Clearly, the reason why so many public agencies demand cost benefit analysis as an 
integral part of any evaluation report is, at the surface level, a need for clarification 
of the costs associated with demonstrated outcomes.  For the policy maker it is of 
importance to know not only to what extent a given project or program is successful, 
but also if there is a reasonable proportionality between costs and the results 
achieved. Usually, this boils down to the simple question of whether the benefit cost 
ratio is the greater one or not.  At a deeper, more subtle level, it may be questioned 
whether it is not the accountancy-like logic that constitutes a rhetorical beauty so 
perfectly suited for policy discourses that is the reason.  It is disturbing that a tech-
nique, well proven to be seriously flawed and void of any scientific merit, still has its 
camp of devotees and is even regarded as a requirement for a complete evaluation.  
 
                                                        
10 The statement is signed by Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins 
 281 
The causal-counterfactual approach (Pearl, 2000) to evaluations is a rather recent 
invention.  In essence, the inspiration for this approach can be found in several 
shortcomings of the established quasi-experimental approach (Cook et al., 1979).  
First and foremost, there has been a longstanding agreement among most scholars 
that the only appropriate way to talk about the effect of a public intervention is to 
speculate about the hypothetical situation that would have prevailed in the absence 
of the intervention.  This line of reasoning introduces the term counterfactual and 
the interpretation and quantification of impact or effect of the intervention as the 
difference between the factual and the counterfactual.  The development in possible 
world semantics (Lewis, 1973) provided the logic for counterfactual reasoning, and 
work in statistics along the same line of reasoning (Rubin, 1974, 1978, 1990) made 
the technical solutions available.  The technical/statistical solutions also facilitated a 
way out of those problems that had laid earlier analysis of the quasi-experiments on 
shaky grounds, in experimental language, the non-random assignment of treatment, 
and the effects of cases (individuals, firms) being singled out for treatment for spe-
cial reasons, the so-called selection effect.     
 
Lewis’ original (Lewis, 1973) formulation of the counterfactual theory of causation 
was spelled out under the assumption of determinism and had to be modified to al-
low for chancy causation. This work led to the more general notion of the causal 
counterfactual.  “Where c and e are distinct events, e causally depends on c if and 
only if, if c had not occurred, the chance of e’s occurring would have been much less 
than it actually was (given that c occurred)” (Lewis, 1986).  This more common 
sense notion of causality as related to events in the past, laid the ground for joining 
the logical structure of causation with the probabilistic notion of causation.   In a 
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number of works, mostly in the field of medical statistics, Paul R. Rosenbaum and 
Donald B. Rubin (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985; Rosenbaum, 1995; Rosenbaum et al., 
1983) developed their framework for the so-called observational studies where the 
properties of random assignments are emulated by means of matching procedures.  
Throughout the 1990s this line of reasoning was followed up, criticized and refined 
by a number of statisticians (Robins, 1989, 1997), a number of econometricians 
(Heckman, 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Heckman & Smith, 1995a; 
Heckman & Smith, 1995b) and sociologists (Winship & Morgan, 1999).  The 
causal-counterfactual approach follows the language of experimentation, similar to 
the literature on quasi-experimentation.  Contrary to the quasi-experimental tradi-
tion, the causal-counterfactual approach facilitates statistical analysis in practical 
settings, not merely discussions of potential and pitfalls.  
 
 
Of the seven ‘schools’ listed above, the first one, the ‘decision support’ school 
comes close to the common-sense view of evaluation. That is, evaluations of pro-
grams and projects are not that unrelated to other kinds of evaluations, say testing of 
products, or medical checks. There is no attempt to avoid evaluative claims; the most 
noteworthy with this point of view is that they see evaluations as an integrated part 
of the evaluating agency’s decision problem. The ‘relativistic’ approach avoids di-
rect evaluative conclusions in favor of relativistic ones. The ‘rich description’ ap-
proach avoids them in favor of non-evaluative descriptions. The ‘social process’ 
school avoids evaluative conclusions in favor of insights and understanding of social 
phenomena, and the ‘constructivist’ or ‘fourth generation’ avoids them along with 
all factual claims (Scriven, 1993).  Cost-benefit analysis and the causal counterfac-
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tual approach are somehow not as easily categorized as ‘schools’ as the other five.  
For public interventions, most bureaucrats consider cost-benefit analysis a must, 
regardless of whatever ‘school’ the evaluation task is performed under.  This follows 
from the overarching understanding of the society as an economy, a perspective em-
bedded in the NPM paradigm.  The causal counterfactual approach is included as a 
‘school’ for a slightly different reason.  It is the only perspective listed that allows 
for the analysis of effects without assuming effects from the outset, and hence the 
‘school’ that facilitates analysis based on the smallest number of untestable assump-
tions. 
 
Table 5 sums up the basic features of the seven ‘schools’ I have briefly described 
above. A hypothetical seminar with, say, five devotees of each of the seven different 
‘camps’ reveals the problem for evaluation research thought of as a discipline.  As-
sume for the sake of simplicity that each participant was educated in such a way that 
he/she new only his/hers own perspective.   It is highly unlikely that any kind of 
communication would take place. It is more likely that well-known psychological 
mechanisms of self-defense would be mobilized in accordance with what is known 
from the institutional perspective.  Hence, it is not unreasonable to look for sources 
of bias in evaluation research, not only in the methodologies employed, but also in 
the human factor. The fact that evaluation research is conducted in settings that un-
avoidably includes not only conflicting interests and world-views, but also relations 
between fallible humans with limited rational capacities is a good reason for tight-
ening the methodological grip, thereby leaving less space for accusations that ‘any-
thing goes’.  
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Table 5. ‘Schools’ and dominating traits of the agenda setting processes  
 
 AGENDA SETTING THEMES 
‘SCHOOLS’ Evaluative 
Claims 
Relation to 
Stakeholders 
Relation to 
Evaluation 
Basis for 
Validity 
Research Strategy / 
Methodology 
   Management claims  
The ‘decision support’  
school 
 
Yes Biased towards con-
tractor 
Insider Rational action Predominantly 
quantitative 
The ‘relativistic’  
approach                
Yes Objective, but 
receptive towards the 
goals of the 
contractor 
Outsider, but 
receptive 
towards the 
goals of the 
contractor 
Design  Qualitative/ 
Quantitative  
The ‘rich description’ 
approach  
No Independent Outside, 
overlooking 
Understanding Qualitative 
The ‘social process’  
school 
Yes Independent Independent Design and 
measures 
Predominantly 
quantitative 
The ‘Fourth generation’ 
 
No Negotiator Independent 
judge 
Weighted 
views 
Qualitative 
Cost-benefit analysis Yes Independent Independent Neo-classical 
Economic 
Theory 
Quantitative/  
semi-empirical 
The Causal-counterfactual 
approach 
 
Yes Independent Independent  Design Predominantly 
quantitative 
  
 
 
4.4. Methodologies, ideas and basic beliefs 
In accordance with many other scholars e.g., Morgan et al. (1980), I agree that the 
qualitative-quantitative divide is a misnomer that covers up a variety of underlying 
ideological11, epistemological and ontological questions.  When such questions are 
clarified, the link between methodologies, i.e., strategies of inquiry and method, i.e., 
techniques of investigations, becomes more transparent and explicit.  The concept of 
‘ideology’ as used here refers to ideas that stick in the mind regardless of the extent 
to which they have been proven erroneous.  It does not necessarily have to be asso-
ciated with a specific political ideology and it will be used interchangeably with the 
term ‘idea’. Epistemology refers both to an underlying theory of knowledge and as 
used here, especially to beliefs about how knowledge or truth can be comprehended.  
                                                        
11 By the term ‘ideology’ we refer to the pre-Marx concept of ideology that was first coined by Destutt de Tracy 
in 1796 to refer to the ‘science of ideas’.  
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The term ontology refers to beliefs and theories of reality or existence, i.e., one’s 
ontological beliefs determine how one thing about reality and about what exists in 
fact and what exists only in thought.  I also introduce the terms ‘pragmatic ontology’ 
and ‘ontological commitment’ where the first concept implies an acceptance of phe-
nomena and events that have causal powers regardless of the extent to which we are 
able to establish the underlying process that brought these phenomena or event into 
existence. The term ‘ontological commitment’ implies that ontologies are socially 
embedded, and thus, subject to commitment by the researchers who inhabit the dif-
ferent positions.  The term ‘pragmatic ontology’ further implies that I do not follow 
the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism, that mental phenomena can have no 
causal effects.  On the contrary, I accept all phenomenon and events that probes to 
have causal effects as valid explanatory factors.   As institutional processes lies at 
the heart of the kind of phenomenon I believe to be related to outcomes in evaluation 
studies, and cognitive processes may entail mental constructs, variables based on 
emotional or other mental constructs are of importance.  By the same token, argu-
ments concerning ‘ontological commitment’ assume that commitment works via 
personal involvement and hence, can best be explained by cognitive theory based 
uncovering of the institutional processes involved.  Also, I do not accept the notion 
of methodological individualism since I acknowledge concepts based on character-
istics of institutional arrangements where constructs cannot be deconstructed in a 
way that makes it probable to trace the individual motives or decisions.  That is, such 
concepts should be considered valid as long as they have explanatory power.  Few of 
the core concepts introduced are new to the debate over methodologies and my inter-
pretations are not particularly controversial.  The point to be made is that the inter-
pretations are not value free.  The ideological stance of the researcher is usually 
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made clear in their outline of core concepts that clarify their basic beliefs about how 
reality can be reached and interpreted.  This constitutes problems with the individual 
researcher’s attitude towards research.  Moral judgments set aside, it could be argued 
that opportunism is unavoidable, due to external pressures in terms of demands on 
earnings and loyalty towards one's colleagues earning expectations, when funding is 
received from related sources. We should hope that we never reach the point where 
consultants and researchers openly admit that they would have given an honest an-
swer, could they only afford to do so.  It is, however, fortunate that, in particular 
among young career-oriented researchers, a self-imposed naiveté eases the burdens 
of blatant opportunism. 
  
4.5. The paradigm debate 
The debate over qualitative versus quantitative inquiry in evaluations research has 
mainly evolved around an assumed strong tie between paradigms and methods. The 
notion of a paradigm is in most cases directly inspired by Kuhn’s (Kuhn, 1962) con-
cept, although discussions seem to reveal different interpretations of Kuhn’s con-
ceptualization.  Mostly, the term paradigm seems to be taken as synonymous with 
“philosophical world view”. This expansion of the concept unfortunately serves an-
tagonism and fuels debates more effectively than the more modest idea of paradigm 
as “the psychological phenomenon related to believing that the description or expla-
nation is correct, and the sociological phenomenon surrounding the coordinated en-
terprise of instrumentation, graduate education, textbook writing, reading, and ‘prob-
lem-solving’ according to the suggestions of the theory’s agenda”, called “normal 
science” by Kuhn (Poslby, 1998:202).   A second misinterpretation of Kuhn is the 
assertion of a close connection in general between a single paradigm and an entire 
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academic discipline; an interpretation that departs substantially from Kuhn’s in-
tentions but is well suited for justifications of sharp delimitation between disciplines 
or sub-disciplines.  Also, a small and rather insignificant sub-field may look more 
prominent when it is introduced as a new paradigm, alternative to a larger, estab-
lished discipline.  At any measure, it is hard to be confident that it is the question of 
qualitative versus qualitative inquiry that constitutes a paradigmatic divide.  It seems 
more to be the case that the debate over paradigms is used as a rhetorical device for 
the sake or the argument.  Adding descriptions of the epistemological and onto-
logical beliefs presumed to be essential to the various “philosophical world view” a 
debate where polarization is a likely outcome is generated since a “straw-man” ex-
treme and representative of historical well-known philosophical positions but char-
acteristic of only few living researchers, is constructed.   Many evaluation research-
ers characterize this debate as “unfortunate” (Worthen et al., 1997).   
 
The debate over methods may also be seen as bearing the imprint of the history of 
evaluation.  In the 1950s and 1960s evaluation was mainly something that concerned 
primary schools.  The few people that were engaged in evaluation research were 
schoolteachers.  With increased attention to the problems of evaluating the effects of 
new reform programs for schools and new pedagogical techniques for making edu-
cation more effective, the psychologist, trained in the experimental tradition entered 
the scene.  The work of Campbell and Stanley (1969) gave considerable impetus and 
inspiration to evaluation research and made experimental and quasi-experimental the 
predominant approach.   At that time, in the middle of the sixties, there was a recog-
nized criticism of the experimental tradition within the psychological profession.  
This disagreement was mainly due to the tension between the established Freudian 
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psychoanalytic tradition and experimental psychology.  In the education community, 
reactions toward the new evaluation techniques was also probably inspired by the 
pedagogy of scholars like Paolo Freire and others whose main concern was very dif-
ferent from those of the proponents of experimentation.  Hence, due to its roots in 
the efforts to reform in the primary schools system, it is likely that the conflict be-
tween qualitative and quantitative methodologies has a history that reflects the con-
trast between managerial and pedagogic thinking in the Great Society era of the late 
sixties and early seventies.  Hence, the conflict shows path dependence, a heritage 
long forgotten by today’s actors in the debate.   
 
4.6. Sub-discipline loyality 
It is generally accepted that the term social sciences covers several basic disciplines, 
such as economics, sociology, anthropology, organization studies, and so forth.  
Within or between these basic disciplines a variety of sub-fields or sub-disciplines 
have emerged over the years.  Each of these up-and-coming sub-disciplines can be 
viewed as having an inner drive towards maturity, although some of them may turn 
out to be short-lived fads.  The development towards maturity implies a number of 
institutional processes, such as organizing conferences and the establishment of new 
journals in the field. The ambitions of the sub-fields may vary from the more modest 
to the full-blown ambitions of professionalism with formal educational requirements 
and well-defined boundaries for membership. In Niklas Luhmann’s (1995) terms this 
development implies a kind of autopoiesis12 where the growth of an academic sub-
field may partly depend upon the new field’s ability to draw the demarcation lines 
which distinguish members from non-members.  The notion of being a member of a 
                                                        
12 Autopoiesis refers to a process whereby an organization produces itself. 
 289 
distinguished academic field seems to be of importance for academic identity 
(Henkel, 2005). Academic identity determines the character of the language the 
scholar is expected to use in written and oral presentation, i.e. what terms are antici-
pated to be excessively repeated and emphasized.  Moreover, academic identity of-
fers a relief from the burden of an otherwise perceived constant demand for acquir-
ing new knowledge.  Within what can loosely be termed “the evaluation commu-
nity” patterns of sub-divisional grouping is very visible.  It is visible in the confer-
ence programs of both the European Evaluation Society (EES) and the American 
Evaluation Association (AEA). Terms like “evidence-based evaluations” 
(e.g.,Sanderson, 2002) would in some meetings create reactions equivalent to the 
division of the Red Sea.    
 
The debate over qualitative versus quantitative methods appears to be cemented by a 
sharp assignment of priority for either the first or the latter-mentioned kind of meth-
odology. Thus, as evaluation becomes increasingly divided into distinct sub-fields, 
questions concerning methods become apparent.  The world-views inherent in the 
sub-disciplines usually reflect those of a parent discipline.  The methodological pe-
culiarity of the parent discipline is in usual carried over to its respective sub-disci-
plines. As new theoretical projects, sub-disciplines tend to have a self-protective 
drive towards maturity, manifested by the development of core concepts and re-
search methodologies.  As such, some of the new sub-disciplines may have traits that 
are not well suited for investigations where the quest for causal conclusions is un-
avoidably strong.  Attempts to comply with the demand for causal claims such as 
Lawrence B. Mohr’s (1999) re-introduction of causation without variance  correctly 
point out causation does not require statistical models.  Also, the APA standard re-
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quest for effect-size reporting has produced efforts to include concepts such as sta-
tistical power, effect-size and validity in qualitative studies (Onwuegbuzie, 2003; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007a, b). Thus, naturalistic inquiries seem to be subject to 
external pressure, e.g. from academic journals, for including types of reasoning usu-
ally associated with quantitative methodologies.  The attempts to conform to these 
demands indicate that there is still a considerable amount of work to be done 
(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007a).  
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5. Expectations, confirmation bias, and self-delusions 
5.1. Sources of bias – cognitive perspectives  
Human perceptions are fallible and the direction of bias is usually in support of our 
preconceived beliefs, i.e., confirmation bias.  Confronted with our erroneous predic-
tions the common reactions to the alternative better predictions may be resistance, 
rationalization of one’s own prediction and to cast doubt upon the foundation of the 
undesirable prediction.   The extent of the literature on confirmation bias is consid-
erable (e.g. Baron, 1981; Benshakhar, 1995; Davis, 1994; Gadenne, 1982, 1984; 
Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; MacCoun, 1998; Mynatt, Doherty, & 
Tweney, 1977; Nickerson, 1992) and is relevant for evaluation research as well as 
other research.  For our discussion here, however, we will only scratch the surface.    
 
We can coarsely distinguish between two separate potentially bias producing proc-
esses within the evaluation setting:   a) those typical of the research process itself 
and, b) those communication processes that cause clearly biased results to become 
accepted by governmental agencies.  Clearly, these processes are related, but for the 
purpose here, it is convenient to split the discussion into two parts.  The first part 
concerns the relationship between the researcher and his/her interpretation of data.  
This involves not only the peculiarities of the individual researchers but also traits 
that are present in the research community that embeds the researcher. The second 
part concerns the stakeholders in the evaluation process itself.  The most prominent 
of these is the evaluation management and other relevant stakeholders, the policy-
makers and other parts of the government agencies involved in or affected by the 
outcomes of the evaluation.  
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Researcher will most likely approach the relevant stakeholders affected by the pro-
ject/program in question with some pre-determinate ideas or hypotheses about what 
reactions or expectations are central to the evaluation.  The quantitative oriented 
researcher may express his/her ideas in the form of written questions in a question-
naire or as instruction in an interview guide.  The qualitative oriented researcher is, 
however, less assertive of own capabilities to settle in advance what the right ques-
tions might be, and want to figure this out by interacting with the people involved, 
either via direct conversation or by other means that allow for the most direct com-
munication. Interaction and direct involvement with those affected by the public 
project/program in question, seem to be salient features that distinguish qualitative 
inquiry from quantitative inquiry.  Clearly, the personal features of the qualitative 
inquiry procedures are in line with cognitive psychology reasoning insofar that it 
recognizes limited cognitive capacity.  The qualitative methods literature is, how-
ever, more reluctant to incorporate newer research on expectation confirmation in 
interpersonal relations.  Several theories concerning expectation confirmation may 
apply.  The hot cognition hypothesis (Abelson, 1963) posits that all social concepts 
that have been frequently used in the past become “affectively charged” positively or 
negatively tagged, with the affective charge linked directly to the concept in memory 
(Chen & Bargh, 1997).   The most well-known type of expectation confirmation is 
the self-fulfilling prophecy where our expectations about others, whatever their ori-
gins, tends to elicit the very behavior that is expected.  Coincidentally, this line of 
research has much in common with evaluation research, as they both originate from 
studies of the primary school system.  One of the first hints of expectancy confirma-
tion was the demonstrations that teachers who were led to expect particular levels of 
performance from students in their classroom, acted in ways that elicited perform-
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ances that confirmed the initial expectations (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968).  More 
recent research shows that the processes of expectancy confirmation and disconfir-
mation involves a complex intertwining of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral 
activities in social interaction (Snyder & Stukas, 1999) but also that the phenomena 
follows traceable paths that make it possible to map the mechanisms at work.  De-
composition of the elements of the mechanisms into a series of steps suggests the 
following sequence: (a) perceivers adopt beliefs about targets; (b) perceivers behave 
toward targets as if these beliefs were true; (c) targets fit their behavior to perceiv-
ers’ overtures; and (d) perceivers interpret targets’ behavior as confirming their be-
liefs (Kelly, 1992).    Expectations can be categorized according to their properties, 
such as certainty, accessibility, explicitness, and importance.  Increases in one of 
these properties should lead perceivers to increase their tendency to act on expecta-
tions in ways that increase the likelihood of confirmation (Olson, Roese, & P., 
1996).   The studies of expectancy confirmation complement the more philosophy of 
science oriented debates over the problem of “theory-laden” observations (Estany, 
2001; Franklin et al., 1989; Holman, 1979; Moore & Barresi, 1993) i.e., the influ-
ence of theory on what see (Scaff & Ingram, 1987).   
 
5.2. Bias due to scholarly training 
In the Anglo-Saxon world researches are generally trained in a tradition where the-
ory guides observations and tests, that is; observations are, by definition, decided 
upon by theory and thus, researchers may see what they are looking for.  This view 
of the relation between theory and data is different in other spheres of the world. The 
favored method of e.g. Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1998; 1999; 1991b) is corre-
spondence analysis (Benzecri, 1969; Greenacre, 1993; Hill, 1974); a method where 
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the iteration between data an theory is explicitly stated as an integral part of the re-
search process.  Thus, the absolute priority of theory is not absolute.  Moreover, in 
practical research, the iterative switching between data and theory is usually the case 
despite the fact that this practice may violate the logic of statistical tests.  It could be 
maintained that strict commitment to a chosen theory which induces a temptation to 
have a selective attitude towards the data is more of a problem for the Anglo-Saxon 
researcher than theory-laden observations.  Rigorous theories tend to rebut rigorous 
empirical tests.  
 
The file-drawer problem (e.g.,Rosenthal, 1979; Rotton, Foos, Vanmeek, & Levitt, 
1995; Shadish, Doherty, & Montgomery, 1989) is well known to researchers.  In its 
most extreme version it insinuates that “journals are filled with studies that show 
Type I error while the file-drawers are filled with the 95% that show non-significant 
results” (Rosenthal, 1979:638).  Researchers are trained to expect that only studies 
that confirm results will become published.   The tendency to prefer studies that pro-
duce significant results may carry over to the evaluation setting, regardless of quali-
tative or quantitative methods orientation. 
 
Moreover, it could be argued that the qualitative researcher, as an interpreter of 
“data” takes the role of an expert. As pointed out by Robyn Dawes (1979), simple 
linear models may in many cases (Kuhn, 1962) outcompete the clinical intuition of 
presumably skilled expertise.   
 
5.3. The Measurement Question – a source of confusion 
Summative evaluations assume outcome assessments, i.e., one or other kind of 
measurement of what is achieved by the project or program in question have to be 
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acknowledged.   If we for simplicity imagine three different scholars, one with 
his/her basic methodological training in psychometrics, one in econometrics and one 
trained in qualitative methods only, their conception of what to measure would 
surely differ.   The psychometric inclined researcher would most likely have a theo-
retical concept as his point of departure and spend considerable time on explaining 
the measurement procedure and to what extent he/she succeeded13 in measuring 
what was intended.   The econometrician would most likely look for things like 
number of new jobs created, the meaning of significant events such as bankruptcies 
or mergers or one other predefined measure in money terms.   Both the psychometri-
cally inclined and the econometrically inclined would look for measures that are 
embedded within a field-specific theoretical framework, but while the psychometri-
cally inclined would emphasize measurement, the econometrically inclined would 
look for some magnitude “already out there” and emphasize the data-generating 
process, i.e. the process that left the observable tracks14.   The qualitative methods 
inclined researcher would most likely also take theory15 as his/her point of departure 
and, much in line with the psychometrician he/she would emphasize measurement.   
However, while the traditional psychometrician would most likely prefer predefined 
items, preferably tested by other researchers in several other studies, the qualitative 
method researcher would prefer to rely on his/her personal interpretation.  Thus, 
while the psychometricians rely on a worldview that research is cumulative or at 
least self-correcting in the sense that he/she has to believe that the many efforts to 
establish an item-bank that over time makes constructs converge towards the seman-
tic domain of the theoretical concept, the qualitative researcher has to rely more on 
                                                        
13 They usually succeed, otherwise it is not reported. 
14 The business student, trained in a hybrid of the psychometric and the econometric tradition would be utterly 
confused and invariably report Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. 
15 It is not always clear what is meant by theory; here we at a minimum think of something like a model, analyti-
cal framework or a conceptual scheme. 
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his/her personal intuition.  Moreover, because qualitative methodology is not a sin-
gle method but a bundle of many different and to some extent incomparable heuris-
tics for making sense of the empirical world as perceived by her/him personally, the 
urge to discover something new as opposed to the drive towards seeing something 
recognized by others, involves a kind of self-exposure which is not experienced by 
the psychometrician.  Clearly, new surprising discoveries may be more risky than 
well recognized findings and any deviation from what is expected e.g., by the 
evaluation, management might trigger a quest for validity.  While validity assess-
ment is routinized in the psychometrician’s research process, it is less well devel-
oped within a qualitative inquiry framework (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007b).  More-
over, the evaluation management and other stakeholders are quite likely to take va-
lidity assessment as a “quality-clue” and thus, in a conceivable battle over conflict-
ing interests among stakeholders, the psychometrician may score in terms of legiti-
macy, despite the qualitative methods, the researcher’s inclusion of the term “quali-
tative”, which is easily and even unconsciously associated with “quality”, is the ab-
stract aspect of research that signals trustworthiness to the layman.  Both the psycho-
metrician and qualitative researcher are primarily equipped with methodological 
apparatuses unambiguously oriented towards an understanding of the empirical 
world as interpreted by human experience i.e., they use instruments aimed at elicit-
ing human perceptions.  Thus, the double nature of their common endeavor is to 
interpret interpretations; the psychometrician primarily by means of statistical mod-
els that extend what is already known and the qualitative researcher by means of 
systematic inquiries, on the hunt for new interpretations.  
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Compared to the psychometrician and the qualitative researcher, the econometrician 
tends to come across as naïve and ignorant, in particular in the view of the part of the 
new generation of qualitative inquiry scholars that from the outset have chosen to 
renounce so-called “positivist methods” altogether.  Heavy reliance upon the be-
havioral assumption of the “economic man” may be read as unawareness concerning 
the human condition for interpreting the outer world.  Psychometricians seem to 
have forgotten their debt to econometricians, in particular the works of Goldberger 
in the early seventies (e.g., Goldberger, 1972; Joreskog & Goldberger, 1975).   The 
principal disagreement between psychometricians and econometricians over the 
measurement question is of a different nature than the disagreement between quali-
tative methods researchers and the econometricians; while psychometricians con-
sider econometricians to go too light on the measurement question and rely too heav-
ily on behavioral assumptions, the qualitative method researcher appears to un-
derstand econometricians as representatives of a kind of contemporary “Vienna Cir-
cle”; more or less today’s logical positivists.   This angle on discussions does, by its 
sweeping through the older philosophical debates over questions of human access to 
the empirical world, in fact produce interesting reflections over the development of 
social science methodology; unfortunately, it also prevents recent developments 
within econometrics from being communicated to the evaluation community at 
large.   
 
The most undercommunicated aspect of summative evaluation is the consequence of 
the inherent counterfactual nature of the established jargon, at least within the 
evaluation of EU-framework programs (Luukkonen, 2000) where additionality is a 
central concept.  Additionality means that observed outcomes would not have been 
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present without the program in question and, if positive additionality is said to exist, 
the cost-benefit ratio has to exceed unity.  Since additionality is established in the 
terminology as the criteria for success of a chosen policy, the discourse following 
the presentation of an evaluation report is structured as if observed outcomes are 
caused by the program/project that is evaluated.   This is likely to happen regardless 
of whether a method which justifies this kind of reasoning is applied or not. 
 
The idea that qualitative inquiry makes the evaluation task easier is not alien to re-
searchers.  This is not a very productive idea. To use a phrase from Thomas A. 
Schwandt, a prominent scholar of qualitative inquiry, such a position is doubly 
tragic: 
“Sadly, some researchers seem drawn to qualitative inquiry for the simple fact that 
they do not wish to “deal with numbers.” This is doubly tragic. First, it is based on 
faulty reasoning— there is nothing inherent in the epistemologies of qualitative in-
quiry that prohibits the use of numbers as data. Second, such a stance can be based 
in the illusion that so-called qualitative inquiry is somehow “easier” to do than so-
called quantitative inquiry. But it is hard to imagine what criteria might be employed 
to determine that the level of effort and thought required for writing field notes, 
conducting and transcribing interviews, interpreting different kinds of qualitative 
data, and so on is somehow lower (or higher, for that matter) than that required for 
designing and executing a careful and meaningful test of a statistical hypothesis. 
These inquiry tasks simply require different kinds of awareness, knowledge, and 
skills.” (Schwandt, 2000:206) 
 
 
The econometrician’s presumed naivety with respect to the measurement question is 
frequently emphasized as an important difference between naturalistic inquiries and 
statistically oriented quantitative methodologies.   The ‘brute fact’ argument and the 
‘theory-laden’ observations argument is occasionally introduced as a hint to the con-
sequences of ignoring the inevitable effect of theory, namely that you see what you 
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are looking for.  Thus, as indicated by the quotation, below, naïve belief in the pos-
sibility of objectivity could lead to worthless measurements.    
“Since the classic studies of Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1962), it has become com-
monplace to note that there is no such thing as a brute ‘fact’ or a completely neutral 
‘observation language’ simply ‘there’ in the world, existing independently of all 
conceptualization and serving as definitive test of our theoretical generalizations.  
The ‘facts’ composing the world of our observations are always ‘theory-laden’ 
(partly quoted from Hanson, 1958:19).” (Scaff et al., 1987:235)  
 
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is hard to find a quantitative ori-
ented researcher who would completely disagree. Some would find the tendency to 
absolutism in the quotation a bit out of place, in particular since the quotation dem-
onstrates that the ‘brute fact’ argument is not well understood16.  The naturalists’ 
argument that “there exists multiple realities which are, in the main, constructions 
existing in the minds of people; they are therefore intangible and can be studied only 
in holistic, and idiosyncratic, fashion” (Guba & Lincoln, 1988:81-82) does not rule 
out the possibility for measurements that many people may comprehend similarly.   
In summative evaluations it is of grave importance that central measurements can be 
communicated and are easily understood in the same manner by stakeholders and the 
wider audience. 
 
In 1966 Donald D. Campbell and his associates (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & 
Sechest, 1966) made an important contribution, apparently long forgotten by the 
evaluation research community, by introducing the somewhat strange term ‘unobtru-
sive measures’.  Webb et al. (Webb et al., 1966) defined reactivity as obtrusiveness, 
thus making the search for unobtrusive measures the search for methods that do not 
                                                        
16 The term ”brute facts” was first coined by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe  (Anscombe, G. E. M. 
1958. On Brute facts. Analysis, 18: 69-72.) and was meant as a term for that which has no explanation outside 
the institutional framework in which it is embedded such as e.g., a hundred dollar bill, which clearly, without an 
institutionalized money system is just a piece of paper.  Thus, brute facts are not suited for explanations 
(Fahrbach, L. 2005. Understanding brute facts. Synthese, 145(3): 449-466. 
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affect or distort the data that are collected.  Both quantitative and qualitative meth-
odologies presuppose the participation of individuals as research objects.  Thus, re-
gardless of the data collection methods being interviews, surveys, rating scales or 
open questions in questionnaire based studies; people have to volunteer to participate 
in the endeavor of data collection.  For this process to succeed there must be consent 
among the participants that it is worthwhile to offer the time and effort necessary to 
help the researcher to gather the data that is needed for the study.  In the psychology 
literature this spurs a variety of questions, some of an ethical nature e.g. (Atwell, 
1982), others of methodological character e.g. (Rosenthal, 1976).  It is undoubtedly 
unethical to force people to participate in a study and it is questionable to engage 
people in studies where they disagree with the purpose of the study or would not 
have participated had they known the purpose of the study.   Clearly, attitudes to-
ward a study may also affect how people choose to relate and react to various ques-
tions.  Thus, the way a given study relates to its study objects is a methodological 
problem and a potential source of bias such as e.g. strategic answering due to posi-
tive/negative interests or indifference (careless respondents) towards the outcomes of 
the study (e.g.,Schmitt & Stults, 1985).   
 
Administrative records are unobtrusive in the sense that there is no reason to expect 
reactions towards the collection of administrative data in general, in particular when 
administrative archives would exist independent of the project/program under scru-
tiny. Objection to the use of administrative records by participants in the pro-
ject/program that is evaluated is a different issue.   
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A property related to unobtrusiveness is stability.  By stability we here think of sta-
bility over time, location and groups.  Comparisons of outcomes over time, between 
various locations and groups require that we measure the same phenomena every 
time.  Since summative evaluations aim at detecting differences between identifiable 
participants and non-participants, a degree of neutrality of measures is necessary for 
meaningful comparisons.   Since stability across subjective interpretations may be 
hard to achieve, even for the experienced researcher, naturalism may be the best 
choice for measurements in summative evaluations.   Thus, traditional scientific 
methodology may be the preferred choice when stability across repetitions is of im-
portance.  
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6. Presumed consequences – a summing up 
This section sums up some probable answers to the three theses proposed and other 
peculiarities of the circumstances that confront evaluation researchers when the task 
at hand is applied summative evaluations and the demand for causal claims is pre-
sent albeit not always explicitly contractually stated.  
 
6.1.The three theses 
6.1.1. Consequences of the substandard argument 
 
Concerning the substandard argument I have suggested that “accepting substandard 
evaluations leaves the debate over evaluation methodology obsolete and makes it hard to 
establish the status of evaluations”.   
 
As previously stated, I think the substandard argument should be rejected.  The sen-
sible line of reasoning put forward by Coleman (1972) four decades ago was based 
on the contemporary development of evaluation methodology.  Since then, evalua-
tion methodology has made substantially progress and it is possible to present trust-
worthy analyses of presumed outcomes of programs and projects; analyses that are 
trustworthy in the sense that they fulfill the transparency requirement and can, within 
reasonable limits of probability, establish whether intended program goals are at-
tained or not.  Methodological progress is not, however, our main reason for reject-
ing the substandard argument.  It is more the expected consequences of the accep-
tance of lower methodological standards in an increasingly routinized use of evalua-
tions. The last two decades have seen a substantially growth in use of evaluations.  
In the US, the introduction of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 
which made evaluations mandatory for programs and projects with expenditures 
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above a specified sum, had a major impact.  Moreover, evaluations are now both an 
integrated part of NPM and an important ingredient in the media-strategy of the 
agency responsible for the program/project in question.  The extensive use of evalua-
tions in combination with the impression that “anything goes” with respect to meth-
odology (Adelman, 1996) is not a good scenario.  The impression that the fact that 
an evaluation is carried out is sufficient is disturbing.  The remaining part of the 
process of legitimating the program/process is handled by the spin doctors and the 
media strategy.  Such a development is unfortunate, both from a reputation of the 
social sciences point of view and a professional evaluator’s point of view.   Within 
the individualizing logic of NPM, this development is understandable; the insistency 
that an identifiable person should carry the responsibility for the result of public 
programs/projects is to some extent a rather recent invention, born from media con-
venience.  Regardless of whether this person was responsible for the initiative to the 
project/program in question, to what extent he/she was in charge of the practical 
implementation or not, the need for attributing success of failure to a person that can 
be interviewed, asked for comments an so on, is crucial for the construction of media 
coverage.   Thus, summative evaluation may take the character of a verdict, both 
with respect to the program/project under scrutiny and the person assumed responsi-
ble.  Evidence and verdict are connected, both in legal terms and in the folk psychol-
ogy that produces reactions from the media audience.  Verdicts based on flawed evi-
dence are undesirable and so are declarations of successes which appear to be more 
marketing than research-based documentation.  
 
Evidence and methodology is an inseparable duality.  Moreover, the transparency of 
the methods applied is critical for external judgments of the quality of the evidence 
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presented.  Thus, the growth and extensive use of evaluations that has emerged over 
the two recent decades implies that the idea that we should accept lower standards 
for evaluations than for discipline research is not a good idea for summative evalua-
tions.   
 
6.1.2. Qualitative methods for summative evaluations: The amalgamation problem 
My proposal concerning the sole reliance upon qualitative methods for summative 
evaluations states that: “Qualitative inquiry may produce confirmation bias in evaluation 
studies by amalgamating the research and the researcher, and hence confusing psychologi-
cal self-defensive mechanisms and professional argumentation. Thus, conflict may be ex-
perienced as insult and support for argument as praise, constituting a mechanism that in-
creases the probability of agreement between the researcher and the dominant stake-
holders.” 
 
Clearly, the research/researcher amalgamation problem is a difficulty of concern not 
only for the qualitative researcher.  Generally, the research process implies consider-
able personal involvement.  The researcher who feels that the research task is exe-
cuted in a proper way is usually prepared to defend his/her work.  The critical dif-
ference between qualitative and quantitative inquiry is rooted in the subjective, in-
terpretative aspects unique to qualitative inquiries.  While most quantitative inquiries 
operate at the molar level of observations and restrict evaluative causal claims to this 
level, qualitative inquiries may go beyond this level and try to understand the un-
derlying mechanisms beyond the observable. It is not all that clear whether the quali-
tative analysts accept the notion that causal assertions are meaningful at the molar 
level even when the ultimate micromediation is not known (Cook et al., 1979).  Most 
facets of qualitative inquiries do, however, define their activities as characterized by 
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the difference between what they do and what quantitative researches do.  Thus, 
quantitative inquiries serve as a reference base.  While molar causation is central to 
quantitative analyses e.g. analyses based upon measures against the counterfactual, it 
has no place in qualitative inquiries. Whereas quantitative analyses emphasize mod-
els, rules and formal procedures, qualitative analyses accentuate the narrative.  Thus, 
a report based upon quantitative analyses may appear as sterile, demanding reading 
while the report from the qualitative analyst tells a story that may even be interesting 
to read.  Moreover, the quantitative report may contain equations and statistical ex-
pressions unfamiliar to the reader.  In sum, the qualitative report may be more com-
municative than the quantitative report.   
 
However, in summative evaluations, the first question is: Did the project/program in 
question turn out according to intention? And second: Did it produce the intended 
results at a cost that makes it beneficial to society?  In my opinion, a worrisome 
number of summative evaluations provide a positive answer to both questions.  The 
sheer fraction of yes’s compared to no’s indicates confirmation bias (Jones et al., 
2001; Nickerson, 1992; Pollard, 1983) of the kind usually termed researcher bias 
(Bamberger, Rugh, Church, & Fort, 2004).   To my knowledge no study   of confir-
mation bias exists which involves a qualitative/quantitative distinction.  The point to 
be made here is that summative evaluations force a decision concerning the success 
or failure of a project/program and also force the conclusion that these outcomes can 
be causally attributed to the project/program in question.  Any disagreement con-
cerning this conclusion asks for a thorough investigation of the evidence behind this 
decision.  Hence, under fierce conflict between stakeholders, methods which are 
transparent in the sense that every step in the research process is traceable, is to the 
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researcher’s advantage.  The researcher can find shelter under the protective um-
brella of objectivity only as far as he/she can demonstrate, step by step, exactly how 
the conclusions were produced.   The appeal to objectivity is probably the best pos-
sible escape route for the researcher in a situation of fierce conflict.  The only alter-
native, the appeal to authority, would probably, according to Aaron et al., (1990) be 
of less use.   Appeal to objectivity, however problematic it may be, is a less viable 
possibility for the qualitative researcher.   Accusations of subjectivity are hard to 
beat off when personal interpretation and understanding is an integral part of the 
method applied.  Thus, since conflict is a frequently occurring situation in summa-
tive evaluation, methods that permit for a kind of detachment, i.e., that make it pos-
sible to create at least some distance between the researcher and his/her work, in 
short, traditional scientific methods, may be preferable.    
 
Lately, the study of evaluations per se has gained attention from scholars, and a 
number of academics seem to endorse E. R. House’s (1999) conclusion that17:  
 
“Society expects for evaluation to be based on scientific authority . . . the more objective and less ideological 
evaluation becomes, the more useful it is and the more it threatens established authority. A useful practice would 
provide sound evaluations that are not ideological. . . The evaluation theory developed so far is too ideological.” 
(House et al., 1999:30) 
 
 
6.1.3. Schools and subdisciplines: Consequences of scholarly contradicting world views 
The many subdisciplines of evaluation offer a smorgasbord of alternatives where the 
nature of the evaluation report can be picked according to taste.  As shown in Table 
5, the different ‘schools’ vary with respect to their relationship to management, their 
relationship to stakeholders, and their willingness to make evaluative claims.   For 
                                                        
17 Quotation from Henry, G. T. 2001. How modern democracies are shaping evaluation and the emerging chal-
lenges for evaluation. American Journal of Evaluation, 22(3): 419-429. 
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formative evaluations, the smorgasbord may be useful.  Pluralism is positive in the 
sense that is prevents the dominance of a single perspective, thus some aspect of the 
program/project under scrutiny that would otherwise be neglected could be brought 
to attention.  On the other hand, for summative evaluations, pluralism in perspectives 
may be negative if it opens up for predictable outcomes, i.e., evaluation management 
is supplied with a mean for choosing the results that suit their preferred agenda.  
Provided that each perspective is assigned near equal legitimacy and the peculiarities 
of each different ‘school’ is known by the evaluation management, opportunism may 
win through.  
 
6.2. The irrereversibility of customs and habits 
Institutionalization processes are runaway trains that come into action simply as time 
passes and activities are repeated.  The logic of NPM is based upon mimetic proc-
esses (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989) where public 
sector programs and projects mimic what is perceived as parallel tasks in the private 
sector.  The evaluation part, which is not correspondingly common in the private 
sector, is included as justified by the demand for accountability and as an act or re-
sponsibility due to the fact that actions are undertaken on behalf of the public inter-
est.   The basic view of the private enterprise as driven by the logic of consequen-
tiality, i.e., rational, informed self-interest is central to NPM.  Thus, when the rules 
of rational action are transformed to the public sector, productivity is enhanced via 
incentives since “man’s natural proclivity is to pursue his own interests” (Brennan & 
Buchanan, 1985:ix).   
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However, in the public sector the demand for legitimacy may oust the demand for 
accountability and the actions required for establishing legitimacy may differ from 
the procedures that facilitate accountability.  Thus, as public agencies copy the prac-
tices of other public agencies and evaluations become commonly routinized due to 
media-driven language games and the ‘semantic magnet’ properties of the term 
‘evaluation’ (Vedung, 2000), institutional processes cement evaluations as part of 
the public agency’s modus operandi.  As part of the going concern of a public 
agency, that status of evaluation changes and becomes sustained by the logic of ap-
propriateness (March  & Olsen, 2004).  Evaluation is now commonplace and accep-
tance of the new routine becomes part of the rules that guide appropriate behavior.  
Thus, the identity and role as a bureaucrat now encapsulates the acceptance of 
evaluations and objections to the new routine or to the quality of reports may be 
taken as unwillingness to comply with agency culture and the community of col-
leagues.   
 
It is not likely that the number of evaluation reports produced in the near future will 
drop.  Attempts to reduce the number of summative evaluations at a stage of pro-
gram development so early that no results should be expected to be observable, 
would most probably raise objections from many public agencies.  Thus, even 
though the immoderate optimism and faith in liberal economics that gave birth to 
NPM and the Reinvention Government movement in the early eighties has lost its 
momentum, evaluations as an essential part of public programs and projects prevail. 
Thus, since a growth in the production of evaluations is predictable, quality consid-
eration should be essential both to the evaluation research community and the public 
at large.      
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7. Evaluation commissioning 
7.1. Competitive tendering 
The general rule for the contracts for public evaluations is open competitive tender-
ing.  Within the European Union and the EEA countries announcement of tenders 
are subject to strict rules to make sure that contracts above a minimum value are 
subject to open competition between relevant research institutions and consulting 
companies.  There are few restrictions with respect to formal qualification for appli-
cants and no prerequisites in forms of certificates or other statements of eligibility 
for contractors.  The tenderer is free to contract with any offeree found suitable for 
the purpose at hand.  There are no restrictions in terms of required procedural ar-
rangements for the bidding process, e.g. independent assessment of what should be 
considered the best offer or rules concerning repeated use of contractors.  In most 
cases, contractual decisions are handled by the office or agency responsible for the 
projects or programs under examination.  Contract prices are normally fixed or 
nearly fixed and the evaluation management is often in charge of both developing 
the tender documents and making the decision about whom to hire for the evalua-
tion.  Thus, contractual agreements are usually based on assessment of the perceived 
quality of the bidder’s proposal about how to solve the task at hand.  Thus, the repu-
tation of the offeree and expectations about the nature of the final product play cen-
tral roles for the formation of contracts.  Reputations and expectations may primarily 
appear as recognition of the quality of research and the ability to carry out eminent 
evaluations, but it may also include the rumor that dominant stakeholders usually get 
the answer they want.  If experience indicates that re-contracting depends more upon 
sufficient support for the interests of central stakeholders than on the quality of the 
 310 
research that carries the conclusions of summative evaluations, we may have a situa-
tion where open competitive tendering systematically deflates the value of evalua-
tions.   Institutionalization of summative evaluation as the end of line unit within the 
logic of NPM may, under unfavorable circumstances where research institutions 
depend heavily upon funding from evaluation contracts, encourage a kind of con-
formity that renders summative evaluations uninformative.  
 
7.2. Specification of the evaluation task 
The basic question in any evaluation is to provide trustworthy evidence about the 
merit or worth of the program or project in question.  The reasons for using phrases 
like evaluation research and the reasons for engaging a research institution to do the 
job are rooted in the need for trustworthy conclusions.  Public agencies invoke the 
legitimacy of science by asking for answers based upon scientific methods.    
 
A question is an expression of intellectual anxiety and an answer an attempt at reso-
lution of that anxiety (Myhill, 1951). From a logical point of view, we can distin-
guish between two kinds of questions, formal and informal questions.  A formal 
question carries with it the form of its answer, i.e., the social context is such that the 
criterion of the acceptability of the answer is known and agreed upon by both ques-
tioner and answerer in abstraction from the answer itself (Myhill, 1951). The purest 
kind of formal question is the question of the truth or falsity of a mathematical theo-
rem within a known system. The criteria for being a proof within the system are ex-
actly specified and agreed upon by both questioner and answerer.  In empirical re-
search formal questions are a less pure kind of formal questions.  Criteria of confir-
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mation are less specifiable than for the mathematical proof and hence, not so easily 
agreed upon by the research community.   
 
An informal question is one where the form of the answer is not known either by the 
answerer or the questioner in abstraction from the answer itself.  The dictum that the 
meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification, does not apply to proposi-
tions which answer informal questions, since part of the meaning of such questions 
is to question what the form of its answer should be (Myhill, 1951:58).  Hence, part 
of the meaning of the question “What are the merits of this particular project” is 
“What form of answer is best suited to resolve the anxiety expressed by this ques-
tion”?   That is, to the extent a question is formal, to an equivalent extent the ques-
tioner will be prepared to state precisely the kind of evidence it would take to con-
vince him/her of the of the truth of any proposed answer.  Hence, a formal question 
asks for the matter of its answer but provides a specification of the form of the an-
swer while an informal answer asks for both.  The ambiguity of the informal ques-
tion opens the opportunity for the researcher as contractor to advocate his/her pre-
ferred form of answer and the tenderer receives a menu of possible solutions where 
it is fairly easy to predict reactions from various audiences such as the media, the 
policy makers or various research communities.  Thus, an evaluation concerning, 
say, toxic waste does not require much knowledge of chemistry and an evaluation of 
a vaccination program may not specify the need for epidemiological expertise.  In-
deed, the paradox of the demand for qualitative methods in the era of NPM is not a 
paradox but more of a confirmation of the dictum that management is better left to 
the managers.     
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7.3.The integrity of research 
The legal language of most evaluation contracts is usually aimed at protecting the 
interests of the evaluation management.  Thus, the evaluation management refrains 
from specifying the form of the answer to the evaluation problem, have the right to 
accept any methodological solution suggested and have legal monopoly on the use 
of the reports produced.   In sum, conducting evaluation makes weighty demands 
upon the integrity of research.  In an ideal world, researchers should, by upbringing 
or education, have internalized a commitment to present only what they at a mini-
mum themselves believe to be valid knowledge.  In philosophy of science jargon18 
this should imply that: 
• The researcher should not acknowledge any higher authority than the authority 
of the best argument. 
• The researcher should not accept any other directional force, whether it be social 
or human based, than the institution of the “argumentative game” itself.  That is, 
the logic of the argument should not be contaminated by considerations regarding 
social roles, status or position. Also, there should be unrestrained freedom of 
speech and symmetry between all parts involved in the argumentative dialog. 
• The free, argument-driven fellowship and what it produces should serve as meas-
ures for actions and institutional arrangements and also as a critical test of what 
should be considered as valid, legitimate and rationally acceptable.  
• The top priority should be the awareness of self-deception19, the most common 
plague for the social scientist. 
 
                                                        
18 Adapted from Habermas, J. 1990. Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification. In S. 
Benhabib, & F. R. Dallmayr (Eds.), The Communicative ethics controversy: viii, 378 s. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press., page 118. 
19 This argument is from Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. New York: MacMillan..  
 313 
Many researchers would discard such pronouncement as naïve or even exorbitant.  
Some may admit that the four points above are actually a proper description of their 
own, basic thoughts about doing research, although that they found them idealisti-
cally naïve. Others would say that the four points have a blatant flavor of objectiv-
ism and that they personally were working in a field where the prevailing paradigm 
barred against beliefs in the possibility of objectivism.  Many researchers would ac-
knowledge that publishing in leading journals of their field gave much of the raison 
d'être for their scholarly efforts, not their inner feelings of intellectual honesty.  
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8. Concluding remarks 
I clearly recognize a place for qualitative inquiries in evaluation studies but also that 
the multiple realities supposition and the emphasis on subjective interpretation may 
produce unwarranted ambiguities in summative evaluations. Many problems per-
ceived to exist between proponents of qualitative and quantitative research may stem 
from misunderstandings.  Even well conducted, backward traceable and replicable 
quantitative studies have a difference between reconstructed logic and logic in use 
(Kaplan, 1964).  The logic in use during the research may take many forms, may go 
back and forth in iterative steps, may involve interpretations and may not look very 
different from what the qualitative researcher is doing, with the exception that it 
usually involves numbers.  The reconstructed logic, which succeeds the actual re-
search process, is more stringent since it orders the sequence of the work and fills in 
what is actually done at each step of the quantitative research schemata.  Thus, the 
research process may invariably have the two facets Reichenbach (1938) coined con-
text of discovery and context of justification.  It is worth noting that it is the recon-
structed logic that makes analyses replicable and backward traceable.  In short, in 
summative evaluations a few elements should be recognized, such as: 
• acknowledgement of the reliance on the senses in the research process, and, a 
• mandatory a priory statement of methodological principles, an  
• awareness to the replicability principle, combined with  
• sensibility concerning the communicability of results, and finally,   
• it should be possible to falsify any hypothesis introduced. 
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Attention towards agreed upon scientific standards does not remove the dilemmas 
that frequently meets the evaluator.  Time constraints and a lack of access to relevant 
data may compel substandard methodologies. Summative evaluations of programs 
and projects concerning, say, aid to developing countries, where relevant data in 
some cases is near inaccessible, may imply an implicit ultimatum to accept lower 
methodological standards.  Any evaluative claim would require the construction of a 
baseline and a likely counterfactual. The implicit third requirement is that the base-
line and the counterfactual are constructed in accordance with recognized methods, 
i.e., that the source of authority is science in one or other sense. Lack of methodo-
logical rigour may in the long run undermine the legitimacy of social science based 
research.    
 
The mere growth in the number of evaluations conducted worldwide and the grow-
ing number of consultancy companies implies that strong institutional forces are 
cementing evaluations both as an industry and evaluations as an institution itself.  
From a commercial point of view the cost-effectiveness of evaluation methodologies 
is an issue. Despite the numerous Evaluation Standards issued from organizations 
like the World Bank, the European Commission and national accounting offices it is 
not necessarily the case that future evaluation practices invariable contribute to pub-
lic trust in social science based research.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Initial Matched Pairs – Original and corrected samples1 
 
 
Regional Venture Capital Loans  Regional Venture Capital Loans 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin      tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0001 437.5 437.5 217.7 680.5  1.00 0.0004 365.0 365.0 148.5 580.0 
1.05 0.0003 393.5 485.5 171.0 734.5  1.05 0.0014 324.0 401.5 110.5 626.0 
1.10 0.0010 352.5 530.0 128.5 788.5  1.10 0.0040 286.8 436.5 75.0 670.0 
1.15 0.0031 310.0 571.0 88.0 838.5  1.15 0.0097 254.1 475.5 43.0 711.5 
1.20 0.0082 272.5 612.8 51.5 889.5  1.20 0.0210 222.5 511.0 8.0 751.0 
1.25 0.0189 237.0 656.5 13.5 944.5  1.25 0.0407 190.7 541.5 -25.5 792.0 
1.30 0.0383 202.5 701.0 -23.0 998.3  1.30 0.0715 157.5 572.0 -60.5 829.5 
1.35 0.0702 167.0 740.5 -59.5 1047.0  1.35 0.1155 128.5 602.5 -94.4 867.5 
1.40 0.1170 133.0 782.5 -95.5 1101.0  1.40 0.1734 99.5 641.0 -123.5 908.0 
1.45 0.1798 102.5 821.0 -128.0 1154.0  1.45 0.2440 73.5 671.5 -153.0 950.5 
1.5 0.2573 74.0 858.0 -161.0 1203.5  1.50 0.3248 50.0 703.0 -185.0 988.0 
N=343  N=279 
             
Investment Grants  Investment Grants 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin      tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0000 738.5 738.5 514.0 983.0  1.00 0.0000 636.5 636.5 428.5 863.5 
1.05 0.0000 675.3 802.5 457.0 1051.5  1.05 0.0000 586.0 687.4 381.0 919.0 
1.10 0.0000 618.5 863.5 404.5 1120.0  1.10 0.0000 540.0 738.5 337.5 973.5 
1.15 0.0000 564.0 923.5 356.0 1188.5  1.15 0.0000 495.0 787.0 296.0 1026.9 
1.20 0.0000 514.0 983.0 309.5 1258.5  1.20 0.0000 453.5 834.8 257.0 1079.5 
1.25 0.0000 466.5 1039.7 264.5 1324.5  1.25 0.0000 415.0 879.0 219.5 1131.5 
1.30 0.0000 423.0 1095.5 223.5 1392.5  1.30 0.0001 378.0 923.0 184.5 1183.0 
1.35 0.0001 381.0 1152.5 183.5 1462.0  1.35 0.0003 342.5 966.5 149.5 1235.0 
1.40 0.0003 342.0 1209.0 145.0 1528.0  1.40 0.0009 309.5 1009.5 116.5 1288.0 
1.45 0.0011 304.5 1265.5 109.0 1592.4  1.45 0.0026 278.0 1050.0 84.0 1338.0 
1.50 0.0033 268.0 1320.0 73.5 1658.5  1.50 0.0063 248.0 1092.5 53.0 1387.0 
1.55 0.0086 234.5 1375.0 40.5 1724.5  1.55 0.0138 218.0 1134.5 23.0 1434.5 
1.60 0.0198 201.0 1430.0 9.0 1790.5  1.60 0.0274 190.5 1174.5 -4.0 1483.0 
1.65 0.0407 169.5 1485.0 -21.0 1857.0  1.65 0.0499 162.0 1216.5 -31.5 1532.5 
1.70 0.0753 138.7 1538.5 -50.5 1926.5  1.70 0.0838 136.0 1258.5 -57.0 1578.5 
1.75 0.1269 109.5 1591.0 -78.5 1993.5  1.75 0.1308 110.5 1297.0 -82.5 1623.5 
1.80 0.1966 81.0 1645.5 -106.0 2060.5  1.80 0.1915 85.0 1336.5 -108.0 1669.0 
1.85 0.2829 54.0 1697.0 -133.0 2129.5  1.85 0.2646 61.5 1374.0 -132.0 1716.6 
1.90 0.3813 27.5 1750.0 -160.0 2200.0  1.90 0.3472 37.0 1412.0 -156.0 1765.0 
1.95 0.4851 3.0 1802.2 -185.5 2268.0  1.95 0.4354 15.0 1451.0 -178.5 1811.0 
2.00 0.5874 -20.5 1856.6 -210.5 2334.5  2.00 0.5247 -7.0 1487.0 -201.5 1857.5 
N=619  N=470 
 
 
 
                                                        
1  Original samples include duplicated records in both treatment cases and the control cases.  Duplicates  and 
outliers are removed in the corrected samples. 
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Rosenbaum Bounds - Initial Matched Pairs – Original and corrected samples 
 
Both Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grants  Both Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grants 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin      tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0000 696.8 696.8 445.5 968.8  1.00 0.0000 718.0 718.0 478.0 981.0
1.05 0.0000 636.5 758.0 389.5 1041.0  1.05 0.0000 668.0 772.0 430.0 1041.5
1.10 0.0000 578.0 819.5 333.0 1113.5  1.10 0.0000 619.0 821.8 384.0 1102.5
1.15 0.0000 526.0 881.0 283.0 1185.1  1.15 0.0000 572.5 873.0 340.0 1165.8
1.20 0.0001 472.5 938.5 235.5 1255.5  1.20 0.0000 531.5 920.5 299.0 1225.5
1.25 0.0003 425.0 997.0 185.5 1322.5  1.25 0.0000 489.5 967.0 262.5 1282.5
1.30 0.0009 380.0 1053.0 141.0 1387.5  1.30 0.0001 449.5 1015.1 225.4 1339.5
1.35 0.0029 334.5 1111.5 98.6 1452.5  1.35 0.0002 415.0 1061.5 189.0 1395.5
1.40 0.0078 294.5 1168.0 56.0 1515.2  1.40 0.0006 379.0 1109.0 155.0 1451.5
1.45 0.0181 255.5 1225.5 16.5 1584.0  1.45 0.0016 345.0 1159.3 120.5 1505.7
1.50 0.0374 215.5 1279.5 -22.6 1649.5  1.50 0.0036 312.6 1205.0 88.0 1562.5
1.55 0.0695 178.5 1333.5 -60.5 1708.3  1.55 0.0076 283.0 1249.5 55.0 1615.0
1.60 0.1176 143.1 1384.5 -99.5 1772.5  1.60 0.0149 255.0 1293.5 25.0 1668.0
1.65 0.1830 109.5 1434.5 -136.5 1833.0  1.65 0.0268 227.5 1337.0 -3.5 1719.8
1.70 0.2645 77.0 1486.5 -173.0 1901.5  1.70 0.0451 198.3 1379.6 -33.0 1771.6
1.75 0.3582 42.0 1537.0 -210.5 1961.0  1.75 0.0714 172.0 1419.5 -60.0 1822.0
1.80 0.4584 12.2 1591.4 -248.0 2020.0  1.80 0.1068 146.0 1462.5 -89.5 1876.5
1.85 0.5585 -17.5 1641.5 -284.0 2079.5  1.85 0.1520 120.5 1505.5 -116.5 1929.5
1.90 0.6525 -48.0 1689.0 -321.0 2142.8  1.90 0.2066 96.0 1548.3 -142.5 1978.5
1.95 0.7359 -79.5 1736.5 -354.5 2204.0  1.95 0.2695 72.5 1588.5 -167.5 2027.8
2.00 0.8061 -108.0 1786.9 -390.0 2261.5  2.00 0.3389 47.0 1629.5 -195.5 2081.0
N=491  N=376 
             
Financial Schemes: Entire Dataset  Financial Schemes: Entire Dataset 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin      tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0000 644.0 644.0 505.5 791.8  1.00 0.0000 584.5 584.5 455.5 722.5
1.05 0.0000 585.1 703.5 451.0 856.0  1.05 0.0000 538.0 633.5 411.5 774.5
1.10 0.0000 532.4 761.5 401.0 918.5  1.10 0.0000 493.0 681.0 368.5 825.0
1.15 0.0000 482.0 819.0 353.5 980.5  1.15 0.0000 451.5 727.5 328.0 874.0
1.20 0.0000 435.5 875.0 308.5 1041.0  1.20 0.0000 413.0 772.5 290.1 923.0
1.25 0.0000 392.0 930.0 265.5 1100.0  1.25 0.0000 376.0 816.2 254.5 970.5
1.30 0.0000 350.5 984.5 225.0 1159.1  1.30 0.0000 340.5 859.5 219.5 1017.0
1.35 0.0000 310.5 1037.5 186.0 1217.5  1.35 0.0000 306.6 902.0 186.5 1063.0
1.40 0.0000 273.0 1090.0 148.5 1274.5  1.40 0.0000 275.0 943.0 154.5 1108.5
1.45 0.0001 237.0 1141.5 113.0 1331.5  1.45 0.0000 245.0 983.5 123.5 1154.7
1.50 0.0007 202.0 1193.0 78.0 1387.5  1.50 0.0003 214.5 1024.0 93.5 1198.7
1.55 0.0039 169.0 1243.3 45.0 1442.8  1.55 0.0014 186.5 1063.2 65.0 1242.0
1.60 0.0156 137.0 1292.5 12.5 1498.3  1.60 0.0054 159.0 1102.0 37.0 1285.0
1.65 0.0477 106.0 1343.0 -19.5 1552.5  1.65 0.0170 132.0 1141.5 10.2 1329.0
1.70 0.1158 75.5 1391.0 -50.5 1608.5  1.70 0.0438 106.5 1180.0 -16.0 1371.0
1.75 0.2300 47.0 1439.5 -80.5 1662.5  1.75 0.0954 81.0 1217.5 -42.0 1411.5
1.80 0.3843 18.5 1487.5 -109.0 1716.1  1.80 0.1790 57.1 1254.0 -67.0 1453.5
1.85 0.5549 -9.0 1535.0 -138.0 1771.1  1.85 0.2940 33.0 1290.5 -92.0 1493.6
1.90 0.7119 -36.5 1582.8 -166.5 1824.5  1.90 0.4309 11.0 1328.0 -115.5 1534.0
1.95 0.8337 -62.5 1630.5 -194.0 1878.5  1.95 0.5730 -11.5 1363.9 -139.0 1574.5
2.00 0.9144 -88.5 1676.5 -221.0 1932.0  2.00 0.7030 -34.0 1398.0 -161.5 1615.0
N=1453  N=1125 
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Rosenbaum Bounds - Initial Matched Pairs – Original and corrected samples 
 
The FRAM Program  The RFAM Program 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical 
 Hodges-Lehmnann point esti-
mate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin    tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0072 221.5 221.5 43.0 396.0  1.00 0.0104 203.0 203.0 30.5 376.5 
1.05 0.0223 179.5 261.5 5.0 433.5  1.05 0.0290 164.5 240.5 -5.0 412.5 
1.10 0.0556 142.0 299.0 -33.0 471.0  1.10 0.0669 130.0 277.0 -40.0 447.0 
1.15 0.1159 106.5 334.0 -68.5 508.0  1.15 0.1312 95.5 311.0 -73.0 479.5 
1.20 0.2071 71.0 367.0 -104.0 543.5  1.20 0.2240 64.0 341.0 -107.0 512.5 
1.25 0.3253 40.0 399.0 -140.0 579.5  1.25 0.3402 35.0 371.5 -140.0 544.5 
1.30 0.4587 9.5 428.5 -171.5 615.0  1.30 0.4685 7.5 400.0 -169.0 575.5 
1.35 0.5918 -20.5 458.5 -205.0 650.0  1.35 0.5954 -21.0 427.0 -201.5 608.0 
1.40 0.7109 -49.0 488.5 -237.0 681.0  1.40 0.7089 -46.5 453.0 -229.5 638.5 
1.45 0.8075 -77.0 516.0 -267.5 712.5  1.45 0.8019 -72.5 479.3 -259.0 667.0 
1.50 0.8792 -105.0 544.5 -299.0 743.0  1.50 0.8722 -99.0 505.0 -287.5 693.0 
N=430  N=391 
             
The Network Program  The Network Program 
Rosenbaum Bounds - Original Sample  Rosenbaum Bounds - Corrected Sample 
Г p-critical  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Г p-critical 
 Hodges-Lehmnann point esti-
mate 
    tmax tmin CImax CImin      tmax tmin CImax CImin 
1.00 0.0000 903.7 903.7 567.3 1260.5  1.00 0.0000 671.5 671.5 362.0 1004.3 
1.05 0.0000 756.1 1053.6 429.5 1421.1  1.05 0.0002 544.1 803.5 240.0 1144.5 
1.10 0.0001 621.0 1200.5 300.0 1580.0  1.10 0.0026 426.0 932.0 126.0 1281.5 
1.15 0.0010 494.3 1344.5 178.0 1736.0  1.15 0.0188 313.5 1057.5 17.5 1417.3 
1.20 0.0090 376.0 1487.3 64.0 1890.0  1.20 0.0818 209.5 1181.2 -85.0 1551.1 
1.25 0.0474 263.5 1626.0 -45.0 2040.4  1.25 0.2309 110.3 1300.7 -182.8 1682.5 
1.30 0.1579 157.5 1764.5 -150.9 2189.5  1.30 0.4582 15.5 1420.0 -278.0 1812.0 
1.35 0.3590 57.0 1900.0 -251.5 2338.0  1.35 0.6922 -75.0 1537.3 -369.4 1936.8 
1.40 0.6016 -39.9 2032.8 -350.6 2484.5  1.40 0.8616 -161.5 1652.4 -459.2 2061.5 
1.45 0.8035 -133.5 2164.0 -446.3 2630.0  1.45 0.9508 -244.5 1766.5 -547.0 2183.0 
1.50 0.9238 -223.0 2295.6 -541.5 2773.0  1.50 0.9861 -326.5 1878.0 -632.1 2306.0 
N=1482  N=1405 
 
 
 
 
Over the next pages we show the development of the Rosenbaum Bounds for the 
Financial Schemes for matched pairs over time.  The changes in the number of cases 
and Rosenbaum Bounds reflect the effects of attrition.  This development is shown 
for the entire Financial Schemes dataset only. A complete detailed overview would 
require 17*5* = 170 different tables. 
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Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 244.5 244.5 146.0 347.5 1.00 0.0000 275.0 275.0 144.5 410.5
1.05 0.0000 217.0 272.0 118.5 378.0 1.05 0.0002 239.0 310.5 108.5 449.5
1.10 0.0001 191.0 299.0 93.5 406.5 1.10 0.0009 204.5 346.0 75.0 487.5
1.15 0.0004 166.0 325.0 69.5 435.0 1.15 0.0043 172.5 380.0 44.0 524.5
1.20 0.0019 143.0 350.5 46.5 464.0 1.20 0.0152 142.5 413.5 13.5 561.5
1.25 0.0071 120.5 376.0 24.5 491.0 1.25 0.0423 112.5 445.0 -15.5 598.0
1.30 0.0214 99.5 399.5 3.5 518.0 1.30 0.0965 84.5 477.0 -44.5 633.5
1.35 0.0530 79.5 423.5 -16.5 545.0 1.35 0.1853 58.5 508.0 -72.0 668.5
1.40 0.1106 60.5 447.0 -37.0 569.5 1.40 0.3073 33.0 538.0 -98.5 702.5
1.45 0.1995 41.5 470.0 -56.5 594.5 1.45 0.4499 8.5 568.5 -124.5 737.5
1.50 0.3166 23.5 492.5 -74.5 619.5 1.50 0.5944 -15.7 598.0 -148.0 773.0
1.55 0.4511 6.5 514.5 -93.0 643.0 1.55 0.7230 -39.0 627.0 -173.0 806.5
1.60 0.5871 -10.5 537.0 -111.0 667.0 1.60 0.8247 -61.5 655.5 -196.5 840.0
1.65 0.7098 -27.5 557.0 -128.0 691.0 1.65 0.8971 -83.5 683.0 -219.0 873.0
1.70 0.8093 -43.5 577.5 -145.5 714.5 1.70 0.9438 -105.0 711.5 -242.0 906.0
1.75 0.8828 -58.5 597.5 -162.5 737.0 1.75 0.9713 -126.0 740.0 -264.0 939.0
1.80 0.9324 -73.0 617.5 -178.5 761.5 1.80 0.9863 -145.5 768.0 -285.0 970.0
1.85 0.9633 -88.0 637.5 -194.5 783.5 1.85 0.9938 -165.5 796.0 -306.0 1002.5
1.90 0.9812 -103.0 656.5 -210.5 806.5 1.90 0.9974 -184.5 823.5 -327.0 1034.0
1.95 0.9909 -117.5 676.0 -226.0 828.0 1.95 0.9989 -203.5 849.0 -347.0 1065.0
2.00 0.9958 -131.0 695.5 -241.5 850.0 2.00 0.9996 -221.5 876.0 -367.0 1097.0
Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 448.0 448.0 286.0 626.0 1.00 0.0000 676.5 676.5 475.0 902.0
1.05 0.0000 405.5 491.5 243.0 675.5 1.05 0.0000 622.0 733.0 425.5 965.0
1.10 0.0000 365.5 535.5 202.5 723.5 1.10 0.0000 572.0 787.0 377.5 1026.0
1.15 0.0000 326.5 580.5 165.5 771.0 1.15 0.0000 525.5 841.0 333.0 1086.0
1.20 0.0002 289.0 623.0 130.0 819.5 1.20 0.0000 481.5 893.5 290.0 1145.5
1.25 0.0009 254.0 663.5 94.5 865.5 1.25 0.0000 441.0 945.5 249.0 1204.5
1.30 0.0034 219.0 703.5 61.5 914.0 1.30 0.0000 399.5 996.5 211.0 1262.0
1.35 0.0101 188.0 741.0 30.0 961.0 1.35 0.0001 362.0 1047.0 173.5 1318.5
1.40 0.0258 158.0 781.5 -1.0 1008.0 1.40 0.0004 327.0 1094.5 139.0 1375.5
1.45 0.0563 129.0 820.5 -30.5 1053.0 1.45 0.0012 291.5 1143.0 104.5 1432.5
1.50 0.1076 99.5 858.0 -60.0 1098.0 1.50 0.0035 259.0 1190.0 71.5 1487.0
1.55 0.1832 73.0 897.5 -87.5 1143.5 1.55 0.0089 226.5 1237.0 39.5 1542.5
1.60 0.2815 47.5 935.5 -114.5 1187.0 1.60 0.0198 197.5 1284.0 9.5 1596.5
1.65 0.3960 21.5 973.0 -140.5 1232.0 1.65 0.0398 167.0 1329.5 -19.5 1648.5
1.70 0.5166 -3.5 1012.0 -165.5 1274.0 1.70 0.0725 139.0 1375.0 -48.5 1700.5
1.75 0.6324 -27.0 1047.5 -191.0 1316.0 1.75 0.1208 111.0 1420.5 -76.0 1751.0
1.80 0.7345 -50.5 1083.5 -216.0 1356.0 1.80 0.1859 85.0 1464.5 -102.5 1801.5
1.85 0.8178 -73.0 1120.5 -240.0 1395.5 1.85 0.2666 59.0 1509.0 -130.5 1849.0
1.90 0.8810 -95.5 1155.5 -263.5 1435.5 1.90 0.3593 34.5 1553.0 -155.5 1899.0
1.95 0.9259 -117.0 1190.0 -285.5 1475.0 1.95 0.4584 10.0 1595.5 -180.0 1944.5
2.00 0.9560 -137.0 1227.0 -307.0 1512.5 2.00 0.5576 -13.5 1636.5 -205.0 1991.0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=597 Matched Pairs N=579 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -1992- Sample Rosenbaum Bounds -1993- Sample
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -1991- Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=640 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -1990- Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=654 Matched Pairs
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Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 1001.0 1001.0 755.0 1263.0 1.00 0.0000 905.0 905.0 637.0 1193.0
1.05 0.0000 936.3 1066.5 696.5 1336.5 1.05 0.0000 836.5 977.5 572.0 1270.5
1.10 0.0000 875.0 1131.8 640.5 1409.0 1.10 0.0000 770.0 1046.0 511.0 1345.5
1.15 0.0000 817.0 1193.0 585.5 1483.0 1.15 0.0000 707.5 1114.0 451.5 1420.0
1.20 0.0000 763.5 1253.0 536.5 1552.5 1.20 0.0000 649.5 1179.5 395.5 1495.0
1.25 0.0000 715.5 1314.0 487.0 1618.5 1.25 0.0000 595.0 1242.5 342.0 1569.0
1.30 0.0000 668.5 1373.0 440.0 1685.5 1.30 0.0000 543.0 1305.0 291.5 1642.5
1.35 0.0000 623.0 1433.0 397.0 1753.0 1.35 0.0000 495.0 1367.5 245.0 1714.0
1.40 0.0000 579.0 1492.5 352.5 1815.5 1.40 0.0002 447.0 1426.5 199.0 1785.5
1.45 0.0000 540.0 1548.5 311.5 1879.0 1.45 0.0007 401.5 1487.0 156.0 1856.5
1.50 0.0000 499.5 1602.0 271.0 1944.5 1.50 0.0021 358.0 1546.0 116.0 1927.5
1.55 0.0000 460.5 1655.0 234.5 2003.0 1.55 0.0054 317.0 1607.0 73.0 1995.5
1.60 0.0002 425.5 1710.5 196.5 2061.5 1.60 0.0126 276.5 1665.0 34.5 2061.0
1.65 0.0005 388.5 1763.0 161.0 2121.0 1.65 0.0262 239.5 1722.5 -2.5 2126.5
1.70 0.0013 354.0 1814.0 127.5 2180.5 1.70 0.0496 202.0 1780.0 -38.5 2191.0
1.75 0.0032 320.0 1864.0 94.0 2239.5 1.75 0.0857 168.5 1836.0 -76.0 2253.5
1.80 0.0071 288.0 1916.0 59.5 2298.0 1.80 0.1369 135.5 1892.5 -112.5 2319.0
1.85 0.0143 258.5 1965.0 29.0 2356.0 1.85 0.2036 102.0 1948.0 -146.5 2379.5
1.90 0.0265 228.5 2012.0 -3.5 2415.5 1.90 0.2842 69.0 2003.0 -179.5 2439.5
1.95 0.0459 198.5 2058.0 -34.5 2475.0 1.95 0.3749 38.5 2053.0 -212.5 2499.0
2.00 0.0742 170.5 2106.0 -64.5 2527.0 2.00 0.4706 9.2 2105.0 -245.5 2557.5
Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 717.0 717.0 423.0 1026.5 1.00 0.0000 736.3 736.3 379.0 1106.5
1.05 0.0000 641.5 793.0 351.5 1109.5 1.05 0.0002 647.5 827.0 291.0 1209.0
1.10 0.0000 570.0 866.5 283.0 1189.5 1.10 0.0009 561.0 913.0 204.0 1306.0
1.15 0.0003 501.0 939.5 216.5 1271.5 1.15 0.0036 476.0 995.5 128.5 1399.0
1.20 0.0012 436.5 1013.0 154.5 1348.5 1.20 0.0116 402.5 1077.0 56.5 1495.0
1.25 0.0043 376.0 1081.0 96.0 1423.5 1.25 0.0310 329.5 1162.5 -17.0 1582.0
1.30 0.0128 318.5 1147.5 39.5 1498.0 1.30 0.0695 260.5 1243.5 -89.0 1670.0
1.35 0.0320 263.0 1214.0 -15.5 1574.0 1.35 0.1339 191.5 1319.5 -156.5 1761.0
1.40 0.0685 211.0 1279.5 -69.5 1648.5 1.40 0.2264 130.5 1396.3 -220.5 1845.5
1.45 0.1281 160.5 1341.0 -123.5 1717.5 1.45 0.3424 72.0 1476.5 -287.5 1930.0
1.50 0.2132 113.0 1403.5 -175.5 1787.5 1.50 0.4709 13.0 1547.0 -351.5 2018.5
1.55 0.3202 67.0 1462.5 -221.5 1855.5 1.55 0.5983 -44.5 1615.5 -409.5 2096.0
1.60 0.4407 21.0 1522.5 -269.0 1924.5 1.60 0.7126 -101.5 1687.5 -468.0 2172.5
1.65 0.5631 -22.0 1583.0 -314.0 1993.0 1.65 0.8060 -155.5 1759.5 -524.0 2258.0
1.70 0.6764 -66.5 1643.0 -360.0 2060.0 1.70 0.8763 -206.0 1829.0 -586.5 2338.5
1.75 0.7728 -108.5 1698.5 -405.0 2126.0 1.75 0.9254 -258.5 1893.5 -645.5 2416.5
1.80 0.8486 -150.5 1753.0 -449.5 2191.5 1.80 0.9572 -311.0 1963.0 -698.5 2498.0
1.85 0.9041 -191.5 1810.0 -491.5 2256.5 1.85 0.9767 -361.0 2031.0 -754.5 2581.5
1.90 0.9421 -227.0 1864.5 -535.5 2320.5 1.90 0.9879 -406.5 2093.0 -809.0 2656.5
1.95 0.9666 -265.5 1918.5 -576.5 2383.5 1.95 0.9940 -454.0 2151.5 -862.0 2731.0
2.00 0.9816 -301.0 1973.0 -617.5 2442.5 2.00 0.9971 -497.5 2215.5 -918.0 2808.0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=566 Matched Pairs N=536 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -1996- Sample Rosenbaum Bounds -1997- Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=573 Matched Pairs N=563 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -1994- Sample Rosenbaum Bounds -1995- Sample
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Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 1139.0 1139.0 707.0 1607.5 1.00 0.0000 1188.5 1188.5 698.5 1714.0
1.05 0.0000 1028.5 1250.0 602.0 1728.5 1.05 0.0000 1073.5 1306.5 583.0 1847.5
1.10 0.0000 927.0 1357.5 505.5 1847.0 1.10 0.0000 967.5 1422.5 475.0 1984.5
1.15 0.0001 833.5 1458.0 414.0 1970.5 1.15 0.0003 861.5 1538.5 373.0 2129.0
1.20 0.0002 747.3 1561.0 322.0 2089.0 1.20 0.0010 760.5 1648.5 276.0 2271.0
1.25 0.0010 660.5 1655.0 237.5 2198.5 1.25 0.0034 662.5 1753.0 181.0 2404.5
1.30 0.0033 579.0 1756.5 158.5 2313.0 1.30 0.0095 571.0 1863.0 90.0 2539.0
1.35 0.0091 501.5 1851.5 82.0 2426.0 1.35 0.0230 485.0 1973.5 8.5 2676.0
1.40 0.0217 426.5 1953.0 13.0 2533.0 1.40 0.0483 402.0 2087.5 -76.5 2812.0
1.45 0.0456 355.0 2048.0 -59.5 2636.5 1.45 0.0902 323.0 2198.5 -152.5 2937.0
1.50 0.0854 284.5 2137.5 -126.0 2744.0 1.50 0.1519 248.0 2308.5 -225.0 3061.0
1.55 0.1443 219.5 2226.5 -193.5 2848.5 1.55 0.2334 173.5 2415.5 -294.5 3184.0
1.60 0.2228 155.5 2317.0 -260.0 2950.0 1.60 0.3311 101.0 2521.5 -359.5 3311.0
1.65 0.3179 95.0 2407.5 -324.5 3044.0 1.65 0.4383 36.5 2632.5 -429.5 3434.0
1.70 0.4233 38.0 2495.5 -383.5 3143.0 1.70 0.5470 -30.5 2736.5 -496.5 3561.0
1.75 0.5313 -18.0 2574.5 -440.0 3244.5 1.75 0.6493 -94.0 2841.0 -558.5 3677.0
1.80 0.6342 -72.5 2656.0 -498.5 3345.5 1.80 0.7393 -154.0 2939.0 -624.5 3810.5
1.85 0.7259 -125.0 2742.0 -555.0 3441.5 1.85 0.8139 -210.0 3037.0 -686.0 3938.0
1.90 0.8026 -178.5 2822.5 -609.0 3537.5 1.90 0.8722 -262.5 3134.0 -744.0 4065.0
1.95 0.8632 -232.0 2901.5 -664.0 3628.0 1.95 0.9155 -318.0 3227.5 -802.5 4195.5
2.00 0.9088 -282.8 2980.5 -721.5 3729.0 2.00 0.9460 -367.5 3327.3 -860.0 4317.0
Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0000 1148.5 1148.5 599.0 1767.5 1.00 0.0008 839.5 839.5 322.5 1413.0
1.05 0.0001 1013.5 1286.5 475.5 1927.0 1.05 0.0032 720.0 964.0 207.0 1545.0
1.10 0.0004 898.5 1420.5 363.5 2083.5 1.10 0.0105 608.5 1083.5 93.5 1679.0
1.15 0.0017 787.5 1545.5 259.5 2233.0 1.15 0.0279 506.0 1198.5 -12.5 1816.5
1.20 0.0057 674.5 1671.5 154.5 2384.0 1.20 0.0624 407.5 1310.5 -111.5 1958.0
1.25 0.0153 574.0 1805.5 59.0 2543.5 1.25 0.1204 313.5 1422.5 -206.0 2087.5
1.30 0.0355 474.0 1929.5 -39.0 2695.0 1.30 0.2044 221.5 1528.0 -296.5 2216.5
1.35 0.0716 385.5 2051.0 -123.0 2834.0 1.35 0.3112 133.5 1636.0 -382.0 2343.5
1.40 0.1282 301.5 2170.0 -209.5 2979.0 1.40 0.4321 46.5 1741.5 -461.0 2467.5
1.45 0.2067 215.0 2298.0 -290.5 3133.5 1.45 0.5553 -34.5 1851.5 -538.0 2598.0
1.50 0.3044 136.0 2414.5 -370.0 3268.0 1.50 0.6695 -112.0 1959.0 -614.5 2726.0
1.55 0.4145 62.5 2539.5 -449.0 3405.0 1.55 0.7668 -189.0 2057.5 -684.0 2858.0
1.60 0.5280 -15.5 2652.5 -523.5 3542.5 1.60 0.8435 -259.5 2160.0 -756.5 2980.5
1.65 0.6361 -84.5 2769.0 -598.0 3682.5 1.65 0.9000 -326.5 2263.5 -831.5 3110.0
1.70 0.7315 -150.5 2881.5 -670.0 3826.5 1.70 0.9390 -391.5 2361.5 -904.0 3234.5
1.75 0.8103 -218.0 2994.0 -734.0 3964.5 1.75 0.9643 -452.3 2456.3 -967.5 3344.5
1.80 0.8715 -281.5 3115.0 -802.5 4096.0 1.80 0.9800 -513.5 2556.0 -1031.5 3467.5
1.85 0.9164 -344.5 3215.0 -870.0 4238.0 1.85 0.9892 -571.5 2655.5 -1105.5 3589.5
1.90 0.9477 -405.5 3325.5 -930.5 4379.5 1.90 0.9944 -631.5 2756.5 -1173.5 3698.0
1.95 0.9684 -464.5 3434.5 -1000.5 4511.0 1.95 0.9972 -682.5 2855.0 -1229.5 3818.5
2.00 0.9816 -522.0 3539.5 -1062.5 4643.5 2.00 0.9986 -736.0 2951.5 -1296.0 3930.5
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=457 Matched Pairs N=429 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds -2000 - Sample Rosenbaum Bounds - 2001- Sample
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds - 1998 - Sample Rosenbaum Bounds - 1999 - Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=506 Matched Pairs N=477 Matched Pairs
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Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0268 591.0 591.0 -7.5 1180.5 1.00 0.0325 637.5 637.5 -38.5 1314.5
1.05 0.0656 461.0 717.0 -123.0 1311.5 1.05 0.0755 496.5 778.5 -180.0 1462.5
1.10 0.1337 338.0 835.5 -244.0 1444.5 1.10 0.1475 362.0 912.5 -310.5 1605.0
1.15 0.2336 219.5 954.0 -359.0 1572.5 1.15 0.2496 233.0 1046.5 -437.5 1747.5
1.20 0.3588 110.0 1059.5 -465.0 1709.5 1.20 0.3742 113.0 1161.5 -559.5 1890.0
1.25 0.4954 2.5 1169.0 -579.0 1847.0 1.25 0.5079 -7.0 1279.5 -676.0 2025.5
1.30 0.6274 -85.5 1273.5 -683.5 1974.0 1.30 0.6356 -116.5 1399.0 -785.0 2160.0
1.35 0.7418 -181.0 1373.5 -791.5 2097.5 1.35 0.7459 -224.5 1512.0 -888.0 2292.5
1.40 0.8318 -273.0 1477.0 -899.0 2211.0 1.40 0.8328 -326.0 1618.5 -995.5 2415.0
1.45 0.8967 -362.0 1577.0 -1004.5 2329.0 1.45 0.8959 -423.0 1729.5 -1099.5 2543.0
1.50 0.9400 -445.5 1684.5 -1111.0 2433.0 1.50 0.9385 -518.5 1836.8 -1206.5 2660.0
1.55 0.9669 -535.0 1790.0 -1210.0 2541.5 1.55 0.9654 -609.5 1945.5 -1316.0 2771.5
1.60 0.9826 -616.0 1894.0 -1306.5 2657.0 1.60 0.9814 -694.0 2048.5 -1424.0 2880.0
1.65 0.9913 -696.5 1989.0 -1402.0 2766.0 1.65 0.9904 -780.5 2153.0 -1529.0 2988.5
1.70 0.9958 -778.5 2084.5 -1501.0 2880.5 1.70 0.9953 -861.5 2256.0 -1629.5 3092.5
1.75 0.9981 -862.5 2173.0 -1596.5 2987.5 1.75 0.9977 -942.5 2350.5 -1728.0 3205.0
1.80 0.9991 -945.5 2262.5 -1690.5 3092.0 1.80 0.9990 -1018.5 2445.0 -1821.0 3312.5
1.85 0.9996 -1025.0 2349.5 -1777.0 3202.0 1.85 0.9995 -1098.0 2540.5 -1911.5 3427.0
1.90 0.9998 -1105.0 2428.0 -1880.0 3299.0 1.90 0.9998 -1181.5 2630.5 -1994.5 3537.5
1.95 0.9999 -1181.0 2511.0 -1978.0 3389.5 1.95 0.9999 -1263.0 2714.0 -2078.5 3641.0
2.00 1.0000 -1256.5 2591.0 -2073.5 3474.0 2.00 1.0000 -1343.0 2794.8 -2160.0 3742.0
Г p-critical Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0147 733.5 733.5 69.5 1488.0 1.00 0.0004 1226.0 1226.0 505.5 2024.5
1.05 0.0375 597.0 874.5 -57.5 1660.5 1.05 0.0016 1077.5 1375.5 362.0 2190.0
1.10 0.0802 465.0 1021.5 -181.5 1817.5 1.10 0.0050 934.0 1517.0 236.0 2348.5
1.15 0.1483 344.5 1162.5 -304.0 1969.5 1.15 0.0128 804.0 1663.0 104.0 2499.5
1.20 0.2420 229.5 1290.5 -423.0 2117.5 1.20 0.0287 684.0 1797.3 -20.0 2648.5
1.25 0.3555 118.0 1431.5 -549.5 2269.5 1.25 0.0565 574.0 1931.0 -138.5 2801.0
1.30 0.4785 17.0 1556.5 -669.0 2404.0 1.30 0.1000 474.0 2067.0 -254.0 2960.0
1.35 0.5989 -76.5 1691.5 -796.5 2535.0 1.35 0.1610 361.0 2190.0 -362.5 3118.5
1.40 0.7068 -174.0 1811.0 -920.5 2661.0 1.40 0.2388 262.5 2308.5 -469.5 3270.5
1.45 0.7960 -267.5 1924.5 -1046.5 2788.5 1.45 0.3299 166.0 2425.0 -574.0 3419.5
1.50 0.8647 -359.5 2045.5 -1166.5 2916.5 1.50 0.4289 67.8 2542.5 -675.5 3552.0
1.55 0.9142 -452.0 2154.0 -1286.0 3045.5 1.55 0.5291 -23.5 2655.5 -778.0 3702.5
1.60 0.9478 -549.5 2270.0 -1412.5 3179.5 1.60 0.6245 -116.5 2767.5 -874.5 3851.5
1.65 0.9695 -641.0 2375.5 -1524.5 3289.0 1.65 0.7103 -200.0 2891.0 -979.5 4005.5
1.70 0.9828 -733.5 2470.5 -1643.5 3426.0 1.70 0.7835 -284.5 3006.0 -1075.0 4147.5
1.75 0.9907 -825.0 2574.5 -1763.5 3555.5 1.75 0.8432 -366.5 3125.8 -1164.5 4275.0
1.80 0.9951 -923.5 2663.5 -1873.5 3681.0 1.80 0.8897 -446.0 3239.5 -1256.5 4389.0
1.85 0.9975 -1017.0 2760.0 -1980.0 3823.5 1.85 0.9246 -525.5 3347.5 -1347.5 4525.0
1.90 0.9988 -1107.0 2853.0 -2097.5 3941.0 1.90 0.9498 -600.5 3458.5 -1443.0 4655.0
1.95 0.9994 -1195.5 2956.0 -2205.0 4076.0 1.95 0.9674 -676.0 3552.5 -1530.5 4783.5
2.00 0.9997 -1287.0 3047.0 -2309.0 4205.5 2.00 0.9793 -754.8 3665.3 -1625.0 4914.0
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=353 Matched Pairs N=330 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds - 2004 - Sample Rosenbaum Bounds - 2005 - Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate  Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=397 Matched Pairs N=375 Matched Pairs
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds - 2002 - Sample Rosenbaum Bounds - 2003 - Sample
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Г p-critical
t max t min CI max CI min
1.00 0.0010 1290.8 1290.8 461.5 2187.5
1.05 0.0033 1133.0 1447.5 314.0 2371.0
1.10 0.0088 991.5 1602.0 171.5 2550.0
1.15 0.0202 851.5 1747.5 37.0 2731.0
1.20 0.0410 721.5 1898.0 -96.0 2915.5
1.25 0.0746 599.5 2044.0 -210.5 3099.0
1.30 0.1235 472.5 2171.5 -318.5 3280.5
1.35 0.1883 361.0 2301.5 -422.5 3465.0
1.40 0.2673 256.0 2449.0 -530.0 3649.0
1.45 0.3568 149.0 2580.0 -635.0 3840.5
1.50 0.4515 49.0 2713.0 -736.5 4030.5
1.55 0.5459 -50.0 2854.5 -835.5 4216.5
1.60 0.6349 -138.5 2987.0 -937.0 4398.0
1.65 0.7148 -223.0 3120.0 -1036.0 4574.0
1.70 0.7834 -303.5 3254.0 -1131.0 4770.0
1.75 0.8398 -378.0 3394.0 -1239.0 4941.5
1.80 0.8845 -461.5 3526.0 -1338.0 5114.0
1.85 0.9188 -536.0 3655.5 -1436.0 5286.5
1.90 0.9442 -609.0 3801.5 -1541.0 5450.0
1.95 0.9625 -684.0 3940.5 -1637.0 5611.0
2.00 0.9753 -754.3 4069.5 -1735.0 5777.0
All Kinds: Venture Capital & Investment Grant
Rosenbaum Bounds - 2004 - Sample
 Hodges-Lehmnann point estimate
N=291 Matched Pairs  
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Appendix B  
 
 
Panel data estimates – difference –in-differences 
 
Tab B1a Regional Venture Capital Loans – Treatment Period 1995 - 2006
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    742.01     
     (553.11)     
Period After Intervent. 782.29    793.80    -11.51 
 (164.13)    (163.36)     
Treatm x Intervent. 733.97 [ 278.93  1189.01] 754.52 [ 301.73  1207.32 ] -20.55 
 (232.11)    (231.02)     
Constant 3434.22    2813.08     
 (83.65)     (391.11)     
F 54.03         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     117.43     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         4.60 
p-value         0.100 
Number of obs       = 5442         
Number of groups =    422         
 
Tab B1b Regional Venture Capital Loans – Treatment Period 1991 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    220.66     
     (591.03)     
Period After Intervent. 432.11    450.23    -18.12 
 (211.77)    (210.70)     
Treatm x Intervent. 1125.64 [ 538.52  1712.77 ] 1135.40 [ 551.40  1719.41 ] -9.76 
 (299.49)    (297.97)     
Constant 3251.03    2830.62     
 (134.40)     (417.92)     
F 29.14         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     65.15     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         2.43 
p-value         0.296 
Number of obs       = 5442         
Number of groups =   422         
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Tab B2a Investment Grants – Treatment Period 1995 - 2006
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    1759.53     
     (1011.69)     
Period After Intervent. 1869.90    1926.95    -57.05 
 (416.99)    (414.77)     
Treatm x Intervent. 1615.50 [ 459.55  2771.46 ] 1620.98 [ 471.31  2770.64 ] -5.48 
 (589.72)    (586.57)     
Constant 6178.56    4610.28     
 (224.54)    (715.37)     
F 44.99         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     102.50     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         3.87 
p-value         0.144 
Number of obs       = 11912         
Number of groups =     856         
 
Tab B2b Investment Grants – Treatment Period 1991 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference
Treatment-Control -    582.51     
      (689.74)     
Period After Intervent. 1597.178    1608.96    -11.77 
 (211.15)    (210.71)     
Treatm x Interventi. 888.49 [303.14  1473.83 ] 898.59 [314.55   1482.62 ] -10.10 
 (298.61)    (297.98)     
Constant 3863.68    3497.59     
 (138.42)    (487.72)     
F 97.90         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     204.39     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         3.27 
p-value         0.1948 
Number of obs       = 11912         
Number of groups =     856         
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Tab B3a Both Investment Grants & Venture Capital Loans – Treatment Period 1995 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    1363.25     
     (528.15)     
Period After Intervent. 1737.38    1751.22    -13.84 
 (198.06)    (196.77)     
Treatm. x Intervent. 1814.99 [ 1265.97  2364.02 ] 1829.45 [ 1284.04   2374.87 ] -14.46 
 (280.09)    (278.28)     
Constant 4940.12    3957.46     
 (103.53)     (373.46)     
F 199.33         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     430.63     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         1.96 
p-value         0.375 
Number of obs       = 12414         
Number of groups =     920         
 
 
 
 
Tab B3b Both Investment Grants & Venture Capital Loans – Treatment Period 1991 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    351.88     
     (595.36)     
Period After Intervent. 1510.11    1508.98    1.13 
 (270.60)    (268.15)     
Treatm x Interventi. 2409.68 [ 1659.56  3159.80 ] 2414.80 [ 1671.54  3158.05 ] -5.12 
 (382.68)    (379.21)     
Constant 4169.13    3634.47     
 (174.00)    (420.98)     
F 120.49         
p-value 0.000         
Wald chi-square     265.88     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         0.01 
p-value         0.993 
Number of obs       = 12414         
Number of groups =     920         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 334 
 
 
 
Tab B4a The FRAM Program – Treatment Period 1997 - 2006
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    124.79     
     (258.74)     
Period After Intervent. 1673.33    1659.52    13.81 
 (90.72)    (90.43)     
Treatm. x Intervent. 358.71 [106.57  610.85 ] 369.82 [118.59  621.04 ] -11.11 
 (128.63)    (128.18)     
Constant 3636.69    3509.86     
 (44.11)    (182.93)     
F 418.39         
p-value 0.0000         
Wald chi-square     837.09     
p-value     0.0000     
Hausman chi-square         3.65 
p-value         0.1613 
Number of obs       = 10964         
Number of groups =     760         
 
 
Tab B4b The FRAM Program – Treatment Period 1992 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    -145.38     
     (288.70)     
Period After Intervent. 1626.95    1607.13    19.82 
 (120.07)    (119.88)     
Treatm x Interventi. 516.79 [183.64  849.92 ] 522.25 [189.73  854.77 ] -5.46 
 (169.95)    (169.66)     
Constant 2987.36    2940.14     
 (76.89)    (204.11)     
F 250.65         
p-value 0.0000          
Wald chi-square     495.61     
p-value     0.0000     
Hausman chi-square         12.35 
p-value         0.0021 
Number of obs       = 10964         
Number of groups =     760         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 335 
 
 
 
Tab B5a The Network Program – Treatment Period 1997 - 2006
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    2120.05     
     (712.85)     
Period After Intervent. 2166.02    2149.04    16.98 
 (176.82)    (176.37)     
Treatm. x Intervent. 3254.64 [2764.50  3744.77 ] 3241.60 [2752.73  3730.46 ] 13.04 
 (250.07)    (249.43)     
Constant 8415.87    7298.92     
 (81.97)     (504.06)     
F 544.92         
p-value 0.0000         
Wald chi-square     1106.03     
p-value     0.0000     
Hausman chi-square         7.44 
p-value         0.0243 
Number of obs       = 38058         
Number of groups =   2728         
 
 
Tab B5b The Network Program – Treatment Period 1993 - 2006 
 
 Fixed     GLS random     
Independent effect    effect     RE-FE 
variables estimates 95% Conf. Interval estimates 95% Conf. Interval difference 
Treatment-Control -    1505.77     
     (731.85)     
Period After Intervent. 2431.69    2414.05    17.64 
 (194.33)    (194.06)     
Treatm x Interventi. 2707.81 [2169.15  3246.47 ] 2695.87 [2157.96  3233.77 ] 11.94 
 (274.82)    (274.45)     
Constant 7380.38    6448.16     
 (116.58)    (517.50)     
F 428.03         
p-value 0.0000         
Wald chi-square     871.48     
p-value     0.000     
Hausman chi-square         11.52 
p-value         0.0031 
Number of obs       = 38058         
Number of groups =   2728         
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Appendix C   Size distributions for Costs of Financial Schemes  
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Figure C1 Regional Venture Capital Loans 
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Figure C2 Investment Grants 
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Figure C3 Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants Combined 
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Appendix D    
 
Table D1  Differences between Analyzed and Total Means – Mill. NOK 
 
 
Kind of Allocation Sample Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t (diff).)
Regional Venture Total 1990 354 0,6815 1,507 0,5240 0,8390 0,1298 0,89
Capital Loans Analyzed 1990 119 0,5517 0,921 0,3845 0,7189
Total 1991 238 0,7112 1,389 0,5338 0,8886 0,3747 2,37
Analyzed 1991 82 0,3365 0,583 0,2084 0,4646
Total 1992 228 1,2278 3,930 0,7149 1,7407 0,6864 1,17
Analyzed 1992 45 0,5414 0,710 0,3281 0,7547
Total 1993 95 0,9993 2,517 0,4866 1,5120 0,0533 0,08
Analyzed 1993 17 0,9460 2,045 -0,1054 1,9974
Total 1994 54 1,1483 2,793 0,3860 1,9106 0,7713 0,99
Analyzed 1994 13 0,3770 0,350 0,1655 0,5885
Investment Grants Total 1990 312 1,0567 8,534 0,1061 2,0073 0,7414 0,72
Analyzed 1990 69 0,3153 0,320 0,2384 0,3922
Total 1991 320 0,6267 1,188 0,4960 0,7574 0,2691 1,90
Analyzed 1991 72 0,3576 0,331 0,2798 0,4354
Total 1992 325 0,7648 1,607 0,5894 0,9402 0,2751 1,33
Analyzed 1992 63 0,4897 0,726 0,3069 0,6725
Total 1993 469 0,7341 2,021 0,5507 0,9175 0,3364 1,54
Analyzed 1993 86 0,3977 0,359 0,3207 0,4747
Total 1994 604 0,6613 1,139 0,5703 0,7523 0,0987 1,03
Analyzed 1994 178 0,5626 1,046 0,4079 0,7173
Both Categories Total 1990 359 0,8691 1,503 0,7131 1,0251 0,0507 0,32
The Loan Part Analyzed 1990 121 0,8184 1,605 0,5295 1,1073
Total 1991 328 0,8228 1,146 0,6983 0,9473 0,0837 0,73
Analyzed 1991 111 0,7391 0,693 0,6087 0,8695
Total 1992 269 0,9949 2,118 0,7406 1,2492 0,2566 0,96
Analyzed 1992 71 0,7383 1,442 0,3970 1,0796
Total 1993 186 0,7253 0,881 0,5979 0,8527 0,0961 0,61
Analyzed 1993 34 0,6292 0,581 0,4265 0,8319
Total 1994 112 1,1574 3,447 0,5120 1,8028 0,5185 0,90
Analyzed 1994 36 0,6389 0,643 0,4213 0,8565
Both Categories Total 1990 359 0,6385 1,042 0,5303 0,7467 0,1309 1,31
The Investment Part Analyzed 1990 121 0,5076 0,606 0,3985 0,6167
Total 1991 328 0,5980 0,999 0,4895 0,7065 0,0490 0,48
Analyzed 1991 111 0,5490 0,681 0,4209 0,6771
Total 1992 269 0,6392 1,034 0,5151 0,7633 0,1247 0,91
Analyzed 1992 71 0,5145 1,020 0,2731 0,7559
Total 1993 186 0,5256 0,627 0,4349 0,6163 0,1412 1,27
Analyzed 1993 34 0,3844 0,392 0,2476 0,5212
Total 1994 112 0,9506 3,043 0,3808 1,5204 0,2972 0,58
Analyzed 1994 36 0,6534 0,791 0,3858 0,9210
[95% Conf. 
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Table D2   Statistics for Analyzed Sample – Financial Schemes – Mill. NOK 
 
 
Year Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean St.dev Sum
1990 0,5517 119 0,921 65,65 0,3153 69 0,320 21,75 0,8184 121 1,605 99,03 0,5076 0,606 212,69
1991 0,3365 82 0,583 27,59 0,3576 72 0,331 25,75 0,7391 111 0,693 82,04 0,5490 0,681 61,42
1992 0,5414 45 0,710 24,36 0,4897 63 0,726 30,85 0,7383 71 1,442 52,42 0,5145 1,020 60,94
1993 0,9460 17 2,045 16,08 0,3977 86 0,359 34,20 0,6292 34 0,581 21,39 0,3844 0,392 36,53
1994 0,3770 13 0,350 4,90 0,5626 178 1,046 100,14 0,6389 36 0,643 23,00 0,6534 0,791 13,07
Sum 1013,8 138,6 212,7 277,9 384,6
N 1117 276 468 373
Venture Capital Loans Investment Grants Capital Loans Part Investment Grants Part
Both Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants
 
 
Table D3   Statistics for All Available data – Financial Schemes – Mill. NOK 
 
 
Year Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean N St.dev Sum Mean St.dev Sum
1990 0,6815 354 1,507 241,25 1,0567 312 8,534 329,70 0,8691 359 1,503 312,01 0,6385 1,042 229,24
1991 0,7112 238 1,389 169,26 0,6267 320 1,188 200,53 0,8228 328 1,146 269,87 0,5980 0,999 196,14
1992 1,2278 228 3,930 279,94 0,7648 325 1,607 248,55 0,9949 269 2,118 267,63 0,6392 1,034 171,95
1993 0,9993 95 2,517 94,93 0,7341 469 2,021 344,28 0,7253 186 0,881 134,91 0,5256 0,627 97,76
1994 1,1483 54 2,793 62,01 0,6613 604 1,139 399,42 1,1574 112 3,447 129,63 0,9506 3,043 106,46
Sum 4285,5 847,4 1522,5 1114,0 801,6
N 4253 969 2030 1254
Venture Capital Loans Investment Grants Capital Loans Part Investment Grants Part
Both Regional Venture Capital Loans and Investment Grants
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Table D4  Future values of initial endowments for Venture Capital Loans – Analyzed Allocations – Mill. NOK 
 
 
Ad- Cum-
Total justed ula- 
Alloca- Alloca-  tive
Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum
1990 65,7 79,4 119 119 79,4 79,4 79,4 79,4 79,4 79,4
1991 27,6 33,4 82 201 85,0 33,4 118,4 82,6 33,4 116,0 80,2 33,4 113,6
1992 24,4 29,5 45 246 90,9 35,7 29,5 156,1 85,9 34,7 29,5 150,1 81,0 33,7 29,5 144,2
1993 16,1 19,5 17 263 97,3 38,2 31,5 19,5 186,5 89,4 36,1 30,7 19,5 175,6 81,8 34,1 29,8 19,5 165,1
1994 4,9 5,9 13 276 104,1 40,9 33,7 20,8 5,9 205,5 92,9 37,6 31,9 20,2 5,9 188,5 82,7 34,4 30,1 19,7 5,9 172,7
1995   276 111,4 43,8 36,1 22,3 6,3 219,9 96,6 39,1 33,2 21,0 6,2 196,1 83,5 34,7 30,4 19,8 6,0 174,4
1996 276 119,2 46,8 38,6 23,8 6,8 235,3 100,5 40,6 34,5 21,9 6,4 203,9 84,3 35,1 30,7 20,0 6,0 176,2
1997 276 127,6 50,1 41,3 25,5 7,3 251,8 104,5 42,2 35,9 22,8 6,7 212,1 85,2 35,4 31,0 20,2 6,1 177,9
1998 276 136,5 53,6 44,2 27,3 7,8 269,4 108,7 43,9 37,3 23,7 6,9 220,5 86,0 35,8 31,3 20,4 6,2 179,7
1999 276 146,0 57,4 47,3 29,2 8,3 288,2 113,1 45,7 38,8 24,6 7,2 229,4 86,9 36,1 31,6 20,7 6,2 181,5
2000 276 156,3 61,4 50,6 31,2 8,9 308,4 117,6 47,5 40,3 25,6 7,5 238,5 87,7 36,5 31,9 20,9 6,3 183,3
2001 276 167,2 65,7 54,2 33,4 9,5 330,0 122,3 49,4 42,0 26,6 7,8 248,1 88,6 36,9 32,2 21,1 6,4 185,2
2002 276 178,9 70,3 58,0 35,8 10,2 353,1 127,2 51,4 43,6 27,7 8,1 258,0 89,5 37,2 32,6 21,3 6,4 187,0
2003 276 191,4 75,2 62,0 38,3 10,9 377,8 132,3 53,4 45,4 28,8 8,4 268,3 90,4 37,6 32,9 21,5 6,5 188,9
2004 276 204,8 80,5 66,4 41,0 11,7 404,3 137,6 55,6 47,2 30,0 8,8 279,1 91,3 38,0 33,2 21,7 6,5 190,8
2005 276 219,2 86,1 71,0 43,8 12,5 432,6 143,1 57,8 49,1 31,2 9,1 290,2 92,2 38,4 33,5 21,9 6,6 192,7
2006 276 234,5 92,1 76,0 46,9 13,4 462,9 148,8 60,1 51,0 32,4 9,5 301,8 93,1 38,8 33,9 22,1 6,7 194,6
Sum 138,6 167,7
Future values for different Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK starting poins - Mill. NOK starting poins - Mill. NOK
30 % loss over 10 years 30 % loss over 5 years
Discount rate 7% - 3%=4% Discount rate 7% - 6%=1%
 * Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
No Loss
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Table D5 Future values of initial endowments for Venture Capital Loans – All Allocations – Mill. NOK 
 
 
Ad- Cum-
Total justed ula- 
Alloca- Alloca-  tive
Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum
1990 241,2 291,9 354 354 291,9 291,9 291,9 291,9 291,9 291,9
1991 169,3 204,8 238 592 312,3 204,8 517,1 303,6 204,8 508,4 294,8 204,8 499,6
1992 279,9 338,7 228 820 334,2 219,1 338,7 892,1 315,7 213,0 338,7 867,5 297,8 206,9 338,7 843,4
1993 94,9 114,9 95 915 357,6 234,5 362,4 114,9 1069,4 328,4 221,5 352,3 114,9 1017,0 300,8 208,9 342,1 114,9 966,7
1994 62,0 75,0 54 969 382,6 250,9 387,8 122,9 75,0 1219,3 341,5 230,4 366,4 119,5 75,0 1132,7 303,8 211,0 345,5 116,0 75,0 1051,4
1995 969 409,4 268,5 415,0 131,5 80,3 1304,6 355,2 239,6 381,0 124,2 78,0 1178,0 306,8 213,1 349,0 117,2 75,8 1061,9
1996 969 438,1 287,2 444,0 140,7 85,9 1396,0 369,4 249,2 396,3 129,2 81,2 1225,2 309,9 215,3 352,5 118,3 76,5 1072,5
1997 969 468,7 307,4 475,1 150,6 91,9 1493,7 384,1 259,1 412,1 134,4 84,4 1274,2 313,0 217,4 356,0 119,5 77,3 1083,2
1998 969 501,6 328,9 508,3 161,1 98,4 1598,2 399,5 269,5 428,6 139,8 87,8 1325,1 316,1 219,6 359,6 120,7 78,1 1094,1
1999 969 536,7 351,9 543,9 172,4 105,2 1710,1 415,5 280,3 445,7 145,3 91,3 1378,1 319,3 221,8 363,2 121,9 78,9 1105,0
2000 969 574,2 376,5 582,0 184,4 112,6 1829,8 432,1 291,5 463,6 151,2 94,9 1433,3 322,5 224,0 366,8 123,2 79,6 1116,0
2001 969 614,4 402,9 622,7 197,4 120,5 1957,9 449,4 303,2 482,1 157,2 98,7 1490,6 325,7 226,2 370,5 124,4 80,4 1127,2
2002 969 657,4 431,1 666,3 211,2 128,9 2095,0 467,4 315,3 501,4 163,5 102,7 1550,2 328,9 228,5 374,2 125,6 81,2 1138,5
2003 969 703,5 461,3 713,0 226,0 137,9 2241,6 486,1 327,9 521,5 170,0 106,8 1612,2 332,2 230,8 377,9 126,9 82,1 1149,9
2004 969 752,7 493,5 762,9 241,8 147,6 2398,5 505,5 341,0 542,3 176,8 111,1 1676,7 335,5 233,1 381,7 128,2 82,9 1161,4
2005 969 805,4 528,1 816,3 258,7 157,9 2566,4 525,7 354,7 564,0 183,9 115,5 1743,8 338,9 235,4 385,5 129,4 83,7 1173,0
2006 969 861,8 565,1 873,4 276,8 169,0 2746,1 546,7 368,8 586,6 191,3 120,1 1813,5 342,3 237,8 389,4 130,7 84,5 1184,7
Sum 847,4 1025,3
Discount rate 7% - 6%=1%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
Discount rate 7% - 3%=4%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
30 % loss over 10 yearsNo Loss
* Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
30 % loss over 5 years
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
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Table D6 Future values of initial endowments for Investment Grants – Analyzed data & All Allocations – Mill. NOK 
 
Ad- Cum- Ad- Cum-
Total justed ula- Total justed ula- 
Alloca- Alloca-  tive Alloca- Alloca-  tive
Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum
1990 21,8 26,3 69 69 26,3 26,3 1990 329,7 398,9 312 312 398,9 398,9
1991 25,7 31,2 72 141 28,2 31,2 59,3 1991 200,5 242,6 320 632 426,9 242,6 669,5
1992 30,8 37,3 63 204 30,1 33,3 37,3 100,8 1992 248,5 300,7 325 957 456,7 259,6 300,7 1017,1
1993 34,2 41,4 86 290 32,2 35,7 39,9 41,4 149,2 1993 344,3 416,6 469 1426 488,7 277,8 321,8 416,6 1504,9
1994 100,1 121,2 178 468 34,5 38,2 42,7 44,3 121,2 280,9 1994 399,4 483,3 604 2030 522,9 297,2 344,3 445,7 483,3 2093,5
1995 468 36,9 40,8 45,7 47,4 129,7 300,5 1995 2030 559,5 318,1 368,4 476,9 517,1 2240,1
1996 468 39,5 43,7 48,9 50,7 138,7 321,5 1996 2030 598,7 340,3 394,2 510,3 553,3 2396,9
1997   468 42,3 46,8 52,4 54,2 148,4 344,1 1997 2030 640,6 364,1 421,8 546,0 592,1 2564,7
1998 468 45,2 50,0 56,0 58,0 158,8 368,1 1998 2030 685,4 389,6 451,3 584,3 633,5 2744,2
1999 468 48,4 53,5 59,9 62,1 169,9 393,9 1999 2030 733,4 416,9 482,9 625,2 677,9 2936,3
2000 468 51,8 57,3 64,1 66,5 181,8 421,5 2000 2030 784,8 446,1 516,7 668,9 725,3 3141,8
2001 468 55,4 61,3 68,6 71,1 194,6 451,0 2001 2030 839,7 477,3 552,9 715,8 776,1 3361,7
2002 468 59,3 65,6 73,4 76,1 208,2 482,6 2002 2030 898,5 510,7 591,6 765,9 830,4 3597,1
2003 468 63,4 70,2 78,6 81,4 222,8 516,3 2003 2030 961,4 546,5 633,0 819,5 888,5 3848,9
2004 468 67,9 75,1 84,1 87,1 238,4 552,5 2004 2030 1028,7 584,7 677,3 876,8 950,7 4118,3
2005 468 72,6 80,3 90,0 93,2 255,0 591,2 2005 2030 1100,7 625,7 724,7 938,2 1017,3 4406,6
2006  468 77,7 86,0 96,3 99,7 272,9 632,5 2006  2030 1177,7 669,5 775,5 1003,9 1088,5 4715,0
Sum 212,7 257,4 Sum 1522,5 1842,2
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
* Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
Analyzed data
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
* Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
All data
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Table D7 Future values of initial endowments for combined Venture Loans and Investment Grants – Analyzed data – Mill. NOK 
 
Ad- Cum- Ad-
Total justed ula- Total justed
Alloca- Alloca-  tive Alloca- Alloca-
Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum tions tions * 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum
1990 99,0 119,8 121 121 119,8 119,8 119,8 119,8 119,8 119,8 212,69 257,4 257,4 257,4
1991 82,0 99,3 111 232 128,2 99,3 227,5 124,6 99,3 223,9 121,0 99,3 220,3 61,42 74,3 275,4 74,3 349,7
1992 52,4 63,4 71 303 137,2 106,2 63,4 306,8 129,6 103,2 63,4 296,3 122,2 100,3 63,4 285,9 60,94 73,7 294,6 79,5 73,7 447,9
1993 21,4 25,9 34 337 146,8 113,7 67,9 25,9 354,2 134,8 107,4 66,0 25,9 334,0 123,5 101,3 64,1 25,9 314,7 36,53 44,2 315,3 85,1 78,9 44,2 523,5
1994 23,0 27,8 36 373 157,1 121,6 72,6 27,7 27,8 406,8 140,2 111,7 68,6 26,9 27,8 375,2 124,7 102,3 64,7 26,1 27,8 345,6 13,07 15,8 337,3 91,0 84,4 47,3 15,8 575,9
1995 373 168,1 130,1 77,7 29,6 29,8 435,3 145,8 116,1 71,3 28,0 28,9 390,2 125,9 103,3 65,4 26,4 28,1 349,1 361,0 97,4 90,3 50,6 16,9 616,2
1996  373 179,8 139,2 83,1 31,7 31,9 465,8 151,6 120,8 74,2 29,1 30,1 405,8 127,2 104,3 66,0 26,7 28,4 352,6 386,2 104,2 96,7 54,1 18,1 659,4
1997 373 192,4 149,0 89,0 33,9 34,1 498,4 157,7 125,6 77,2 30,3 31,3 422,0 128,5 105,4 66,7 26,9 28,7 356,1 413,3 111,5 103,4 57,9 19,4 705,5
1998 373 205,9 159,4 95,2 36,3 36,5 533,3 164,0 130,6 80,3 31,5 32,6 438,9 129,8 106,4 67,3 27,2 29,0 359,7 442,2 119,3 110,7 62,0 20,7 754,9
1999  373 220,3 170,6 101,9 38,8 39,0 570,6 170,6 135,9 83,5 32,7 33,9 456,5 131,1 107,5 68,0 27,5 29,2 363,3 473,1 127,7 118,4 66,3 22,2 807,8
2000 373 235,7 182,5 109,0 41,6 41,8 610,5 177,4 141,3 86,8 34,1 35,2 474,7 132,4 108,6 68,7 27,7 29,5 366,9 506,3 136,6 126,7 71,0 23,7 864,3
2001 373 252,2 195,3 116,6 44,5 44,7 653,3 184,5 146,9 90,3 35,4 36,6 493,7 133,7 109,7 69,4 28,0 29,8 370,6 541,7 146,2 135,6 75,9 25,4 924,8
2002 373 269,9 208,9 124,8 47,6 47,8 699,0 191,8 152,8 93,9 36,8 38,1 513,5 135,0 110,8 70,1 28,3 30,1 374,3 579,6 156,4 145,1 81,3 27,2 989,5
2003 373 288,8 223,6 133,5 50,9 51,2 747,9 199,5 158,9 97,6 38,3 39,6 534,0 136,4 111,9 70,8 28,6 30,4 378,0 620,2 167,4 155,2 87,0 29,1 1058,8
2004 373 309,0 239,2 142,9 54,5 54,7 800,3 207,5 165,3 101,6 39,8 41,2 555,4 137,7 113,0 71,5 28,9 30,7 381,8 663,6 179,1 166,1 93,0 31,1 1132,9
2005 373 330,6 256,0 152,9 58,3 58,6 856,3 215,8 171,9 105,6 41,4 42,8 577,6 139,1 114,1 72,2 29,2 31,0 385,6 710,1 191,6 177,7 99,5 33,3 1212,2
2006 373 353,7 273,9 163,6 62,4 62,7 916,2 224,4 178,8 109,8 43,1 44,6 600,7 140,5 115,2 72,9 29,5 31,4 389,5 759,8 205,0 190,1 106,5 35,6 1297,1
Sum 277,9 336,2 384,6 456,4
Investment Grant Part
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
* Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
Regional Venture Capital Loans Part
No Loss 30 % loss over 10 years 30 % loss over 5 years No Loss
Assumed discount rate 7% Discount rate 7% - 3%=4%
Future values for different Future values for different Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK starting poins - Mill. NOK starting poins - Mill. NOK
Discount rate 7% - 6%=1%
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Table D8 Future values of initial endowments for combined Venture Loans and Investment Grants – Analyzed data – Mill. NOK 
 
 
 
Ad- Cum- Ad-
Total justed ula- Total justed
Alloca- Alloca-  tive Alloca- Alloca-
Year tions tions * N N 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum tions tions * 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Sum
1990 312,0 377,5 359 359 377,5 377,5 377,5 377,5 377,5 377,5 229,2 277,4 277,4 277,4
1991 269,9 326,5 328 687 404,0 326,5 730,5 392,6 326,5 719,2 381,3 326,5 707,9 196,1 237,3 296,8 237,3 534,1
1992 267,6 323,8 269 956 432,2 349,4 323,8 1105,5 408,3 339,6 323,8 1071,8 385,1 329,8 323,8 1038,8 172,0 208,1 317,6 253,9 208,1 779,6
1993 134,9 163,2 186 1142 462,5 373,9 346,5 163,2 1346,1 424,7 353,2 336,8 163,2 1277,9 389,0 333,1 327,1 163,2 1212,4 97,8 118,3 339,8 271,7 222,6 118,3 952,4
1994 129,6 156,9 112 1254 494,9 400,0 370,8 174,7 156,9 1597,2 441,7 367,3 350,3 169,8 156,9 1485,9 392,9 336,4 330,3 164,9 156,9 1381,4 106,5 128,8 363,6 290,7 238,2 126,6 128,8 1147,9
1995 1254 529,5 428,0 396,7 186,9 167,8 1709,0 459,3 382,0 364,3 176,6 163,1 1545,3 396,8 339,8 333,6 166,5 158,4 1395,2 389,0 311,1 254,9 135,4 137,8 1228,3
1996 1254 566,6 458,0 424,5 200,0 179,6 1828,6 477,7 397,3 378,8 183,6 169,7 1607,1 400,8 343,2 337,0 168,2 160,0 1409,1 416,3 332,9 272,7 144,9 147,5 1314,3
1997 1254 606,2 490,1 454,2 214,0 192,2 1956,6 496,8 413,2 394,0 191,0 176,4 1671,4 404,8 346,6 340,4 169,9 161,6 1423,2 445,4 356,2 291,8 155,1 157,8 1406,3
1998 1254 648,7 524,4 486,0 229,0 205,6 2093,6 516,7 429,7 409,8 198,6 183,5 1738,2 408,8 350,1 343,8 171,6 163,2 1437,5 476,6 381,1 312,2 165,9 168,9 1504,7
1999 1254 694,1 561,1 520,0 245,0 220,0 2240,1 537,3 446,9 426,1 206,6 190,8 1807,8 412,9 353,6 347,2 173,3 164,9 1451,8 510,0 407,8 334,1 177,5 180,7 1610,0
2000 1254 742,7 600,3 556,4 262,1 235,4 2396,9 558,8 464,8 443,2 214,8 198,5 1880,1 417,0 357,1 350,7 175,0 166,5 1466,3  545,6 436,3 357,5 189,9 193,3 1722,7
2001 1254 794,6 642,4 595,4 280,5 251,9 2564,7 581,2 483,4 460,9 223,4 206,4 1955,3 421,2 360,7 354,2 176,8 168,2 1481,0  583,8 466,9 382,5 203,2 206,9 1843,3
2002 1254 850,3 687,3 637,0 300,1 269,5 2744,2 604,4 502,7 479,4 232,3 214,7 2033,5 425,4 364,3 357,7 178,5 169,8 1495,8 624,7 499,5 409,3 217,5 221,3 1972,3
2003 1254 909,8 735,4 681,6 321,1 288,4 2936,3 628,6 522,8 498,5 241,6 223,2 2114,8 429,7 368,0 361,3 180,3 171,5 1510,8 668,4 534,5 437,9 232,7 236,8 2110,4
2004 1254 973,5 786,9 729,3 343,6 308,6 3141,9 653,8 543,7 518,5 251,3 232,2 2199,4 434,0 371,6 364,9 182,1 173,3 1525,9 715,2 571,9 468,6 249,0 253,4 2258,1
2005 1254 1041,6 842,0 780,4 367,7 330,2 3361,8 679,9 565,5 539,2 261,4 241,5 2287,4 438,3 375,4 368,6 183,9 175,0 1541,1 765,3 612,0 501,4 266,4 271,1 2416,2
2006 1254 1114,5 900,9 835,0 393,4 353,3 3597,1 707,1 588,1 560,8 271,8 251,1 2378,9 442,7 379,1 372,2 185,8 176,7 1556,6 818,9 654,8 536,5 285,1 290,1 2585,3
Sum 1114,1 1348,0 801,6 969,9
Investment Grant Part
No Loss
Future values for different Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK starting poins - Mill. NOK
30 % loss over 10 years 30 % loss over 5 years
Assumed discount rate 7% Discount rate 7% - 3%=4% Discount rate 7% - 6%=1%
Regional Venture Capital Loans Part
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
Assumed discount rate 7%
Future values for different
starting poins - Mill. NOK
No Loss
* Assumed Revenue Effects due to tax financing is 21%
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Figure D1 Interest rate 1990 - 2006 
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Table D9 Calculation methods for Two-period difference-in-differences – Missing by year versus missing by pair  - 1000 NOK 
 
 Pairs Total
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err. Year Obs. Estimate Std.Err.
1989 302 151 0.00 240.361 -473.01 473.01 Before 1989 151 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Before
1990 338 187 134.27 242.180 -342.11 610.65 1990 151 204.77 148.49 -88.64 498.19
1991 338 187 -75.96 226.004 -520.52 368.60 1991 145 -25.51 171.31 -364.12 313.10
1992 321 170 139.83 266.082 -383.67 663.32 Intervention 1992 133 136.43 228.73 -316.03 588.89 Intervention
1993 311 160 576.53  293.880 -1.73 1154.79 1993 124 539.47 * 257.79 29.18 1049.75
1994 309 158 959.87 * 344.172 282.64 1637.11 1994 123 834.15 * 381.78 78.39 1589.92
1995 306 155 479.96  358.942 -226.36 1186.29 1995 119 274.11  388.43 -495.08 1043.30
1996 306 155 487.11  447.413 -393.31 1367.52 1996 119 287.21  476.36 -656.11 1230.53
1997 295 144 599.34  569.283 -521.06 1719.74 1997 114 551.15  688.50 -812.89 1915.18
1998 285 134 910.98  589.863 -250.10 2072.05 1998 107 934.03  704.42 -462.54 2330.60
1999 279 128 2037.20 * 520.143 1013.26 3061.13 1999 102 1955.67 * 693.12 580.70 3330.63
2000 275 124 1835.83 * 582.345 689.37 2982.29 After 2000 100 1734.67 * 793.38 160.44 3308.91 After
2001 266 115 1359.01 * 648.526 82.07 2635.95 2001 93 1039.36  880.34 -709.07 2787.78
2002 253 102 1356.54 * 637.585 100.85 2612.24 2002 81 219.63  695.47 -1164.39 1603.65
2003 250 99 614.49 575.237 -518.48 1747.47 2003 79 25.65  638.59 -1245.69 1296.98
2004 242 91 1284.53 * 641.128 21.58 2547.49 2004 73 707.11  736.45 -760.99 2175.21
2005 235 84 2001.74 * 598.097 823.38 3180.11 2005 67 1101.24  635.68 -167.93 2370.41
2006 228 77 2183.59 * 725.685 753.62 3613.57 2006 61 1029.48  951.18 -873.17 2932.12
938.05 679.33
1262.53 821.61
Average 1989-2006 = Average 1989-2006 =
Average 1995-2006 = Average 1995-2006 =
∗        p≤ .05
% Conf. Interval  ] % Conf. Interval  ]
Regional Venture Capital Loans
Gardner & Altman (missing by year) Pairwise Comparisons (missing by pair by year) 
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Table D9 Continued… 
 
 Pairs Total  
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err. Year Obs. Estimate Std.Err.
1989 424 212 0.00 303.253 -596.08 596.08 Before 1989 212 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Before
1990 512 300 183.46 257.301 -322.04 688.96 1990 207 330.42 188.31 -40.85 701.69
1991 549 337 112.18 254.361 -387.46 611.82 1991 209 367.24 228.62 -83.47 817.96
1992 556 344 341.63 274.301 -197.17 880.43 Intervention 1992 196 257.81 261.24 -257.42 773.03 Intervention
1993 576 364 733.69 * 305.894 132.88 1334.50 1993 196 795.01 * 282.30 238.27 1351.75
1994 574 362 1023.92 * 315.773 403.70 1644.14 1994 195 1280.31 * 325.39 638.56 1922.07
1995 560 348 874.00 * 341.334 203.54 1544.45 1995 193 1193.88 * 366.30 471.39 1916.36
1996 564 352 936.95 * 433.616 85.25 1788.66 1996 195 541.07  485.40 -416.28 1498.42
1997 546 334 1081.25  575.458 -49.14 2211.65 1997 188 398.43  675.40 -933.96 1730.81
1998 523 311 1555.02 * 578.113 419.30 2690.74 1998 179 1551.05 * 694.02 181.48 2920.62
1999 507 295 1811.97 * 734.455 369.00 3254.93 1999 173 1586.54  937.15 -263.26 3436.34
2000 487 275 2299.33 * 806.736 714.21 3884.46 After 2000 161 1466.23  965.25 -440.04 3372.50 After
2001 465 253 1579.54 * 788.704 29.66 3129.43 2001 155 1123.95  1019.23 -889.53 3137.43
2002 440 228 1015.54  795.883 -548.68 2579.77 2002 141 318.86  1005.18 -1668.44 2306.16
2003 420 208 1571.32 * 792.444 13.65 3128.99 2003 131 1015.83 * 1058.72 -1078.72 3110.39
2004 407 195 1901.06 * 865.542 199.55 3602.58 2004 123 1514.50 * 1188.69 -838.63 3867.63
2005 394 182 1397.73 789.539 -154.53 2950.00 2005 117 1403.35 1161.20 -896.54 3703.25
2006 376 164 1340.86  919.702 -467.58 3149.29 2006 106 2316.46  1179.30 -21.88 4654.80
1097.75 1027.11
1447.05 1202.51Average 1995-2006 = Average 1995-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ] % Conf. Interval  ]
Average 1989-2006 = Average 1989-2006 =∗        p≤ .05
Investment Grants 
Gardner & Altman (missing by year) Pairwise Comparisons (missing by pair by year) 
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Table D9 Continued… 
 
 
 Pairs Total  
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err. Year Obs. Estimate Std.Err.
1989 598 299 0.00 248.489 -488.02 488.02 Before 1989 299 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Before
1990 673 374 438.27 * 220.915 4.50 872.04 1990 296 520.85 * 163.70 198.68 843.02
1991 690 391 596.30 * 227.598 149.43 1043.17 1991 286 830.79 * 203.09 431.04 1230.54
1992 681 382 1049.85 * 247.518 563.86 1535.85 Intervention 1992 268 1240.03 * 244.00 759.62 1720.43 Intervention
1993 676 377 1277.25 * 274.103 739.05 1815.45 1993 259 1541.10 * 298.78 952.75 2129.46
1994 671 372 1814.07 * 309.561 1206.24 2421.90 1994 255 2071.99 * 344.03 1394.48 2749.51
1995 666 367 2309.14 * 357.225 1607.71 3010.56 1995 251 2424.55 * 400.47 1635.83 3213.28
1996 667 368 2013.32 * 424.515 1179.76 2846.87 1996 252 2042.25 * 461.97 1132.42 2952.07
1997 641 342 2175.29 * 489.538 1213.99 3136.58 1997 234 2003.50 * 596.06 829.15 3177.85
1998 620 321 2760.49 * 569.185 1642.72 3878.26 1998 220 2735.07 * 716.10 1323.73 4146.41
1999 593 294 2621.42 * 582.131 1478.12 3764.72 1999 202 2484.83 * 731.78 1041.89 3927.77
2000 579 280 2942.37 * 693.571 1580.14 4304.60 After 2000 196 3083.07 * 876.33 1354.78 4811.37 After
2001 551 252 1972.08 * 656.114 683.28 3260.88 2001 181 1713.79 * 800.06 135.08 3292.50
2002 537 238 1522.45 * 646.891 251.70 2793.21 2002 175 1166.39  818.61 -449.29 2782.07
2003 520 221 1279.49 * 641.793 18.66 2540.33 2003 165 961.39  863.08 -742.80 2665.57
2004 509 210 1420.75 * 685.671 73.64 2767.86 2004 157 822.77  960.83 -1075.14 2720.68
2005 493 194 2113.10 * 661.747 812.90 3413.31 2005 146 1727.30  973.93 -197.63 3652.22
2006 465 166 2444.49 * 766.326 938.58 3950.40 2006 124 2196.42  1235.73 -249.62 4642.46
1708.34 1642.56
2131.20 1946.78
Average 1989-2006 = Average 1989-2006 =
Average 1995-2006 = Average 1995-2006 =
∗       p≤ .05
% Conf. Interval  ] % Conf. Interval  ]
Both Regional Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grants Combined
Gardner & Altman (missing by year) Pairwise Comparisons (missing by pair by year) 
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Table D9 Continued… 
 
 
 Pairs Total  
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err. Year Obs. Estimate Std.Err.
1991 323 646 0.00 222.425 -436.77 436.77 Before 1991 323 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Before
1992 349 672 127.77 231.808 -327.39 582.93 1992 323 209.84 174.71 -133.89 553.56
1993 365 688 66.88 198.406 -322.67 456.44 1993 323 157.68 120.22 -78.83 394.19
1994 374 697 358.46 191.654 -17.83 734.75 Intervention 1994 323 413.81 * 145.79 126.99 700.63 Intervention
1995 380 703 434.07 * 196.238 48.78 819.36 1995 319 470.58 * 178.36 119.66 821.50
1996 379 702 642.50 * 209.257 231.65 1053.35 1996 317 644.22 * 196.23 258.13 1030.31
1997 369 692 675.69 * 254.292 176.40 1174.99 1997 309 535.98 * 240.18 63.37 1008.59
1998 346 669 489.10 291.506 -83.29 1061.49 1998 292 372.71 293.73 -205.39 950.82
1999 319 642 924.37 * 329.651 277.04 1571.70 1999 274 593.54  330.94 -57.97 1245.05
2000 297 620 871.71 * 376.273 132.78 1610.63 2000 260 495.29  398.92 -290.25 1280.82
2001 269 592 529.73 559.126 -568.39 1627.85 2001 235 -98.17 621.31 -1322.26 1125.91
2002 250 573 605.69 444.499 -267.36 1478.74     After      2002 221 205.01 506.95 -794.08 1204.11     After      
2003 233 556 518.75 489.980 -443.70 1481.19 2003 205 86.16 598.57 -1094.01 1266.33
2004 220 543 836.97 534.318 -212.62 1886.56 2004 193 564.25 663.85 -745.11 1873.62
2005 206 529 568.49 598.684 -607.61 1744.59 2005 182 107.07 773.81 -1419.78 1633.91
2006 188 511 443.39 657.031 -847.44 1734.21 2006 166 116.22 902.51 -1665.74 1898.19
505.85  324.95
643.13  297.81
Gardner & Altman (missing by year) Pairwise Comparisons (missing by pair by year) 
∗        p≤ .05
Average 1997-2006 = Average 1997-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ] % Conf. Interval  ]
Average 1991-2006 = Average 1991-2006 =
The FRAM Program
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Table D9 Continued… 
 
 Pairs Total  
Year Obs. Obs Estimate Std.Err. Year Obs. Estimate Std.Err.
1992 1364 2728 0.00 558.121 -1094.38 1094.38 Before 1992 1364 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Before
1993 1360 2724 458.18 582.239 -683.50 1599.86 1993 1360 463.73 * 234.52 3.67 923.79
1994 1330 2694 830.25 621.703 -388.82 2049.31 Intervention 1994 1330 842.67 * 272.36 308.37 1376.97 Intervention
1995 1288 2652 1214.54 656.764 -73.28 2502.36 1995 1288 1205.26 * 363.36 492.41 1918.11
1996 1245 2609 1847.26 * 698.991 476.63 3217.90 1996 1245 1867.65 * 418.79 1046.04 2689.25
1997 1160 2524 1930.82 * 694.840 568.30 3293.33 1997 1160 2132.66 * 475.93 1198.87 3066.45
1998 1082 2446 2232.43 * 744.199 773.10 3691.75 1998 1082 2482.83 * 532.14 1438.70 3526.97
1999 1000 2364 4008.54 * 906.567 2230.79 5786.29 1999 1000 4295.65 * 723.88 2875.16 5716.15
2000 958 2322 3636.47 * 971.249 1731.87 5541.08 2000 958 3823.20 * 892.78 2071.17 5575.24
2001 899 2263 5611.40 * 989.927 3670.14 7552.66 After 2001 899 5801.91 * 936.12 3964.68 7639.15 After
2002 829 2193 4513.24 * 1031.067 2491.27 6535.22 2002 829 4616.19 * 979.65 2693.30 6539.08
2003 772 2136 3397.61 * 1009.099 1418.69 5376.53 2003 772 3394.90 * 1001.47 1428.97 5360.82
2004 727 2091 3722.14 * 1043.948 1674.85 5769.42 2004 727 3516.42 * 1062.23 1431.01 5601.82
2005 670 2034 4058.36 * 1093.130 1914.59 6202.14 2005 670 3871.75 * 1194.39 1526.55 6216.94
2006 614 1978 4199.36 * 1150.487 1943.07 6455.66 2006 614 4139.43 * 1435.56 1320.22 6958.63
2777.37 3032.45
3731.04 3807.49
Pairwise Comparisons (missing by pair by year) Gardner & Altman (missing by year)
∗        p≤ .05Average 1992-2006 = Average 1992-2006 =
Average 1997-2006 = Average 1997-2006 =
% Conf. Interval  ] % Conf. Interval  ]
The Network Program
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Figure D2 Comparisons of calculation methods for Gardner & Altman versus Pairwise deletion 
 
Regional Venture Capital Loans Black = Garndner & Altman
Red = Pairwise deletion by year
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Figure D2 Comparisons of calculation methods for Gardner & Altman versus Pairwise deletion, Continued… 
 
 
Black = Gardner & Altman
Red = Pairwise deletion by year
Both Venture Capital Loans & Investment Grants Combined
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Figure D2 Comparisons of calculation methods for Gardner & Altman versus Pairwise deletion, Continued… 
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NHH, the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, is one of the leading business
schools in Scandinavia. Over z,7oo students are enrolled in our various programmes. We have recently
reorganised our programmes so that they follow a 3+z+3 year sequence, leading to the awarding of
Bachelor of Science, Master of Science and Ph.D. degrees respectively.
NHH has a long reputation for its high academic level and contributions to the international research
community. A large number of our faculty hold a Ph.D. from institutions outside of Norway, in
particular top US universities. This creates a diverse and stimulating academic environment.
The Ph.D. student body is made up of around 1oo men and women working within different
specialisations. The programme encourages close interaction between students and faculty in a
social/academic climate where students are regarded as junior colleagues.
The Ph.D. programme offers courses over a wide range of topics within Accounting, Economics,
Finance, Management Science and Strategy and Management. The programme aims at giving the
graduate a solid training in performing high quality scientific research in these areas, making use of
state of the art empirical and theoretical techniques. This prepares the student for emplolment in
national and international policy institutions, within research centres, business enterprises, and for the
international academic job market. The entire programme is taught in English and runs over three
years, with the first year consisting primarily of course u'ork. The next two years are then devoted to
independent research and the writing of a doctoral thesis, under the supen'ision of an advisor
appointed from the NHH faculty.
Trykk: Allkopi AS, Bergen 55 55 30 55 . w.allkopi.no
